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THE  SERIES 
"Until  either philosophers become  kings,"  said Soc- 
rates, "or  kings philosophers, States will never succeed 
in  remedying  their  shortcomings."  And  if  he  was 
loath to give forth this view, because, as he admitted, 
it might "sink  him beneath the waters of  laughter and 
ridicule," so  to-day among us it  would doubtless resound 
in folly if  we sought to apply it again in our own field 
of State life, and to assert that philosophers  must be- 
come  lawyers  or  lawyers  philosophers,  if  our  law  is 
ever to  be advanced into its perfect working. 
And yet there is hope, as  there is need, among us to-day, 
of  some such transformation.  Of  course, history shows 
that there always have been  cycles of  legal  progress, 
and that they have often been heralded and guided by 
philosophies.  But particularly  there is hope  that our 
own people may be the generation now about to exem- 
plify  this. 
There  are  several  reasons  for  thinking  our  people 
apt thereto.  But, without delaying over the grounds 
for such speculations, let us recall  that as shrewd and 
good-natured  an observer  as DeTocqueville  saw  this 
in  us.  He admits that "in  most of  the operations of 
the mind, each American appeals to  the individual exer- 
cise  of  his  own  understanding  alone;  therefore  in  no 
country in the civilized  world  is less attention paid  to 
philosophy  than in the United States."  But, he  adds, 
"the  Americans are much  more addicted to the use of 
general  ideas than the English,  and entertain a  much GENERAL INTRODUCTION  GENERAL INTRODUCTION  vii 
greater  relish  for  them."  And  since  philosophy  is, 
after all, only the science of  general ideas -  analyzing, 
restating,  and  reconstructing  concrete  experience - 
we may well trust that (if  ever we do  go at it  with a will) 
we shall discover in ourselves a taste and high capacity 
for it, and shall direct our powers as fruitfully upon law 
as  we have done upon other fields. 
Hitherto,  to be  sure,  our own  outlook  on juristic 
learning has been insular.  The value of  the study of 
comparative law has only in recent  years come  to be 
recognized by us.  Our juristic methods are still primi- 
tive, in that we seek to know only by our own experi- 
ence, and  pay  no  heed  to the  experience  of  others. 
Our historic bond with English law alone, and our con- 
sequent lack of  recognition  of  the universal character 
of  law as a generic institution, have prevented any wide 
contact  with  foreign  literatures.  While  heedless  of 
external help in the practical  matter of  legislation, we 
have  been  oblivious  to the  abstract  nature  of  law. 
Philosophy of  law has been to us almost a meaningless 
and alien  phrase.  "All  philosophers  are  reducible  in 
the end to two classes only:  utilitarians and futilitari- 
ans,"  is the cynical epigram  of  a great wit of  modern 
fiction.'  And no doubt the philistines of  our profession 
would echo this sarcasm. 
And  yet no country and no age have ever been free 
(whether conscious of  the fact or not) from some drift 
of  philosophic thought.  "In each epoch of  time,"  says 
M. Leroy, in a brilliant book of  recent years,  "there is 
current a certain type of  philosophic doctrine -  a phil- 
osophy deep-seated in each one of  us, and observable 
clearly and consciously in the utterances of  the day - 
alike in novels,  newspapers, and speeches, and equally 
'  h?. Dumaresq, in Mr. Paterson's  "The  Old Dance Master." 
in  town  and country,  u-orkshop and counting-house." 
Without some  fundamental  basis of  action, or  theory 
of ends,  all  legislation  and judicial  interpretation  are 
reduced to  an anarchy of  uncertainty.  It  is like mathe- 
matics  without  fundamental  definitions  and  axioms. 
Amidst such conditions, no legal demonstration can be 
fixed, even for a moment.  Social institutions, instead 
of being governed by the guidance of  an intelligent free 
will, are thrown back to the blind  determinism of  the 
forces  manifested  in  the  natural sciences.  Even  the 
phenomenon of  experimental legislation, which is pecu- 
liar  to Anglo-American  countries, cannot successfully 
ignore the necessity of having social ends. 
The time is ripe for  action in this field.  To  quote the 
statement of  reasons given in the memorial presented at 
the annual meeting of  the Association of  American Law 
Schools in August, 1910: - 
The need of  the series now proposed is so obvious as hardly to 
need advocacy.  We  are on the  threshold of a long period of construc- 
tive readjustment and restatement of our law in  almost every depart- 
ment.  We  come to  the task, as  a profession, almost wholly untrained 
in the technic of legal analysis and legal science in general.  Neither 
we.  nor any community, could expect anything but crude  results 
uithout  thorough  preparation.  Many  teachers,  and  scores  of 
students and  practitioners,  must first  have  become  thoroughly 
familiar  with the world's methods of  juristic  thought.  As a  first 
preparation for the coming years of  that kind of  activity, it is the 
part of  wisdom  first to familiarize ourselves with  what has been 
done by the great modern thinkers abroad -  to  catch up with  the 
general state of learning on the subject.  After a season of  this, we 
shall breed a family of well-equipped and original thinkers of  our 
own.  Our own law must, of course, be worked out ultimately  by 
our own thinkers; but they must first be equipped with the state 
of learning in the world to  date. 
How  far from  "unpractical"  this field  of  thought and research 
really is has been illustrated very recently in the Federal Supreme 
Court, where the opposing opinions in a great case (Kuhn v. Fair- viii  GENERAL  INTRODUCTION  GENERAL INTRODUCTION  ix 
mont  Coal  Co.) turned  upon  the  respective  conceptions  of  "law" 
in the abstract, and where Professor Gray's recent work on  "The 
Nature and Sources of  the Law" was quoted, and supplied direct 
material for judicial decision. 
Acting upon  this memorial, the following resolution 
was passed at  that meeting: - 
That a committee of five be appointed by the president, to arrange 
for the translation and publication of a series of continental master- 
works on jurisprudence and philosophy of law. 
The committee spent a year in collecting the material. 
Advice was sought from a score of  masters in the leading 
universities of  France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and else- 
where.  The present series is the result of  these labors. 
In the selection of  this series,  the committee's  pur- 
pose has been, not so much to cover the whole field of 
modern philosophy of  law, as to exhibit faithfully and 
fairly all the modern viewpoints of  any present  impor- 
tance.  The older foundation-works of  two generations 
ago  are,  with  some  exceptions,  already accessible in 
English  translation.  But  they  have  been  long  sup- 
planted  by  the products  of  newer schools of  thought 
which are offered in this series in their latest and most 
representative form.  It is believed that the complete 
series  will  represent  in  compact  form  a  collection  of 
materials whose equal cannot be found at this time in 
any single foreign literature. 
The committee  has  not  sought  to offer  the  final 
solution of  any philosophical or juristic problems; nor 
to follow any preference for any particular  theory  or 
school of thought.  Its  chief purpose has been to  present 
to English readers the most representative views of  the 
most modern  writers in jurisprudence  and  philosophy 
of law.  The series shows a wide geographical represen- 
tation; but the selection has not been centered  on the 
notion  of  giving  equal  recognition  to  all  countries. 
Primarily, the desire has been to represent the various 
schools of  thought; and, consistently with this, then to 
represent the different chief  countries.  This aim, how- 
ever,.  has  involved  little  difficulty;  for  Continental 
thought has lines of  cleavage which make it easy to  rep- 
resent the leading  schools and the leading  nations  at 
the same time.  Germany, for example, is represented 
in  modern  thought  by  a  preponderant  metaphysical 
influence.  Italy is primarily positivist, with subordinate 
German and English influences.  France in its modern 
standpoint is largely sociological, while making an effort 
to assimilate English ideas and customs in its theories 
of  legislation and the administration of justice.  Spain, 
Austria, Switzerland, Hungary, are represented  in the 
Introductions and the shorter  essays; but no country 
other than Germany, Italy, and France is typical of  any 
important  theory  requiring  additions to the scope of 
the series. 
TO  offer here an historical introduction, surveying the 
various schools of  thought and the progress from past 
to present, was regarded by  the committee as unneces- 
sary.  The volumes of  Dr. Berolzheimer and Professor 
Miraglia amply serve this purpose; and the introductory 
chapter of  the latter volume provides a short summary 
of  the history  of  general  philosophy,  rapidly  placing 
the reader in touch with the various schools and their 
standpoints.  The series has been so arranged  (in  the 
numbered list fronting the title page) as  to indicate that 
order of  perusal which will be most suitable for those who 
desire to master the field progressively and fruitfully. 
The committee takes great  pleasure  in acknowledg- 
ing the important part rendered  in the consummation 
of this project, by the publisher, the authors, and the 
translators.  Without them this series manifestly  would 
have been impossible. x  GENERAL  INTRODUCTION 
To the publisher we are grateful for the hearty spon- 
sorship of a kind of literature which is so important to 
the advancement of American legal science.  And here 
the Committee desires also to express its indebtedness 
to Elbert H.  Gary, Esq., of  New  York  City, for his 
ample provision  of  materials  for  legal  science  in  the 
Gary Library  of  Continental  Law  (in  Northwestern 
University).  In the researches  of  preparation for this 
Series, those materials were found indispensable. 
The authors (or their representatives)  have cordially 
granted the right of  English translation, and have shown 
a friendly  interest in promoting our aims.  The com- 
mittee would  be  assuming  too much  to thank  these 
learned writers on its own behalf, since the debt is one 
that we all owe. 
The severe labor  of  this  undertaking  fell  upon  the 
translators.  It required not only a  none too common 
linguistic skill, but also a wide range of  varied learning 
in fields little travelled.  Whatever success may attend 
and  whatever  good  may  follow  will  in  a  peculiar 
way be attributable to  the scholarly labors of  the several 
translators. 
The committee finds  special  satisfaction  in  having 
been able to  assemble in a common purpose such an array 
of talent and learning; and it  will feel that its own small 
contribution to this unified effort has been amply recom- 
pensed  if  this series will  measurably  help  to improve 
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BY JOSEPH H.  DRAKE 
I.  THE  AUTHOR  AND THE  TRANSLATOR.  Rudolf J. 
von  Ihering was born  at Aurich, in East Friesland, on 
August  22,  1818.  He was descended  from  a  long line 
of  lawyers  and  administrators.  Following  the  family 
tradition  he  studied  law,  hearing  lectures  at I-Ieidel- 
berg, Munich, Gottingen and Berlin.  He received  his 
doctor  degree from  the University  of  Berlin  in  1842, 
with  a  dissertation  entitled  "De  Hereditate  Possi- 
dente."  In the following year  he  began  work  as an 
instructor in law.  He became professor of  law at Basel 
in 1845, was called to Rostock in 1846, to Kiel in 1849, 
to Giessen in 1852, and to Vienna in 1868.  In 1871 he 
was recalled from Austria to the newly established Ger- 
man  university  at Strassburg.  After  one  year's  resi- 
dence  here  he  received  a  call  to Gottingen, where  he 
continued  to teach  until  his  death, on September  17, 
1892, declining calls to Leipsic and Heidelberg.  During 
his stay at Vienna he received his title of  nobility from 
the Emperor of  Austria. 
The first volume of "Der Zweck im Recht"  was pub- 
lished in 1877;  the second volume, not until 1883.  The 
English work here presented is a translation of  the first 
volume of  the 4th German edition, published by Breit- 
kopf and Hartel (Leipsic, 1903).  The other published 
works  of  the  author  are:  "Abhandlungen  aus  dem 
romischen  Rechts"  (Leipsic,  1844) ;  "Zivilrechtsfalle 
ohne Entscheidung"  (Leipsic, 1847;  11th edition, Jena, 
1909);  "Der  Geist des romischen  Rechts auf  den ver- 
schiedenen Stufen seiner Entwickelung"  (4 vols.,  Leip- 
sic,  1852-1865;  5th  and  6th  editions,  Leipsic,  1906- xvi  EDITORIAL PREFACE  EDITORIAL  PREFACE  mii 
07) ; "Ueber den Grund des Besitzschutzes"  (Jena, 1868; 
2nd edition, Jena, 1869) ; "Die  Jurisprudenz  des  tag- 
lichen Lebens"  (Jena,  1870;  13th edition, Jena, 1908); 
"Der  Kampf  ums Recht" (Regensburg, 1872;  17th edi- 
tion, Vienna, 1910) ; "Vermischten Schriften juristischen 
Inhalts"  (1879) ; "Gesammelte Aufsatze" (3 vols., 1881) ; 
"Das Trinkgeld"  (Brunswick, 1882;  3rd edition, 1889) ; 
"Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudence"  (Leipsic, 1885; 
10th edition,  Leipsic,  1909);  "Der  Besitzwille;  Zug- 
leich eine Kritik der herrschenden juristischen Methode" 
(Jena,  1889).  After  his  death  there  appeared  "Die 
Vorqeschichte  der Indo-Europaer"  (Leipsic,  1894) and 
"Die  Entwickelungsgeschichte  des romischen  Rechts" 
(Leipsic,  1894).  In  1852,  he established  along  with 
Gerber  the  "Jahrbiicher  fur  die  Dogmatik,"  which 
immediately  became  one of  the most  important legal 
periodicals of  Germany, a position due in great part to 
Ihering's contributions to  it. 
A sketch of  his life by Mitteis may be found in "All- 
gemeine  Deutsche  Biographie,"  Vol.  L.  A very inter- 
esting  and sympathetic  account of  him as a scholar, 
teacher  and man was  published  by  Munroe Smith in 
the articles entitled,  "Four German Jurists"  ("Political 
Science  Quarterly,"  Vol.  10, pp.  664-692  and Vol.  11, 
pp. 278-309).  A critical appreciation of  him by his pupil 
and  life-long  friend,  Adolf  Merkel,  appeared  in  the 
"Jahrbiicher  fur die Dogmatik"  shortly after his death. 
This has been translated and published  in this volume 
in Appendix  I. 
"Der Kampf ums Recht" has been translated into Eng- 
lish,  under  the title  of  "The  Struggle  for  Law,"  by 
John J. Lalor of  the Chicago Bar.  Chicago:  Callaghan 
and Company, 1879.  "Die  Jurisprudenz des taglichen 
Lebens"  has been translated by Henry Goudy, D. C. L., 
Regius Professor of  Civil  Law in the University of  Ox- 
ford, under the title of  "Law  in Daily Life."  Oxford: 
clarendon Press, 1904. 
The  translator  of  the  present  volume,  Dr.  Isaac 
Husik, is a  Ph.D.  of  the University  of  Pennsylvania. 
He  is  Instructor  in  Hebrew,  Gratz  College,  Phila- 
delphia and a Lecturer on Philosophy in the University 
of Pennsylvania, a member of  the American Philosophical 
Association, of the American Association for the  Advance- 
ment of  Science and of  the Third International Congress 
of  Philosophy,  held  at Heidelberg,  September,  1908. 
He has written  articles on the Aristotelian philosophy 
and other topics, and is well known as an authority in 
medieval philosophy. 
11.  BENTHAM  AND IHERING. TO  American lawyers 
Ihering is known as the German Bentham.  The simi- 
larities between them are due rather to the facts that 
they thought along the same lines, that each belonged 
to a  transition  period  in the legal thinking of  his own 
country, and that each suggested similar correctives for 
the legal fallacies of  his time and his environment, than 
to any direct imitation of  the English Utilitarian by the 
German jurist.  In the first volume of  "Der Zweck irn 
Recht"  it will  be noted  that Ihering  makes but little 
use of  Bentham's ideas.  In the second volume, published 
six years after the first, when he comes to a b resent at ion 
of  his own ethical theory, he cites Bentham as a com- 
mendable  type of  the earlier  Utilitarians.  He credits 
Bentham (Vol.  11, p. 133) with a very important con- 
tribution  to ethical  theory.  "Those  concepts  which 
appear but dimly in Leibnitz ('omne honestum publice 
utile, omne turpe publice damnosum'), which Kant, too, 
had before him in his  'supremely  good'  ('Weltbesten'), 
Bentham  first  recognized  with  perfect  clearness,  and, 
under  the  very  appropriate  name  of  Utilitarianism 
developed  into an independent  ethical  system."  But EDITORIAL PREFACE  EDITORIAL PREFACE 
it is evident that Ihering uses  Bentham's fundamental 
concept merely as a starting point for his own philoso- 
phy.  Taken as a point of departure, however, it is, as 
Ihering himself says, of  the greatest importance. 
Bentham's basic maxim was that the test of  right and 
wrong is the greatest happiness of  the greatest number. 
He thought that in this he had discovered a principle of 
ethical and legal  calculus by the use of  which  ethical 
norms and legal rules could be worked out which would 
have absolute validity.  "Nature,"  says Bentham, "has 
placed  mankind under the governance of  two sovereign 
masters,  pain  and  pleasure.  The principle  of  utility 
recognizes this subjection and assumes it as the founda- 
tion of  that system.  By the principle of  utility is meant 
that principle  which approves or disapproves of  every 
action whatsoever, according to the tendency  which it 
appears to have to  augment or diminish the happiness of 
the party whose interest is in question."  This doctrine 
is of  course  not new,  but in Bentham's  hands it was 
turned from a philosophic doctrine into a political device 
for the legislative  reform of  an effete legal system.  It 
commends itself for its simplicity.  Find out what rules 
are adapted to bring about the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number, adopt these rules as laws by the 
sovereign power  of  the state, and a political  and legal 
millennium  is assured. 
Though  Ihering cites Bentham's  basic concept with 
approval,  he  also  gives  in  his  criticism  of  him  the 
distinction  between  his  own  social  utilitarianism  and 
Bentham's purely subjective view.  Utility was with Ben- 
tham that which was useful to the individual, and this 
"subjectively  useful  is wrongly exalted as the measure 
and  criterion  of  the objectively  and  socially  useful." 
The good of the individual is never an end in itself but 
only a  means for accomplishing a  social  purpose.  An 
individual  may act for  his  own  happiness, but this is 
to be done not in his own interest but in the interest of 
society,  and  this relation  of  the individual  to society 
cannot  be  determined  by  "any  abstract  theoretical 
formula, but by practical  considerations."  Bentham's 
theory of  law is a purely individualistic one.  The law is 
to be invoked as a means of  securing and protecting the 
welfare  of  the individual.  This  theory  is  more  fully 
elaborated  by Mill  and the later  English  Utilitarians. 
With  Ihering, on the other hand, law is a social  force, 
created by society,  and to be used for the benefit of  the 
individual interest only in so far as the interest of  the 
individual coincides with the interest of  society. 
Bentham and Ihering are alike in espousing an impera- 
tive theory of  law, and both are brought to this not only 
by natural bent, but also even more by their reaction 
against the juristic thinking of  their times.  The  ear!iest 
incentive to Bentham's juristic  efforts came by way of 
repulsion  to Blackstone.  The doctrine of  the original 
contract had been appealed to by Blackstone to explain 
the origin of  society and law, and,  although he disavowed 
definite belief  in it, he had not shown just how much he 
really retained.  He also speaks vaguely of  a  "natural 
society"  that  apparently  grows  out of  the  expanded 
family, but closes  this paragraph  by  saying that the 
"original  contract . . . in  nature  and  reason  must 
always be  understood  and implied  in the very act of 
associating  together.''  Bentham  pounced  on this un- 
fortunate wabble  and, after  rending  in tatters  Black- 
stone's verbose contradictions, substitutes for them the 
simple  principle  of  utility,  which  furnishes  the  on!y 
clew  to guide  one  through  this  maze.  Blackstone's 
definition of  law was equally faulty.  He puts in close 
juxtaposition  a traditional and an imperative theory of 
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ment in law, poured  out the vials of  his wrath on the 
Blackstonian political optimism that lauded the system 
of common law as the most perfect conceivable one, and 
brought  our whole system of  jurisprudence  to the test 
of  expediency, insisting that all its provisions should be 
brought by legislation to conform to the wants of  men 
and to the promotion of the greatest happiness. 
As Blackstone  is  Bentham's  bdte  noire, so is  Puchta 
that of  Ihering.  Savigny, the greatest  German  jurist 
of the  first half of  the nineteenth century, reacting against 
the natural  law  concepts  of  the preceding  generation, 
had  set  forth  with  wonderful  scholarly  acumen  and 
broad  historical  grasp the idea  that  law  is,  like  lan- 
guage, an historical product of  the life  of  a people.  This 
seems to carry with  it by  implication a  sort of  legal 
fatalism.  The jurist  can  have  but little  influence in 
determining how the law is to develop.  His activity as 
an historian  is limited  to a  study of  what is and has 
been in legal phenomena and his juristic philosophy to 
a  generalization  of  the principles  which  explain  these 
facts.  Savigny, as  a practical jurist and historian of  the 
law, was  never  carried  off  his  feet  into the whirlpool 
of  juristic  metaphysical  speculation; but  Puchta,  his 
contemporary, who  was more philosopher  than jurist, 
indulged  to  the  full  the  Teutonic  tendency  toward 
abstract  generalization.  Ihering's  expressions  of  dis- 
gust with these philosophic vagaries, as uttered by him- 
self in the latter part of  his  "Scherz und Ernst" and in 
the  preface  to "Der  Besitzwille,"  remind  one of  the 
opening paragraphs of  Bentham's "Fragment  on Gov- 
ernment,"  with  his  like condemnation  of  Blackstone. 
Ihering brought "the jurisprudence  in the air" down to 
"a  jurisprudence  of  realities."  Denying  that law was 
only  a  growth  which  men  could  simply  observe and 
from the observation work out the principles which they 
saw developed, he asserted  that law was also, and pre- 
dominantly, the realization of  a purpose,  and that this 
purpose had been and could be attained only by struggle. 
Furthermore, this purpose was a social purpose and had 
for its aim the securing of  the interests of  the individual 
only so far as society recognized them. 
Neither Bentham nor Ihering was a practicd lawyer. 
To neither will the thoroughgoing  metaphysician allow 
the title of  philosopher, but to each is unanimously con- 
ceded the name of  a great legal genius.  Bentham brings 
all legal facts to a focus about his central idea that legis- 
lation  must  be  shaped with  reference to the greatest 
good  for the greatest number.  Ihering makes much of 
the proposition that the sense of right and justice must 
constantly affect the social purpose of law, and that our 
legal system must constantly be reshaped  to allow the 
exercise of this purpose.  The end and aim of  Bentham's 
life work was codification and, although he did not live 
to see the Reform Bill of 1832, it is generally admitted 
that his  life-long insistence  on  the simplicity,  possi- 
bility and supreme desirability of  law reform was one of 
the principal  instrumentalities  in  starting the making 
over of  law by legislative enactment, which has been the 
most characteristic  feature of  legal history  of  England 
during the  century  that has  elapsed since  his  death. 
The codifying activity of  Ihering was hardly more than 
an episode in his very active career.  As a conclusion of 
his  "Possessory  Intention,"  he gives us some criticism 
of  the first draft of the German Civil Code, and in the 
final draft of  that wonderful instrument a few provisions 
are conceded to have been affected by his doctrines, but 
his actual part in shaping the form of  the great German 
codification is not to be compared with that exerted by 
many of  his contemporaries. 
111.  IHERING'S  MESSAGE. Ihering's  criticism  of 
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whom he  laughingly insults by calling him the Puchta of 
the classical world -  is indicative of  his revolt against 
the juristic  tendencies in Germany in the middle of the 
nineteenth  century,  tendencies  which  are  apparently 
still  operative  in America  in  this  first  quarter  of the 
twentieth  century.  The jurist  Paulus, in his endeavor 
to systematize the law of  possession,  had  assigned  as 
the reason for the fact of  possession, the intention of the 
holder to  possess.  He gave this as the logical reason for 
the existence  of certain  anomalous  rules of  possession 
existing in the Roman law of  the classical period.  Ihering 
boldly announced that these rules had no logical explana- 
tion, but had arisen simply because of  accidents in the 
historical  development  of  the  doctrine  of  possession 
in Roman law.  Savigny had devoted his life to  the care- 
ful working out of  certain legal  principles which  in the 
course  of  history  had  been  developed  in  the  Roman 
law.  Puchta had attempted to fashion these principles 
into a philosophic  system and to crystallize them in a 
body  of  dogmatic juristic  doctrine possessing  a  philo- 
sophic validity. 
In our Anglo-American system of  jurisprudence, Coke, 
in  the  earlier  period,  and  Blackstone,  in  the  later, 
have played the part of a Paulus in their giving of  naive 
and superficial  reasons  for  the legal  anomalies  of  our 
system.  The  careful  investigation  of  the  historical 
sources of  our law and the presentation of  the results 
in  case-books  and treatises, which  have  absorbed  the 
energies of  our best English and American legal scholars 
during the life of  the past generation, have performed 
for our law a  service comparable to that rendered  to 
Roman law by the great Savigny; but we  find among 
our own historical scholars a  tendency similar to that 
found among the followers of  Savigny, to rest content 
with this historical achievement and to ignore or even 
to ridicule  the possibilities  of directing by philosophic 
prevision  the development of law in the future.  As  an 
example of  this somewhat contemptuous attitude toward 
law as it ought to be, note the disparaging reference to 
the "philosophic  jargon  of the German"  made by one 
of our most distinguished representatives of the English 
historical school of  jurists.  On the other hand, we find 
many a  Puchta among  our  American jurists,  both on 
and off  the bench, who apply the principles  that have 
been  worked  out in the development of  our Common 
Law as though they were "A priori" mathematical axioms 
and not ''A posteriori" working formulz, which  have  to 
be constantly reshaped to  adapt them to the ever chang- 
ing requirements of  a developing society. 
American juristic  thinking at the present time needs 
a  von  Ihering.  Our  jurists,  our  legislators  and  our 
courts, both bench and bar, are still holding fast to an 
historical  "Naturrecht"  built  up on the precedents  of 
the Common Law, which has many analogies to  the type 
of  juristic thinking in vogue in Germany during the first 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  All  of  our  lawyer?, 
judges and legislators who are trained in the traditions 
of  the Common Law hold with characteristic and com- 
mendable professional conservatism to the good that is 
and has been in our legal system, insisting, too, upon 
the prime virtue of  a system of  law that is certain, but 
apparently forgetting  that law is not an end in itself 
and as such to be brought to a state of  formal and static 
perfection, but that the end is the good of society.  The 
public is crying out against our crystallized and inelastic 
theory and practice of  law.  The proper  application of 
the idea of  law as purpose would, in many cases, loosen 
our legal  shackles  and  open  the way  out of  our legal 
difficulties. 
This idea of Ihering may not be the last word on the 
philosophy of law.  Possibly the criticism made by some xxiv  EDITORIAL PREFACE 
of his German successors that it is not a philosophy at 
all may be well founded.  But it certainly is an uplifting 
and inspiring idea and is not too far ahead of  our own 
prevalent juristic thinking to make the adoption of  it a 
practical  impossibility  for  us.  In those  very  difficult 
cases where our judges are confronted with the task of 
extending a principle of  law to meet a new set of  facts 
which call loudly for a remedy, if  the courts had the idea 
that the purpose of  law was to satisfy properly our chang- 
ing social demands, we  should have  fewer  reactionary 
decisions that have caused so much popular discontent 
with the law -  decisions which are justified by the courts 
handing them down, by the arguments that there are 
"no precedents" in the Common Law for them, or that 
to extend the principle will "open the flood-gates of liti- 
gation."  The days of  "  laissez faire"  in  legal matters 
have gone by in America as well  as in Germany.  We, 
too, must recognize that our historical Common Law is 
not sufficient for the demands of  present day life unless, 
by our struggles with a purpose, we can add to the law 
as it  is and has been, some of the principles of  the law as  it 
ought to be, in order to satisfy our growing social needs. 
INTRODUCTION TO THIS VOLUME 
BY HENRY  LAMMI 
The Chairmanof the Committee (may his tribeincrease!) 
because I happen to like him, persuaded me into writ- 
ing an "Introduction"  to LAW  AS A MEANS  TO AN END. 
What a judge on the bench, hard beset by his tasks and 
busy with Doe  v.  Roe and Smith v. Jones,  feeling for 
justice  if  perchance he can find it, has to do with intro- 
ducing to critical readers a book  on the philosophy of 
the law, is  an untold  story all to itself.  That he is 
likely to make a faux fiasof  so elegant a function  in 
politeness  as  an  Introduction,  will  appear  doubtless 
in  good  time and  due course,  if  you  have  patience, 
0 gentle  (but quizzical) reader. 
Those who amuse themselves analyzing  things,  who 
know what's what (which is said by one shrewd observer 
to be "as high as metaphysic wit can fly"), will be able 
without  my  help  to divide  this  introduction  into: 
firstly, a word about von Ihering, the author; secondly, 
a word or two about his'book  (and herein of  philosophy 
in general);  and, thirdly, into sundry and divers other 
heads and subheads at  will. 
A word  more in your ear, reader.  This book, taken 
up by me with diffidence and hesitation, was read under 
a glow of  fascination (as it will by you), and laid down 
with regret, because the man had evidently something 
more worth  while to say.  A  book  dealing  with  man 
(which includes what Iago called the immortal part of 
him, viz., his mind) as seen through his laws, must deal 
in speculative probabilities.  Hence you need not believe 
all you read.  You may have doubts yourself; but you 
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require that the writer believes a11  he writes and makes 
you  believe that he does, or you will  have none of  it. 
You  wag your head  and shoot out your tongue at any 
other kind of  a book on so serious a theme.  Now, von 
Ihering believes in himself  and his theories with all his 
might and main, and you will like that.  He says him- 
self:  "The  gift of  a cold  hand  is compatible with an 
ice cold heart. . . . Only the gift of  a warm hand feels 
warm."  Von  Ihering's hand was warm for mankind. 
Rudolph von Ihering, the son of  a  practising lawyer 
and thus born into the law  (a chip off  the old block), 
was  college bred  at Heidelberg, Gottingen and Berlin, 
graduating  a  doctor  juris.  Living  up  to the  title  of 
"doctor,"  teaching became his life work.  He lectured 
on Roman law at  Berlin, Basel, Rostock, Kiel, Giessen, 
Vienna,  and  then  at Gottingen, dying  there  in  1892, 
full  of  years  (the rise  of  three score and ten)  and of 
honors  many.  When  he  became  old,  he could  "read 
his history" in the eyes of  those who knew him. 
"In  appearance he  was  of  middle  stature,  his  face 
clean-shaven  and  of  classical  mould"  (as  became  a 
Roman scholar), "lit up with vivacity and beaming with 
good nature."  As those who knew him testify, so those 
who read after him must admit, that he had read deeply 
with a keen and appreciative eye as a student and lover 
of  humanity; that  his thinking, always clean and original, 
was  sometimes  daring;  that  his  theories,  formulated 
with precision  and lucidity, were asserted with boldness 
and defended with a charm of wholesome and homely wit, 
a chaste and animated vigor of  style and an uncommon 
brilliancy of  reasoning.  If  he is not a god, he is at  least 
a half-god (and a very good one at  that) in philosophy. 
TO  bring  those of  us who  read  (and  think)  only  in 
the English  tongue in contact with  this elegant trans- 
lation is permanently  to widen one's horizon and open 
a  new window  through which  the mind's eye, now and 
onward, may look down an  interesting vista.  If  he who 
two ears of  corn or two blades of  grass to grow 
where only one grew  before desems well  of  mankind, 
as we are told, surely he who gives us two ideas where 
only one existed  before is in the same class.  So much 
is  clear, I  think, and can  be  said with safety of  von 
Ihering's book. 
But  whether  von  Ihering  ranks  in  mental  stature 
as a philosopher with Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Seneca, 
Pau!,  Paley, Butler, Hobbes,  Locke, Bentham, Bacon, 
Spencer,  Darwin,  Kant,  Hegel,  Montesquieu,  Mill, 
Hamilton, may be  left  to the intelligent  judgment  of 
mankind -  it  being  true  in  speculative  philosophies 
as in puddings or clothes, viz., the proof  of  the one lies 
in  tasting and of  the other in wearing  them.  Verily, 
the reader  of  all  philosophies  must  be reminded  that 
the theories of  today are sometimes exploded tomorrow; 
that the road man has traveled is marked by the grave- 
stone of  this or that philosophy;  that what is meat to 
one age is poison to another;  that (as Marcus Tullius 
Cicero tells us)  "there  is nothing so absurd as not to 
have been  said  by some  philosopher."  And  does not 
Paul say (who was a sound philosopher and lawyer -  a 
fine  combination):  "Beware  lest  any  man  spoil  you 
through philosophy and vain deceit after the traditions 
of  men, etc."  So, the drama puts it:  "There are more 
things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of 
in your philosophy." 
To know  anything  well,  one  must  know  it  by  its 
cause  and by  its reason.  True philosophy consists in 
looking with a piercing and discriminating eye beneath 
mere surfaces and appearances,  the shell of  things, to 
the real heart, the kernel, of  the matter.  Religion has 
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its philosophy, morality has its philosophy, history has 
its  philosophy.  Philosophy  surrounds  man  as water 
does an island.  As Sir John Culpepper said of  monopoly 
in the Long Parliament, it  sups in our cup, it dips in our 
dish, it sits by our fire.  It  would be strange indeed, then, 
if  Law  did  not have  its philosophy.  It emphatically 
has.  And it levies tribute on all other philosophies, - 
on  ethics, logic,  metaphysics,  morals,  nature,  history, 
as well  as on experience -  which  latter is a  school of 
philosophy all to itself, withal having a bitter teacher. 
The philosophy of  the law overlaps  them  all, even as 
Aaron's  rod  swallowed  the  magicians'  rods.  Perad- 
venture, knowledge is not wisdom.  "Knowledge comes, 
but wisdom  lingers."  To be  a  philosopher means  to 
be a lover of  wisdom, and, by virtue of  the very term 
(all sensible men being inclined to philosophy), it fol- 
lows that when we are invited, as we are in this book, to 
go back  to the very beginning of  things  to get at the 
object and uses of law, the why  and the wherefore of 
its existence, its cause, the invitation is alluring to all 
normal  persons,  however  long  and  strange  the jour- 
ney -  doubly  so  to the lawyer and  jurist,  whose  con- 
cepts, profession and occupations are directly involved. 
Even the old man has the divine itch to inquire, to  know, 
to see, to find out.  Take Ulysses:  The poet sent him 
on his last voyage  (whereon, maybe, he would  "touch 
the Happy  Isles and see the great Achilles, whom we 
knew")  because of 
"This great spirit, yearning in desire 
To follow knowledge like a sinking star 
Beyond the utmost bound of  human thought." 
Von  Ihering's  theory,  in  outline,  is shadowed forth 
in  these  generalizations:  "The  entire  scheme  of  the 
law  is:  I exist  for myself, the world  exists for me, I 
exist  for  the world";  "Law  is not  the  highest  thing 
in  the world,  not  an end  in itself, but it is  merely  a 
means to an end, the final end  being the existence of 
society";  "Our  objective  point  is the State and  the 
Law,  our  starting  point  is  the  individual  himself"; 
"Law  is the sum of  the conditions of  social life in the 
widest  sense of  the term, as secured by the power  of 
the State through  the means of  external compulsion"; 
"The  fundamental  idea  of  the present  work  consists 
in the thought that purpose"  (human purpose?) "is the 
creator of  the entire law, that there is no rule which 
does not owe its origin to a purpose, i.e.,  to a practical 
motive.'' 
Beginning,  as do all  philosophers, at the beginning 
(even the humorous ones, like our old  imaginary friend 
Diedrich Knickerbocker in his  History of  New  York), 
von Ihering  takes egoism, self-interest, as his beginning 
point.  "Absent  egoism, there is no spring or motive 
power, and the machine refuses  to work."  Egoism is 
the egg from which all the phenomena of  the law and 
social life  have been hatched -by  evolution, as it were. 
Barter, contract, property, commerce, inheritance, self- 
denial,  self-control, duty, right,  justice,  the law,  the 
State,-one  and all sprang from egoism.  So partnerships, 
competition,  culture, schools, hospitals,  public  spirit, 
patriotism, right as against might, self-defense, and the 
splendid inventions of  money, the alphabet, exchange, 
credit,  etc., -all  came by the law of  cause and effect 
from  egoism.  The  laws  of  men  do  not  touch 
thoughts as thoughts.  However, the laws of  men have 
to do with the mind, the will, of  men.  They deal with 
the will  of  man when the purpose is once formed and 
comes into open view through some act or thing affect- 
ing another.  Do your minds meet?  Behold the contract! 
What does the contract, the document, the law, mean? 
Look for  the intent!  Is some form of  wrong  (malum xxx  INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION  xxxi 
in  se)  held  in judgment,  the inquiry is:  What was the 
intent?  For, as Justice Holmes  has pointed  out, even 
a  dog knows  the difference between  being kicked  and 
being  stumbled  over,  between  purpose  and  accident. 
Even  obedience  comes  from  egoism  in  von  Ihering's 
philosophy  (the will  of  man  first  having  been  broken 
and tamed by the iron fist of  force).  But he has some 
trouble  with  affection  and  friendship.  What  is  to 
become of  conscience  he does not tell  us.  Under  the 
glow of  his  ingenious  evolution  of  the solitary, primal 
man (say, Ab, who lived in a cave and tackled the saber- 
toothed tiger with a club, up to a  Humboldt or a Glad- 
stone  and  the modern  State), he  indulges  the daring 
speculation that as "an object is at first taken up by the 
individual, grown  larger  it is taken over by associated 
interests,  at full  size  it falls to the lot of  the State," 
so, "if  inference from the past to the future be justified, 
the State will  in  final  purpose take up within  itself  all 
social purpose." 
As  said, von  Ihering's  philosophy  begins  with  man 
as a  savage, and solves from  thence,  plus  egoism,  the 
riddles  of  law,  civilization,  government  and  social 
conditions by the rule  of  causality,  natural  evolution, 
in  which  results  spring  from  their  antecedents  inevit- 
ably  in  an endless  chain  of  causation.  Darwin  took 
von  Ihering's  primal  man and traced  him  back  to a 
monkey.  (Thereby hangs a  tale over the loss of  one.) 
Is it all  so?  Maybe -  and maybe not.  We need  not 
believe  implicitly;  but  we  are  forced  without  stint 
to admire von Ihering's bold and inquiring spirit, which, 
digging through the dust of  ages and casting doubt to  the 
wind, undertakes to read the everlasting riddle of  things 
and tell  us the story in words we  can understand  and 
with an air of  certainty and verisimilitude.  "If  the play 
of the world's  history was renewed  a thousand times," 
says Doctor von Ihering, "humanity would always come 
to the same point where it finds itself at  the present, viz., 
the law." 
Was man originally a savage, or did he retrograde into 
savagery now and then?  Is the "fall"  of  man an un- 
thinkable hypothesis?  Are the concepts of  justice, right, 
truthfulness, conscience, mercy, charity, friendship, duty, 
religion,  and all the noble precepts of  natural law and 
natural  equity,  and  moral  law,  the  result  of  a  slow 
evolution through the ages, the result of  mere cause and 
effect?  Or,  are they  of  divine  origin,  implanted  by 
his Maker in the breast of  the just man, as some of  us 
old-fashioned folks were taught to believe?  If  one were 
to say there had not been much, if  any, advance in our 
conceptions of those fundamentals since Job discoursed 
with  his three friends at the door of  his  tent on the 
plains of  Uz, or since the Sermon on the Mount, would 
that saying be quite outside the pale of  fact, or beyond 
the  realm  of  philosophy? 
Suppose some  law-giver  expelled  from  his  laws,  as 
with  a  club, the  great  primal,  natural, God-given  (as 
some of  us believe)  injunctions or concepts anent mur- 
der, theft, fraud by lying, perjury, adultery, etc., would 
they long stay out?  What says the philosophical  pre- 
cept?  Though you expel Nature as with a club, be sure 
she will  return.  Is there not some philosophical  basis 
for the theory that God, Providence, has a finger both 
in man and in his affairs?  Is it not the instinctive def- 
erence  to and  reliance  on  those  natural  equities,  as 
implanted by Heaven in the human breast, that causes 
constitutional limitations to be put on the power of  the 
legislature  to abrogate them by law?  May not juris- 
prudence be the knowledge of  things divine and human; 
the science of  the just  and unjust?  May not the law 
of  laws be to love your neighbor as yourself? -  to live INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION 
honestly,  not  to injure  another, to give  to each  one 
his  due?  So  Ulpian  put  it  and  Justinian  borrowed 
from him. 
But this is not a  disquisition.  It is  an "Introduc- 
tion,"  hence an intimation of  two sides to the proposi- 
tions maintained by our author is enough. 
In groping through the past and present,  as with  a 
candle, to find the philosophy of  law, what is the phil- 
osophical basis or point of  view, if  any, for the opposi- 
tion to much written law?  The proverbs of  the fireside 
as well  as the observations  of  philosophers  show  that 
such  exist.  For instance:  Plutarch  tells  us  that one 
of  the wise men of  Greece told Solon when he was com- 
piling his code of  written laws that he was wasting his 
time.  Written laws, said  the doubting wiseman (even 
at that early day), were mere  cobwebs through which 
big  flies  break  and  in  which  little  ones  are  caught. 
"When the State," says Tacitus, "is  most  corrupt, then 
laws are most  multiplied."  So,  Doctor Johnson:  "A 
corrupt  society  has  many  laws."  So  the  proverbs: 
As  fast as laws are devised, their evasion is contrived; 
God keep me from the Judge and Doctor;  He that goes 
to law does as the sheep that in a storm runs to a briar; 
There  is  nothing  certain about  law  but  the expense; 
In a thousand  pounds of  law there is not one ounce of 
love;  The laws are not made for the good;  The  law 
has a nose of  wax, one can twist it as he will;  The more 
laws, the least justice;  The  more laws, the more offenders; 
There is no law without a hole in it if  one can find  it 
out.  In fact,  I  recall  that one, ambitious for  power 
(even  as  Archimedes  longed  for  a  certain  lever  and 
fulcrum), declared:  "Give me the making of  the songs 
of the people and I care not who makes their laws." 
But it is  not allowed  to a man to know everything, 
and, peradventure, there may be no philosophical basis 
at all  for such  views.  In either  view  of  it,  Doctor 
van  Ihering  was justified  in  omitting  them.  It may 
be the austere  and  dry style of  most of  them, or the 
forbidding  bulk  of  law  books  may cause many to be 
frightened  into  not  reading  them.  Certainly  the 
wind  sits in that quarter.  Books, says one who knew 
them  and loved them, that you  may carry to the fire 
and hold readily in your hand, are the most useful after 
all.  A man will  often look at them and be tempted to 
go on, when he would be frightened 4t books of  a larger 
size and more  erudite appearance.  Von  Ihering's  law 
book  fills  the bill  of  Johnson's  description.  Another 
philosopher  has said:  "Some  books  are to be tasted, 
others  swallowed,  and  some  few  to  be  chewed  and 
digested."  LAW AS  A  MEANS  TO  AN  END is one  of 
those  Bacon had in mind to be chewed and digested. INTRODUCTION 
"Der  Zweck  im  Recht,"  "Law  as a  Means  to an 
End," or, to translate the German words more literally, 
"Purpose in Law," -such  is the title which Jhering gave 
to his  last great work.  In this title he  proclaimed  a 
principle, which, if  it has never been inoperative -  for 
indeed  its  constant  working  is  of  the essence of  his 
thesis -has  yet never, save perhaps by Bentham, been 
so clearly enunciated, and has been too often forgotten 
by lawyers, alike in the countries of  the Common Law 
and in those which to a greater or less extent received the 
law of  Rome.  Every art and science must needs  have 
its proper principles with which to do its work, and is 
fairly  entitled  to protest  against  unwarranted  inter- 
ference from outside, whether it be the interference of 
the plain  man, or of  an alien  department of  thought. 
But the workers in each special department are too apt 
to forget that their branch is but a branch of  the tree 
of  life and of  knowledge.  Sooner or later  the complete 
separation  of  any human activity from  other  human 
activities will  mean withering and death.  Or, in other 
words, the separation of  different departments is a divi- 
sion of  labor, and division of  labor is a form of  social 
co-operation.  Sooner or  later every  group of  workers 
must render an  account of  its stewardship, and must seek 
fresh authority from humanity at large.  The isolation 
in which  law even now  finds itself  has its counterpart 
in the separation of our Faculties of  Law from thedepart- 
ments which bear or bore such names as Arts, Humanity, 
or Literae Humaniores. 
M.A.,  B C.L.;  Fellow  of  All  Souls College, and Vinerian  Pro- 
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Whether Jhering's work which is now presented to  the 
English speaking world is a work of  legal philosophy, or 
whether he is entitled to the name of  a legal philosopher, 
is a question which may be left to  the judgment of  those 
who have framed a definition, satisfactory to themselves 
and others, of  legal philosophy.  Of  such definitions an 
abundance may be found  in an earlier volume of  this 
series2  Jhering  himself  regretted  his  want  of  early 
training  in  general  philosophy,  and  a  recent  school, 
which affects to belittle him, has taken him at  his word. 
But if  the best thought, which is not purely technical, 
on any subject may be called its philosophy, then un- 
doubtedly  Jhering  is  a  legal  philosopher  of  the  first 
rank,  the greatest thinker on law whom  Germany has 
produced since Savigny. 
And  Jhering  is something more  than a  philosopher 
of  law.  Far more clearly than the majority of  his country- 
men he grasped the essential difference between law and 
other modes of social regulation, but he saw at  the same 
time the impossibility of  a fruitful study of  law in iso- 
lation from other social factors.  His insistence on the 
positive  character  of  law  is  in  substantial  agreement 
with  the attitude  of  Austin,  but his  concern  is  with 
questions of  function rather than of  formal definition; 
and while he never loses touch with the historical method 
and  spirit, his ultimate objective is what we are accus- 
tomed  to call  censorial  jurisprudence, or the theory of 
legislation.  And even this is for him only a part of  a 
larger  theory  of  social functions.  Thus in his second 
volume he was led to turn aside from law and to enter 
on a consideration of the workings of  morality and social 
habits and customs, and to descend  even to a detailed 
discussion of  the significance of  the forms of  intercourse 
and language. 
ZBerolzheimer, "The World's Legal Philosophies.' 
Jhering's theory has a value for legal and social thought 
in the English speaking countries no less than among his 
countrymen and upon the Continent of  Europe.  But the 
form  in which  it is cast  is largely  conditioned  by  his 
intellectual environment, and the conditions of  his own 
upbringing,  from  which  throughout  his  life  he  was 
emancipating himself.  Often the English reader will be 
inclined to feel that he is unnecessarily  laboring a point, 
or dealing at  disproportionate length with matters which 
might  be  taken for  granted.  This is  partly  due to a 
thoroughness which is never content to buiid  until the 
foundations have been  completely  tested;  partly  to a 
vivid interest in details which he indulges at  the expense 
of  form  and system;  but very  often also  to the fact 
that he is making a protest against doctrines from which 
he has only by great efforts  freed himself, and of  which we 
have never felt the hold and pressure. 
Therefore  it may be  worth  while  to say something 
by way of  contrasting the very different course which 
legal  development has taken in Germany as compared 
with the countries of  the Common Law. 
In England  the law  of  the King's  Courts was not  a 
subject of  University  study.  We may trace here  and 
there the influence of  a mediaeval logic on the formation 
of  legal conceptions, we may find here and there that a 
reference  to the law of  nature will  serve  to help  an 
argument on its way, but for  the  most  part  our law 
remained,  in the ordinary  sense of  the word,  frankly 
unacademic.  In this there was enormous gain.  If  we 
lost the advantages of  method which a study of the civil 
law  gave, we  were  saved  the dangers of  putting  new 
wine into old bottles, we were saved from the importa- 
tion of  doctrines which had little to do with facts.  The 
King's  Courts and the Moots and Readings of the Inns 
were  the  Common  Lawyer's  University, -  a  narrow wxviii  INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION  xxxix 
school it may be, if  we  think of  general culture, but a 
school at  every moment in touch with practice and with 
life.  Formalism and fiction and artificiality there might 
be; but through these and by means of  these the needs of 
men were realized.  Over and over again Jhering's thesis 
might  be  illustrated  from  our  own  law.  In many  a 
development, where much  else is obscure,  the purpose 
is as clear  as daylight.  The formal reasons which  are 
given for the effect of  a common recovery in barring an 
estate tail are unsatisfying  enough;  about the purpose 
which  was at work  there can be no doubt.  How  the 
doctrine of  consideration came to be adopted is a matter 
still  of  discussion and research, but the enforceability 
of  informal  agreements  was  a  concession  to practical 
needs, and one may suspect that practical requirements 
had as much as anything to  do  with the refusal to  extend 
enforceability  in the absence of  consideration.  And  if 
we ask why our Courts drove a coach and four through 
the Statute of Uses, the true answer is not that a use 
cannot be engendered of  a use  (which even formally is 
not the whole  truth), but that Englishmen  could  not 
live without uses and trusts. 
Still, as time went on, all was not well with the Com- 
mon  Law.  It could  break new  ground;  it could  still 
in  the  eighteenth  century embody  large  parts  of  the 
Law  Merchant;  but it could not reject what was once 
a~cepted.~  The worst parts of  the Criminal Law, of  the 
law  of  evidence, of  real property, of  the law of  husband 
and  wife, were  irrevocably  fixed.  The more  the  law 
"he  movement  from  precedent  to  precedent  is  not  always 
broadening;  it may lead into the narrowest  of  blind  alleys.  It is 
one thing to see the immediate needs of  the particular case;  another 
to find a principle which will serve for the future.  Many a time the 
good sense of  our judges  has enabled them to keep the wider end 
in view;  but not always.  Often the dead past barred the way. 
showed  itself  at  variance with the needs of  modern life, 
the more inclined were its defenders to treat it as the 
prfection of  reason.  The debt which the seventeenth 
century  owed  to the formalism which  had  saved  the 
liberties  of  England  was repaid  with usurious interest 
by the complacency  of the eighteenth.  It needed  tEe 
genius of Bentham to  make men see once more that law 
was made for man and not man for law.  Since his time 
legislation has been active enough, and most of  the abuses 
against  which  he  protested  have  been  removed  or 
mitigated.  But much of  the  evil of  a divorce between law 
and the life of the community remains.  Rules and dis- 
tinctions survive which  have ceased  to have any prac- 
tical  value,  if  they  ever  had.  Law  remains  a  very 
esoteric  science.  Legislative reform has made it more 
serviceable but not more intelligible to the layman, and 
lawyers and judges  constantly immersed  in the details 
of  a  particular case rarely  have time to think of  the 
wider  purposes  for which  law  exists.  Public  policy 
has  rightly  been  described  as an  unruly  steed:  but 
sometimes there is no other; and woe to the untrained 
rider. 
Very  different  has been  the course of  legal develop- 
ment in Germany.  Without any but the most shadowy 
political unity, with no commori legislature, no common 
judicial  system, it was saved from a complete diversity 
in the development of its local laws only by the recep- 
tion of  the Roman Law.  Thus a  learned  law, a law 
taught and learned in Universities, became the Common 
Law  of  Germany, largely  superseding the native and 
local law, ready to step in, at  any rate, where the local 
law was silent. 
It  followed that the field upon which law could make 
new growth was the University rather than the Courts: 
the men "learned  in the law"  were professors or writers INTRODUCTION 
rather than judges and advocates, and the former class 
exercised an influence over its development which  it is 
hard for us,  brought up in the traditions of  judge-made 
law,  to understand.  These conditions had the advantage 
of  preserving for law a place among other liberal studies 
and fertilizing it by contact with them; but they weak- 
ened its hold upon immediate practical needs, and hin- 
dered the drawing of  any sharp line between law and the 
principles of  moral  and political science.  The Roman 
Law  texts were  largely  inapplicable  to modern condi- 
tions;  but it was assumed that a  right  interpretation 
could  find  in  them  underlying  principles  of  universal 
applicability.  And while on the one hand the eighteenth 
century system of  "natural law" or "natural rights" was 
largely a generalized statement of  principles ultimately 
derived  from  Roman  Law  as viewed  in  the  light  of 
modern usage, violence was often done to the texts in 
the desire to make them fit in with the results of  a prior2 
theory.  The philosophical upheaval  at the end of  the 
eighteenth and the beginning of  the nineteenth century 
shattered  the  basis  of  the doctrine  of  natural  rights, 
and  the  spirit  of  scholarship  and  historical  investi- 
gation, of which Savigny was the foremost representative 
in  the field  of  law, insisted on a truthful interpretation 
of  the texts,  which  in  the  long  run  was  bound  to be 
incompatible with their adaptation to the needs of modern 
life. 
The characteristic doctrine of  the German historical 
school that law is a growth determined by a somewhat 
mystically  conceived national will,  had  the immediate 
effect of  checking schemes for  codification and  legisla- 
lation.  The production  of  law  was regarded  as some- 
thing  analogous to a  natural  process, with  which  the 
legislator  could  not  and  ought  not  to  interfere;  the 
most  that might  be  permitted  to him  was  to give  a 
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clearer expression to the national will as  manifested inexist- 
i11g  practice  and  custom,  or  to apply  correctives  in 
matters of  detail.  The civilized  world  owes  an enor- 
mous debt to the historical  school  for  the services of 
brilliant and patient investigation which it has rendered, 
and which  have been continued  in  Germany and else- 
where long after its favorite doctrines had fallen to the 
ground:  and Germany has good  cause to be  grateful 
to it for preventing  a premature codification.  But its 
conception of law was bound  to be sterile of  practical 
results, above all in a country where popular participation 
in the making and application of  the law was at a mini- 
mum.  For all practical purposes the popular will had to 
be regarded as  residing in the legislator, the judge and the 
scientific lawyer (above all the latter), in whom alone it 
could find  any conscious expression.  No doubt by the 
stress which it laid on national individuality, the historical 
school  stimulated  the  investigation  of  German  legal 
antiquities, and favored  the dream  of  a  reconstruction 
and  revival  of  the native law;  and this tendency  has 
had important practical results in the modern Imperial 
Code.  But for immediate purposes  recourse was had 
again to the texts of  the Roman Law.  They were sub- 
jected  to a  critical  examination,  assisted  by  all  the 
resources  of  modern  scholarship:  leading conceptions 
were  discovered  in them, and  from  these conceptions 
the consequences must be deduced  with  rigorous logic. 
The conceptions must  be reasonable, if  not  in regard 
to practical needs, at any rate in regard  to the require- 
ments of  the  philosophy  of  law;  they must  also  be 
consistent  with  the  texts.  Extraordinary  acuteness, 
ingenuity  and  labor  were  brought  to bear  upon  the 
task, and with the most fruitful results;  it is not too 
much to say that without the work of  Savigny and his 
followers the Imperial Code of  modern Germany would 
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But it is equally true that it would have been impos- 
sible without Jhering.  For the method against which he 
revolted  was  fundamentally  unsound.  It could  only 
work  by something like a pious fraud.  Though natural 
rights were discarded, there was bound to be a reversion 
to something  like the procedure  of  the natural  rights 
school.  The fundamental conceptions must  carry con- 
viction  as in  themselves  necessary, and  they must  be 
present, or at least implied in, or consistent  with  the 
texts.  An  unconscious  juggling  was  inevitable;  you 
must put into your legal concept the results which you 
wish to get out of  it; you must put a non-natural sense 
upon  the  text  to make  it square  with  the  concept. 
Worst of  all, in the desire to satisfy the requirements of 
philosophy and scholarship practical considerations were 
forgotten or deliberately neglected.  "Law,"  says Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, a favorite pupil of Savigny, "is an object 
of pure science, and pure science is in no way concerned 
with  the  question  of  application  or  applicability."s 
In the present work Jhering has occasion to reprobate 
the teaching of Puchta that the legislator may deprive 
customary law of its enforcement in the Courts and yet 
cannot deprive it of  its character as law.  An  English 
lawyer will have no difficulty in understanding the sar- 
casm which Jhering elsewhere pours out on the "Begriff- 
jurisprudenz"  of  Puchta, when he learns that the latter 
asserted as matters of  principle the absolute inconceiva- 
bility of  a partial intestacy and of  a genuine represen- 
tation of  the principal by the agent.6 
Yet Jhering was himself brought up in this very school, 
and dedicated  the first  part  of  his  "Geist  des  romi- 
schen Rechts"  ("Spirit  of  the Roman Law")  to Puchta's 
'  Quoted by Landsberg, "Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissen- 
schaft," 111, 2, notes, 110 
Landsberg,  111, 2-453. 
memory.  Even  here one can see the beginnings of  the 
breach with his teacher.  It is one thing (as he sees) to 
have to deal with  Roman Law as existing law, another 
to understand it in its historical development; its method 
and  its history  are of  value for  all time, but the rules 
of  Roman  Law  have no universal validity.  "Through 
Roman Law  but beyond it"  is  the motto  which sums 
up in his eyes  the significance of  the Roman  Law  for 
the  modern  world.  Thus  his  outlook  was  directed 
ever  more  towards  the present  and  the future.  The 
"Spirit  of  the Roman  Law" was never finished.  More 
and  more as the work  proceeded he  felt  the trammels 
which  his  program  imposed  on  his  utterance  of  the 
thoughts  which  he  now  had  most  at heart.  In  the 
last  portion  which appeared  of  the "Spirit"  (the  first 
division  of  the  third  part)  his  repudiation  of  the 
treatment of  law as if  it were a system of  logical cate- 
gories and his conceptions of  purpose as the determining 
factor  in  law,  of  "protected  interest"  as the essence 
of  legal right, came to the front.  But he could no longer 
be  content  to expound  fundamental  doctrines  under 
the guise of  criticism of  ancient law. 
It was thus that the "Zweck  in1 Recht"  came to be 
written, a work of which  it may fairly be said  that it 
freed German  legal  thought from  the shackles of  the 
Digest and the usurpations of  philosophic systems.  Not 
but what much, incalculably much of  permanent value 
had  been  accomplished under those hard  task-masters : 
Jhering's work itself  could not have been done but for 
them.  But the time had come for a return to the reali- 
ties of  the present, and for raising  the embargo which 
Savigny had laid on legislation. 
Of  the  significance  of  Jhering's  teaching  for  the 
student of  the social sciences and for those who are con- 
cerned,  whether  as thinkers  or as practical  men, with INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION  xlv 
social  and  legislative  problems,  a  few vv01-d~  may  be 
said.  His repudiation of a "jurisprudence of concepts" 
and of  the lCwritten  reason"  of  the Roman Law as the 
last word in legal and legislative theory led him to reject 
the individualism  of  the early  and  middle  nineteenth 
century, and the stress which he laid on social utility 
gave an impulse and a  justification  to the "collectiv- 
ism"  (to use  the word  in  the wide  sense with  which 
Professor Dicey 7  has used it) which has been the most 
characteristic tendency  of  our own  time and the force 
of which is not yet spent.  That is on the face of  it the 
most  striking and immediate  consequence of  Jhering's 
doctrine.  It is  at any rate  the  practical  conclusion 
which he drew for our own time, and whether we approve 
of  it or not, it is at  least to his credit that he foresaw the 
urgency of  claims, which, when he wrote,  were barely 
beginning to make themselves heard.  For my own part, 
I believe that for present needs this "collectivist"  ten- 
dency  is justified,  and its dangers often unnecessarily 
feared and exaggerated.  But a comparison of  Jhering's 
doctrine with that of  Bentham seems to me to show that 
the principle of  social utility as conceived by Jhering is 
not inconsistent with, and indeed requires, a due appre- 
ciation of  the claims of  the individual, while Bentham's 
teaching  is  capable  of  conversion  to the  uses  of  the 
completest absolutism. 
But before I  turn to this comparison, I  should like 
to call attention  to some practical  considerations of  a 
more  general  kind  which  follow  from  Jhering's  main 
position. 
On the one hand the conception of  law as determined 
by purpose will strengthen our respect for and confidence 
in  law.  We  shall believe that for the most  part it is 
7 "Law and Opinion," Lecture IV, el  passzm. 
the outcome of  human experience and has received and 
retained its force because it gives effect to the greatest 
common measure of  human needs.  We shall be prepared 
to meet the demands for innovation or revolution on a 
common ground.  We shall not present our law as a closed 
system  of  unalterable  principles  in  which  no  breach 
may be made;  we  shall not put it forward as the per- 
fect work of  reason.  On the contrary we  shall admit 
the claim  that human  institutions must  satisfy  human 
needs.  But we  shall assert with some confidence that 
this  claim  has  never  been  wholly  disregarded  in  the 
making of  law.  We shall rely on a strong presumption 
that, at least in its main outlines, our law serves and has 
served those needs.  Where a crying evil is pointed out 
as calling for immediate reform of  the law, we shall ask 
whether it is certain that the law has not already taken 
account of  it, refused  to interfere for the good  reason 
that to do so would  be to prejudice higher and wider 
needs.  It is only in this fashion that the existing legal 
order  can  be  defended  against  rash  claims,  whether 
founded on self-interest or sympathy. 
On  the other hand, we  shall oppose no deaf  ears to 
such claims.  If  we  give up, as I believe we are bound 
to do, the notion of  natural rights in the sense of  particu- 
lar institutions to which  every system of  positive  law 
ought without regard to consequences to give effect, we 
shall not be  able to set up any rule of  law  as sacred 
and exempt from criticism and attack.  For if the belief 
in the purposive character of  law  is a justification for 
optimism,  this is no uncritical  optimism;  and it is no 
part  of  Jhering's  doctrine  that law  has  at any time 
succeeded fully in giving effect to the purposes which it 
serves, and it is no answer to that doctrine to point to 
the  fallibility of  lawyers and  legislators.  Again, it is 
true that law  would  have been  impossible if  at every INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION 
moment  it was  required  to  have  regard  to purpose. 
The purposes of  law are embodied in legal conceptions 
which must develop in independence and cannot at  every 
step be  called  upon  to conform  to particular  needs. 
Otherwise system and certainty would be unattainable. 
But this  autonomy of law, if  it were  only  because  of 
excess  or  defects  of  logic,  will  lead  to a  divergence 
between law and the needs of  life, which from time to 
time  calls for correction.  Further, the preponderance 
now  of  this,  now  of  that class in  the community  has 
led to the advancement of  purposes which are at  variance 
with  the interests of  other classes which  attain or seek 
political  power.  Lastly, changes whether  in  economic 
conditions or in opinions and ideals bring to light new 
purposes which the law, formed under other conditions, 
material or moral, is incapable  of  adequately  serving. 
Law cannot  therefore refuse at any time to submit to 
criticism any, even its most fundamental principles, if 
they are challenged on  the ground  that they  do not 
serve or have ceased to serve the needs of  mankind; it 
can only insist that the challenge shall be made good by 
proof.  How  far if  at all  the needful changes can or 
ought  to be  carried  out  by  judicial  decisions or  the 
development of  legal theory, and how far the interven- 
tion  of  the  legislator  will  be called  for, is  a  matter 
that will vary from one legal territory to another accord- 
ing to the accepted traditions as to the binding force of 
precedents,  the character  of  the enacted  law, and the 
wider or narrower liberty of  judicial  interpretation. 
Jhering stands alone, or almost alone, among German 
writers in his admiration for Bentham's work;  there is 
much  in  common  in  the qualities of  their  genius, in 
their deep but not uncritical  optimism, in their repug- 
nance to doctrines of  natural right, in their determination 
to keep in  touch  with  the facts of  life.  Both  show a 
curious trait of  what  looks like  pedantry,  Bentham  in 
his elaborate classifications and love of  coining words for 
the  purpose  of  marking  distinctions,  Jhering  in  his 
rather  naive faith in the possibility of  discovering the 
inner meaning of  a word by a reference to its derivation. 
But  these  are  mere  surface  mannerisms.  Both  are 
fundamentally at  one in their conceptions of  the functions 
of  law. 
But Jhering has two great advantages.  In the  first 
place  Bentham's  unhistorical  mind  often  made  him 
see in the past and present nothing but a record of  folly 
and injustice, and led him to believe that a new heaven 
and a new earth could be established by the recognition 
and  application  of  the  principle  of  utility.  Jhering, 
though alive to the one-sidedness of  the historical school, 
was full of  the historical spirit, and  could see that the 
principle of  utility  had always been at work, however 
unconsciously, in human  affairs.  In the second place, 
Bentham had embarrassed his doctrine by  a  particular 
and untenable theory of  the nature of  utility, the theory 
that the only purposes of  human action are in the last 
resort the pursuit of  pleasure and the avoidance of  pain, 
and had professed to establish a calculus by means of  the 
summation of  pleasures and pains, which should afford 
a criterion of  ethics and legislation. 
It was this, above all, that stood in the way of  Ben- 
tham's  recognition  in  philosophic  Germany.  What 
made him the force that he was in England and in the 
English speaking world  was not his hedonism, but his 
acute perception  of  the purposes which intelligent men 
would desire to  see carried out, and of  the reforms which 
were  necessary in  order  to carry them out.  It did not 
need  a theory  of the greatest happiness of  the greatest 
number  to convince men that humanity in the criminal 
law,  reasonable rules of  evidence,  freedom from  antiquated INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION 
restrictions on contract, would further desirable purposes. 
The calculus of  pains and pleasures was a superstructure 
which men  might  accept or reject, but which made no 
difference in the value  of  the reforms, when once men 
had grasped the idea that the law was their servant and 
not their master.  Jhering rejects hedonism and eudaemon- 
ism;  as he sees that  human nature rejects them; and 
he  finds  no short cut, like  Bentham's  calculus, to  the 
determination of  the  priorities  among  competing  pur- 
poses. 
We  must  remember  that  his  book  is a  fragment, 
and that he never lived to carry out his intention (stated 
at the end  of  Chapter  IV) of  answering the question, 
"What  is purpose?"  But if  he had done so, it seems 
probable  that the answer  to this question  would  have 
been a determination rather of  the form of  the concep- 
tion of  purpose than of  its content.  The truth is that to 
set out an order of  priority among purposes as univer- 
sally valid would be to fall back on something very like 
"natural  right";  as indeed Bentham's  greatest happi- 
ness  principle  was  unconsciously  a  reversion  to that 
doctrine.  We  cannot  measure  the value  of  ends  by 
reference  to some  other  standard,  and  therefore  the 
search for such a standard is illusory.  All that we can 
demand  is such a conception of  their relations to each 
other as will  be  consistent with men's moral conscious- 
ness.  That this consciousness differs from man to man 
may afford a problem for ethical theory; but for the prac- 
tical life of  the individual, and even more for the task 
of the legislator, the agreement far outweighs the differ- 
ences. 
In  one  sense  Bentham  is  an  individualist,  while 
Jhering's  conception is one of  social utility.  For Ben- 
tham all ends are the pleasures and pains of  individuals: 
society is nothing but a sum of  individuals, and utility 
depends on nothing but the sum of  their pleasures and 
pains.  It is true that Jhering's work as far as we  have 
it:  is so much concerned with  the exposition of  the use 
which  society makes of the egoistic motives, and in the 
showing  that  the  balance  of  accounts  between  the 
individual  and  society  shows  a  balance  of  individual 
satisfaction in his favor, that one may get the impression 
that at bottom  his social utility would  turn out to be 
nothing but a sum of  individual utilities.  It  is true that 
he  nowhere  clearly  works out  the  conception, but his 
criticism  of  Bentham  in  his  second  volume  makes  it 
clear  to my  mind  that he would  have  rejected  such a 
conclusion.  What  he  says  there  of  patriotism  seems 
inconsistent with the notion that he would have treated 
patriotism as nothing more than an interest in the wel- 
fare of  a number of  present or future individuals. 
Further, it is notorious than  in a very practical sense 
Bentham was an individualist, because he believed that 
the removal of  restrictions  would  tend  to a very great 
increase in human happiness including a high degree of 
equality in the distribution  of  wealth.  Jhering  has no 
such confidence.  It is true that he rightly  appreciates 
the value of  contract and property as levers in the social 
mechanism, but he  refuses  to approve  as a  matter of 
course  of  the  enforcement  of  every  contract  merely 
because it is a contract not subject to some specific vice: 
he approves of  guild regulations and the suppression of 
the interloper;  he is clear that the right of  property is 
founded upon, and may have to give way to considera- 
tions of  social utility.  This is a difference in the appli- 
cation of principles rather than in the principles them- 
selves, and Bentham's views on the relief  of  poverty and 
the limitation  of  the rights  of  succession  to property 
show that he was no unbending individualist.  Neverthe- 
less  for  practical  purposes  Bentham's direct  influence INTRODUCTION 
was  all  on  the side of  the  individualism  of  the early 
nineteenth century, while Jhering may fairly be reckoned 
as a herald of  the collectivism which marked its close. 
But  from  another  point  of  view  the  positions are 
reversed.  Once satisfy the Benthamite that the  economic 
assumptions  on which  his  individualism  is  based  are 
unsound, and for purposes of  practical politics that indi- 
vidualism collapses.  If unlimited  freedom of  contract 
does not make for the greatest happiness of  the greatest 
number  (and in practice material well being will be the 
main  consideration),  if  it seems likely that such well- 
being  can be increased by regulation and interference, 
then  Bentham's  utilitarianism  not  only  permits,  but 
requires that individualism shall give way to the greatest 
practicable  collectivism.  Professor  Dicey  has  rightly 
called attention to the debt of  collectivism to Bentham.' 
Now  it is certain that Jhering would have sympathized 
with the general trend of  modern legislation in this direc- 
tion and would probably have approved of  it largely in 
detail. 
It is clear that he looked with approval on the move- 
ment  which  transferred  large  departments  of  action 
first  from  individuals  to  voluntary societies and  then 
from societies to the state.  He was not prepared to set 
any limits to the increase of  state activity.  Further, it is 
clear,  from  his  criticism of  von  Humboldt  and  John 
Stuart Mill in the eighth chapter, that he sees no way to 
define a  sphere of individual  liberty within which  the 
interference  of  the State is illegitimate.  But what is 
equally clear is that he did not draw the easy conclusion 
that all rights  of  the individual must disappear in the 
last resort in the face of  the claims of  social utility.  On 
the contrary he recognizes the question of  the limits of 
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the power of  the state and the law over against the sphere 
of individual liberty as a real problem, and one which 
bars his way and which  he  cannot  solve.  He  cannot 
solve it, that is, in the sense in which the upholders of 
natural right claim to find a solution, a formula which 
shall  be  good  for all  time  and  under  all  conditions. 
And  he seems right in holding that in  this sense  the 
question is an insoluble one, that it is as he says an "ever 
fluid" question, one which will receive a different answer 
at different times  and  under  varying conditions.  But 
the admission that there is a problem is a concession of 
all that is worth preserving in  the doctrine of  natural 
rights,  namely  its insistence  on  the reality  and  value 
of  the individual.  And while he rejects its attempt to 
treat law and society as merely derivative, at the same 
time he steers clear of the tendency of  some at least of 
its critics to treat society as the only reality.  Bentham's 
doctrine, while  it on the one hand  repudiates natural 
rights and on the other looks upon  the institutions of 
society as nothing more than a machinery for increasing 
the sum total of  pleasurable sensations, puts no value 
upon the individual save as the receptacle of  such sensa- 
tions;  it has no answer, for instance, to the claim of  a 
majority to oppress a minority, if  once the majority is 
satisfied that the increase of  its pleasure will outweigh in 
quantity the pain of  the oppressed. 
It  has been said of  Jhering that with all his theoretical 
utilitarianism  he  remained  a  practical  idealist.  This 
estimate correctly emphasizes the two sides of his social 
philosophy;  but it should not mislead us into thinking 
that there  is any inconsistency between  them.  Plato 
too was  a  utilitarian, as well  as an idealist, and  his 
example should warn us against  the confusion of  utili- 
tarianism and hedonism.  In its true sense utilitarianism 
is nothing but a  refusal  to isolate any part of human lii  INTRODUCTION 
action and to consider it apart from its consequences, a 
refusal to believe that in  the last  resort ideals can be 
unrelated or hostile to one another.  It is by his insist- 
ence on this truth that Jhering's work has done and will 
continue  to do the  greatest  service  in  furthering  the 
advancement of law and legal science, and bringing them 
into a  right  relation  to  other  departments of  human 
activity and knowledge. 
All  Souls College,  Oxjord. 
October, 1913. 
AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 
The book, of which I herewith present the first half 
to the public, is an offshoot of  my work on the Spirit 
of  Roman  Law  ("Geist  des romischen Rechts").  The 
last volume of  that treatise (Part 111, division I), which 
appeared in 1865 in its first edition, concluded with the 
establishment  of a  theory  of  "rights  in the subjective 
sense."  In  it I  gave  a  definition  differing from  the 
prevailing one, by putting Interest insteadof Will at  the 
basis of  law.  The further justification and illustration of 
this point of view was reserved for the succeeding volume. 
In the course of its development, however, I soon went 
beyond  this  point  of  view.  The concept  of  Interest 
made it  necessary for me to consider Purpose, and "right 
in the subjective sense"  led me to "right in the objec- 
tive sense."  Thus the original object of  my investiga- 
tions was transformed into one of  much greater extent, 
into the object of  the present book, viz., Law as a means 
to an end.  Once this question came before me, I was 
no longer able to avoid it; it always emerged again in 
one form or another.  It was the sphinx which imposed 
its question  upon me, and I must solve its riddle if  I 
would regain my scientific peace of  mind. 
I think it necessary to make this explanation because 
it tclls the reason which prevented me from continuing 
the above work.  I cannot return to it until the present 
work  is  finished.  For me, personally,  the  latter  has 
become  my  paramount  interest, and  it has relegated 
the above work,  which  I had  formerly considered my 
life work, to a secondary place.  It is possible that the 
judgment of  the world will determine the relative value 
of  the two works differently from the way  I do.  But 
tome, personally, no choice was left between the two. AUTHOR'S PREFACE  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  lv 
The fundamental idea of  the present  work  consists 
in the thought that Purpose is the creator of  the entire 
law;  that there is no legal rule which does not owe its 
origin  to a  purpose,  i. e., to a  practical  motive.  The 
second part of  the book is devoted to the establishment 
of  this  principle,  and  to the detailed  exposition  and 
illustration of  it in connection with the most important 
phenomena  of  law.  The first part was  originally  out- 
side of  my calculation, it was wrested  from me against 
my will.  I  had  to say to niyself  that a  book  which 
intends  to make  purpose  the foundation of  the entire 
system of  law must give an account of  the concept of 
purpose.  I  should have been  glad  to borrow  it from 
others and build upon the results gained by them, but 
I was convinced that they did not give me what I was 
looking  for.  The best  thing  I  met  in  my search  is, 
according to my opinion, the discussions of  Trendelen- 
burg in his "Logische  Untersuchungen,"  (Vol. 2, 3d  ed. 
Leipzig, 1870, pp. 14 ff .), masterly in form and content. 
But the hefght and the breadth in which the problem is 
there conceived,  viz., purpose as a  world-forming prin- 
ciple, yielded nothing for the limited point af  view from 
which I had to consider purpose, viz., its significance for 
the human will.  Nor did I find anything in other writers, 
whether philosophers or jurists, which satisfied me in this 
direction. 
I  found myself  obliged therefore to attack the prob- 
lem myself.  The first part of  the work  (The Concept 
of  Purpose) is devoted to  an  attempt at its solution.  I 
had  originally  counted  on a  volume  of  moderate size 
for the two parts together.  But in the course of working 
it out, the first part alone assumed such proportions that 
I had to think of  a separate volume of  good size for it, 
and I was not even able to keep within these extended 
limits, for I found it necessary, from external considera- 
tions, in order, namely, not to let the first volume swell 
out of  all proportion to the second, to assign the con- 
cluding chapters of the first part to the second volume, 
in order to bring about an external equilibrium of  the 
two volumes. 
The problem  of  the first part placed me in a domain 
where I am a dilettante.  If I ever deplored the fact that 
the period  of my development  came at a  time when 
philosophy  was in discredit, it was in connection  with 
the present work.  What the young man missed at  that 
time  by reason  of  the unfavorable  disposition toward 
philosophy that then prevailed, could no longer be made 
up by the man of  mature age.  If, nevertheless,  I was 
not frightened away from treating a philosophical theme, 
it was because I hoped that the knowledge of  the posi- 
tive juristic  material,  in which  I  have  the advantage 
over the professional philosopher, would at least furnish 
him  with  data which  may be useful  for his purposes. 
The spell  under  which  philosophy  lay at the time of 
Hegel,  the anathema  placed  on anyone who,  without 
being trained in the subject, presumed to  give his opinion 
on philosophical  questions, the sovereign contempt with 
which  the  philosopher  of  the  Hegelian  school  looked 
down upon the man of  positive science, has fortunately 
given way to  a different disposition.  Surely not to the 
detriment  of  philohophy.  Philosophy  may  reject  or 
rectify what the philosophical naturalist brings to light, 
but his attempt to philosophize  in his domain, i.e., to 
search out universal ideas, is hardly altogether devoid of 
benefit  to philosophy, provided  only the man brings to 
his task the necessary knowledge of  his subject, scien- 
tific earnestness and an eye for  the universal.  And  I 
hope that this will prove to  be true also in my case. 
I have taken care not to  economize in the use of  illus- 
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as of  the jurist.  I made use of  every opportunity which 
presented  itself to me of  placing the particular  in the 
service of  general ideas.  For the sake of the philosopher, 
in order to bring before him the material ; for the sake of 
the jurist, in order to present to him the general idea in 
the material, and the connection of  the particuiar with 
the whole.  I  have  endeavored  at the same  time to 
present the purely juristic material in such a manner as 
to make it intelligible to the educated layman. 
I  must  be  prepared  for readers who will judge  the 
value of the work only by the particular views contained 
in it.  It is the usual standard of  the jurist in judging 
works of  his professi~n. In  a work which, like the present, 
pursues no practical or dogmatic purpose, but takes for 
its task the presentation of the whole connection of  law, 
such judgment would show the lack of  all understanding 
for the meaning of  the problem.  Its difficulty lay for 
me, after I had made up my mind regarding my funda- 
mental idea, just in the building up of  the whole, viz., 
in the discovery of  the right connection, how one thing 
is joined  to the other, in the logical articulation of  the 
individual  parts,  in  the  development  of  the concept 
unbroken by any leaps, advancing step by step from the 
simplest to the higher.  Upon this systematic or dialectic 
element I expended the utmost care, and I have for this 
purpose  touched  upon  a mass of  points and questions 
in strict logical progression solely in order to denote the 
point where they enter into the general framework of  the 
law. 
This  endeavor  after  strict  logical  articulation  is 
responsible for the arrangement of  the chapters.  Every 
chapter treats a topic complete in itself.  This explains 
the  very  unequal  length  of the chapters,  which  may 
seem very strange to one who sees in a chapter ending 
nothing more than a resting point to take breath.  Such 
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a reader may  lose  his wind in my seventh and eighth 
chapters.  But he will  find  his  chapters there also in 
another form, namely in the numbered  subdivisions into 
which  these  chapters  are divided.  They  denote  the 
articulations, or individual branches of  the fundamental 
idea to which these two chapters (Reward and Coercion) 
are devoted, and what I have just said about the strictly 
progressive development  of  the concept  which  I  have 
proposed to  myself as  a standard, applies here with special 
force. 
For the rest I refer the reader to the book itself.  There 
is only one more point on which I must add a few words. 
It is the opposition  between the 'law of  causality' and 
the 'law of  purpose' in the first chapter.  No philosopher 
of  the present day will admit such opposition, and very 
properly so.  Only one of  two things is possible.  Either 
cause is the moving force of  the world, or purpose.  In 
my opinion it is purpose.  Purpose can give forth the 
law of  causality, the law of  causality cannot give forth 
purpose.  Or, to speak  more  plainly,  the assumption 
of  a purpose in the world, which, since I am simple enough 
not to be able to think of  purpose without a conscious 
will, is synonymous in my mind  with  the assumption 
of  2 God, -  the assumption, I say, of  a purpose in the 
world posited  by  God, or of  a  divine idea of purpose, 
is quite compatible, in my opinion, with the affirmation 
of  the strictest law of causality.  Granted that the latter 
works  just  as the extreme Darwinists  teach, crushing 
inexorably what cannot maintain itself  in the struggle 
of  existence, beginning with  the Moneron and without 
any further creative act bringing forth everything out 
of  itself, progressing from one step to the other up to 
man -  still, when I set a boulder in motion on the top 
of  the mountain in order that it  may drop into thevalley, 
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in motion  in the stone?  If  cause  has been  so formed 
by purpose from the very  beginning  that in  its con- 
tinuous motion it produces one thing out of  the other, 
and finally arrives at the point which purpose has fore- 
seen and willed, is it purpose or cause which governs the 
entire motion?  When  the statue which  he  wants  to 
create stands before the mind of  the sculptor, and years 
glide by until the hand completes  it according to the 
laws of mechanics, i.  e.,  according to  the law of  causality, 
is it a work of  the hand or of  the mind?  I do think it 
is a work of  the hand in the service of  the mind.  I, for 
my part, do not presume any  judgment on the correctness 
of  the Darwinian theory, although  the very results at 
which I personally have arrived in reference to the his- 
torical  development  of  law  confirm  it to the  fullest 
extent in my sphere.  But even if  the truth of  the theory 
were as firm in my mind as a rock, I do not see how it 
would in the least disturb my belief  in a divine idea of 
purpose.  In the Moneron, which according to Haeckel 
leads with  necessity to man, God foresaw man, as the 
sculptor forsees the Apollo in the marble, or,  as Leibnitz 
has already said, "In Adam God pre-formed and willed 
the entire human race." 
The assumption  of  a  two-fold  law  in the world  of 
phenomena, of  the law of causality for inanimate creation 
and the law of  purpose for animate, is not in the least 
opposed to this conception.  Both find their unity in the 
law  of  purpose  as the highest  world-forming principle. 
Matter may obey the one, and the will the other; both 
of  them, each in its own manner and sphere, simply carry 
out the works which were imposed upon them from the 
beginning by purpose.  One  legal purpose  is produced 
out of  the other with  the same necessity  with  which, 
according to the Darwinian theory, one animal species is 
developed  from  the other.  And  if  the  world  should 
be created a thousand times as it was once created, - 
after milliards of years the world of  law would still bear 
the same form;  for purpose  has the same  irresistible 
force for the creations of the will in law as cause has for 
the  formation  of  matter.  Thousands  of  years  may 
elapse before this compelling force of  purpose  becomes 
visible in a particular point in law -  what are a thousand 
years  in  comparison  with  milliards?  Law  obeys  this 
compulsion willingly or unwillingly.  But the compulsion 
proceeds step by step.  Law knows no leaps any more 
than nature, the antecedent must be there first before 
the  higher  can  follow.  But  when  it is  once  there, 
the higher is unavoidable -  every antecedent purpose 
produces  the following one, and from  the sum  of  all 
particulars  is  produced  later,  through  conscious  or 
unconscious abstraction, the universal -the  legal ideas, 
legal  intuition, the sense of justice.  It is not the sense 
of  right that has produced  law, but it is law that has 
produced the sense of  right.  Law knows only one source, 
and that is the practical one of  purpose. 
But I must stop, in order not to anticipate the dis- 
cussions which must be reserved for the second part of 
my work.  What has already been  said will  suffice to 
meet  the attacks to which my distinction between the 
law of  causality and the law of  purpose may be exposed 
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PART I 
THE CONCEPT OF PURPOSE 
CHAPTER I 
THE  LAW  OF  PURPOSE 
5  1.  CAUSE AND PURPOSE. -  Q 2.  PROBLEM OF THE WILL 
1N THE LIVING BEING. -  $3. THE ANIMAL;  PSYCHOLOGI- 
CAL LEVER OF ITS WILL;  INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE. - 
Q 4.  THE CONCEPT OF LIFE. -  5 5.  THE VOLUNTARY PRO- 
CESS  IN  MAN:  I.  INNER STAGE. -  1.  PURPOSE;  2. RELA- 
TION OF PURPOSE  TO ACTION;  3.  THE LAW OF PURPOSE; 
4.  PURPOSE IN THE FORM OF  REASON;  HABITUAL ACTION. 
-  11.  EXTERNAL  STAGE  IN  THE  VOLUNTARY  PROCESS; 
THE LAW OF CAUSALITY. 
According  to  the  "Principle  of  Sufficient  Reason" 
nothing ever happens of  itself  ("causa  sui"), for every- 
thing that happens, every change in the world  of sense, 
is the consequence of  another antecedent change, with- 
out which the former would not have taken place.  This 
fact, postulated by our thinking, and confirmed by experi- 
ence, we  designate, as is well known, by the phrase, the 
Law of  Causality. 
$  1.  Cause and Purpose.  This law holds also for the 
will.  Without sufficient reason a movement of  the will 2  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH.  I 
is as unthinkable as a movement of matter.  Freedom of 
the will, in the sense that the will can set itself in motion 
spontanmusly  without  a  compelling  reason,  is  the 
Miinchhausen  of  philosophy, who can pull himself  out 
of  a swamp by his own hair. 
There is just  as much  need,  therefore, of  sufficient 
reason for the will as  in the processes of  material nature. 
But in  the  latter  it is mechanical,  and is called  cause 
("causa  efficiens") ;  in the will it is psychological, and we 
call it purpose  ("causa  finalis").  Thus, the stone does 
not fall in order to fall, but because it must fall, because 
its support is taken away; whilst the man who acts does 
so, not  because of  anything, but in order  to attain to 
something.  This  purpose  is  as ir,dispensable  for  the 
will as  cause is for the stone.  As there can be no motion 
of  the stone without a cause, so can there be no move- 
ment of  the will without a purpose.  In the former case 
we speak of  the mechanical law of causality, in the latter 
of  the psychological.  I shall designate the latter hence- 
forth  as the Law of  Purpose;  partly  for  the sake of 
brevity, partly to indicate in the very name that purpose 
forms  the only  psychological  reason  of  the will.  The 
mechanical law of causality, therefore, will need no addi- 
tional  description,  and  I  shall  henceforth  designate it 
simply as the Law of  Causality. 
The law of causality may now be restated:  There can 
be  no process  in  the external world  of  sense without 
another antecedent process which  has effected it, or in 
the words of  the well-known formula:  No effect without 
a cause.  The law of purpose is:  no volition, or, which is 
the same thing, no action, without purpose. 
In "Cause"  the object  upon which  the effect is pro- 
duced is passive.  The object appears simply as a single 
point in the universe at  which the law of  causality is car- 
ried  out in that moment.  In "Purpose,"  on the other 
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hand, the thing which is set in motion by it appears as 
self-active; it acts.  Cause belongs to the past, purpose 
to the future.  External nature, when questioned regard- 
ing the reason of  its processes, directs the questioner to 
look  back;  whilst  the will  directs  him  forward.  The 
answer of  the one is "quia,"  of  the other, "ut."  To be 
sure this does not mean that in Purpose the process of 
nature is reversed, which requires the determining cause 
to precede the thing determined by it.  The determining 
reason belongs here also to the present;  the determining 
cause  here  too  precedes  the  thing  determined  by  it; 
this is the idea (or purpose), which existing in the agent 
induces him  to act.  But the content of  this  idea  is 
constituted by something in the future (that which the 
agent wishes to attain), and in this sense we may say 
that in volition the practical motive lies in the future. 
$ 2.  Problem of  the  Will in the Living Being.  Where 
life in nature develops itself  into soul, there too begins 
that provision for one's own life, that self-determination 
and self-preservation which we know as  will and purpose. 
Every living being is  so  constituted as  to  be its  own keeper, 
the guardian and preserver of  itself, and nature further 
has provided that this fact shall not remain hidden from 
it, and that the living being shall not lack the necessary 
means to solve his own problems of  existence. 
Life in this sense begins in nature  with the  lower animal, 
and at the same point also begins the problem  of  the 
will.  Here, low in the scale of  life, where with the will 
appears also for the first time the indispensable motive 
-  purpose, let us try to get our first view of  volition. 
The dry sponge fills  itself  with  water;  the thirsty 
animal  drinks.  Is  it the  same  process?  Externally, 
yes;  internally, no.  For the sponge does not fill itself 
in order to do so, but the animal does drink in order to 
quench its thirst.  Who tells us this is so?  The animal THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH. I  THE LAW  OF PURPOSE 
itself.  A  well  trained  dog  will  not  drink  when  his 
master forbids him.  How is this?  Because over against 
the idea  of  the water  which  he knows can quench his 
thirst, there presents itself to him the idea of the beating 
which  he receives  when  he  drinks against his master's 
orders, -  an idea evoked  by no present sensible impres- 
sion,  but  coming  rather  as a  result  of  memory.  The 
idea of  the blows does not remove for  the dog the dry- 
ness  of  his  palate  and  that  sensible  condition  of  his 
thirst which  is  ca!led  forth thereby.  A fact cannot  be 
removed  by an idea; but an idea may and does attack 
that  which  is  similar  to it. viz., another idea, and will 
subdue it when it is stronger.  But if  the overcoming of 
the incitement to drink be  in  this case  (since it rests 
upon  the co-operation of  the memory)  a  psychological 
process, and not a mechanical one, the incitement itself, 
whether  the animal resists or yields, is  a  psychological 
act. 
$ 3.  The Animal; PsychologicalLezrer of  its Will; Influ- 
ence  of Experience.  The physical condition of  the dry- 
ness of  the palate does not therefore as such bring about 
the drinking, it does this solely by changing the physical 
and  mechanical  pressure  into  a  psychological.  This 
process  therefore does not come under  the law  of  cau- 
sality, but under that of purpose.  The animal drinks in 
order  to quench its thirst;  it forbears in order not to 
receive blows.  In both cases it is the idea of  something 
in the future which impels the animal to its conduct. 
In another  way  also  we  may convince  ourselves  of 
the correctness of  our  position.  For  whether  we  dip 
the sponge in water or in sulphurir: acid or in anything 
else, it always fills itself, even  though  the fluid  destroy 
it.  Whereas the animal,  though  taking the water, will 
reject the sulphuric acid.  Why?  Because it feels that 
the sulphuric acid  is fatal to it.  The animal therefore, 
distinguishes  between  that  which  is  beneficial  to its 
existenceland  that which is injurious;  it discriminates 
before it decides and makes use of  former  experiences. 
Right action for the animal is by no means indicared in 
instinct alone; for there is hereditary experience to guide 
him;  the animal is directed by  the experience of  the 
species as well  as by that of his  individual self.  The 
understanding of height and depth and the estimate of 
distance by the eye, his judgment of  the degrees of  heat 
of  food and drink which is beneficial or injurious and so 
on, must be learned by the young dog and cat by way 
of  failing down some step and burning his muzzle; the 
animal too must gain sense through pain.  A stick may 
fall a thousand times, and it always falls again; because 
for the stick, there is no experience.  But a dog which 
has once been deceived by a trap in the shape of  a loaf 
of  bread or a stone is  thereafter  made  the wiser.  For 
the animal, therefore,  experience is a factor; the memory 
of  what was pleasant or unpleasant, beneficial or injuri- 
ous  exists for it, and  the  practical  ability to turn to 
account such impressions for future use; hence the reali- 
zation of  purpose. 
$ 4.  The Concept  of Lzfe.  With this is most closcly 
connected  the  concept  of  animal  life.  Consciousness 
alone  is not yet life.  If  the faculty of  thought  were 
granted the stone, it would remain a stone;  the figures 
of  the external world would merely be reflected in it as 
the moon is reflected  in the water.  Even  the richest 
knowledge is not life; a book in which the secret of  the 
whole world were revealed,  though it became conscious 
of  itself, would still remain a book.  Neither is sensation 
life any more than is knowledge.  Hf  the plant felt an 
injury done it as painfully as the animal, it would  not 
yet thereby be like  the latter.  Animal  life, as nature 
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of  existence with one's own power  ("volo,"  not "cogito, 
ergo  sum");  life  is the  practical  application, by way of 
purpose,  of  the external  world to one's own existence.  The 
entire equipment of the living being:  sensation, under- 
standing,  memory,  has  meaning  only  as a  protection 
thereof.  Understanding and sensation alone would not 
be able to effect  this if  it were  not for  the addition  of 
memory.  It  is memory that gathers together and secures 
in experience the fruit of  these two, in order to apply 
such experience to the purposes of  existence. 
The will is no more dependent upon self-consciousness 
than is life;  and he who has the sense of  the inner con- 
nection  existing between  the two will justly  regard  as 
superficial and prejudiced that view of  the animal which 
would deny its purposing power the name of  will because 
of  a defective self-consciousness which  is less complete 
than man's  own.  This low view  of  animal volition is 
by no means the profound thing it  professes to  be. 
The essential characteristics of  the human will  (with 
the exception  of self-consciousness,  which  in man also 
may be wanting or pass out of  function permanently or 
temporarily), are found, as we shall see later, also in the 
animal.  And  even  the  animal's  faculty  of  thinking, 
which is presupposed in its power to  will, is incomparably 
higher than at  first sight it has the appearance of  being. 
It  is so easy to say, the idea of  a future event impels the 
animal  to action.  And  yet how  much  is involved  in 
this!  The idea of  the future means an idea subsumed 
under  the category of possibility.  The animal,  there- 
fore,  in comparing  this idea with  that of  the present 
state, proves its ability practically  to employ the two 
categories of the actual and the possible.  Similarly it 
makes use of  the categories of purpose and of  means.  It 
would not at  all be thinkable that it should will if  its 
understanding  did not control them.  I, for  my part, 
am so farfrom looking down contemptuously upon the 
will of the animal, that on the contrary I  regard it as 
worthy  of  the  highest  respect,  and  in  the  following 
chapter  I shall make the attempt to derive from it the 
scheme of  purpose in general. 
5 5.  The Voluntary Process  in Man.  Our discussion 
hitherto  has  shown  us that purpose  is the idea of  a 
future event which the will essays to realize.  This con- 
cept of  purpose, which by no means exhausts the essence 
of the latter, must suffice for the present until the progress 
of  our investigation has put us in a position to replace 
it by one that is completely adequate.  We shall operate 
with it in what follows, as the mathematician operates 
with x, in dealing with an  unknown quantity. 
Turning now to  the human will, let us confine our task 
in this chapter merely to  the proof of  the law of  purpose, 
or the principle:  no volition without purpose.  The nega- 
tive form of  this expression is: volition, the inner process 
of  the formation of  the will, does not come under the 
law of  causality; its efficient reason is not cause but pur- 
pose.  But the realization of  the will, its emergence into 
the world of sense, does come under the law of  causality. 
The former  is the internal stage of  the will, the latter 
the external. 
I. Internal  Stage:  1.  Purpose.  The internal  stage 
begins with an act of  the faculty of  ideation (representa- 
tion).  There emerges  in the soul a  picture,  an idea 
(representation) of a future possible state,  which promises 
the subject a greater satisfaction than the state  in which 
he finds himself  at the moment.  The reason why the 
idea emerges  lies  partly in the subject himself,  in his 
individuality,  his character, his principles,  his view  of 
life; partly in external influences.  That in the soul of 
the criminal there emerges the thought of  a wicked deed 
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nature; in  the soul  of  the good  man such  a  thought 
does not arise.  The same holds of  the idea of  a  good 
deed which arises in the soul of  the latter;  it would  not 
have  been  possible  in  the  former.  Thus,  the  possi- 
bility of  the first impulse to a deed is conditioned by the 
given individuality of  the subject, in whom lies the ulti- 
mate reason  for  the impulse.  The external influences, 
on the other  hand, give only  the impulse to the deed, 
the occasion  for its performance.  They indicate to us 
the point at  which the law of  causality is able to exercise 
an influence  on  the  formation of  the  will,  but  they 
indicate at the same time also the limit of  this influence. 
For as was shown above  (p. 4) in  our discussion  of  the 
voluntary  process  in  the animal,  these external  influ- 
ences have no direct power over the will;  they acquire 
such only by being converted into psychological motives, 
and not until  they are thus converted.  Whether they 
can  do this  depends  upon  the measure  of  resistance 
which they find within the subject. 
The idea of  the future state  is distinguished from other 
ideas in being practical in its nature.  It  contains within 
itself a challenge to action, it is a prefiguring of  the deed, 
presented before the will by the faculties of  ideation and 
desire.  The  acceptance  of  the  presentation  depends 
upon  the preponderance  of  the  reasons  for  the deed 
over the reasons against it.  Without such a preponder- 
ance the will  can no more be set in motion  than the 
balance can move \\ hcn there is an equal weight in both 
scales -  it is like  the  case of  the well-known  ass of 
Buridan between the two bundles of  hay.  The decision 
shows that in the judgment of  the agent the preponder- 
ance was there; every decision ("Entschluss")  is preceded 
by an antecedent balancing ("Schliessen"), i. e., a trying, 
which is  brought to  an  end by the  decision ("Entschluss"). 
2.  Relation  of  Purpose lo  Action.  The satisfaction 
which  the person  who wills promises himself  from the 
act forms the purpose of  his volition.  The act itself  is 
never  the purpose,  but only a means to the purpose 
Whoever drinks wants indeed to drink, but he wants it 
only for the sake of  the consequence which it  has for him, 
in other words, in every act, it is never the act itself we 
want, but only its effect upon us.  This means in other 
words:  in  our  action we  want  only  the purpose.  It 
might  be  objected  that  my  statement  in  the  above 
example  is true only  when  one drinks because  he is 
thirsty.  In that case, to be sure, he is not concerned 
about drinking  but  only  about  quenching  his  thirst. 
But the statement is not true, it will be said, when he 
drinks for the sake of enjoyment, for then drinking is a 
purpose,  not a  means.  When  the latter  affords  him 
no enjoyment, for example if  the wine be spoiled or is 
tasteless, he leaves off  drinking.  The illusion that the 
act itself might be the purpose has its explanation only 
in  the  circumstance that  the latter may be  connected with 
it in a two-fold manner.  The purpose may be directed 
either upon the effect which the action produces during 
the act  of its undertaking, or upon the effect which it  pro- 
duces after the termination of  the act.  Whoever drinks 
water because he is thirsty, or takes a business trip, is 
concerned  with that which  lies beyond the drinking or 
beyond the trip.  But if a person drinks wine for the  sake 
of  the enjoyment, or  takes a pleasure trip, he  intends that 
which lies in the action.  That the purpose may extend 
equally to  both needs not to be mentioned. 
3.  The Law of  Purpose.  But however the purpose 
may be combined with the act, and whatever the nature 
of  the purpose  may be,  without  a  purpose  action is 
unthinkable.  Acting,  and  acting  with  a  purpose,  arc 
synonymous.  An act without a purpose is just as much 
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We have now arrived at the point which we laid down 
above to be proved, viz., the existence of  the law of pur- 
pose.  It deserves the name of a law only if  its realiza- 
lion  is  absolutely  necessary,  and  the possibility  of  a 
deviation  or  exception  unthinkable;  otherwise  it is a 
rule,  not a law.  Has it really a claim  to that name? 
So far as I see, this can be denied only on two grounds. 
The first is that we act not only with a purpose, but also 
for  a  reason,  for  example,  because  we  are compelled, 
because  duty or the law of  the State demands it.  The 
second  is that there is also completely unconscious and 
purposeless action, for example, the action of  the insane, 
or  action  which  has become  habitual  to such a degree 
that we no longer think anything in the doing of  it. 
4.  Purpose in the Form  of  Reason.  The first objec- 
tion seems to be unanswerable.  For if  it  were groundless, 
we  should  have  to make  use  of  the particles, in order 
to, that, in order  that  ("ut"),  which  express purpose, in 
assigning the motive of  an action, and not of  the particle, 
because ("quia") , which expresses reason.  The  linguistic 
usage,  however, of  all  nations employs  both  particles 
equally. 
Let us try to see what the actual truth is about the 
particle "because."  If  one says, "I drink because I am 
thirst?,"  his statement is quite intelligible to everyone. 
If he were to say, "because it rained yesterday," no one 
would  understand  him.  Why  not?  Because there is 
no  visible connection between the reason assigned and 
the drinking.  Such a connection, however, is established 
through  the particle  "because,"  only where the phrase 
"in  order  to"  is  concealed  behind  it.  The reason  in 
action is only another form of  expressing purpose;  where 
this  is not the case  there is no action, but an event. 
"He leaped from the tower because he wanted to com- 
mit  suicide" -  here  the  term  "because"  signifies  "in 
order to."  "He  lost  his life because  he  fell  from the 
tower" -  here the particle really does signify "because." 
In the former case there was an act, here an event. 
But why do we use the term "because" instead of  "in 
order to"?  We do it preferably in those cases where the 
agent did not possess full freedom of  resolution, but where 
there was some sort of  a  constraint, whether  physical, 
legal, moral, or social.  Where this is not the case, we 
either simply communicate the fact, if  there can be no 
doubt about the purpose; or where more than one pur- 
pose may be thought of, we also indicate the purpose in 
order to assign a motive for the fact.  A person is not 
apt  to say  that he  has  given  his  children  Christmas 
presents in order to  afford  them joy, or that he has bought 
a house in order to live in it.  But if  a person has bought 
a house to tear it down, to let it, or to sell it again, he 
will, if  he wants to assign a motive, add the purpose. 
Let  us  see  now  whether  the  above  statement  will 
stand  the test.  Let us  first  take the case of  physical 
compulsion.  Where the robber deprives his victim vio- 
lently of  his watch and his purse, there is no action at all 
on the part of  the victim, but only on the part of  the 
robber.  But the threats of  the robber  determine the 
person  threatened to give,up his watch and his purse. 
The  latter  acts,  even  though  under  the  influence  of 
(psychological) compulsion.  Does he act here for a rea- 
son or with a purpose?  Doubtless the latter.  He gives 
his watch  and his purse in order to save his life.  His 
life is worth more to him than his watch, and he sacri- 
fices the less valuable in order to retain the more valu- 
able.  He may  possibly believe that submission were a 
disgrace  to his  honor and so undertake a fight with the 
robber.  Here too it is a purpose which is held in view. 
That in this case there is an actual act of  the will, and 
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jurists with their keen understanding have rightly recog- 
nized,' and it is hard to comprehend that there still are 
those among our jurists  of today for whom  this truth 
has been discovered in vain.  For if  any one should have 
an open eye for this truth, it is the jurist, to whom, if  he 
deserve this name, a practical understanding should  tell 
where  it would  lead  to if  we should deny in case of CO- 
ercion the presence of will.  In that case every one would 
be unfree who yielded to external influences in making 
his decision.  The jailer who, softened by the tears and 
entreaties of  relatives, allows the criminal, condemned to 
death, to escape, is unfree.  The cashier laying hands 
on the safe in order to furnish bread to his hungry chil- 
dren, is  unfree.  Where  would  be  the limit?  If  the 
drowning person who promises his fortune for the rope 
that is thrown to him can repudiate his promise on the 
ground that it was forced  from him  only through  the 
condition of  constraint in which  he found himself, why 
not also the traveller, who is forced on the journey  to 
submit to  higher prices than the native, or than he him- 
self  would  have  paid  at home?  Casuistry  can  easily 
put together an  entire chain of  such cases with gradually 
rising or diminishing constraint, and bid us tell at  what 
particular link of  the chain constraint  ceases and free- 
dom begins.  The law may in many such  cases deny 
the juristic validity of  an action, as the Roman law has 
done where coercion exceeds the measure of  the ordinary 
resisting power  of  man ("metus  non vani hominis,  sed 
qui  merito  et  in  hominem  constantissimum  cadat," 
4.2. 6).  But this is without significance for the question 
as to whether we are to assume an act of  will, for this 
question does not at all come before  the forum of  the 
In two words  Paulus, in Dig. 4. 2. 21,  8  5, hits the nail on the 
head:  "coactus  uoluz" -  I w~lled  because I was compelled. 
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law,2 it belongs  to psychology.  The law also declares 
immoral contracts void, but it has not yet occurred to 
any one to deny them for that reason the character of 
voluntary acts.  The State also coerces us by its laws - 
are our actions then not free because we follow the laws? 
The question  leads us to another instance in which 
cause seems to exclude purpose.  The debtor pays his 
debt.  Why?  Who would  not be inclined  to answer, 
because he owes it?  But here, too, a disguised "in order 
to" lurks behind the term "because."  Thedebtor pays in 
order to  free himself from his debt.  If  this can be done 
in another way, or if the cfrcumstances are such that the 
external ac'c of payment is juristically inadequate to the 
purpose, he does not pay.  He  who sees the determining 
reason of  the payment in the pressure of  the debt, might 
just  as well, in the case of  the prisoner  who throws off 
his chains, call the chains the reason of  the act.  If  the 
prisoner had not felt the desire for freedom, he would 
not at all have taken advantage of  the opportunity to 
get rid of  his chains.  The same is true of  the  debt.  He 
who is not pressed by it does not pay, and he who pays 
does not do  it because of  the  debt,  i.e., because of  a fact 
in the past, but on account of  the future, namely, a pur- 
psse, in order to remain an honest man, in order not to 
endanger his credit or reputation, in order not to expose 
himself to a legal action.  If we are  not always conscious 
of  these special purposes in our payments, this is a matter 
to be referred  to the chapter  on purpose in  habitual 
action (see below).  Obedience to  the laws is to  most men 
In this relation is applicable what Gaius says, 111,  194:  "Neque 
enirn lex facere potest, ut qui manifestus fur non sit, manifestus sit, 
non magis, quarn qui omnino fur non sit, fur sit et qui adulter aut 
homicida non sit, adulter vel homicida sit.  At illud sane lex facere 
potest, ut perinde aliquis poena teneatur atqui si furturn vel adul- 
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a matter of  habit, without any reflection.  They get, as 
a  rule, no clear  notion  of  the why  and  the wherefore 
until they get into temptation to transgress the law, and 
then  they  discover  after  careful  self-examination  the 
@r@ose behind every "why." 
The same  is  true  of  the  performance  of  ethical 
duties as of  legal obligations.  When  I  give alms to a 
poor man, it is not because he is poor, but in order that 
I  may help a person in need.  The signification of  the 
particle  "because"  is merely to call forth the term  "in 
order  that." 
The above deduction, which  aims essentially at the 
idea that every reason may be converted into a purpose, 
might  be objected to on the ground  that the contrary 
is just  as possible.  Instead of saying:  I buy a house in 
order io  live in it, I need only change my expression and 
say, because I have need of  it to live in.  The objection 
would  be well  founded if I  had in mind  the possibility 
of  a different form of  expression in language.  My mean- 
ing, however, is not chat every reason may be expressed 
in language as purpose, but that it really is a purpose. 
In the phrase, "have need of," the purpose concealed in 
language  comes to view again, and so in all other cases. 
The second  objection  stated  above  (p.  10)  t>  the 
absolute  necessity of a  purpose,  was the possibility  of 
unconscious and purposeless action.  The objection was 
answered even before it was raised by the proof  given 
above  (p. 6) in the case of the animal, that there is no 
need of  consciousness  in volition and hence not in purpose. 
The insane person also acts (so far as his doings may lay 
claim to this name), not without purpose.  His actions 
are distinguished from those of  the rational person, not 
by  the want  of  purpose,  but by  the peculiarity  and 
abnormity of the purpose;  and I might assert that the 
last  remnant  of  his  human  quality  as compared  with 
animality appears in this very fact that he sets himself 
purposes  which  go beyond  the purely  animal life,  and 
of which the animal would therefore not at  all be capable 
-in  the caricature the man in him is still recognizable. 
Even  habitual  action, in which we no longer do con- 
scious thinking at  all, is still purposeful action.  Habitual 
action  represents in  the life of  the individual  the same 
phenomenon  as morality and customary  law do in the 
life of  a people.  In both, the individual as well as the 
people, a  more or less clearly conscious or felt purpose 
originally called forth the action, but the frequent repe- 
tition of the same acticn from the same motives and with 
the same purpose, has bound together purpose and action 
to such a degree that the purpose has ceased to be a con- 
sciously perceptible element of  the voluntary process. 
My development  of  the law of  purpose is now  con- 
cluded,  and  as  a  result  we  carry away  with  us  the 
principle,  that volition and volition with  a  purpose  are 
synonymous terms, and there are no purposeless actions. 
Although language makes use of  this expression, it does 
not  denote  the absence  of  purpose  in  general,  but of 
intelligent purpose.  I name as an example the torture 
of  animals.  It is objectively purposeless,  i.e.,  not  de- 
manded  by any purpose in life;  subjectively, however, 
it is not  purposeless,  for  the torturer  has  a  purpose, 
namely, to feast on the torments of  the animal.  Opposed 
to purposeless  action, which  takes the wrong  purpose, 
is inappropriate action, which selects the wrong  means. 
11.  External  Stage  in  the  Voluntary  Process:  the 
Law of  Causality.  The internal stage of  an action ends 
with  the  resolution, the act by which the will  relieves 
itself of  further balancing, and puts an end to the state 
of irresolution.  Next in order comes the performance of 
the resolution -  the deed.  By means of the deed  the 
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under the rule of  its  laws.  In  place of the law of Purpose, 
the will  is now  subject to the law  of  causality-not 
merely  in the negative  sense  that it can do nothing 
against this law,  but also in the positive sense that it 
needs  the co-operation  of  the latter  to realize  itself. 
He who throws himself  down from a tower in order to 
commit  suicide  transfers the carrying out of  his resolu- 
tion to  the law of  gravity.  And if  it is only a word that 
he has to  speak, merely the word "yes,"  at the altar by 
which he enters into marriage,  he counts upon the vibra- 
tions of  the air carrying the sound to  the ear of the other 
person.  In short, every action, whatever its content, 
requires  the  co-operation  of  natural  laws.  Therefore 
the success of  every action is conditioned by the right 
knowledge and application of  these laws ("naturae non 
imperatur  nisi  parendo").  If  the  bullet  falls  to the 
ground before it reaches the goal, this fact proves that 
the person shooting took less  powder  than nature de- 
manded to  carry the bullet to  the goal.  In every action 
we have nature by our side as a servant, who carries out 
all our orders without refusal, provided these have been 
given in the right manner. 
This external action of  the will is apparently identical 
with other processes of  nature.  Whether the stone falls 
from the roof, or a person throws it down, whether the 
word or the thunder sets the sound waves of  the air in 
motion,  seems to be  quite the same from  the stand- 
point of nature.  In reality, however, it is quite different. 
The falling of  the stone and the rolling of  the thunder 
are effected by  nature itself,  by  means  of  antecedent 
causes.  The throwing of  the stone and the speaking of 
the word, on the contrary, are acts in which nature has 
no part, a force enters her dominion over which she has 
no power, -  the human will.  The human will denotes 
the limit of  her empire; where its dominion begins, hers 
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ceases.  Cause and effect, which follow each other in the 
world  of  sense like waves in endless  succession,  break 
against every human will.  Over the latter the law of 
causality  has no  power,  but only the law  of  purpose. 
The will is free in relation to nature;  it obeys not her 
law but its own.  But whereas nature has no power over 
the will,  the latter has power  over  nature;  she must 
obey the will whenever it so desires -  every human will 
is  a  source of causality  for the external world.  Thus 
the will may be designated as the end and beginning of 
the movement  of  causality in nature -  will means the 
waintenance of  one's own causality over against the exter- 
nal world. 
This independence of  the will on the law of  causality, 
or its freedom in relation to the external world, does not 
mean, however, that the will can withdraw into itself as 
into a  strong fortress, which  will  protect it against all 
assaults  from  without.  The external  world  knows  its 
hiding place and often knocks at  the gate  with rude hand, 
asking for admittance, -  nature with hunger and thirst, 
man with  threats and violence.  But if  the will  itself 
does  not open  the gate, the besieger  cannot  come  in, 
and if  a strong will guards the fortress, then the whole 
world  may storm  it, without  accomplishing  anything. 
There are no terrors and tortures which  man has not 
applied  to bend  the will;  but the moral power of  con- 
viction, the heroism of  duty, of  personal love, of  religious 
faith, of  love  of  country, have defied  them all -  the 
witnesses in blood  of  the inflexible strength of  the will 
are numbered in millions.  To be sure the witnesses of 
the weakness of  the human will  are numbered in mil- 
liards, but they do not refute our statement, for we did 
not  mean to say that external influences  cannot affect 
the will mediately  (by means of  psychological  pressure, 
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over it, or, which is the same thing, that the will is not 
under the law of causality, but under the law of purpose. 
Therefore the will  is the truly  creative  force in the 
world, i.e., the force which  produces out of  itself.  It 
does so primarily in God, and by way of  imitation also 
in man. 
The lever of  this force is purpose.  In purpose is con- 
cealed  man,  humanity, history.  In the two particles 
"quia" and "ut"  is reflected the opposition of  two worlds : 
II  quia"  is nature, "ut"  is man.  In this "ut"  he has the 
whole world in reversion, for "ut"  signifies the possibility 
which exists of establishing a relation of purpose between 
the external world and the ego, and to this relation there 
are no bounds set either by the ego or the external world. 
With "ut"  God gave man the whole earth, as  the Mosaic 
story of  creation (Genesis I, 26, 28) makes God himself 
announce it. 
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CHAPTER  I1 
THE CONCEPT OF PURPOSE  IN ANIMALS  AS 
POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR THE  PROB- 
LEM OF PURPOSE  IN MAN 
5 1.  THE  MECHANISM OF  THE  ANIMAL WILL. -  5 2.  SELF- 
RELATION IN PURPOSE. -  8 3.  REALIZATION OF THE CON- 
DITIONS OF  EXISTENCE THROUGH THE WILL. 
In the preceding chapter we have arrived at  the result: 
no volition without purpose;  but we  do not yet know 
what purpose is, for the concept with which we satisfied 
ourselves for the moment, viz., the direction  of  the will 
toward  a  future  state which  it intends  to realize,  is 
inadequate and must be replaced by a more fitting one. 
5 1.  Mechanism of  the Animal Will.  We can facilitate 
our search or make it more difficult according to  the point 
at which we begin.  We may Iook for purpose where it 
has attained its full development:  in the market of  life, 
in the varied and confusing tumult of  human endeavor. 
Here,  however, we  should  have but little prospect  of 
mastering it so readily, for in Protean fashion it changes 
its form there unceasingly.  But we  may also look  for 
it in a place where it appears in a very simple form, so 
that we cannot fail to recognize it, I mean in that stage 
where it first emerges in creation:  in  the low  stage of 
animal life.  Here we will try to take hold of  it. 
Let us therefore put the question, "What is purpose?" 
with regard to the animal.  Let drinking be the process 
in the life of  the animal, which shall give us an answer 
to our question.  We wish to know the elements which 
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The  anima!  drinks,  the  animal  breathes.  Both 
processes are  vital functions of  the animal, indispensable 
for the preservation of  its life.  Yet they are essentially 
different.  Breathing takes place invo!un  arily, it takes 
place .also in sleep1;  drinking is voluntary, and unthink- 
able in sleep.  Nature has reserved to  itself the effecting 
of  the former, which takes place altogether according to 
the law of causality; the latter she has handed over to 
the animal, and it is accomplished by an act of  will on 
the part of  the animal, i.e., it comes under the law  of 
purpose.  However imperious the incitement to drink- 
ing may be which  nature calls forth in the animal by 
means of  thirst, it may be overcome by a counter incite- 
ment that is greater;  a well trained dog will not drink 
until his master permits. 
But this means, in other words, that drinking takes 
place  in the animal in the form of  self-determination. 
Self-determination, accordingly, is the first element which 
we derive from this process. 
Why does the animal drink?  You may answer,  be- 
cause it feels thirsty.  But  we have shown above (p. 10) 
the incorrectness of  this answer.  If  drinking is really 
an act of  the will in the animal, it cannot, according to 
the law of  purpose established in the last chapter, result 
from a "because,"  but from an "in  order that." 
Shall we then have to  answer instead, that the animai 
drinks for the purpose of self-preservation?  This answer 
is both true and false.  It is true from the standpoint 
of the purpose of  nature.  In the plan of  nature as she 
has actually formed the animal organism, drinking is an 
indispensable  means for  the preservation  of  life.  But 
this purpose of nature is not at the same time that of 
the animal.  For the purpose of  nature the copulation 
of the animal is also indispensable, but when the animal 
undertakes the act it has not in view  the purpose  of 
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preserving  the species, it merely follows its impulse, it 
desires to put an end to the discomfort which it feels. 
In both cases, when it drinks and when it copulates, it 
serves the purpose of  nature, but it serves it only by 
serving  itself, i.e.,  two purposes  coincide,  the general 
purpose of  nature and the individual  purpose  of  the 
animal (Chap. 3).' 
The purpose of drinking from the standpoint of  the 
animal  is therefore  not self-preservation;  hence,  it is 
incorrect to think of  the instinct of  self-preservation as 
a  motive that influences the animal itself,  one might 
with equal right speak of  an instinct of  the preservation 
of  the species.  The animal,  which  knows  nothing  of 
its self, but only feels it, cannot have the thought of  pre- 
serving its self as  something valuable.  The motive which 
nature sets in motion in order practically to bring about 
self-preservation is a  different one,  viz., the  feeling  of 
pleasure  and of discomfort.  The discomfort which the 
animal feels when it is about to  perform an act according 
to the demand  of  nature is nature's  summons to the 
undertaking of  the act; the pleasure which  the animal 
feels when it has done what it should is nature's rcward. 
Pleasure  from the standpoint of  nature means, in every 
living being, that  it is in harmony with nature; discom- 
fort, pain, agony, means that the animal is in disagree- 
ment with nature. 
Ej 2.  Self-relation  in  Purpose.  The purpose  which 
the animal pursues in drinking is therefore not that of 
To  this opposition of  general and individcal purpose, or objective 
and subjective, I return in the second volume (first section n.  16), 
where I treat of  the teleology of  the ethical.  I designate there the 
subjective determining reason,  which is different from the purpose 
of  the objectively  ethical  (the ethical norm,),  by the terrn motive. 
The criterion of  ethical conduct is the agreement of  the subjective 
determining reason with the objective purpose of  the ethical. 22  THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH. 11 
self-preservation, but that of  terminating the discomfort 
which it feels.  The impulse to its purpose is given to 
the animal accordingly by its own inner state, it comes 
to it not from without but from within.  We have thus 
found the second element to be derived from the process 
in  question, eviz.,  the purposive  reason  residing in  the 
subject  himself,  the  inner  necessity  ("solicitation" 
["Sollizitier~n~"]  many call it) of  setting  this purpose 
to itself. 
The animal turns to the water; it knows from experi- 
ence that the water can quench its thirst.  In directing 
its faculty of  desire to the water it establishes a practical 
relation between itself and the water, and this is the third 
element  in the voluntary process, eviz.,  purpose-relation 
or self-relation.  This relation, however, expresses itself 
in the animal in the form of  a feeling of  its dependence 
upon the water, of  its being conditioned by the latter. 
It  is the same element which we shall find later (Chap. 12) 
in man as Interest. 
Purpose-relation effects the transition from the cause 
of  volition to purpose.  To  express ourselves concretely, 
the discomfort of  the animal (the condition occasioning 
volition)  calls  forth  in  it the  desire  to remove  the 
same (first beginning of  purpose).  It recognizes in the 
water  the means for  attaining  this purpose  (purpose- 
relation) ; the hitherto  undetermined  volition  acquires 
thereby a determined direction.  The expression of  the 
inner state of  the subject in this stage of  the voluntary 
process is the feeling of  dependence. 
After  the animal  has taken  the water  to itself,  the 
purpose is attained, i.e., its relation of  dependence upon 
the water has ceased.  But it has not merely ceased, it 
has  changed  into its opposite.  The water, which  till 
now had the power over the animal and determined the 
latter, has now come into the power of the animal, and 
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is determined by the latter, it has become the servant, 
i.e., the means for the animal's purpose.  The concept 
of  means consists therefore in the purposive dependence 
of  the subject upon it. 
$ 3.  Realization of  the Conditions of  Existence through 
the  Will.  Let us now combine in a formula the essen- 
tial  features  resulting  from  our  consideration  of  the 
voluntary process in the animal, adding thereto the ele- 
ment  of  the external  deed  discussed  above  (p.  16). 
Our formula will  then  be:  (1) the removal  of  (2) the 
inner  feeling  of  dependence  (3)  through  one's  own 
power  (4)  by means of  acting upon the world  of  sen- 
sible matter.  The third  and  fourth  elements  of  this 
formula  (self-determination and external deed) have no 
further interest for our purpose of  comparing the volun- 
tary process in man with  that of  the animal;  the first 
and  second,  however,  are  extremely  important.  In 
these two seems to be contained the principle that the 
reason and the purpose of  the will reside in the animaI 
itself, the movement of  the will starts from the animal 
and returns to it again; in other words, the animal does 
everything for its own sake. 
Is this principle  true?2  It has been  derived  from a 
process where  it fits,  but  there are in the life of  the 
animal other processes to which it does not apply.  The 
animal feeds and protects its young, and many even risk 
their lives for them.  The animal therefore acts not only 
for  itself  but also  for  others.  Our  formula  therefore 
which  represents  the animal  as acting  for  itself, and 
thus realizing nature's  purpose of  its self-preservation, 
does  not  by any means  exhaust  the essence and  the 
function  of  the animal  will  in  the  plan  of  creation. 
Nevertheless  we  shall  for  the present  adhere  to this 
I maintained it in the first edition. 24  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH.  11 
formula  in the consideration of  the human will, which 
follows, in order to  see how far it will be adequate for an 
understanding of  human will. 
In man we designate the exclusive  tendency  of  the 
will to one's own self  as egoism.3  The following investi- 
gation is meant to show what part egoism plays in the 
human world, what it  is able to  accomplish, and where it 
fails.  After  we  have learned  the whole  extent  of  its 
powers, we shall have an opportunity, in studying the 
theory of  the ethical (Chap. 9), to form a conception of 
the phenomenon of  acting for others, which seems quite 
inexplicable from the standpoint of  egoism. 
3 The reason why the expression is not applied to the lower animals 
will be  stated in connection with the discussion  of  the ethical ele- 
ment (11, n. 12). 
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CHAPTER I11 
EGOISM  IN  THE  SERVICE  OF  ALTRUISTIC 
PURPOSES 
5 1.  COINCIDENCE OF THE PURPOSES OF THE ETHICAL 
WORLD. -  5 2.  NATURE. -  5 3.  COMMERCE. -  5 4.  ORGAN- 
IZED AND NON-ORGANIZED  PURPOSES. -  § 6.  THE STATE 
AND THE LAW. 
5  1.  Coincidence  of  Purposes.  How can  the world 
exist under a regime of egoism, which desires nothing for 
the world, but everything for itself  alone?  The answer 
is, the world exists by taking egoism into its service, by 
paying it the reward which it desires.  The world inter- 
ests egoism in its purposes,  and is  then assured  of  its 
co-operation. 
This is the simple device by means of  which  nature, 
as well as humanity and the individual man, gain con- 
trol of  egoism for their purposes. 
5 2.  Nature.  Nature wills the existence of  human- 
ity.  For the realization of  this will it is necessary that 
the individual man preserve the life which  nature gave 
him, and hand it down to others after him.  The self- 
preservation and propagation of  the individual are there- 
fore necessary conditions for the attainment of nature's 
purpose.  How does she attain this purpose?  By inter- 
esting egoism in it.  This she accomplishes by offering 
the latter a premium in case it does what it should, viz., 
pleasure, and by threatening punishment if it does not 
do what it should, or does what it should not, viz.,  pain. 
If  by exception  the two fail  of  their  effect, nature is 
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life holds out to a man is greater than the sum of  pleas- 
ures or enjoyments which it offers him, life is no longer 
for him a good, but a burden, and as everyone throws 
away a  good  which  has turned  into a  burden,  so the 
egoist throws away his life -  suicide is in such a case 
the inevitable conclusion to egoism.  Whether there is 
not  another standpoint upon  which  a  man  may place 
himself in such a case is a question which we shall have 
occasion later  to investigate;  as far as nature is con- 
cerned the man justifies  himself  before her simply by 
saying:  the premium  which  you  have offered  me  for 
preserving my life is too small in comparison with the 
pains  and agonies which  you have laid  upon me, it is 
your own fault if  I return to  you a gift which has no longer 
any value for me, and which I am not in duty bound to 
retain;  we  two stand merely on terms of  mutual give 
and take. 
But nature has taken care that those cases in which 
the account tells against her shall be very rare and iso- 
lated ;  she has so  regulated the average relation between 
pleasure and pain in life that the former regularly  has 
the preponderance.  If nature had not done this, or if  it 
were possible that the relation  should  change so that 
pleasure  should  be less  than pain, nature would  have 
the same experience as an employer of  labor who reduces 
the wage of  his workmen beyond  measure,  and is left 
without hands;  the world would die out in the second 
generation. 
Nature  also can win man for  her  purposes  only by 
setting in motion  the lever of  his  own  interest within 
him.  She herself has chosen this way;  if  she had not 
wanted  it she would  have had  to make man different 
from what he is.  As he is, she has no other means of 
making him serviceable to her purpose than by appeal- 
ing to his own interest.  This interest she has given him 
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in the form of  pleasure and pain.  By means of  pleasure 
and pain nature is able to guide us in the paths that we 
should  follow, by  means  of  these  two  she  unites  our 
interests to her  purposes.  He who does something for 
the sake of the pleasure, or forbears because of  the evil 
consequences, acts for his own sake, but he carries out 
at the same time the orders of  nature.  If  there is any- 
thing  which  confirms  me  in  the  belief  of  purpose  in 
nature,  it is  the use  she  makes  of  pain  and pleasure. 
Imagine them absent or interchanged, associate pain with 
nourishment  and  pleasure  with  death, and  the human 
race would disappear in the first generation.  If  thereawere 
no purpose of nature at the basis of  the feeling of  pleas- 
ure, why has she attached it only to the voluntary and 
intentional  functions  of  the human  organism, why not 
also to the involuntary?  Why does not the circulation 
of  the blood  and respiration  cause man the same pleas- 
ure as the satisfaction of hunger  and thirst?  He who 
holds that matter  forms itself  without purpose  or  plan 
has no answer to this question.  It would be incompre- 
hensible why  pleasure, left to pure chance, should have 
made its appearance at one point of  animal life, and not 
also at another, why it should not have attached itself 
just  as well  to the coming and going of  the teeth, the 
growth  of  the hair, as to nourishment  and copulation. 
But  nature  economizes  pleasure -  she grants  it only 
where she cannot do without it, only as a premium for 
something  for  which  she has  need  of  animal  or  man. 
In the same way does she employ pain.  Pain, too, does 
nor appear without plan, but is just  as much calculated 
by  nature as pleasure.  An  interruption of the normal 
functions of  our organs which does not threaten the con- 
tinuance of  life, as, for example, the interruption of  see- 
ing and hearing by the closing of  the eyes and ears, is 
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breath  produces  at once  discomfort.  Pain  serves  in 
creation as a warning of  danger. 
8 3.  Commerce.  Nature herself  has shown man the 
way he must follow in order to gain another for his pur- 
poses: it is that of  connecting one's own purpose  with the 
other  man's interest.  Upon  this principle  rests all  our 
human  life:  the State, society,  commerce,  and inter- 
course.  The co-operation  of  a  number  of  people  for 
the same purpose is brought about only by the converg- 
ing of  all  the interests upon the same point.  No one 
perhaps has in view the purpose as such, but every one 
has his own interest in view, a subjective purpose which 
is quite different from the general objective one, but the 
coincidence of  their interests with  the general  purpose 
brings it about that every one in taking pains for himself 
at  the same time becomes active for the general purpose. 
Where  such  an interest  is  not  present  originally, it 
must be created  artificially.  Let us take  the  simplest 
case of  anindividual who needs theco-opetationof another 
in  order  to attain  his  purpose.  The extension  of  my 
factory requires the cession of  a piece of  land on the part 
of  my neighbor.  Every one knows that the only pros- 
pect I  have of  coming into possession  of  the land is by 
purchase.  By means of  my  offer  of  purchase  I  create 
artificially  in the person  of  my neighbor  an interest in 
the realization  of  my purpose,  provided  I offer  him  an 
amount such that his interest in relinquishing his claim 
to the land is greater than in retaining it.  If he demands 
more than my interest amounts to, then there is no agree- 
ment in our respective  interests, and the purchase does 
not take place.  Only when the price is high  enough to 
make the sale of  the land  more advantageous  for  him 
than its ownership, and low enough to  make the purchase 
similarly  advantageous  for me,  is  the  point  reached 
where  the two interests  are in  equilibrium,  and  the 
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consequence is the  conclusion of the  contract of sale.  The 
fact of  the conclusion of  the contract contains the proof 
that according to the judgment of the two contracting 
parties the point of  identity of the several interests has 
been  reached.  The judgment  might  have  been  erro- 
neous, the subjective conviction or the objective state of 
the interest might change later, it nevertheless remains 
true that at the decisive moment the two parties were 
subjectively convinced of  the coincidence of  their inter- 
ests, otherwise they would not have come to an agree- 
ment.  Agreement of  wills in a contract ("consensus") 
means agreement of the parties concerning the complete 
identity of  their respective interests. 
As it is not the objective interest but the subjective 
judgment  of the presence of the latter that is decisive, 
all the means  which  are capable of  calling  forth  this 
judgment  are just  as much  calculated  to bring  about 
an agreement as those which aim at  the objective estab- 
lishment of  an interest.  Hence the value of  business 
eloquence in the making of  contracts -  he who speaks 
well pays less or gets more than he who speaks poorly. 
The buyer lowers the value of  the article, i.e.,  he seeks 
to convince the seller that the latter has an interest in 
giving  up the article for  the price offered;  the seller 
praises it up, i.e.,  he seeks to convince the buyer that his 
interest requires he should  take it for the price asked; 
each of  the two parties endeavors to prove the existence 
of an interest for the other which he does not properly 
value, and experience shows that the eloquence of daily 
life is not without its reward.' 
'  Closely connected with this is the juristic concept of  "dolus"  in 
the making of  contracts.  The purpose of  "dolus"  cons~sts  in bring- 
ing about a conviction of  interest; not, however, by means of busi- 
ness e!oquence,  which is fully tolerated by the law (Dig. 4. 3. 37: 
Quad venditor dicit ut commendet), but by the display of false facts 
calculated to bring about the decision of  the other person, hence by 
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The circumstances just  described  form  the basis  of 
all intercourse, not merely commercial, of which  I  am 
thinking especially,  but also social.  The purposes  of 
social life also can be attained only by moving the other 
side with a lever  of  interest, except  that the interest 
here is of a different  nature from that which is employed 
in commercial life.  Here it is the interest of entertain- 
ment, distraction, pleasure, vanity, ambition, social con- 
sideration,  etc.  But without  such  interest, here  also, 
no person can be moved, no society is thinkable, even in 
the social sense, unless the guests find their advantage 
therein.  By lending their presence they show that such 
an interest -  even though perhaps the negative one of 
a social duty -  exists in their person. 
§ 4.  Organized  and  Unorganized  Purposes.  I  have 
so far had in view the case of  individual purposes for the 
realization of  which one needs the co-operation of  other 
persons;  and it has been shown that egoism, or letting 
the other person's  interest share in one's own purpose, 
is a sure means of  securing this co-operation.  The  same 
holds true of  the purposes of  the group. 
These are of  two kinds:  those for the pursuit of  which 
there is an apparatus created by a confirmed and regu- 
lated union of  members having a similar aim, i.e., organ- 
ized  purposes;  and those which  have no such system, 
but depend entirely upon the free efforts of  individuals, 
i.e.,  unorganized  purposes.  As the latter have no par- 
ticular interest for us, I confine myself to giving a few 
examples. 
I.  Unorganized  Purposes.  1.  Science.  Scieilce 
unites  all  its members  into  an invisible  community. 
They all exert their powers for the purposes of  science, 
and  the total result of  the co-operation  of  all its dis- 
ciples consists in the preservation, extension, and increase 
of science.  The form  of  this activity is on the whole 
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completely  free, for although there is an organization in 
science, viz., the organization of  teaching in the form of 
institutions of  learning, and that of  research in academies, 
it needs no saying that such organization is not meant 
to replace the spontaneous movement of  science.  Nor 
could  it do so, even within  the boundaries of  a single 
State, not to speak of  the higher unity of science, which 
embraces the whole world. 
Such universal sovereignty comes to science of  itself. 
How?  By its own power and force of  attraction.  But 
this is only another way of  expressing the interest which 
determines  every  individual  to devote himself  to  it; 
we might in the same way designate the force of  attrac- 
tion of  money as  the lever of commerce.  In both cases, 
in commerce as well as in science, it is the purely self- 
regarding  interest  of the individual  that produces the 
activity, except that the interest in science is incompar- 
ably more complex;  consisting as it does in the inner 
satisfaction which it yields, the feeling of  duty, of  ambi- 
tion, of  vanity; the living it  offers;  and after the failure 
of  all other motives besides, that of  mere habit;  to be 
secure Prom the  dread of  ennui.  He who does not in some 
way find his advantage in science, will not work for it, 
any more than will a laborer whom  the pay does not 
attract.  In a place  where,  and at a  time when,  the 
rewards  of  science  offer  no  incentive,  the  latter  will 
look in vain for disciples. 
2.  Political  Parties.  As  a  second  example of  unor- 
ganized  co-operation  for  like  purposes  which  interest 
brings about, I name the political party, whose guarantee 
for the co-operation of  its members rests merely upon 
the existence of  a  union of  interest and the intensity 
with which this is regarded  by the several members. 
11.  Organized  Purposes.  Organized  purposes  are 
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make it scarcely  necessary  to cite examples.  To the 
jurist I need only mention such forms of  organization as 
associations, trade guilds, ~artnerships  and corporations 
to remind  him  of the  infinite  wealth  these  purposes 
embody.  Let me select from their number an example 
which  will  be especially  instructive from  our point  of 
view -  the formation of  a joint-stock company for the 
purposes of  building a railway.  Of  all the shareholders, 
no single one perhaps is interested in the objective pur- 
pose of  the railway, z~iz.,  the opening of  a new route of 
communication.  Government  alone  in  granting  the 
privilege has such purpose in view  (for the government 
alone interest and purpose are one), and yet even there 
artificial  stimulation may have been necessary  ere  the 
undertaking could be set in motion.  Of  the shareholders 
one has in view the permanent investment of  his capital; 
the other buys shares only to sell  them again immedi- 
aicly;  the third, a wealthy proprietor of  landed  estate, 
or manufacturer, buys in the interest of  facilitating the 
realization  on his products or manufactures;  the fourth 
because he owns shares in a rival company;  the fifth, a 
municipality, because it is a condition of  influencing the 
selection  of  the route of  the proposed  road  which  will 
be  favorable to it.  In short, everyone has his special 
interest in view, no one thinks of  the purpose, and yet 
the same is perhaps furthered in this way more surely 
and quickly than if  it had been pursued by the govern- 
ment directly. 
$ 5.  The State and the Law.  The  organization of  pur- 
pose  attains its highest  point in the State, not in the 
Church.  The latter, from the nature of  its purpose, is, 
from the point of  view of  organization, far inferior to the 
State;  namely,  in reference  to what is the purely  ex- 
ternal element of  the machinery by which  the purpose 
is  realized. 
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The organization of  the purpose of  the State is char- 
acterized  by  the extended  application  of  law.  Does 
this mean that the lever of  egoism or of  interest in this 
sphere is inadequate or superfluous?  Not at all, for the 
law itself, even though it carries necessity on its banner, 
must after all  appeal to interest, i.e.,  to free action in 
accordance with one's own choice; it attains its purpose 
in most cases only by bringing  interest over to its side. 
The criminal is not concerned about the purpose of  the 
State or of  society, he is guided in his deed solely by his 
own purpose, by his lust, his greed or other viciousness, 
in short, his interest.  But it is exactly this interest of 
his with regard to which the State calculates what means 
for protecting  itself  against him it has, by punishment. 
For the State says to him:  follow your interest, but see 
to what side the balance  inclines  when  I  put  punish- 
ment in one of  the scales.  If  the instrument  so often 
fails of  its purpose despite the fact that the punishment 
is made severe  enough,  this is due  in  most  instances 
to the fact that the threat of punishment is after all  no 
more than a threat, the psychological  effect of  which in 
every case depends upon  the criminal's  calculation of 
the chances of  his discovery. 
But not every law  carries punishment with it.  The 
law which commands the debtor to pay his debt, or the 
possessor of  an article belonging to another to return it 
to its owner,  threatens no  punishment.  What deter- 
mines  these persons  to do what  they  should?  To be 
sure they  have no penalties  to apprehend,  but other 
disadvantages await them (legal costs).  If  despite this 
prospect so many legal  actions are preferred by those 
who know that they are in the wrong,  the reason is the 
same as above in the case of  the criminal, the hope that 
for  lack of  evidence the law will not succeed in reaching 
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But although in this case the law to a certain extent 
still finds in interest an ally, there is a point where the 
possibility of  such alliance ceases, and where direct com- 
pulsion alone can accomplish the thing desired.  Inter- 
est will  not determine the accused or the condemned 
to betake himself to the inquest chamber or the house 
of  correction, or to mount the scaffold -  direct compul- 
sion  is  necessary.  Similarly  must  compulsion be  em- 
ployed when dealing with the condemned debtor who is 
not willing to pay the debt of  his own accord  (a levy 
upon his property). 
The apparatus which the State employs for realizing 
its purposes  is exactly  the same as that which  nature 
applies to the fulfilment of  her objects.  It  is based upon 
a two-fold manner of  compulsion, a direct or mechanical, 
and an indirect or psychological.  The circulation of  the 
blood, digestion, etc., nature effects in a mechanical way, 
she takes care of  the matter herself;  and similarly the 
State manages the infliction of  penalties, the execution of 
civil sentences, and collection of  taxes.  Other functions 
and activities, on the other hand, both nature and State 
have left to the initiative of  the individual himself.  In 
fact those activities in general which are not essential to 
their purpose, they leave uncoerced -  they form the indi- 
vidual's free (physical and legal) domain.  Those activi- 
ties, however, which are essential to their purpose, both 
have secured by the indirect compulsion of  psychological 
pressure. 
Unity of  purposes and interests on both sides is the 
formula whereby  nature, the State and  the individual 
gain  power  over egoism.  Upon it rests the wonderful 
phenomenon  of  the human world, that a force directed 
to the lowest purposes brings about the highest results. 
It  wills itself alone, its poor evanescent ego with its paltry 
interests, and it calls into being  works and structures 
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compared with  which the ego is like a grain of  sand in 
comparison with  the Alps.  Nor  is the counterpart  to 
this wanting in nature.  In the chalk cliffs of  the Infu- 
soria, we  find a similar marvel;  where an animal so tiny 
as to be imperceptible to the naked eye creates a whole 
mountain.  The Infusorium is egoism -he  knows and 
wills only himself, and yet creates a world! 36  THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  ICH. rv 
CHAPTER  IV 
THE PROBLEM  OF SELF-DENIAL 
$ 1.  THE IMPOSSIBILITY  OF ACTION  WITHOUT  INTER- 
EST. -  $2. INTEREST  IN  SELF-DENIAL. -  $3. CONTRAST 
OF SELF-REGARDING AND NON-SELF-REGARDING  ACTION. 
-  5 4.  SELF-DENIAL AND UNSELFISHNESS. -  6 6. PLAN OF 
INVESTIGATION:  SYSTEM  OF  HUMAN  PURPOSES. -  $ 6. 
THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF SELF-ASSERTION. 
§  1.  Impossibility  of  Action  without  Interest.  The 
preceding development has shown that action for others 
is not beyond the capacity of  egoism.  But  this was based 
on a very important assumption, namely, that in action 
for others there is involved action for oneself. 
This assumption  holds  good  for countless actions of 
our life, but who would venture to  say that it  is true for 
all?  Does the mother desire anything for herself  when 
she  sacrifices  herself  for  her  child?  Or the Sister of 
Mercy, who  risks  her  own  life at the bedside  of  one 
suffering  from the plague,  in order to save the life of 
another?  He who  knows  no other  motive  of  human 
action than egoism will find insoluble riddles confronting 
him in human life.  His own admission, that he is not 
himself  capable of  such  acts of  self-denial, must force 
from the egoist the acknowledgment that there are other 
motives of  human action in the world besides egoism. 
Language designates the sentiment from which these 
actions proceed  as self-denial;  the agent in his action 
desires nothing for himself, but for another.  The possi- 
bility of  such action is not a contradiction of  the law of 
will proved  before to be one with  the law  of  purpose. 
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Self-denial, too, contains something of  future desire, but 
it is a desire that reaches out for others, not for oneself. 
Still, in the phrase  "for  others"  lies the difficulty!  He 
who has never reflected on this matter will not compre- 
hend why we see in this the most difficult problem of  the 
human  will.  What can  be more  simple? such  a  one 
will  aver:  experience  shows  us  self-denial  daily.  'The 
egoist  alone,  in  whose  narrow  soul  the  thought  of  a 
sacrifice  for  others  finds no room,  can  object  thereto. 
Yet daily  experience  also shows us that a  stone falls. 
But to see a phenomenon  and to comprehend  it are two 
different  things;  science  required  thousands  of  years 
before it understood  the fall of  a stone.  To  the psycholo- 
gist a disinterested  action, a deed done for others, con- 
tains no less a  problem  than does for  the physicist the 
fall of  a  stone,  nay, rather,  the problem  is even more 
difficult.  To him this fact is not a whit less wonderful 
than if  water were  suddenly to rise up a  mountain.  A 
recent philosopher '  declares that sympathy is a mysteri- 
ous fact -  but yet how far inferior  still is sympathy, a 
mere  feeling,  in  comparison  with  practical  selfdenial; 
an act done for others at  the expense of  ourselves! 
Yet not all philosophers have looked at  the matter in 
this Way.  To the mind  of  one of  the greatest philoso- 
phers  of  all  times,  Kant, the matter  presents not the 
least difficulty.  His concept of  duty contains the postu- 
late  of  absolute  self-renunciation;  man must  fulfil  his 
'Schopenhauer,  "Die  beiden  Grundprobleme der Ethik"  (2d  ed. 
Leipzig,  1860), p.  209, 229.  It is "something  of  which  the mind 
cannot give an  immediate account, and the causes of  which cannot be 
found by experience."  It is "the great mystery of  ethics, its primi- 
tive  phenomenon  and  the  boundary  stone  beyond  which  meta- 
physical speculation alone can venture to proceed."  This attempt 
of a  metaphysical explanation he makes  pp.  260-275.  I  think  I 
shall be able in the sequel to come to the same result in a simpler 
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duty without any reference to himself, i.e., not for the 
sake of  a subjective purpose, or motive, but for the sake 
of  an objective one (p. 21, note).  Kant's categorical im- 
perative,  upon which  his whole ethics is based,2 makes 
the demand  upon  the will  that it set itself  in motion 
without any interest; its movement is to  be caused solely 
"by  a formal principle of  volition in general, taking no 
account of  any effect to be expected therefrom"  (p. 20). 
The will is "deprived of all such incentives as may arise 
from  obedience to any law, and there remains nothing 
therefore  except  conformity  to the law  of  actions  in 
general, which alone must serve the  will as its principle" 
(p. 22).  The imperative excludes "every  admixture of 
interest  as a  motive"  (p. 60).3  The moral  law  must 
"not  be sought for in the nature of  man (subjective), 
nor in the circumstances of  the world (objective).  Not 
the least thing must be borrowed from the knowledge of 
man, i.e., from anthropology" (pp. 5, 6). 
The bare concept therefore is to  drive the man to act 
and nought  else.  Kant in fact does expressly protest 
against all "moral sentimentality"  (p. 211):  "the feeling 
of pity, and soft-hearted sympathy . . .  is  even irksome 
to  right thinking persons"  (p. 257) ; "man's ethical stand- 
pointis respect for themoral law" (p. 212).  The  sympa- 
thetic person must not take pity upon the poor by reason 
=See his  "Grundlegung  der  Metaphysik  der Sitten"  and  "Die 
Kritik der praktischen Vernunft."  The citations in the text refer 
to the edition of  the complete works of  Kant  by Rosenkranz,  vol. 
VIII. 
The same idea is expressed even more pointedly by Fichte in his 
"System  der Sittenlehre."  For a selection of  passages from it see 
Schopenhauer,  "Grundprobleme,"  p.  181, for ex.  "I  am only an 
instrument, a mere tool of  the moral law, and not at  all an  end. . . . 
The body must be nourished and its health protected for no other 
purpose than that one may be an efficient tool for the advancement 
of  the end of  the reason." 
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of a stir of  sympathy; the dutiful must not fulfil his duty 
for the sake of an  inner peace;  his sole motive must be 
simply a respect for the formal concept of  conformity to 
law.  All  this in  order that the categorical  imperative 
may appear in all its glory as accomplishing everything. 
If it only could!4  You might as well hope to move a 
loaded wagon from its place by means of  a lecture on the 
theory  of  motion  as the human will  by means of  the 
categorical imperative.  If the will were a logical force, 
it would be obliged  to yield  to the power of  a concept, 
but it  is a very actual existence which you cannot budge 
by purely logical deductions, and one must have actual 
pressure to  set it in motion.  This real force which moves 
the human will is interest. 
Let us examine whether the case is different  in self- 
denial ; whether the will, according to Kant's demands of 
it, can set itself  in motion without interest. 
I make sacrifices for my children, for my friends, for 
a common purpose, but not for the Shah of  Persia, not 
for the building of  a temple in India.  My self-denying 
motive is not  impelled  blindly,  finding every  purpose 
equally  acceptable;  for  it criticises  and discriminates 
between  purposes.  They must  all have  some definite 
reference to me if  I  am  to warm  up to them.  The 
Protestant does not contribute to the Pius Association, 
nor the Catholic to  the Gustavus Adolphus Association; 
1 would not do for a total stranger that which I do  for a 
close friend. 
This idea language brings out, as is well  known, by 
such expressions as, to  become interested, to take part in 
a  thing.  This is not yet  the place  more precisely  to 
determine  wherein  such  becoming  interested  consists, 
'  Kant himself has so little confidence in it that he admits (p. 97) 
that, "The  human reason is altogether unable to explain how pure 
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and on what it is based.  This can be done only at  the 
end of  our investigation  (Chap. XII); for the present 
lct  us  accept  the  idea  thus expressed  by  language, 
which we may suppose as understood by all. 
Being  interested in a purpose, or briefly, interest, is 
an  indispensable  condition  for  every  action -  action 
without interest is just as much an absurdity as action 
without a purpose;  it is a psychological impossibility.6 
The interest may be never so slight, but some interest 
there must always be, if the purpose is to have power 
ox cr the will. 
5 2.  Interest  in Self-denial.  If  interest  links  the 
purpose to the agent, and if conduct is not thinkable 
without interest, then self-denial must come under  the 
category of action for  oneself.  In this case, apparently, 
it would  no longer be what it assumes to  be, and those 
moralists would  be right who maintain that the motive 
of  every human action is egoistical. 
Yet such conclusion were too hasty.  Self-denial also 
presupposes interest, but it is of  quite a different kind 
from that of  egoism, and language is  quite right when it 
makes a sharp distinction between the two, and opposes 
"unselfish,  disinterested,  self-denying"  sentiment  to 
"egoistical,  self-interested, self-seeking." 
$ 3.  Self-regarding  and  Non-self-regarding  Acts.  In 
the case of  egoistic action for another, the effec . which 
the agent produces by his action for the other is such an 
indifferent matter to him that he would prefer to attain 
his purpose without it; it is merely a means for his pur- 
pose.  In self-denying action, on the contrary, the effect 
is the purpose which the agent has in view;  if  it cannot, 
or can no longer, be attained, he forbears the act.  No 
one will leap into the flame or into the watcr in order to 
Schopenhauer, "Crundprobleme,"  p. 165, "An act of  w~ll  without 
interest is will without motive, hence an effect without a cause." 
save a person  who is already burned  or drowned -  he 
may  take his own  life in despair on account  of  their 
death, but this we do not call self-denial, for it is not 
action for another.  That which does refer to the agent 
himself in an act of  self-denial is solely the feeling  of 
having helped  another in need,  of  having  caused  him 
joy;  it is the reflex of  another's fortune, another's joy 
shining  back in one's own soul.  He is content with a 
minimum part thereof, and in this very height of  unpre- 
tentiousness lies the beauty, the sublimity of  self-denial. 
It is no inward satisfaction with his own good  deed  for 
which the agent strives;  such may arise from merely a 
cold  conformity to duty without any warmth of  heart. 
His satisfaction arises with the success of  his deed in the 
person of another, with complete banishment of  thoughts 
of  self;  it is just joy in another's good fortune. 
Reward there is after all, the egoist will exclaim;  and 
hence  egoism  again!  Let such  egoist try to discover 
for  himself  what satisfaction  he will  get!  The reward 
which  the hero  obtains  who,  in  order  not  to let  the 
battleship or the fort fall into the hands of  the enemy, is 
blown up with it, would very likely offer small tempta- 
tions for him:  a few minutes or seconds of  inner satis- 
faction purchased  at the expense of  one's whole life - 
in  truth  a  dearly  bought  pleasure,  the egoist  would 
think!  The price and the gain are here in the same pro- 
portion as if  a man, in order to warm himself, were to 
feed  the  fire  in  the stove with  banknotes.  But  the 
egoist calculates too well for this; self-denial is a luxury 
for him which he cannot afford, and in his heart of  hearts 
he regards it as folly when he meets it in others, or tries 
to adjust it to  his own standpoint by introducing ignoble 
and  egoistic  motives.  That such  motives  as vanity, 
expectation of  gratitude, appreciation, etc., may enter is 
just  as incontrovertible  as it is  undoubted  that they 
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5 4.  Selj-denial and  Unselfishness.  Language knows 
beside se2f-denial also the term unselfishness.  Whether 
the two expressions are wholly synonymous, or whether 
they contain some slight difference in shade of meaning, 
I  shall  leave undecided.  Nevertheless,  I  want to call 
attention to  the fact  that  in reality such a difference exists 
between  them and that it would  be well  to use  these 
expressions accordingly.  We can distinguish  two kinds 
of  unselfish  action:  those  from which  egoism  is com- 
pletely  separated;  those  which  afford  the self  neither 
advantage nor yet disadvantage, and those which  exact 
from it a sacrifice, some denial of  its individuality.  For 
the latter the proper  expression would  be,  self-denial; 
for the former, unselfishness.  Let me remind the jurist 
of the form in which the contrast is expressed in law.  Of 
non-self-regarding acts (acts of  liberality) the following, 
according to the conception of  Roman law, come under 
the category of  the unseljish, viz., gratuitous contracts 
(gratuitous delivery of  a thing for use, "commodatum," 
"precarium";  gratuitous keeping of  an object belonging 
to another,  "depositum";  gratuitous care of  another's 
business,  "mandatum,"  "negotiorum  gestio");  under 
the category  of self-denial comes gift  ("donatio"  with 
its subdivisions,  "pollicitatio"  and  "votum").  Gift  is 
the  juristic  form  of  proprietary  altruism,  sacrifice  of 
property   right^.^ 
0 In testamentary dispositions there is no self-denial psychologically. 
Juristically they are distinguished from gift by the fact that while 
both of  them signify an  increase in the property of  the beneficiary, 
the latter alone involves a diminution of  the property of  the giver. 
We may apply to them what the Roman jurist says of  one of  their 
subdivisions,  "mortis  causa  donatio":  "(magis)  se  habere  vult, 
quam eum, cui donat," Dig. 39. 6. 1. pr.  In donation "inter vivos" 
the case is reversed:  "magis  eum quam se habere vult."  Psycho- 
logically this  expresses the truest distinction between the  two species 
of  gift. 
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It  results from the foregoing that there is no action for 
another  in which  the doer does not at the same time 
desire something  for himself.  In egoistic action, that 
which the agent expends is, according to  the standard of 
human  estimation, in equilibrium with  that which  he 
acquires; in unselfish action there is a lack of  proportion 
between the two, which may be so great as to  make the 
act, from the point of  view of  egoism alone, inexplain- 
able.  This circumstance compels us to recognize  that 
egoism is not the only motive of  human will, that there 
is yet another motive besides.  By naming it, whether 
self-denial,  unselfishness,  power  of  sacrifice, love, devo- 
tion, sympathy, goodwill, etc., we have not yet compre- 
hended it, and as  long as this is so, our question concern- 
ing the meaning of  purpose in human will still waits for 
its solution in vain. 
5 5.  System of  Human Purposes.  Whereto shall we 
look  for  information?  Within  the depths of  our  own 
heart?  There is only  one  way,  I  believe,  which  will 
lead us safely to  the goal, and that is to  look for the solu- 
tion of  the problem in the real world.  There must be 
gathered  what these two motives really signify to the 
world, and what part they take in the movement which 
we know as  human life.  When we know what they sig- 
nify there, we shall have comprehended them. 
Human life in this sense, i.e., the  life of the species man, 
not of  the individual, is the sum total of  all human pur- 
poses.  Hence the task to which we apply ourselves in 
the sequel takes the form of  a system of  human purposes. 
I say system, which means:  I want to place these pur- 
poses not merely side by side in a  superficial fashion, 
but I want further to make the attempt to  discover the 
inner connection which subsists between them.  I want 
to show how one joins itself  to the other, the higher to 
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produces the other out of  itself and as a consequence of 
its own nature, by a stringent necessity. 
I will impose upon myself  only one limitation.  The 
work is addressed solely to the jurist, and this has deter- 
mined me in subordinate matters hitherto to introduce 
a number of  things which  have interest for him  alone. 
The like consideration furthermore guides me in setting 
the external limitations and giving the inner form to  the 
system of  human purposes.  It is intended not for the 
psychologist,  but for  the jurist.  Best  perhaps  I  can 
express what is now floating before my mind when I say 
that this is to be a theory of  practical life, sketched not 
for its own sake, but solely with the purpose of  finally 
answering by its help the question, Wherein does purpose 
in the human will consist? 
5 6.  The  Different  Species  of  Self-assertion.  The 
purposes of  human existence in general fall into two large 
groups;  those of  the individual, and those of  the com- 
munity (society).  This contrast we place as the basis 
of  our  presentation.  This does not mean  that in the 
manner of  those holding the theory of  the Law of  hature 
we wish to isolate the individual, separating him artifi- 
cially  from  his historical  connection with society, and 
then  to present  over  against  such  merely  theoretical 
being-for-himself of  an  individual, his actual life in society 
and  being-for-others.  We  consider  the  individual  in 
the position which  he actually holds in the real world, 
but in picturing his life to ourselves we separate from it 
those purposes by which he holds in view solely himself, 
and not society, i.e., any other person or a higher pur- 
pose.  These purposes,  which  proceed  from  the agent 
and return to him, we designate, as is well known,  by 
the term egoistic.  Of  these only three deserve emphasis 
for the purposes of our investigation.  I comprehend them 
all under the name of  individual or egoistic self-assertion, 
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and discriminate between  them as physical,  economical, 
and juristic  self-assertion in accordance with  the three 
directions in which the purpose of  self-assertion is  realized 
by them.  I  avoid  the expression self-preservation, be- 
cause usage refers it exclusively to  the first class. 
The purposes  of  the second  class, of  life in society, 
which embrace also the problems of  the State, I desig- 
nate as social.  The interest  which  these have for  us 
lies not in themselves, but solely in the manner in which 
society and the State induce the individual to co-operate 
in their realization.  The activity cjf  the individual for 
these purposes  of  society is fittingly designated by the 
term social.  The  motives which prompt such  social action 
by the individual are  of  two kinds.  The first is egoism, 
with which weare already familiar.  The  means by  which 
the State and society gain the mastery over this motive 
are reward and punishment.  The second motive is that 
which  contains in itself  the solution of  our problem  of 
self-denial.  It is the feeling  on the part of  the agent 
of  the ethical destiny of  his being, i.e., his feeling that 
existence was given to him not merely for himself, but 
also for the service of  humanity.  In so far as the indi- 
vidual obeys this feeling and thereby realizes the higher 
purpose of  his being, he asserts himself.  I shall there- 
fore  designate  all  action  coming  under  this  point  of 
view, as ethical self-assertion of  the indivzdual. 
In the following chapter (V) we first turn our atten- 
tion to egoistical self-assertion.  The transition to social 
action will be brought about by a consideration of Society 
(Chapter VI).  We shall  then take up the two egoistic 
levers  o;  social  movement,  Reward  (Chapter  VII) and 
Compulsion  (Chapter  VI 11).  The first  belongs  more 
particularly to business, the second to the State, and the 
form it takes constitutes Law.- 
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the existence of  morality, and consists in viewing moral- 
ity as the ideal condition  of  life of  the subject -  com- 
plete identity of  the subjective purpose with  the objec- 
tive.  To understand  this subjective attitude to objec- 
tive morality, it is necessary  to analyze the latter, and 
show how the subjective conception and realization of it 
agree with  that theory  of  the will  which  has been  de- 
veloped  in  the foregoing  discussion, and which  knows 
only  action  of  the subject  for  his  own  sake.  To this 
problem will the ninth chapter be devoted, -The  Theory 
of  Morality. 
After  having determined  the concept of  ethical self- 
assertion,  we  shall  take up the two forms in which  it 
shows its activity;  the Feeling of Duty (Chapter X),  and 
Love  (Chapter XI). 
Having in this way reached  the aim we set ourselves 
above  (p.  43), viz., to gain an idea of  all  the purposes 
for which man can become active, we shall thereupon at 
the end  of the first part again take up the question of 
the will  which  was interrupted  above, in order to bring 
it to a conclusion by analyzing the two concepts, Interest 
and  Purpose  (Chapter  XII).  The application  to law 
of  the results gained in this whole first part of  the book 
will be left for the second part. 
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CHAPTER  V 
THE PURPOSES  OF EGOISTICAL SELF- 
ASSERTION 
5  1.  PHYSICAL SELF-ASSERTION. -  5 2.  ECONOMIC SELF- 
ASSERTION. -  5 3.  PROBLEM  OF  PROPERTY. -  JURISTIC 
FORM. -  5 4.  CONCEPT OF  RIGHT AND DUTY. -  8 5.  WORK. 
--  6 6.  EXCHANGE. -  5  7.  CONTRACT -  THE  LAW. - 
5 8.  JURISTIC  SELF-ASSERTION. 
1  Physical  Self-assertion.  Egoistical  self-asser- 
tion has for its basis the thought of  egoism, viz., that the 
individual exists for himself, and has the purpose of  his 
existence in and of  himself.  Of  the three directions or 
kinds  of  self-assertion  which  we  distinguished  above 
(p. 44)  the physical  contains the lowest  form in which 
purpose first appcars in man ; it  takes us back to  the stage 
in which we first meet it in animate creation, -  the stage 
of  the animal. 
The first object  of  will  is pointed  out by nature to 
man quite as much as to the animal, -it  is the preser- 
vation of  his own existence. 
Discomfort and pain teach him what is repugnant to 
his nature, and urge him to its avoidance;  comfort and 
pleasure and the feeling of  health furnish him  with the 
assurance  that he responds  rightly to the conditions of 
his life.  But the manner in which man meets this prob- 
lem assLmes with the aid of  the human intellect a form 
different  from  that  in  the animal.  I  mean  not only 
knowledge  and  culture of  the  finer  conditions  of  life, 
but the retrospect  which  is granted him  into the past 
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preservation of  the animal is with few exceptions calcu- 
lated for the next moment -  once their hunger is stilled 
most  animals care not for  the coming  day -and  the 
animal's sense of  this is, as a  rule, guided  only by his 
own experience.  In man, on  the contrary, it is based 
not  only  on his  own  experience,  but also  on that of 
others, and not merely on the experience of  a few indi- 
viduals, but on that of  the whole race;  and in his case 
it is not exhausted, as in the case of  the animal, in a 
concern  for the present, but in the present it is already 
thoughtful of  the future, especially in the way of  secur- 
ing his  future means of subsistence.  This concern  for 
the coming  day, called  forth by the bitter  experiences 
lvhich  humanity  underwent at a  time when  nature no 
longer offered  unsought  everything  in sufficient  abun- 
dance, is the original  practical  motive of  property, i.e., 
of  efforts directed not merely  to the acquisition of  the 
momentary need, but to the acquisition and storing up 
of  means of  support not needed until the future. 
$ 2.  Economic  Self-assertion.  This brings us to the 
second class of  self-assertion, the economic.  Of  this we 
find in the animal world only slight, isolated tendencies. 
In accordance with its conceptual and historical origin, it 
is connected with the purpose of  physical self-preserva- 
tion, and in the same measure as the purposes  of  life 
are advanced it also acquires higher aims and problems. 
Securing the future life becomes securing one's future life 
in comfort;  procuring  the necessary  and indispensable 
prepares the ground for what is dispensable but agree- 
able;  the satisfaction of the palate is followed by that 
of  the  eye,  the soul,  and the intellect.  Everywhere 
property  takes its stand by the side of  culture,  ever 
informing of  new wants and purposes, as the ready ser- 
vant who procures the necessary means for everything. 
There is no purpose, no problem belonging to  individual, 
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society,  or State, which  would  not be furthered in the 
most effective way by property;  there is no virtue, no 
vice, either of  the individual or of  the nation, which could 
not find expression in property.  The  manner in which a 
man uses his property is one of  the surest standards for 
judgment of  his character and degree of  culture -  in the 
purposes for which he spends his money he reveals him- 
self.  The means by which he earns it lie only too often 
not in his power, but the manner in which he spends it, 
as a rule, is a matter of  his free resolve.  No fine phrase, 
nor sublime speech, nor outpouring of  feelings in words 
and tears has such convincing force as the dollar which 
issues from the pocket;  a man's cashbook occasionally 
tells more concerning his true character than his diaries. 
§ 3.  Property.  This promotion of  property from  its 
original  function  of securing  the physical  existence  to 
this  its all-embracing mission of  civilization  and ethical 
significance would  not at all have been  thinkable  if  it 
had  not  continually  retained,  exclusively  or predomi- 
natingly,  its  original  function  of  prolonging  physical 
existence for a considerable fraction of  the  population. 
The power of  property in the hands of  him who has more 
than is needed  for  securing  his physical  necessities  or 
even a comfortable living  depends upon others ha-\ring 
less;  who,  being obliged to  work in order to supply what 
they  lack,  must  seek  in  continuous  employment  the 
means of  subsistence. 
$ 4.  Right  and Duty.  The purpose of  life's mainte- 
nance produced  property -  for without property  there 
is no secure future for existence;  the purpose of the two 
conjoined leads to Law -  without law there is no secur- 
ing life and property. 
The form by which law, or right regarded objectively, 
affords  its protection to  both interests is, as  is well known, 
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there is something for  us, and the power  of  the State 
recognizes this and protects us.  Now that which exists 
for us may be, 
(1) Ourselves.  The  legal expression for this is the right 
of personality.  The ethical ground of  this concept is the 
principle, man is an end in himself.  The slave is not for 
himself, but for his master;  he is not an end in himself, 
but exclusively  a means for the purposes of  others. 
That which exists for us may be, 
(2)  A  Thing.  The expression which  designates this 
relation  of  the  thing to our purposes is the right to the 
thing, or  ownership  in the widest  sense.' 
That which exists for us may be, 
(3)  A  Person.  He may exist for us either as a per- 
sonality in its entirety, -  with  reciprocal  relations  (the 
legal relations of  the famzly), or in reference to particu- 
lar acts (right "in  personam"). 
That which exists for us may be finally, 
(4)  The State.  The legal  expression  for  this subser- 
viency of  the State to our purposes is citizenship. 
Opposed  to Right is Duty.  The former  tells us that 
there  is  something  for  us,  the  latter  that  we  are for 
another, but not in the sense that the entire purpose of 
our  being is exhausted  in it  -in  that case the relation 
would  be slavery -  but in the sense that this subser- 
viency forms only a particular incident in the purpose of 
our  being. 
Accordingly,  the  position  of  a  person  in  the world 
depends upon  three conditions, the two from which  he 
derives his right, and a third upon which the world bases 
his duty to it: 
This is the sense in which the philosophers and political econo- 
m~sts  generally use the expression.  It  then embraces property in the 
sense of  the jurist, possession, rights in things belonging to  another, 
and the right of  succession 
(I) I  exist for myself; 
(2) The world exists for me; 
(3) I  exist for the world. 
Upon these three concise  statements rests the entire 
scheme of  law, and not merely that of  law, but the whole 
ethical world-order,  our private life,  life  in  the family, 
business relations, society, the State, international inter- 
course, the mutual  relations  of  peoples,  those  living 
contemporaneously as  well as  those long departed (Chap- 
ter VI). 
5 5.  Work.  Let us return now to property, the occa- 
sion  of  this  interpolation.  The concept  of  property 
contains from the legal  point of  view the principle that 
nature exists for the sake of  man.2  But nature does not 
presenther gifts,  human labor and exertion are needed to 
win them from her.  If a person's own force is not suffi- 
cient, he must have the help of  another, which  in the 
long  run  he can succeed  in  obtaining  only in  return 
for equivalent service by remuneration.  The law recog- 
nizes  the necessity  for this extension of  property to the 
labor-power of  others by granting its protection to con- 
tracts directed thereto.  So  in addition to  the thing, work 
too is introduced into the system of  proprietary right. 
Work keeps step with property, which has gradually 
raised itself to ever higher purposes from the most press- 
ing, but at  the same time the lowest, purpose, of  care for 
physical  life.  Work, too, begins  with the most primi- 
tive form, wiz.,  the cultivation of  the field and the pro- 
curing of  that which  belongs to physical existence;  and 
it advances with the progress of  culture to ever higher 
achievements and problems. 
5 6.  Exchange.  The  laborer takes money in exchange 
for labor  power, the other party takes labor power in 
The saying of the Roman jurist:  "Omnes fructus rerum natura 
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r,xchange for money; both have more need of  that which 
they receive than of  that which they have.  Reward is 
the means by which the surplus labor power which other- 
wise  would  remain  idle  or  but  imperfectly  realized, 
is directed where it can find the best use in the interests 
of  the laborer as  well as of  society.  The same process is 
repeated in the case of things, when one thing is exchanged 
for another  (contract of  exchange in the legal sense) or 
for  money  (purchase).  On  both  sides  the process  is 
based upon giving that for which one has either no use 
at all, or not the right use, in return for that which one 
may better use.  Exchange as a form of  commerce has 
therefore as its object the directing of  every thing where 
it will do that for which it was intended.  No thing per- 
manently remains where it misses its economic destiny 
to serve man;  every thing finds its right owner;  the 
an\.il  finds the blacksmith,  the fiddle the musician, the 
worn coat the poor man, a Raphael the  picture gallery.3 
Exchange may be defined as economic providence,  which 
brings everything (object, labor power)  to the place of 
its destination. 
In speaking of  the destination of  an object, we have 
transferred a concept which  according to our own doc- 
trine is limited to persons, viz., the concept of  purpose, to 
a thing.  Is not this inconsistent?  The answer is ready 
at  hand. 
Our use  of  this expression indicates  that the person 
sees in the thing an available means for his purposes; 
he  therefore puts into the thing as its destination, its 
8To be sure, w~thin  the sphere where it canseek at  all.  A Raphael 
can seek its  owner in the whole world, the  anvll can look for him only 
among the blacksmiths of  the neighborhood.  The same is true of 
labor power.  The ordinary factory laborer cannot look so far as 
the trained techn~cian,  the seamstress not so far as  the opera singer, 
the village schoolmaster not so far as the scholar. 
purpose,  that  which  he  himself  wants to make of  it. 
He substitutes his subjective intention for the objective 
availability  of  the  thing.  The  economic  purpose  of 
things  is  nothing  else  than the availability  for  human 
purposes  which  the things exhibit  from the standpoint 
of  the subjective  economical  consciousness  of  purpose, 
\yhether  this availability  was present  in them from the 
beginning,  or  was  attached  to them  by human  labor. 
Usefulness,  availability,  fitness, destination, purpose  of 
a thing, and whatever other turn of  expression one may 
use, depend  upon  the operation  proved  above  (p. 22), 
in connection  with  the investigation  of  purpose in the 
animal;  viz.,  reference to the self, or  reference  to pur- 
pose.  These terms, however, are based not upon a con- 
crete judgment,  but upon an abstract, i.e., upon a  uni- 
versal  and  generalizing judgment  which  is independent 
of  the  particular  case.  The  purposes  of  things  are 
nothing more than the purposes of  the person  by whom 
they  are applied -  a  gradual extension of  the horizon 
of  purpose in man signifies historically the same fact for 
things. 
As the contract of exchange brings to each party that 
which  possesses  for  his  purposes  a  relatively  higher 
availability  than is present in what he has himself,  it 
may be designated from the standpoint of  the person as 
an act of  economical  self-assertion.  And the business of 
exchange,  which  contains  the regulated  order  of  these 
single acts, may accordingly be designated as the system 
or  organization  of  the economic  self-assertion  of  man. 
The more the business of exchange develops, the wider 
the domain over which  it extends, and the greater the 
quantity of  goods, skill, etc., which  it can realize,  the 
more feasible does the economic self-assertion of the indi- 
vidual thereby become, and the more is it facilitated and 
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of  people bread ; the opening or shortening of  a road, the 
perfection  of means of transportation,  a  cheap  freight 
rate,-in  short,  everything  which  serves  to make it 
possible for things and labor power to seek employment 
in wider  circles, spreads life and  well-being in regions 
where otherwise want and misery would rule; a man who 
would formerly have starved becomes a wcll-to-do man. 
5 7.  Contract.  The form  of  exchange  is  the  con- 
tract.  The jurist  defines contract as the union  of  two 
minds in an  expression of  the will ("consensus").  From 
the juristic standpoint this is perfectly correct, for the 
element of  the contract which  creates obligation lies in 
the will.  But for  us  who  have in view  through  this 
whole investigation, not the will as such, but the,  deter- 
mining element of  it, viz., purpose, the matter assumes 
another, and as I believe, more instructive form.  When 
purpose determines the will, then the circumstance that 
the wills of  two or more persons meet in the same point 
("convenire,"  "conventio,"  "iiberein-[zusammen-]  kom- 
men,"  "~bereinkunft") contains  the proof  that  their 
purposes or interests meet in this point, that the intended 
action in the future, whether of  one party or of  both, is 
calculated to attain this coincident purpose.  With the 
delivery of  the object sold in return for the price agreed 
upon, both the buyer  and the seller attain what  they 
intend.  Through the contract they give evidence of  the 
coincidence of  their interests (p. 28), not, however, as an 
object  of  theoretical  knowledge,  as is  the case  when 
they  are aware that their several speculations  are de- 
pendent  upon  the  occurrence  of  one  and  the  same 
combination of circumstances, but as the practical aim 
of  a co-operation for which thcy both unite. 
But the interests which  now meet may subsequently 
diverge.  In such a  case the one party, whose interest 
has in the meantime become different,  will wish that the 
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performance of  the contract remain unfulfilled, whereas 
the other party, whose  interest has remained the same 
as at the conclusion  of the contract, is just  as eager to 
have it carried out as before.  NOW  if  the law did  not 
step  in with its constraining power, the law which upholds 
a  contract  once  concluded,  the  former  understanding 
would  not come to execution on account of  the want of 
present agreement of interests.  The recognition of  the 
binding  force  of contracts, considered  from  the stand- 
point  of  the idea of purpose,  means nothing else than 
securing the original purpose against the prejudicialinflu- 
ence of  a later shifting of interest, or of  a change of  judg- 
ment  touching  his  interest  on the part of  one of  the 
parties.  In  other words, it means that a change of  interest 
has juristically no force.4  He who insists on carrying out 
the original contract proves thereby that his interest has 
remained  the same;  the opponent, who refuses, proves 
that his interest, or his judgment  thereof  has changed; 
if  the same thing happens in the case of  the other party, 
the contract is not carried out,  the interest determines the 
execution as well as the conclusion of  all contracts. 
The person, i.e., the purpose  of  his physical self-pres- 
ervation, produced property, i.e., the purpose of  the regu- 
lated and assured realization of  that purpose.  The two 
together  lead  again  to law,  i.e.,  to the  securing  of 
Where the law exceptionally allows the extinction of  a contract 
by  reason  of  a  later change of  circumstances  (for example, notice 
given of  the cessation of  agency or of  the dissolution of  partnership; 
demand of  the restitution of  a deposit before the expiration of  the 
time agreed upon;  extinction of  a contract for hire;  Cod. 4. 65. 3.), 
it makes the maintenance of the contract for the party entitled to  the 
above privilege a pure question of  interest.  Not the former condi- 
tion of the interest, but the present, is made to be the determining 
factor for him -  a form of  the contractual relation which dogmatic 
jurisprudence names, it is true, in special cases, but does not take 
into consideration in the general theory of  contract. 56  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH. v 
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their mutual purposes, otherwise solely dependent upon 
the physical  strength of  the subject, by the power  of 
the State.  The concept of  law includes therefore two 
elements;  a system of  purposes,  and a  system of  their 
realization.  As  person  and  property  presuppose  the 
law, so does the law  presuppose the State.  The (prac- 
tical)  motive  (impulse)  of  purpose,  not  the  (logical) 
motive (implication) of the  concept, presses with necessity 
from one to the other. 
5 8.  Juristic  Self-assertion.  The  law embraces  the 
person  on all  sides of  his existence.  The assertion  of 
this position granted him by the law we call the  juristic 
self-assertion of  the person.  This self-assertion extends 
to everything that the person is and has-life,  honor, 
property, family, legal status.  In reference to  property, 
it seems  to comprehend  the whole  of  economic  self- 
assertion.  But the two do not coincide.  The purpose 
of  economic  self-assertion, i.e., of  acquisition  of  prop- 
erty, is not the right  to the thing, but the thing itself; 
otherwise no thief  would steal, for theft does not give 
him  the right, but the thing.  The value of  the thing, 
therefore, controls the purely economic purpose of  the 
acquisition  of  the thing,  and the means put forth in 
attaining this purpose.  This applies to the thief also - 
he will  not expose  himself  to the same danger  for  a 
farthing as he will  for  a thousand  dollars, any more 
than a laborer puts forth the same exertion for one dollar 
as he does for ten.  The same point of  view holds for 
the economic preservation of  the thing -  one does not 
stake ten dollars to procure a dollar -  for the mainte- 
nance of  the thing, therefore, the economic value of  it is 
quite decisive.  But for  the maintenance  of  the right 
to  the thing it is not sufficient; it may be, but it  need not. 
The struggle for the right to a thing may, for example, 
take a form in which it involves a person's sympathies. 
In this case it is no longer a question of  the thing, but of 
the person,  of  his  self-assertion as a  holder  of  rights; 
the economic element is just as immaterial in the matter 
as in a violation of  the law which is aimed directly at  the 
person,  viz.,  an insult  to one's  honor.  The detailed 
treatment which I have devoted to juristic self-assertion 
in  my  "Kampf  ums  Recht"  (7th  ed.  Vienna  1883),5 
excuses me from a lengthy exposition in this place. 
We have now  reached  a  conclusion.  The considera- 
tion of  the three directions  of  egoistical  self-assertion 
has brought before us not merely the main purposes of 
individual  existence  turned  toward  itself,  but  it has 
shown us at  the same time in these individua!  purposes 
the  practical  impulse  of  the concept  of  purpose.  It 
presses ahead irresistibly from one concept to another, 
from person to  property, from these two to  law, from law 
to the State -  there is no halt in this evolution of  the 
idea of  purpose until the highest point is reached. 
We learn from this that when we placed ourselves in 
the  foregoing  upon  the standpoint  of  the individual, 
this did not mean, as we have already remarked  above 
(p.  44), that we considered  it thinkable to isolate the 
individual  by himself -in  that case we  should  have 
had no right to place the two dicta, "The world  exists 
for me,"  and "I  exist for the world,"  beside  the first, 
"I  exist for myself."  What we did was to  indicate the 
attitude which  the individual  takes toward  the world, 
I am innocent of  the frequent caricature of  my opinion as if  I 
held that one should carry on a lawsuit for every disputed right, for 
I have stated with sufficient clearness the conditions under which 
alone I regard it a duty to  assert one's right.  But of  what use is all 
objective clearness when there is subjective darkness in the mind of 
the reader; when people presume to  judge a work, who cannot read, 
who do  not know when they get to  the end of the book what they  read 
at the beginning, and impute absurdities to the author for which 
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when  he  considers the latter solely from  the point  of 
view  of  his om  interest.  How this interest in making 
the world serviceable to it at the same time makes itself 
thereby serviceable to the word, will  be shown in  the 
sequel. 
LIFE THROUGH  OTHERS 
CHAPTER  VI 
LIFE THROUGH AND FOR  OTHERS, OR 
SOCIETY 
Q 1.  SOCIAL  FORM  OF  HUMAN  EXISTENCE. -  Q 2.  THE 
UNINTENTIONAL INFLUENCE OF  ONE UPON THE  OTHER. - 
Q 3.  CONTINUATION OF INFLUENCE  BEYOND LIFE. -  Q 4. 
THE RIGHT OF INHERITANCE IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE 
HISTORY  OF CULTURE. -  Q 6. SOCIAL LIFE AS  A  LAW OF 
CULTURE. -  5 6.  CONCEPT  OF  SOCIETY. -  5 7.  DIFFER- 
ENCE BETWEEN SOCIETY AND STATE. -  $8. PROBLEM OF 
SOCIAL  MOVEMENT. 
$ 1.  Social  Form  of  Iluman Existence.  Our  whole 
culture, our whole history, rests upon  the realization of 
1 In the first edition, this chapter began with a discussion, of  the 
complete  untenableness of  which  I  have become convinced  in the 
meantime, and I can scarcely  comprehend  now how I could  have 
allowed myself  to be carried away by it.  It had as its subject the 
statement that an animal uses other animals only as means for its 
purposes but does nothing for their purposes, and that herein lies 
one of  the main differences between animal and human life.  The 
proofs to the contrary, for example thecare of  animals for their own 
young and even for the helpless young of  other animals, are so 
clearly evident that there is no need at all of  mentioning them. 
Even the idea of  society, i.e., of  a regulated living together in com- 
mon for the purpose of  pursuing common ends, already appears in 
the animal world, and even the idea of  an experience of  the species, 
which  I formerly  denied.  Animals, too, at least some, learn one 
from the other, communicate their experiences to each other and 
apply them.  For animals also history is a  teacher.  My former 
opinion that the animal has its experience only for itself, and that 
with every animal the same game begins over again to  end with it 
again -  without result for the species -  may apply to some classes 
of animals;  in the general way in which I maintained it,  it  is simply 
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individual  human  existence  for  the  purposes  of  the 
whole.  There is no human life which  exists merely for 
itself, every one is at the same time for  the sake of  the 
world;  every man in his place, however  limited it may 
be, is a collaborator in the cultural purposes of human- 
ity.  Even  if  he  is  the  most  insignificant laborer,  he 
takes part in one of  its problems,  and even if  he does 
not work at  all, he helps along in his every day speech, 
for by doing this he helps to keep alive the words of  the 
language handed down to  him, and transmits them in his 
turn.  I cannot imagine a human life so poor, so devoid 
of content, so narrow, so miserable, that it is not of  some 
good to some other life; even such a life has not seldom 
borne  the  world  the  richest  fruit.  The cradle of  the 
greatest man often stood in the poorest hut; the woman 
who gave him  life, who nursed and cherished him, has 
done  humanity  a  greater  service  than many  a  king 
upon  his  throne.  What  can  a  child  be  to a  child? 
Often  more  than  parents  and  teachers  combined. 
In  playing with  his companions the child  often learns 
more  things  and  more  useful  for  practical  life  than 
out of  the  "teachings  of  wisdom  and  virtue."  In 
the ball  of  his comrade which  he tries to appropriate 
he  makes  the  first  practical  acquaintance  with  the 
concept  of  property,  and  the deterring impression  of 
the  bad  habits of  his comrades preaches to  him his first 
morals. 
$ 2.  Unintentional  Influence  of  One  upon the  Other. 
No one exists for  himself  alone, any more than through 
himself  alone, but every one exists at  the same time for 
others, just  as he exists through  others, it matters not 
whether  consciously  or unconsciously.  Just as a body 
radiates the heat which it has received from outside, so 
man radiates the intellectual or ethical fluid which he has 
breathed in the cultural atmosphere of  society.  Life is a 
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constant "inspiration,"  literally, breathing in:  receiving 
from the environment and giving back to it; this holds 
true equally of  physical and spiritual life.  Every rela- 
tion  of  our  human  life  contains  such  an element  of 
"being for each other," most conditions of  life contain a 
reciprocal or mutual element.  The wife exists for the 
husband, but at  the same time the husband for the wife; 
the parents for the childrcn, but the children also for 
the parents.  Servants and  masters,  master  workmen 
and journeymen, the laborer and the employer of  labor, 
friend and friend, the community and its members, the 
State and its  citizens, society and the individual, nation 
and nation, and the particular nation and humanity - 
who can name a relation in which the one does not exist 
for  the other and the latter, at  the same time, also for 
the  former?  And  quite apart from  these  permanent 
relations which make up the standing forms of  our life, 
what does not man sometimes effect by his mere exist- 
ence, by his example, by  his personality, -  nay, by a word 
uttered  at random!  In  short,  wherever  I  turn  my 
glance,  everywhere  is the same phenomenon;  no one 
exists for himself alone; every one  existsat the same  time 
for others, let us say, for the world.  Only his world, as 
well  as the measure and the duration of  the influences 
which he exerts upon it, is different from that of  others. 
The world of  the one ends with his house, his children, 
friends, clients;  the world of  the other extends also to  a 
people, to  humanity. 
5 3.  Continuation of  Influence beyond Life.  The fruit 
of  one sort of  existence for society is summed up in the 
amount of  potatoes, coats, books, etc., which  man has 
furnished  it, whereas  the fruit of  the other kind,  the 
activity of a great poet, artist, technician, scholar, states- 
man, may assume dimensions which mock at all attempts 
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death quickly destroys the traces of  his existence,  the 
existence of  a  historical  personality unfolds  itself  only 
after his death to its full power  and majesty, to ever 
wider  and richer  effects.  Hundreds and thousands of 
years after the ashes of  the great man have long been 
scattered to all the winds, his spirit unceasingly works 
for  the cultural purpose of  humanity.  Homer, Plato, 
Aristotle,  Dante,  Shakespeare -and  who  can  name 
all the heroes of  the spirit, of  art and of  science of  whom 
the same is true? -  all of  them are still standing today 
in our midst, with  living,  unimpaired,  nay, increased 
power-  they  have  sung,  taught,  thought  for  all 
humanity. 
§ 4.  The Right  of  Inheritance  in its Relations to the 
History of Culture.  With this continued influence of  an 
existence after it  has itself come to  an  end, we touch upon 
that form of  existence for others upon which the security 
and the progress  of  our whole  culture depends.  The 
juristic  expression for this is Inheritance.  The idea of 
the right of  inheritance is, the fruit of  my existence does 
not end with me, it benefits another.  The  jurist knows 
the right of inheritance only so far as it has  firoperty 
as its object, inheritance signifies for him only the eco- 
nomic output of  the person, the sum of  his life expressed 
in dollars and cents; but for the historian and the philoso- 
pher the concept of  inheritance extends as far as human 
culture.  The institution of  succession is the condition 
of  all  human  progress;  succession,  in  the history  of 
culture,  signifies  that  the successor  works  with  the 
experiences, with the spiritual and ethical capital of  his 
predecessor -  history is the right of  inheritance in the 
life of  humanity. 
$ 5.  Social  Lzfe  as a  Law  of  Culture.  There  are 
therefore two directions in which  "being  for others"  is 
carried  out;  the influence  of  our  existence  upon  our 
contemporaries, and upon posterity. 
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The measure of  the two gives us the standard for the 
value  of  human existence,  of  individuals as well as of 
nations.  The concept  of  value  is,  as  is well  known, 
relative;  it  means the fitness of a thing for some purpose. 
When applied  to human life  the question  of  value is, 
what benefit  to society accrues  from  it?  And  society 
measures the  value of  human life accordingly.  A criterion 
of the value which society puts upon our life is its knowl- 
edge of  our name.  Our name in the world extends as a 
rule so far, and lasts so long, as our significance for  the 
world.  When the names of  historical  personalities con- 
tinue, it  is merely the proof  that the personalities them- 
selves are still alive for the world.  For the continuance 
of  a historical name, i.e., fame, is not merely a tribute of 
gratitude which  the world  pays, but denotes continued 
activity by its bearer.  How great intrinsically any one 
was is quite an indifferent matter to the world;  it asks 
for and retains only what he was to it.  In the book of 
history name signifies, as  once "nomen"  did in the Roman 
housekeeping  book,  the entry of  a debt.  The genius 
who did nothing for the world will have not the smallest 
item to his credit in the account book of  history.  That 
the familiarity of  a name is a sign of  the significance of 
its bearer, holds also for the small, and even the smallest 
orbit of  civic life.  Here, too, the knowledge of  a name 
extends only so far as society feels the significance for 
itself of  its bearer.  The name of  the ordinary laborer in 
a factory is known only to his comrades and neighbors, 
that of the owner of  the factory is known in the entire 
district. 
A celebrated name is therefore an evidence not merely 
that some one has become something to society or the 
world, but also that the latter is aware of  it -  it is the 
acknowledgment of  its debt through the issue of  a bill ot 
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the bill of exchange, but the bill of  exchange gives the 
claim the character of  incontestable validity.  Its value 
depends not upon the honor and recognition with which 
it is redeemed,  but upon  the assurance which  it gives 
its bearer  that his  life has not been  lost  to humanity. 
Society  does not inquire whether  he  was  actuated  by 
ambition, fame, or the desire to serve humanity, it looks 
solely to the result, not to the motive.  And she is right 
in doing so.  For in crowning those also who were merely 
interested  in  the  reward  which  she  pays  them,  she 
makes sure of  them, too, for her purposes;  only he can 
grudge  them  the wreath  which  she hands  them,  who 
envies the laborer  his pay -  the laurels never fall into 
any one's  lap without  trouble and merit;  they require 
as  a rule the stake of  one's whole life. 
All  that I  have said  so far of individuals  holds true 
also of  nations.  These also exist  not merely for them- 
selves,  but for  the other  nations, for  humanity.2  And 
with them also the influence which they exert upon others 
is not limited to their  lifetime only, but extends to the 
most  distant times  according  to their  importance  and 
their  services.  The art, the literature and the philoso- 
phy of  the Greeks, the law of the Romans, forms to this 
very day an inexhaustible source of  our education.  The 
models  of  the  beautiful,  the  noble,  and  the  mighty 
which  they  have  left  us  in  their  works  of  art, their 
thoughts, their deeds, and their men, still bear new fruit 
every day on receptive soil.  All the civilized nations of 
the world  helped  to form  our culture of  today;  if  we 
could dissolve our present culture into its elements, and 
follow  them up to their  first  beginnings, we should  get 
a list of  nations, and upon it names of  peoples such as 
no documentary history records. 
2For  a further development of  this idea, see my "Geist  des  riirni- 
schen Rechts,"  Vol.  I, p. 6 ff. (4th ed.). 
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To  confirm this conviction in us, the status of  modern 
investigation is sufficient, which is only in its first begin- 
nings of  a cultural history of  humanity;  the future has 
large gains in store in this field.  For our purpose, what 
we already know, and what takes place daily before our 
eyes, is quite sufficient to  warrant the statement that  the 
principle,  "Every  one exists for the worid,"  is just  as 
true of  nations as it is of  individuals.  In it we possess 
the highest cultural law of  history.  The cultural develop- 
ment of  humanity is determined according to the meas- 
ure  in which  it realizes  the above  principle, and wc 
need  only infer from  what  history  does  to what  she 
desires, and prove the manner in which she attains what 
she desires, in order to find in the above principle the 
highest  law  of  all  historical  development,  and in the 
realization of  the same the destiny of  the human race. 
Until this purpose is realized for the whole human race, 
history has not attained what she desires. 
The discussion hitherto was directed  to proving the 
actual validity of  this law;  we  now  add the question 
of  the  form of  its realization. 
A glance at  the world around us teaches us that this 
form is of  two kinds, free and forced.  Whether I shall 
use my head or my hands in the service of  society or not 
is a matter of  my free choice:  he who is liable to serve 
in the army is not asked if  he will serve.  Whether and 
what I shall give away of  my property to  others during 
life, or bequeath by will after  death,  depends  upon myself; 
the payment of  taxes and assessments to  the community 
and the State, and the leaving  of  the entailed portion 
to my children, does not.  The sphere of forcecoincides 
with that of  the law and the State; not, to  be sure, in 
the sense that the State  compels all the purposes which it 
pursues --  art and science cannot be forced;  and yet 
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the modern State -  but in the sense that the State raises 
the means at  least which it needs for these purposes by 
force. 
Of  voluntary actions which we undertake for others, 
some take place from the standpoint of  society without 
any, or at least without much, interest ; others  again are 
quite indispensable to society.  Whether a person does 
anything  for  his  friends, or whether  he contributes to 
some  collection, is indifferent  to society;  but that the 
farmer shall deliver grain, the baker bread, the butcher 
meat, that society shall always find  hands and brains 
ready  for  all  needs  and  purposes,  artisans  and  day- 
laborers,  merchants,  clergymen,  teachers,  officials - 
this is of  the greatest interest to her, and all the arrange- 
ments and habits of  life depend upon this presupposition. 
What  assurance  has she that this presupposition  will 
always be realized?  This is the question of  the organiza- 
tion of society.  It will be necessary, in order to answer 
it, that we first come to an understanding about the con- 
cept of  society,  which we have already used before but 
have not yet explained.  When this has been done we 
shaH consider the leyers which society sets in motion in 
order to carry out her task. 
6.  Concept of  Society.  The concept of  society is, as 
is well known, modern;  it came to us, so far as I  know, 
from France.  The fact that everybody uses the expres- 
sion, whereas there is anything but general agreement 
concerning the conceptual meaning thereof, shows that 
there  must  be  at its basis  an idea  which  our present 
thinking  must  absolutely  have, but which  has yet to 
make its way  into complete conceptual clearness.  As 
the matter has not yet taken its final shape, and every- 
one has his own view of  the expression, I also may be 
permitted  to do the same and bring it into connection 
with my point of  view concerning action for others. 
A society ("societas")  in the juristic sense is a union of 
a number of  persons who have combined for the prose- 
cution of  a common purpose,  and hence every one of 
them in acting for the purpose of  the society at  the same 
time. acts for himself.  A  society in  this juristic  sense 
presupposes a contract, directed to its construction and 
regulation -  the  social  contract.  But  actual  society, 
namely,  co-operation  for  common  purposes,  is  found 
repeatedly  in  life  without  this form.  Our  whole life, 
our whole intercourse, is in this actual non-juristic sense 
a society, i.e., a working together for common purposes, 
in which everyone in acting for others acts also for him- 
self, and in acting for himself acts also for others.  Upon 
this  mutual advancement  of  purposes rests, according 
to my opinion,  the concept of  society.  Society must 
accordingly  be  defined  as the actual  organization  of 
life for and by others and (since the individual is what he 
is, only through others) as the indispensable form of  life 
for oneself;  society is therefore really the form of  human 
life in general.  Human life and social life are synony- 
mous.  The ancient Greek philosophers recognized this 
perfectly;  there is no saying which expresses the social 
nature of  man more concisely and more fittingly, than 
the designation of  man as ($ov  ~XLTLK~V,  i.e., social being. 
The city (W~ALS),  i.e.,  cify life with its constant mutual 
contact and friction, is  the condition  and  the author 
of  all culture, not  merely  political,  which  the  Greek 
word  at first  suggests, but of  each and every kind - 
intellectual, ethical,  economic,  artistic -  in  short,  of 
the entire development  of  the  nation.  It is  society 
that makes  the  above  statement  true  (p.  51), "The 
world exists for me."  But this statement can be  true 
only by means of  the antithesis:  "You  exist  for  the 
world,"  the world  has the same claim  upon  you  that 
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first of  the two statements is realized in the life of  the 
individual is synonymous with what is called social posi- 
tion, viz.,  wealth,  honor, power, influence;  the  meas- 
ure in which the individual makes the second principle 
true in his life determines the worth of  his existence for 
society,  or in  its widest  extent,  for  humanity.  If  it 
were  not that daily experience and history  contradict 
such an opinion in the most glaring fashion, one might 
believe that the motive and the problem of  every social 
order must be to bring about an equilibrium between the 
two principles.  It may be that the distant future car- 
ries in its bosom what the development of  things hitherto 
has not been able to  mature. 
$ 7.  Society and State.  It follows from this that the 
concept of  society partly coincides with that of  thestate. 
But only in part; namely, in so far as the social purpose 
requires the intervention of  external force for its realiza- 
tion.  But it needs it only in small part.  Commerce 
and trade, agriculture, manufacture and industry, art 
and science, the usage of  the home and the customs of 
life, organize themselves essentially.  Only occasionally 
does the State interfere with its law, so far as it is abso- 
lutely  necessary  to secure against violation  the order 
which these interests have evolved independently. 
$ 8.  Problem  of  Social  Movement.  But  geographi- 
cally, too, the sphere of  society does not coincide with 
that of  the State;  the latter ends with  the boundary 
posts of  its territory, the former extends over the whole 
earth.  For  the  statement,  "Everyone  exists  for  the 
other," is true for all humanity, and the march of  social 
movement  is constantly advancing to realize this geo- 
graphically in ever widening extent; to gain new peoples 
constantly for co-operation;  to make all lands, peoples, 
forces,  goods,  useful  for  its  purposes.  To make  the 
work of  the individual, whether it be of  the hand or the 
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brain, as useful as possible for others, and thereby in- 
directly also for himself, to effectuate every force in the 
service of  humanity -  this is the problem  which every 
civilized  people  must  solve, and with  regard  to which 
it  must  regulate  all  its economies.  Production alone 
and  manufacture,  in  short, work alone is not  enough. 
Work alone constitutes only one part of  the  problem, 
the second  part  consists in  finding the man  who will 
best  realize  the purpose of  the labor product -  if  pos- 
sible to look for him over the entire surface of  the earth. 
Most of  the inventions of  modern times move in the two 
directions  indicated  by  these  two  problems.  Some 
have  work  itself  as their object, its simplification, per- 
fection, facilitation;  the others have as their object the 
utilization of  labor by means of  commerce;  the forward- 
ing and transmission of  what the first has produced for 
society -  (whether it be the fruit of  his field, the work 
of  his hands, the product of  his mind or his imagination) 
-  to the proper purchaser, i.e., to the one for whom the 
product  has the greatest value and who will  therefore 
pay the highest price for it.  If  we picture to ourselves 
all the means which the inventive mind of  modern civil- 
ized  peoples has created  for  the purpose  just  named, 
since the time of  the Middle Ages, we have a right to 
maintain that nowadays no power which has the capacity 
to be useful to humanity is lost for its service; every one 
finds  its  proper  application  in  our  times.  The press 
carries  the thought  which  deserves  it from  one point 
of  the earth to the other without delay;  every  great 
truth, every important discovery, every useful invention, 
becomes in a very short time the common property of 
the whole  civilized  world,  and commerce transmits to 
all  the inhabitants of  the earth what  she produces at 
any point, in the T'ropics as well as in the Frigid  Zone. 
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do good thousands  of  miles away.  Quinine, which  the 
Peruvian  laborer  gathers,  causes  the recovery  of  hun- 
dreds in our midst -  the merit of  the preservation of  a 
life upon which  depended the future of  a whole nation, 
or a new era of  art and science, is due in the last instance 
perhaps to the whale-hunter  who procured  blubber  for 
the consumptive.  The laborer in Nuremberg and Solin- 
gen works for the Persian;  the Chinese and the Japanese 
work for us;  thousands of  years hence the negro in the 
interior of Africa will need us as much as  we need him, for 
the man of  science, who opens the interior of Africa, is 
followed very soon after by the merchant  and the mis- 
sionary, who establish enduring connections. 
This  therefore  is  society,  namely,  the realization  of 
the truth of the principle, "Every one exists for the  world, 
and the world exists for every one."  Having determined 
this concept  we  now  return  to the question which  we 
asked  above, viz., What guaranty does society  possess 
that every one will do his share in realizing the principle 
upon  which  her whole existence depends, namely  that 
the  individual  exists  for  society?  The following  dis- 
cussion will give the answer to this question. 
8For the objections to this concept from the juristic standpoint, 
see Vol.  11, no. 18.  That the concept of  society cannot be avoided 
even in legal theory will be shown in Chapter VIII, where I reduce 
the interests protected  by the law to the subject of  their  purpose 
(individual,  State, society).  But the most  valuable  application of 
this concept will be found in the second volume in connection with 
the analysis of  the concept of  the ethical, and in the third  volume 
in connection with the realization of  the  ethical  (social  system  of 
coercion).  [The third volume was never written. -  Translator.] 
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CHAPTER VII 
SOCIAL  MECHANICS,  OR  THE  LEVERS  OF 
SOCIAL  MOVEMENT 
1.  THE  EGOISTIC LEVERS-  REWARD. -  SOCIAL MECHAN- 
ICS. -  COMMERCE. -  $ 1.  INSUFFICIENCY  OF  BENEVO- 
LENCE  FOR  PURPOSES  OF  COMMERCE  (LIBERAL  CON- 
TRACTS  AND  BUSINESS  CONTRACTS ;  ROMAN  SYSTEM 
OF  COMMERCE  IN  EARLIER  AND  LATER  TIMES).- 
ALL  COMMERCE  FOUNDED  UPON  EGOISM. -  $2. THE 
PRINCIPLE  OF  COMPENSATION. -  THE  TWO  PRINCIPAL 
FORMS OF COMMERCE -  THE  FIRST: EXCHANGE (DIFFER- 
ENCE OF PURPOSE ON BOTH SIDES) REAL PERFORMANCE 
AND CONSIDERATION. -  $3. PROGRESS FROM  REAL  CON- 
SIDERATION TO REWARD. -  $4. PROMOTION OF REWARD 
TO EQUIVALENT. -  $5. ORGANIZATION OF WORK  IN THE 
FORM  OF A  VOCATION. -  5 6.  CREDIT. -  $ 7.  IDEAL  RE- 
WARD AND ITS COMBINATION WITH ECONOMIC REWARD 
(SALARY,  HONORARIUM;  MAINTENANCE  IN  CONTRAST 
WITH  REWARD). -THE  SECOND  PRINCIPAL  FORM  OF 
COMMERCE:  PARTNERSHIP  (IDENTITY  OF  PURPOSE  ON 
BOTH  SIDES). -  $ 8.  ASSOCIATION;  PUBLIC  SPIRIT;  DE- 
FECTS OF THE SECOND PRINCIPAL FORM. -  THE BRIGHT 
SIDES OF COMMERCE;  ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF COM- 
MERCE. 
Social  Mechanics.  This  is  the picture of  society as 
life presents it daily to our eyes.  Thousands of  rollers, 
wheels, knives, as in a mighty machine, move restlessly, 
some  in  one  direction,  some  in  another,  apparently 
quite independent of  one another as if  they existed only 
for  themselves,  nay  in  apparent  conflict, as  if  they 72  THE  CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH.VII  SOCIAL  MECHANICS -  REWARD  73 
wanted  mutually  to  annihilate  each  other -  and  yet 
all  work  ultimately  together harmoniously  for  one MY- 
pose,  and one single plan  rules the whole.  What com- 
pels  the elementary  forces of society  to order and co- 
operation;  who indicates to these their paths and their 
motions?  The  machine  must  obey  the  master;  the 
laws  of  mechanics  enable  him  to compel  it.  But  the 
force which  moves  the wheelwork  of  human society is 
the human  will;  that force which,  in contrast  to the 
forces of  nature, boasts of its freedom;  but the will  in 
that  function  is  the will  of  thousands  and millions  of 
individuals,  the struggle  of  interests, of  the opposition 
of  efforts,  egoism,  self-will,  insubordination,  inertia, 
weakness,  wickedness,  crime.  There  is  no  greater 
miracle  in the world  than the disciplining and training 
of  the human will, whose actual realization in its widest 
scope we embrace in the word society. 
The sum of  impulses  and  powers  which  accomplish 
this work  I  call  social  mechanics.  If  these were  want- 
ing, who  would  assure  society  that the moving  forces 
upon which  she counts might  not one day refuse their 
service, or take a direction hostile to her purposes;  that 
the will  might not  one day at this or that point rise  in 
revolt against the role assigned to it and bring the whole 
wheelwork  to a  standstill?  Temporarily such standing 
still actually takes place at individual points;  yea, even 
shocks  which  seem  to threaten  the entire existence of 
society, just as in the human body.  But the vital force 
of  society is so strong and indestructible that she always 
quickly  overcomes  these  disturbances;  in  place  of 
anarchy, order as a rule at once steps in again -every 
social disturbance is only a search for a new and better 
order -  anarchy is only a  means,  never  an end, some- 
thing temporary, never anything permanent ;  the struggle 
crf  anarchy with society always ends with the victory of 
the latter. 
But this means nothing else than that society possesses 
a compelling power over the human will; that there is a 
social mechanics to compel the human will just as there 
is a physical mechanics to force the machine.  This social 
mechanics  is identical  with  the  principle  of  leverage, 
by  means of  which  society sets the will  in motion  for 
her  purposes, or in short, the principle  of the levers  of 
social motion. 
There are four  such levers.  Two of  them  have ego- 
ism as their motive and presupposition; I call them the 
lower or egoistic social levers;  they are reward  and coer- 
cion.  Without  them social  life cannot be thought, no 
commerce  without reward, and no law or State without 
coercion; they represent therefore the elementary assump- 
tions  of  society ;  the  necessary  impulses  which  can 
nowhere be wanting and are not wanting, though their 
condition be ever so rudimentary or degenerate.  Opposed 
to these are two other impulses which have not egoism 
as their motive and presupposition,  but on the contrary 
the denial thereof;  and as they come into play not in 
the lower region of  purely individual purposes, but in the 
higher region of  universal purposes, I call them the  higher; 
or, since, as I shall show later (Chapter IX), society is 
the source of  morality, the  moral  or  ethical  levers  of 
social  motion.  They  are the Feeling  of  Duty  and  of 
Love;  the former the prose, the latter the poetry of  the 
moral spirit. 
Of  the two egoistical  levers, coercion  holds  psycho- 
logically  the lowest  position.  Reward  stands psycho- 
logically  a  degree  higher,  for  reward  appeals  to  the 
freedom of  the subject; it expects its success exclusively 
from the free resolve of  the latter.  In an indolent per- 
son reward fails of  its purpose, whereas coercion proves 
its power  over him also, for it either excludes freedom 
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where  it operates  psychologically  (p.  17).  Coercion 
addresses  itself  to man at his  lowest;  it denotes  the 
lowest point of  social mechanics; which should therefore 
in reality begin  with  coercion.  But the point  of  view 
from which we have to consider  those two levers is not 
the manner  of their  psychological  influence  upon  the 
individual,  but their  practical  significance  for  society; 
and if  we apply the point of view of  social formation to 
the two motives as a  standard  of  measurement, there 
can be no doubt that the social organization of  reward - 
commerce, is to be  designated  as lower  in  comparison 
with  that of  coercion -  the law and the State.  Hence 
an exposition which has made it its task to rise from the 
lower to the higher  in its consideration of  society, must 
begin with reward, as we are going to  do. 
Commerce.  Commerce  is  the  organization  of  the 
assured  satisfaction  of  human  wants,  which  is  based 
upon the lever of  reward.  This definition of  the concept 
embraces  three  elements;  the need  as the motive,  the 
rward  as the means, and  the  organization  in  mutual 
relation of  these elements as  the  form of  commerce.  This 
organization  is,  as perhaps  no  other  element  of  the 
human  world besides,  the natural  product  of  the free 
development of  purpose;  it is  the dialectics  (not  the 
logical  dialectics of  the  concept,  in  which  I  do not 
believe),  but  the  practically  compelling  dialectics  of 
the purpose, which has produced out of  the two factors 
of  need  and  reward  in  gradual  progress  the immeas- 
urable wealth of  formation which  we know  by the one 
word,  commerce.  And  there is no more  grateful  task 
for the thinker  interested  in the practical  than to fol- 
low the ways of  purpose in this matter, and to observe 
how from the simplest germ  there have gradually arisen 
by a compelling  necessity ever higher forms and struc- 
tures.  I  will  make the attempt to bring  to view  this 
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dialectics  of  purpose, by seeking out for all the phe- 
nomena of  commerce those points in which they proceed 
from it as branches and twigs from the trunk, from the 
foot to the crown;  at the same time pointing  out the 
determining  reasons  which  produced  the  particular 
impulses.  The economic side of the question is entirely 
foreign to my investigation, which is purely social in its 
nature,  and  I  am only  interested  in  the arrangements 
upon  which  the  security of the satisfaction of  human 
want is based for society, but not in the laws according 
to which the methods of commerce are regulated.  The 
contents of the problem before us will naturally assume 
a juristic  form, which is inseparable therefrom. 
The decisive position which I shall constantly keep in 
mind in the following consideration is that of  the security 
of  the satisfaction of human wants; it  shall be the stand- 
ard by which  I intend to measure all  the  phenomena 
of  commerce. 
Want is the band with which nature draws man into 
society, the means by which she realizes the two prin- 
ciples of  all morality  and culture,  "Everybody  exists 
for  the world,"  and "the  world  exists for everybodyv 
(p. 51).  Dependent as  he is upon his fellowmen through 
his need, and the more so  as  his need grows, man would 
be the most unhappy being in the world  if  the satis- 
faction of his need depended upon accident, and he could 
not count with all security upon the co-operation  and 
assistance  of  his fellowmen.  In that case the animal 
would be an  object of envy to him, for the animal is so 
made by nature that when it  comes into possession of the 
powers destined for it by nature it needs no such sup- 
port.  The realization  of the mutual relations  of  man 
for her purpose;  the elimination of accident;  the estab- 
lishment of  the security of  the satisfaction of human 
nced as a basal form of social existence;  the regulated, 76  THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH. VII 
assured  and substantial system of  actions and methods 
which  minister  to this satisfaction, keeping equal step 
with the need -  that is commerce. 
The simplest form of  satisfaction of  a need, in man as  in 
the animal, lies in his own  power.  But whereas in the 
animal, need and power coincide, this is not the case in 
man.  It  is this very disproportion between the two, this 
insufficiency of  his  own  power, which  is the cause  by 
means of  which nature forces him to be a man; namely, 
to  look for man, and in association with others to attain 
those  purposes  to which  he is alone  u~cqual. In his 
nccessity  she refers  him  to the outside world  and his 
fellows.  Let us now  investigate how  he makes use of 
others for the satisfaction of  his wants. 
5 1.  Insuficiency  of  Benevolence  for  Purposes  of 
Commerce.  Benevolence  and  beneficence  mean  wishing 
and achieving the good  of  another for this one's own sake, 
without benefit to  oneself.  These, therefore, presuppose 
the  sentiment  of  disinterestedness  and  unselfishness. 
That a system of  commerce cannot be built upon such 
a motive is so evident that we need waste no words in 
discussing it.  Nevertheless,  this does not exclude the 
possibility  that  benevolence  may  after  all  exercise  a 
certain function, even though a limited one, in the pur- 
poses of  commerce.  Let us see whether this is the case 
and to what degree. 
Liberal Contracts and Business Contracts.  If  the ques- 
tion  were  how  far  the juristic  scope  of  benevolence 
extends, we should have to answer, quite as far as that 
of  egoism, for the scheme of  gratuitous contracts (liberal, 
by courtesy, friendly)  contains a completely fitting coun- 
terpart  to that of  onerous  contracts  (egoistic, business 
contracts).  One may add. 
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For  Pay  Gratuitously 
(1  I  An Obiect  Purchase. Exchange  Donation 
(2j The use 
- 
Loan for Use ("com-  Usufructuary Lease 
(a) of an Object  modatum"),  "Preca-  Ordinary Lease  rium" 
(b) of  Capital  Loan on Interest  Loan without Interest. 
I 
Gratuitous  Agency 
("mandatum"), 
Deposit,  Voluntary  (3) Performance of  "0per;e  Illiberales" 
Service  Contract for Services  Assumption  of  An- 
other  Person's  Busi- 
ness  ("negotiorum 
gestio") 
So every business contract has a gratuitous contract 
corresponding to it, and thereby we might suppose the 
significance  of  benevolence in commerce is sufficiently 
proven.  But from the fact that benevolence also makes 
its appearance in the  domain of law, and  has a share in  its 
forms, it does not yet follow by any means that it has 
any practical  significance worth mentioning in the pur- 
pose of  commerce. 
The contracts of  the first column  are based  on no 
other  presupposition  than money -  whoever  pays the 
most  money gets the object, whether  he is personally 
known  or  not.  Those of  the second  column, on the 
contrary, presuppose  certain personal  relations or indi- 
vidual qualities, which give rise to  a given act of  benevo- 
lence -  we do not give presents to, nor do we lend to 
or serve every Tom, Dick and Harry, but we consider 
the person;  and this influence of  the personal  element 
Especially the relation of  friendship.  This element is frequently 
emphasized by the Roman jurists in those contracts:  "affectio," 
Dig. 3. 5. 3  5 9, 39. 5. 5; "officium  amicitiae," 42.5.23;  "officium 
atque amicitia"  17. 1. 1  5 4.  The service which is rendered  is a 
favor, a benefit:  "beneficium,"  13. 6. 17 0 3.; "liberalitas,"  43.26. 
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makes  benevolence  useless  for  the  purpose  of  com- 
merce,  which  requires  complete indifference  of  person. 
(See below.) 
The  initiative which, in all acts that one requires from 
another for the satisfaction of one's needs, proceeds from 
the one who feels the need is called in business contracts, 
ofler;  in gratuitous  contracts,  request;  in charitable 
contracts, begging;  and these three expressions indicate 
sufficiently the difference of  the personal relation exist- 
ing  in the three cases.  Offer requires no special indi- 
vidual  relations  or  qualities  beyond  being  aware,  in 
general, of  the inclination of the other party to make 
the contract;  but the two other forms of  initiative do. 
A  request  for which  the justification  is sought  by  the 
person who makes it in his poverty and need of  help is 
called begging, and the gift which is granted out of  such 
regard,  from sympathy and pity, is called  alms (juris- 
tically  not  distinguished  from  a  gift  "donatio";  the 
difference being simply social in its nature);  and in the 
contemptuous  judgment  which  language passes in this 
term  lies expressed  the uselessness of  this sort of  help 
for  the purposes of commerce.  Assistance which must 
be  bought  at the price  of  personal  humiliation is the 
exact opposite of  that which, as we shall see later, con- 
stitutes  the  highest  and  most  beautiful  aim of  com- 
merce, oiz.,  the independence of  the person.  This humili- 
ation, it is true, is absent in request, but request  has a 
very narrow scope in reference to the thing as well  as 
the person.  One cannot request  everything -  there is a 
point where requesting passes over into begging; -  and 
one cannot request  everybody, unless the content of  the 
request is limited to such favors as every one can grant 
without  the least  exertion;  such  as courtesies  of  the 
street, a request for information, etc.  These alone are 
free from all personal discrimination, and in so far stand 
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on the same line as acts of  business intercourse -every 
one has the right to require them and feel assured that 
they will be granted.  But on the other hand the meas- 
ure of  these favors in respect to content is so very scanty 
that they vanish  into nothingness in comparison  with 
the wealth of  purposes which  commerce has to satisfy. 
Beyond  this minimum of  application, request as well as 
the prospect of  its fulfilment is connected with individual 
personal  relations  (friendship,  neighborhood,  acquaint- 
ance, relation of  dependence, etc.),  and even when these 
are present, its scope is still so narrowly limited that the 
impossibility  of basing any purpose of  commerce upon 
self-denial  (favor) instead  of  upon  egoism  (reward) is 
quite evident. 
Roman System of Commerce in  Earlier and Later Times. 
I  feel the necessity of  making an objection to my own 
view  here.  The theory  advanced  is  taken  from  the 
consideration of  our present life, and is true of  the stage 
of development of  commerce in the present.  In these 
days money  has driven  favor  entirely from  the field 
as a  mode  of  commerce.  But it was  not always  so. 
There were  times  when  one got services  for  nothing 
which now one can get only for money, and that too not 
only  in cases where  there were  special  personal  rela- 
tions,  but in general  and with no limitation.  At this 
time, then, favor actually constituted a factor  in the life 
of  commerce, and exercised a function  therein.  Similar 
conditions are  still to  be found among uncivilized peoples 
of  today in reference to  hospitality; and in regions thinly 
populated  they are found among civilized peoples also. 
The objection is perfectly correct, and I do  not regard 
it as a waste of  time to dwell on it  a little longer, for it  is 
well  calculated to give a  better insight into the life of 
commerce.  Yet it will be advisable for our purpose to 
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what was the condition of  society to which this refers us. 
I know of  no better choice -  quite  apart from the special 
relation which  the ohjcct has for the jurist -  than to 
presentclearly the contrast between paid and gratuitous 
services as it practically  existed  in ancient  Rome for 
centuries;  and then to join  to this an account of the 
transformation  which  the  thing  underwent  in  later 
times.  The  historical excursus which I shall thus insert 
will not be fruitless for the purposes of  our investigation. 
The difference between paid  and gratuitous work in 
ancient  Rome coincides with that between  manual and 
intellectual; the former service alone extended the hand 
for pay, the latter did not.  The conception which  lay 
at  the basis was not peculiarly Roman, it  is found among 
all peoples and individuals upon a low level of  culture, 
for it is nothing  else than the practical  application  to 
work  of  the c udely  material  mode  of  viewing  things 
peculiar  to them.  Bodily work is a fact subject to the 
observation  of  the senses by all persons.  The subject 
who is engaged in it feels it, the third person sees it, and 
not merely the work alone as an act but also its product, 
its permanent  result.  This alone  gives it a  claim  to 
reward;  in the first place because this is the only work 
that costs sweat, and in the second place because, accord- 
ing to crude ideas, this is the only work that produces 
things2  Intellectual labor, on the other  hand, is not 
2This idea is expressed  in language, where  the expression "Ge- 
schaft" [business] (from "schaffen" -  to create) is restricted to work 
in the above sense.  Work ("Arbeit")  is connected with production 
("Schaffen")  and  property  ("Vermogen").  In  Latin:  "opera," 
pains,  effort;  "opus,"  the product  of  work,  "opes"  and "c-opia," 
wealth,  property.  In German:  "Arbeit"  ("arb,"  "arbi,"  "arpi," 
Slavic, with letters interchanged, "rab-ota," Polish "robota")  work, 
and "Erbe"  ("arbja,"  "arbi,"  "arpi,"  "erbi,"  "das  Erbe"-inheri- 
tance-property,  wealth),  "Dienen"  (serving)  and  "Verdienen" 
(earning). 
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regarded as work, for it seems not to fatigue the person, 
and apparently costs him no tro~ble.~  What right can 
a man have to ask of  us remuneration, whose whole work 
for us consists in thinking;  whose service to us is merely 
speaking?  Words cost no money -  he who gives them 
is paid with the same coin in return; he is thanked with 
words, and with  "divine  reward,"  but he gets nothing. 
This conception  which is still prevalent today among 
common  people  was  originally  found  everywhere.  In 
ancient Rome it  was regarded so  seriously that  it  was con- 
sidered  ignoble  to receive  pay  for  intellectual  work. 
Manual  labor  alone  was  paid  for and therefore  also 
despised.  For  reward  ("merces")  puts  it on a  level 
with  merchandise  ("merx");  it  is  offered  for  sale 
("locatur"  from  "locus")  and bought  like the other; 
the  paymaster  takes  the man  along  ("conducere"  to 
lead along with) just as he takes the thing which he buys 
("emere" -  to take).  The expressions for hire are ex- 
actly the same for free men, slaves, and things.  The 
servant or laborer is considered as a temporary contract 
slavc;  his service involves  social degradation  ("minis- 
a The idea  is expressed in  Latin:  "otium,"  leisure,  "negotium" 
(Festus:  quod non sit otium), business.  He who has an occupa- 
tion, a business, has no leisure, and vice versa. 
"Locare,"  to display, to exhibit, is synonymous with public offer 
for  sale.  In  Plautus  the cooks  stand exhibited  in  the market 
place  and are taken  home  by the one who  arranges  for a meal. 
Conversely in the case of  "opus," "locatio," i. e. public bidding, takes 
place on the part of  the one who is looking for one to take it upon 
himself  ("conducit").  The German language borrows the expres- 
sion "Gewerbe"  (trade, industrial  pursuit) from  the same idea of 
exhibiting,  seeking  for  work.  "Gewerbe"  means "werben,"  i. e., 
"suing  for"  work and pay.  It is not applied to intellectual pro- 
fessions, any more than the terminology of  hire ("merces,"  "locatio," 
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teri~m"),~  for it binds him to do things to which a free 
man should not give himself, and which he should leave 
to the slave ("operae illiberale~").~  The service of  the 
free man is no "ministerium,"  but a "munus '; it con- 
sists not in corporeal but in intellectual  activity, and 
it is rendered not for the sake of  reward, but out of  good- 
will  ("gratia'  ), without  pay  ("gratis").  It is a  favor 
("munificentia,"  "beneficium,"  "officium"),  which  is 
worthy of a free man ("1  her,"  "liberalitas"),  and which 
produces in the other party the obligation to thank only, 
("gratiae,"  "gratum  facere" -  "gratificatio").  The 
"munus"  may be returned on the other side ("remun- 
erari"),  under  certain  circumstances  even  in  money, 
but this compensation  is no  "merces,"  but "honor," 
"honorarium,"  an honorary  present  which  does  not 
prejudice  the honor  of  either  party.l  If  special  skill 
or knowledge is necessary  for the service, then it is an 
excellence, a virtue  (Qtmj -  "arsO), which  is an orna- 
ment for the free man ("ars liberalis");  the trouble he 
takes to  learn it is not "labor,"  "opera," but "studium," 
an object of  striving ("studere")  for its own sake. 
Such is the ancient Roman conception.  Agriculture, 
From  "minus,"  "minuere,"  "ministerium,"  i.  e., lowering,  in 
contrast  with  "magis"  "magister,"  "magistratus,"  i. e., elevation 
above the social level of  the ordinary citizen. 
Cicero, "De Officiis"  I, 42.  "Merces auctoramentum servitutis " 
The earnings, he says here, of  all hired labor are dirty:  "quorum 
operae, non quorum artes  emuntur,"  Simibrly the gain of  all manual 
laborers ("in  sordida arte versantur"), of  peddlers and even of  shop 
keepers.  Hence "sordidurn" -  the pay of the broker, Dig. 50.  14.3. 
'Dig.  11. 6. 1. pr " . . .  ad  remunerandum dariet inde honora- 
rium appe lari."  Its value lies not in the money but in the inten- 
tion -a  conception  which  appears again  in the  "honorare"  of 
bequests ("legatum"):  The respectable  person is more concerned 
about the recognition, the honor ("honor legati," Dig. 27. 1. 36. pr.) 
than about the money, no matter how eager he may be to  get it. 
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placing  money,  wholesale  business,  are  respectable; 
every  other  branch  of  industry has a  taint attaching 
to it.  Intellectual  power,  talent, knowledge  is a good 
which everyone who values honor must place gratuitously 
at the disposition  of  his  fellow-citizens  and the State. 
The State official  receives  no salary  (only subordinate 
service is paid, so far as it is not provided for by public 
slaves);  magistracies  are  purely  posts  of  honor 
("honores").  Neither  does  the  calling  of  jurisconsult 
("jurisconsultus"),  SO  entirely  indispensable  to Roman 
life, bring any income. 
For ancient  Rome this conception held  an eminently 
social significance.  I do  not mean this in the sense that 
it determined the social  position  of  the individual and 
the distinction of  classes,  but in reference  to the func- 
tion of  the gratuitous services in commerce.  In Rome 
the gratuitous services covered essential needs of  society 
and the State; the condition of  both rested for hundreds 
of  years on the presupposition that such services could 
be safely depended upon at  all times to the needed ex- 
tent  without  pay;  just  as drinking-water  with  us - 
indispensable, and yet at  the same time free. 
Now what was it that made the Roman give his ser- 
vices free of  charge?  Was it benevolence, unselfishness? 
We do not know the Romans very  well  if  we  believe 
this.  No!  The Roman did not relinquish  all  reward 
for his services, only it did not consist in ringing coins, 
but in a good which had no less a power  of  attraction 
for  the  man of  the higher classes than money for that  of the 
lower, viz.,  honor, prestige, popularity, influence, power. 
This was the price which the prominent public character 
regularly  had  in  mind  when  he  did  anything  for  the 
people;  and  he  measured  the  value  of  magistracies 
accordingly.  The purely  ecclesiastical  posts,  those  of 
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bestowed  no power, enticed him  so little that whereas 
in the  "honores"  the men sought  the office, here  the 
office sought the men. 
It  was not therefore self-denial, but the familiar prin- 
ciple of  egoism,  upon which  in Rome the assurance of 
those  services  was  based  which  were  indispensable  to 
the State and society;  except that the reward which was 
expected  was  not  economical  in  its nature,  but  ideal. 
At  the same time this  phenomenon  so strange to our 
days of  replacing the prosaic motive of  money by more 
ideal motives has a peculiar fascination for us. 
But the thing, in addition to its ideal side, had also a 
very serious practical reverse side. 
A  calling  which  brings  only  honor  but  no  bread is 
closed  to the man of  no means.  So it was in Rome. 
Service of  the State and jurisprudence  actually consti- 
tuted the monopoly of  the well-to-do.  One of  the most 
prominent  jurists  in  the time  of  the early   emperor^,^ 
who had devoted himself  to this science without means, 
had to buy this venture in the choice of  his profession 
by being  obliged  to receive  support from his auditors. 
Where science has not yet won its right, i.  e.,  its  claim to 
compensation, the gracious gift takes the place of  Com- 
pensation. 
This defect  brought about the fall of  the entire system, 
and the innovation, in the transition to  the pay system, 
meant  great  progress  socially.  The  revolution  took 
place  first  in science,  and  this was  brought  about by 
foreign influence.  The Greek teachers in all branches of 
art and science, the "rhetores,"  "grammatici,"  "philoso- 
phi,"  "mathematici,"  "geometrae,"  "architecti," "paeda- 
gogi," and whatever other names those teachers may have 
had  who  made  pilgrimages  to the world  city in great 
numbers to  try their fortune there, and who betray their 
Masurius  Subinus,  Dig. 1. 2.  2  5 48. 
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Greek origin in their names -  all brought collsiderable 
knowledge and skilled  hands.  But their pockets  were 
empty and their stomachs were hungry, and necessity 
forced them to  defy Roman prejudice and accept money 
for instruction.  So these accustomed the Roman to a 
spectacle  hitherto new to him, of  seeing science earn a 
living;  and theirs is the merit -  for it was a merit - 
to have conquered the natibnal prejudice,  and to have 
won  for art and science their legal  status on Roman 
ground.  For so we must regard the circumstance that 
the law did not apply to science  the humiliating  form 
of "actio locati"  and "merces,"  but created for it a new 
form, the "extraordinaria  cognitio"  of  the praetor over 
the honorarium -  the procedural expression of  the fact 
that art  and science were not placed on  the  same line with 
manual  labor.@ The private honorarium  was followed 
later  by  compensation  to teachers  from the funds of 
State and community. 
Jurisprudence too was not left without a trace of  the 
revolution.  Greek influence brought about a division in 
the legal profession  which had been quite unknown  in 
ancient times; between  the purely practical or business 
profession and the purely scientific or theoretical.  The 
former is represented by the "pragmaticus,"  the jurist 
with a Greek title, and patterned after a Greek model, 
a kind of  jurist that was quite foreign to ancient Rome. 
He is a business man who is ready to serve every busi- 
ness interest for money, a juristic commissionaire, or agent, 
good for everything.  The second branch of  the profes- 
sion is represented  by the jurist  with the Roman title 
(~'~u~~sco~su~~us~'),  and in the ancient Roman style, the 
man of  science,  who holds to the traditions of  ancient 
times  and disdains  to make a source of  profit  out of 
@That  this formula was meant as a distinction and privilege fol- 
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science.  He gives his service gratuitously to every one 
who  desires his  advice or instruction,  but with  lofty 
reserve  he  keeps  far  away  from  the  quarrels  of  the 
market place and the tumult of  business life.  He waits 
until he is consulted;  is highly esteemed by public opin- 
ion, and regarded  far superior to the jurist of  mere bread 
and butter.  The highest goal of  his ambition in the time 
of  the emperors was  the bestowal  of  the "jus  respon- 
dendi,"  which  stamped him as the official juristic oracle 
of  the  people.  The  incompatibility  of  compensation 
with  the scientific  calling  of  the jurist  was  so  firmly 
axiomatic to the Roman jurist  that as late as the third 
century in the time of  the emperors, when the revolution 
above  mentioned  had  been  carried  through  in all  the 
disciplines,  one of  them  denied  the teacher  of  law  his 
claim to  a honorarium.1°  Nay, even the public compensa- 
tion,  which  all  other  publicly  appointed  teachers  had 
been  for  a  long  time  receiving,  was  still  denied  the 
teacher of law in the time of  Constantine; and, appar- 
ently, it was not until the period of  decadence from Con- 
stantine to Justinian that he was assigned a salary." 
As  Rome  owes  to the Greeks  the appropriation  of 
pay to art and science, so she owes to the provinces the 
lo Ulpian in Dig. 50. 13. 1  Q 4. 5. " .  .  .  est quidem res sanctissima 
civilis sapientia, sed quae pretio  nummario non sit aestimanda nec 
dehonestanda."  The teachers of philosophy also share in this doubt- 
ful distinction.  It  is said of  them, "hoc primum profiteri eos oportet 
mercenariam  operam  spernere,"  as if  a  philosopher could  live on 
air!  Both  are only allowed to accept a honorarium  offered volun- 
tarily, "quaedam  enim tametsi . . .  honeste accipiantur, inhoneste 
autem petuntur." 
l1 In  Cod. 10.52.6.  of  Constantine, the "mercedes ac salaria" do 
not refer, as the Glossators assumed, to honorarium, but to public 
compensation (Dig. 50. 13. 1 5 5). The decisive addition, "doctores 
legum," which  is wanting in the original text of  the code  in Cod. 
Theod. 12. 2.  1, was made by the compilers of  Justinian.  This will 
justify  the conclusion in the text. 
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introduction of  salary in the service of  the State.  The 
custom of  the aediles spending more than the sums set 
aside by the senate for the public games so that they 
were obliged  in many instances to cover the enormous 
deficit out of  their own means, had become so prevalent 
in the last kentury of  the Republic that whoever did not 
want to ruin  his chances with  the people  and destroy 
his  political  future  dared  not  economize  during  his 
aedileship  even if  he spent his entire income upon it. 
In return, however, the public sense of  ethics allpwed him 
to recoup  himself  as provincial  governor.  Legally  he 
received  merely  the equipment  that pertained  to his 
station, later he received in place of  this a sum of  money 
("vasarium");  but as a matter of  fact his post was an 
indemnification for the costs of  the aedileship and muni- 
cipal magistracy.  It  was an aurhority issued to  him to 
recover, on leaving the service of  the State, the invest- 
ment  he  had  spent  when  he  entered  it -  a  letter of 
marque issued by the people and senate upon the prov- 
inces -  and if  one were  not too clumsy in collecting it 
he  had  nothing to fear.  The emperors  found  it morc 
advisable  to take the business  of  plundering the prov- 
inces into their own hands, and to  this end to redeem the 
undesirable  competition  of  the  provincial  governors 
by a salary.  This is the origin of  salaries in the later 
period  of  State service at Rome.  It  was soon extended 
from this to all imperial officials, whereas in the republi- 
can  magistracies,  which  had  become  insignificant,  the 
old order remained. 
The preceding account proves that for many centuries 
Roman  society  was  able  to  maintain  an  important 
branch of  its public service solely by means of  the ideal 
rewards of  power, influence, honor, prestige;  but that 
it was obliged in later times to  call to its aid the economic 
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not "to put in place of  the former," it is in view of  an 
opinion which  I  shall not be able to prove until later 
(§ 7); namely,  that the kind  of  money  reward  which 
appears in the two spheres mentioned represents not a 
simple case of  economic  reward  but forms a  union  of 
economic and ideal  rewards. 
5 2.  All Commerce Founded  upon Egoism;  Principle 
of  Compensation.  Compensation in the world  of  com- 
merce is only a particular application of  a general idea, 
which  pervades  the whole  human  world,  the idea  of 
retribution  ("Vergeltung").  Beginning  with  reuenge, 
the return of  evil for evil, the idea of  retribution in its 
development always rises higher and higher until finally, 
risen above the region of  human existence, it finds its 
highest conclusion in the idea of a divine retribution and 
justice.  Let us try to get a clear understanding of  the 
content of  the term by reference to its linguistic deriva- 
tion. 
The  German  word  "gelten"  expresses  equality  of 
value.  In the original  transitive  sense,  now  retained 
only  in  the  composite  words  "entgelten"  and  "ver- 
gelten,"  it signifies  the granting  of  equality.  In the 
intransitive  sense,  it  denotes  the  existence  thereof, 
hence the German word  for money,  "Geld"  (originally 
"Gelt"),  means the thing that is equal in value (intran- 
sitive), and the thing that equalizes value (transitive). 
The oldest use of  the expression that is historically trace- 
able ("geltan," "keltan," "gildan")  goes back to  heathen 
worship  (J. Grimm,  "Mytliologie,"  p.  34).  With his 
thank-offering the man paid  (German "galt")  the god 
for  the good which came to  him, with the expiatory offer- 
ing he paid for the evil committed by him.  Our present 
usage  employs  the  term  "Vergelten"  (retribution)  in 
this sense, and distinguishes it from "Entgelten"  (com- 
pensation).  The latter  expression  is  appropriated  in 
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legal phraseology for the equalization of  a service, whether 
promised  beforehand  or to be  expected  under  the cir- 
cumstances ("entgeltliche Vertrage" -onerous  contracts). 
The former expression  is used  for the return of  evil  for 
evil,  and good  for  good,  which  was  not contemplated 
originally. 
Organized  compensation  ("Entgelten")  in  social  life 
becomes  business  intercourse  or commerce ; organized 
retribution  ("Vergelten")  of  the  socially  evil  becomes 
criminal  justice.  The State, public  opinion, and  his- 
tory are divided in the retribution  of  the socially  good, 
but  the  ideal  culminating  point  of  the  concept  of 
retribution in both good and evil is reached in the idea 
of  divine justice.  There is no idea  which  man feels to 
be so compelling as that of  compensatory equalization. 
What the basis of  this is, whether it is innate in man, or 
like many other ideas which we regard as  innate, is only 
a result of  historical development, does not here concern 
us, and we shall take up the question in its proper place. 
But whatever be the final source to which  the idea of 
equalization must be traced, there can be no doubt that 
egoism alone is the impelling motive of  its realization in 
commerce.  Commerce is a complete system of  egoism, 
and nothing more.  I do not  mean to indicate in this a 
defect of  commerce or a failure, but a virtue;  it is the 
element upon which its greatness and strength depend, 
and  according  to  the  perfection  of  this  element  the 
height of  the development of  commerce is determined. 
The more it succeeds in basing the guaranty of  the satis- 
faction of  human wants exclusively  upon egoism in all 
relations  of  life, and in replacing  benevolence and un- 
selfishness by self-interest  and the desire for gain,  the 
more perfectly does it fulfil its task. 
I am  aware that this eulogy of  egoism will arouse oppo- 
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over  the matter  carefully.  Egoism  in  commerce,  he 
will object, is a necessary evil, but where it has not yet 
found its way it  must not be summoned, and we must be 
glad  that we can get along without it.  Let the reader 
make the trial himself in a special case. 
Let him suppose he has the choice between a journey 
into a land where he can find hotels everywhere, and into 
one in which  there are no inns at all, but where this 
want is replaced  by a  general  hospitality.  Where will 
he prefer to guide his steps, provided  there are no other 
circumstances to influence his choice?  I doubt not that 
he would decide for the country of  inns. 
Hospitality is a fine thing, truly; one which opens the 
door to the weary wanderer, and the poetic charm of  the 
thing must not at  all be denied any more than the poetic 
charm  of  robber-knights,  robbers,  and  lions;  yet  for 
practical  life safe streets are better than unsafe;  oxen 
and police officers are better met than lions and robber- 
knights;  and an inn is better than hospitality.  For an 
inn gives me the certainty of  a reception, which  I have 
not in hospitality; and my money spares me the humilia- 
tion of  a request, of  accepting a favor, of  giving thanks - 
my freedom and independence on the journey lie in my 
purse.  Therefore it means an  advance which can hard1  y 
be overestimated when inns are established in an  unpopu- 
lated region where hitherto the stranger was obliged to 
beg  his accommodation.  Then only is a  land of  this 
kind  really opened  to the travelling  public -  and the 
innkeeper becomes no less important for travel than the 
merchant is for the business of  exchange;  both of  them 
guarantee the easy and assured satisfaction of  a certain 
class of  human wants; they contain in them the commer- 
cial organization of  this satisfaction; i. e., a system built 
upon the principle of  compensation. 
The transition  from gratuitousness to compensation 
or from favor to  business, that  was shown in this example, 
has been carried out in many other relations, and is still 
taking place under our own eyes.  Every one who helps 
in  this  transition  deserves  well  of  society,  although 
he earns for his services blame rather than recognition 
from  the  great  majority.  Most  people  see  only  the 
unpleasant  side of  the innovation, viz., that they must 
hereafter pay for that which before they had for nothing, 
without noticing to what degree  the disadvantages  of 
the change are outweighed by the advantages.  I cannot 
forbear from the task of bringing  these advantages into 
fuller light. 
Money alone is really  able to solve the problems of 
intercourse, i. e., to establish completely a thorough sys- 
tem for the assured satisfactions of  human wants.  The 
completeness  of  the system  depends  partly  upon  its 
extensiveness.  Money  satisfies all  needs,  the  noblest 
as well as the lowest;  and to  any extent required, great 
and small.  Partly the working of  the system depends 
upon the fact that the requisite conditions for the satis- 
faction of  all imaginable needs are reduced to the single 
one, infinitely simple, ever constant and wholly calculable, 
viz., money.  There are statements which seem so com- 
monplace that one is almost afraid to make them, and 
yet if  one wants to make a  thing  perfectly  clear  one 
must  not always omit them.  An  example of  this  is 
the  perfect  emancipatory  power  of  money.  Favor  has 
many  conditions,  money  has no other conditions than 
money.  A favor must be asked for with reserve, with 
tact;  it has its moods, its humors and antipathies;  it 
may turn away from the  very person who needs it  most, or 
at the time and in the circumstances when  it is most 
indispensable,  and  though  it were  always  willing  it 
retains its narrow  limitations.  Money knows  nothing 
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not indulge in moods;  has no times when it is less acces- 
sible;  and finally it knows no limit where its willingness 
becomes exhausted.  Egoism has the liveliest interest in 
being  at the service of  everybody, at  all times,  to  any 
extent:  The more we demand of  it the more it does, the 
more we ask of  it, the more willing it is.  Nothing would 
be  more  unbearable  than if  we  had  to depend  upon 
favor for everything that we need, it would be the lot 
of  the beggar!  Our personal freedom and independence 
depends not only upon  our  being  able to pay  but also 
upon our being obliged to pay -  our moral as well as our 
economic independence depends upon  money. 
The  Two  Principal  Forms  of  Intercourse:  First, Ex- 
change (Difference of  Purpose on Both Sides).  The differ- 
ence  between  compensation  and  gratuitousness is  not 
exhausted  by money,  the consideration  may consist of 
other things besides, viz., of  objects or personal service 
(p. 77).  All  such compensatory  contracts are denomi- 
nated in the terminology of  the jurists, onerous or bilateral 
contracts;  the gratuitous are called liberal, lucrative or 
unilateral.  The psychologically  inevitable condition  of 
the process in the former is the conviction of  both parties 
that what each  receives is more valuable  to him  than 
what he gives;  each party not merely tries to gain, but 
is convinced that he does gain.  Without this conviction, 
even  though  objectively  it is  not  in  accordance  with 
fact, no exchange can take place.  The objective desig- 
nation of the consideration as equivalent, however true it 
may  be,  as will  be  seen later, from  the standpoint of 
business intercourse, is decidedly incorrect when looked 
at subjectively  from  the point  of  view  of  the parties. 
A  consideration  which  is for  the  party  nothing  morc 
than an equivalent, i. e., equal in value to the original 
service, has psychologically no force to effect an altera- 
tion of the existing conditions.  To  do this there is need 
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of a  preponderance, of  a plumalent;  not in  the objec- 
tive sense to be sure, but in the subjective; both parties 
must be convinced that they gain by the exchange. 
It may happen that this is really true for both.  He 
who sells an object for which he has absolutely no use 
for a moderate price  improves his economic position, for 
he  gets  something  useful  in  place  of  something  use- 
less, and the buyer, too, is a gainer, who buys the thing 
cheaply.  This possibility of  mutual gain in a business 
transaction depends upon  the difference of  need on the 
two sides;  each of  the two parties has, by reason of  his 
peculiar need, an individual standard for measuring the 
value of  the two articles or acts which form the object of 
exchange;  one which  differs from  the standard of  the 
other, and so it happens that each one gains without 
the other losing. 
This therefore  is the logic of  the bilateral  contract; 
viz., each one looks for his own advantage and  knows 
that the other does the same, and the law admits their 
right to do so.12  It allows egoism free play, so far as the 
latter does not make  use  of  prohibited  means  for  the 
carrying out of  its purpose. 
The relation of  two parties to each other, based upon 
egoistic motives  on  both  sides as seen in business life, 
is  called  the business attitude.  Opposed to this is the 
attitude of  grace or  favor, i.e.,  the relation of  the two 
parties in liberal  contracts  (p.  77), in which  both  are 
12Dig.  19.2.22 Q 3. "Quemadmodum in emendo et vendendo natur- 
aliter concessum est, quod pluris est,  minoris emere, quod minorissit, 
pluris vendere  et ita invicem se circumscribere,  ita in locationibus 
quoque et conductionibus  juris  est."  The nature of  a  relation  of 
trust and confidence (agency, guardianship, partnership, etc. ,) gives 
rise to the opposite state of affairs.  Here "dolus"  begins as soon as 
one pursues his own advantage, whereas in business relations there 
is no "dolus"  unless one pursues his own advantage by means of  a 
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agreed that one does the other a favor.  To  this differ- 
ence of  position  Roman law  attaches important conse- 
quences.  For example, in reference to the dissolution 
of  the relation, the measure of  "culpa,"  the obligation of 
warranty, i.nfamy. 
The  process  in  onerous  contracts,  objectively  con- 
sidered, is that of changing the place of  the objects or 
acts on the two sides.  Each of  the two things or acts 
seeks  the person  with  whom  it can  better  attain its 
destiny, for whom  therefore it has a relatively  higher 
value  than for its present  owner;  and accordingly  it 
changes its present  place  for another.  The expression 
Contract of  Exchange, which the jurist  uses only for the 
exchange of  two objects,'3 applies to all values that form 
the object of  intercourse:  articles, money, service.  The 
German  expression "Verkehr"  (business intercourse)  is 
derived from the idea of  their turning from one place to 
another -  ("Kehren" -  to move, to turn).  The same 
is true of  the German word  "Wandel"  in the phrase 
"Handel und Wandel"  (literal meaning of  "Wandel"  is 
walking,  going,  and in  the  phrase  just  mentioned  it 
means trade).  The corresponding term in Latin, "com- 
mercium," is  borrowed from goods, merchandise ("merx," 
"mercari") , and emphasizes the element of  community 
between  the parties  ("com-mercium")  which  is caused 
by it.  Intercourse ("Verkehr")  is therefore synonymous 
with intercourse of  exchange ("Tauschverkehr"). 
But commerce  ("Verkehr")  does  not coincide  in life 
with Exchange ("Tauschverkehr").  It embraces rather 
two groups of  business  transactions of  which  only one 
has as its motive the exchange of  acts, whereas the other, 
l3  In  connection  with  the  Roman concept  of  "permutatio." 
"Mutuum,"  loan, is connected with "mutare"  (movitare, to move). 
Linguistically it is characterized as change of  place (of  the fungible 
object, with agreement of  subsequent return). 
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on the contrary, has as its motive the union of  persons 
for a common purpose.  The business of  exchange pre- 
supposes a diference  of  need on both sides, and accord- 
ingly also a  difference in the means whereby the need 
is to be satisfied, viz., in the mutual services.  Opposed 
to this is the case where the needs of both parties are 
identical, where their interests coincide for one and the 
same purpose.  Now if each of  them can attain the pur- 
pose by himself  alone as easily and as surely as in com- 
bination  with the other, there is no reason  urging him 
to co-operate with his neighbor.  The case is different 
when the purpose exceeds the powers of  a single person, 
or when the combined pursuit of  it gives a prospect  of 
economy in the means to  be expended, or greater security 
in the attainment of the purpose.  In this case it is to 
the interest  of  both  to unite  their  forces  and  means. 
The juristic  form of  this is the Contract of  Partnership. 
Like the contract of exchange in the wider sense given 
to it above, so the contract of  partnership embraces not 
any particular contract, but a peculiar sphere of  contract 
in commerce.  Like the other it contains a fundamental 
form  of  commerce,  which  is of  unlimited  appliciition, 
I  mean  that of  association.  The principal  difference 
between  these two fundamental forms of  commerce is 
based  upon  the  contrast  of  difference  and identity  of 
purpose.  In exchange  the purpose  of  the one differs 
from that of  the other, and herein lies the reason of  their 
changing;  in partnership  the purpose,  the aim, is the 
same, and that is why they unite.  There is not and there 
cannot be a third form; for an alternative which makes 
the  purpose  bringing  the parties  together  other  than 
either the same or different is inconceivable.  It is evi- 
dent that partnership  belongs  to onerous contracts, or 
which is the same, that here too the principle of  com- 
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Of  these  two fundamental forms, that of exchange is 
inferior, and hence historically the older.  It  is the primi- 
tive  form of. commerce,  from  which  the term  itself is 
derived.  The most  limited  understanding  suficed  to 
see the use of  exchanging two things or acts, but the idea 
of  a common business operation was the work of  an  inven- 
tive and thoughtful mind;  and even in such a mind it 
became  possible  only  at a  certain  stage  of  business 
development.14 
This relation of  the two fundamental forms of  com- 
merce  gives  us  the order  of  the  following  exposition. 
We shall turn first to  the lower and older form, and chall 
try to present clearly and in the proper order the vari- 
ous elements and formative principles contained therein 
in which the force of purpose has become developed and 
realized. 
5 3.  Reward  (Money).  Real  Performance  and  Con- 
sideration.  The simplest formula of  bilateral contract is 
the immediate satisfaction of  mutual needs.  Each one 
of  the two parties receives  the object  or act which  he 
needs.  The  contract,  therefore,  performs  the  same 
l4 "Societas"  as actionable contract belongs in  Rome to the later 
business law ("jus gentiom"),  whereas sale in the form of  "manci-  . 
patio," and loan in the form of  "nexum"  go back to  primitive times. 
To  be sure, this does not mean that there were not actually contracts 
of  partnership even before the introduction of the "actio pro socio," 
whether non-obligatory and founded purely upon mutual good faith 
("fides")  or fear of  public opinion (infamy in case of  disloyalty), or 
concluded  with  legally  binding  force in the form  of  "stipulatio" 
(verbal agreement).  To  attempt to  place the origin of  partnership 
back in the ancient family life of  the Romans I regard as  an error. 
50 far as  brothers and sisters continued after the death of  the father 
their life in common as theretofore, it was legally  under the pro- 
tection of the "act.  fam. erciscundae."  And even late,. the relation 
of  co-succession was not brought by the Roman jurists  under the 
point of  view of partnership any more than was that of  joint owner- 
ship. 
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function for both, and I shall call this form of  exchange 
contract by the name of  equality of function. 
But this simplest form of contract is at  the same time 
the most imperfect, for it presupposes  that each party 
possesses and sells the very thing that the other wants, a 
condition which seldom obtains, and which would make 
commerce exceedingly  slow and clumsy, if  it could  not 
free itself  therefrom.  The means by which  it did free 
itself  from the condition above mentioned contains one 
of  the  most  ingenious  ideas  of  man 15-money.  The 
service which  it renders  commerce is so clear and evi- 
dent  that I  shall  waste no words  upon  it, and shall 
limit myself to a single observation. 
I  have defined  commerce as the system of  the satis- 
faction  of  human  wants.  Is  the definition  good  for 
money too?  Does money satisfy the wants of  him who 
does something for  it?  Not actually, but potentially. 
In the money which the buyer pays him for the thing, the 
seller gets the means for the satisfaction of  his wants; 
and he only has to find the right person who is able to 
do it, to  obtain the most unlimited freedom of  choice in 
respect to all forms and modes of  satisfying his wants 
(time -  place -  persons -  scope).  Money  does  not 
l6 I cannot refrain from inserting here for non-jurists the exposition 
of  the Roman jurist  (Padus)  in Dig. 18. 1. 1. pr.  "Origo  emendi 
vendendique a permutationibus coepit.  Olim enim non ita erat num- 
mus, neque aliud merx, aliud pretium nominabatur, sed unusquisque 
secundum  necessitatem  temporum  ac rerum  utilibus  inutilia  per- 
mutabat, quando plerumque evenit, ut, quod alteri superest, alteri 
desit.  Sed  quia  non  semper  nec  facile concurrebat,  ut, cum tu 
haberes, quod ego desiderarem, invicem haberem, quod tu accipere 
velles, electa materia est, cujus publica ac perpetua aestimatio diffi- 
cultatibus permutationurn aequalitate quantitatis subveniret, eaque 
materia  forma publica  percussa  usum  dominiumque non tam ex 
substantia praebet quam ex quantitate nec ultra merx utrumque, sed 
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therefore satisfy the want immediately, but it confers an 
absolutely sure title to the subsequent satisfaction of  his 
want;  a title respected by all.  The difference  between 
exchange  in the  narrower  sense and  purchase  consists 
therefore in the fact that in the former the satisfaction 
of  the mutual wants takes place in one and the same act, 
whereas in a contract of  purchase  it falls  into several 
acts; the buyer alone, not the seller, receives in this case 
immediately that of  which he has need. 
And so in  contradistinction  to the above formula of 
bilateral contract, which rests upon equality of  function, 
there is  another  based  upon diference  of  function,  in 
which  the one act brings about the actual satisfaction 
of  the want, and the other only the potential.  Or, which 
is  the same thing, there  is on the one side a  real  or 
individual  act, and  on the other an ideal  or abstract 
thing,  viz.,  money.  We  get  therefore  the  following 
schema, already given above (p. 77), which includes now 
all conceivable contracts  of  exchange in the wider sense. 
Real Performance  Money  Contract 
(1) Permanent Cession 
of  a Thing  Price  Purchase 
(2) Temporary Cession 
(a)  of  a Thing  Rent  Contract of  Lease 
(b) of  Capital  Interest  Loan 
(3) Service  Wages  Contract of  Service 
(Honorarium, Salary).  Progress from  Real Considera- 
tion to  Reward.  It  is desirable to have a definite expres- 
sion for the function which money performs in all these 
cases.  The term equivalent is not suitable, for it empha- 
sizes a value relation of  the two acts to each other which 
has nothing  to do with money  as such -  a thing can 
also be the equivalent of  another  (see above).  I will 
permit  myself  to  use  the  concept  of  remuneration 
("Lohn"),  which  is  regularly  identified  in  scientific 
usage with wages, but which has a much wider significa- 
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tion in ordinary usage, as is well known.  I propose to 
use  this  term  for  all  the  three  cases  of  performance 
involving money which were mentioned above.  I shall 
therefore understand  by the term  remuneration  in the 
wider sense not merely the wages of labor, but also the 
purchase  price,  rent,  and  interest.  The  concept  of 
remuneration  in  the  first  sense  (wages)  will  also  be 
extended  later  on  (5 7)  to ideal  remuneration,  as 
opposed to  economic, i.  e., money, and to  mixed remunera- 
tion, which  combines  ideal  with  economic.  By  this 
means the concept of  remuneration becomes so general 
that we may designate remuneration, as I have done in 
the title of  this chapter, as the motive or lever  of all 
commerce.  To  be sure, we are guilty of  the inaccuracy 
of  considering  only  the perfect form  of  exchange  (in 
return for money), and leaving aside the imperfect form 
of  two real  performances as on the whole insignificant 
for commerce. 
But has not the concept lost perhaps its definiteness, 
and at the same time its usefulness, by this extension 
of  its meaning?  I  believe  not.  Money  and real  per- 
formance  are the two forms  of  compensation,  of  the 
equalization of  one act by the other, which are opposed 
to each other by the nature of  the case.  Now although it 
may be necessary  from the standpoint of  the jurist as 
well  as the political  economist  to distinguish  in  the 
function of  money between wages, price, rent and inter- 
est, these differences are of  no consequence in the ques- 
tion which  we have proposed here, and which we have 
to answer, namely, how does commerce effect the satis- 
faction  of  human  wants?  The only  answer  to this 
question  is,  it effects this  immediately  or  mediately; 
immediately by a real  performance, mediately through 
money;  and for  this  function  of money  we  need  an 
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receives  does  not  satisfy  his  want  immediately,  it 
only gives him the means thereto.  The same is true of 
price,  rent, interest in reference  to seller, lessor, lender. 
Whether it is immediate necessity  that impels  the one 
to work, the other to sell, the third to let;  or whether 
it is only the desire to realize in a suitable manner their 
labor power, their articles or their capital, which causes 
them to  do  these things, makes no difference as far as the 
character of  the money is concerned  which they get by 
those transactions.  In the one case as in the other the 
money  does not satisfy the want immediately,  it only 
makes  subsequent satisfaction  possible. 
5 4.  Equivalent.  The  concepts  remuneration  and 
equivalent do not coincide.  The equivalent may consist 
in something other than remuneration (real performance), 
and remuneration may be no  equivalent;  it may exceed 
the amount thereof  or fall below it.  By equivalent we 
understand  the equality  between  an act and  its con- 
sideration, measured by the value of  goods and acts as 
established by experience in commerce.  How the stand- 
ard is formed  and on what it is based is a question of 
political economy, which we need not discuss; our object 
is directed merely to proving the gain which accrues to 
intercourse  from  the  promotion  of  remuneration  to 
equivalent. 
The fixing of remuneration in a  particular case  is a 
matter of  individual agreement, and the law recognizes 
egoism as the determining factor and a just one.16  The 
conception from which the law starts is that each of  the 
two parties has in mind  his own  advantage, each one 
endeavors to use the disadvantage of  the other man's 
l6 Dig. 4. 4. 16 $4.  "In pretzo emptionis et venditionis naturaliter 
licere contrahentibus se circumvenire."  Dig. 19. 2. 22  Q 3.  " . . . 
itn in locationibus quoque et conductionibus  juris  est."  Cod.  4. 
44.  10. "dolus  emtoris . . . non quantitate pretii aestimatur " 
position  in his own  favor.  This disadvantage  may rise 
to a position of  actual duress, when the highest degree 
of want on the one side coincides  with  the  exclusive 
possibility of satisfying it  on the  other.  In this case there 
remains no other choice for the party in need  than to 
accept the conditions dictated by the other party.  The 
drowning man will promise a fortune, if  necessary, for a 
rope;  the man dying of  thirst in the desert will give his 
pearls away for a skin of  water;  Richard I11 in Shakes- 
peare offers "a  kingdom for a horse" -  the most insig- 
nificant thing gains the highest value if  one's life depends 
upon it. 
Is this, then, the fruit of  egoism, which has been so 
glorified by us, namely, pitiless exploitation of  another's 
need!  Does not this result, which outrages every moral 
feeling, force us to declare our whole theory of  egoism 
bankrupt, and to admit frankly that it cannot rise to 
the demand of  commerce, which is to procure the regu- 
lated and assured satisfaction of  human want? Must we 
not confess that society needs a fixed principle by which 
to be guided in order  that egoism, which  is insatiable 
by nature, may have imposed upon it from outside the 
restraint which it does not bear within itself? 
The egoism cf  the one is opposed by the egoism of  the 
other;  the former endeavoring to take as much as pos- 
sible, the latter to  give as little as possible.  The point of 
indifference  or  the zero  point  where  the two produce 
equilibrium  is the equivalent.  Equivalent is the equili- 
brium  effected  by experience between  performance and 
consideration;  it is an amount  of  remuneration  (of  a 
specific  performance)  in  which  both  parties  come  to 
their right, and neither of  the two loses.  Equivalent is 
the  realization  of  the tdea  of  justice  in the domain of 
commerce.  For justice, simply and intelligibly expressed, 
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subsist.  Accordingly, to enforce as  much as possible the 
principle of equivalence in all relations is one of the chief 
problems in the life of  commerce. 
How does society solve it?  Does it solve it by law? 
If  it is true that it is a problem of  justice, then it seems 
inevitably a legal  problem;  for what justice  demands 
must be realized  by law.  According  to  my  opinion, 
however, it is not so, but when it is made out that the 
interest of  all demands a certain order, we must still con- 
sider first whether the interest is not strong enough to 
establish the order by itself.  In this case there is no 
need  of  a law -  no law finds it necessary  to prescribe 
marriage and to forbid suicide. 
Now, does commerce possess the means to realize the 
idea of  equivalent out of  its own power?  On the whole, 
this must evidently be the case;  no law prescribes the 
prices for the  laborer, manufacturer, shop-keeper, etc., 
and yet they observe a price.  Evidently not from dis- 
interested motives or as social doctrinaires in order to 
realize the idea of  equivalent, but because they cannot 
do otherwise.  Who compels  them?  No one else than 
their  own  egoism.  Egoism forms in this case its own 
corrective.  And it does this in a two-fold manner.  First, 
by  means  of  competition.  The egoism  of  the  seller 
who tries to force too high a price is paralyzed by the 
egoism of  another who prefers rather to  sell for a moder- 
ate price than not to sell at all, and the egoism of  the 
buyer who offers  too little is paralyzed by that of  another 
who  offers  more -  competition is the  social  self-adjust- 
ment of  egoism. 
But no matter how  true this may be on the whole, 
there may be special cases or peculiar relations in which 
competition  is  temporarily  or  even  permanently  ex- 
cluded.  The only innkeeper, physician, apothecary in 
the place  has  no  competition  to be  concerned  about, 
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and even when there is more than one it may happen 
that a  person who has need of  their services finds him- 
self in such a position that he can address himself to one 
of them only, and must  submit to the conditions  laid 
down by him.  The surgeon who has completed the opera- 
tion, but has not yet stopped the flow of  blood, has the 
patient in his power, and similarly the innkeeper at  whose 
place the patient is staying.  Who  or what prevents them 
from asking an extravagant price for the completion of 
the  operation,  and  the  continuance  of  the  lodging? 
If they count on future patients and guests, it is regard 
for their  own  advantage.  As  the egoism  of  the  one 
holds in check the egoism of  the other by means of  com- 
petition, so in this case egoism holds itself in check.  The 
egoistic  exploitation  of  the  present  is  opposed  by  a 
regard  for the  future.  The  egoist  balances  the two 
possible  advantages  against  each  other,  and  sacrifices 
the advantage of the moment, no matter how great it is, 
in  order  to secure  the smaller  but  permanent  advan- 
tage for the rest of his life.  Concern for  the future is 
the individual self-regulation  of  egoism  in  those  cases 
where  competition, i. e., the social regulation, fails  to 
act. 
But in order  to be able to look into the future one 
must have an eye to do it with, and the eye of  most 
people is so dull that it does not carry them beyond the 
present.  Others again have such a weak will that they 
cannot resist  the temptation to sacrifice  the future to 
the present  moment, and  it is even  possible  that one 
enormous  extortion l7  outweighs  the loss  of  the entire 
l7 I use the expression here and in the sequel not in the criminal 
sense, but in the economical, to denote the exploitation of  the con- 
dition of  necessity of  another for the purpose of  raising the price 
or the compensation above the equivalent.  Carried on systemati- 
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future, or even that it may seem practicable to practice 
extortion as a  permanent  business  (usury).  Here the 
protection which  egoism  offers against itself  fails,  and 
when the dangers which egoism threatens assume a seri- 
ous aspect there is nothing left to society but the means 
whereby it always tries to  ward off  the dangerous excesses 
of egoism, viz.,  the law.  The laws  which  thus curb the 
excesses  of  egoism  in commercial intercourse are : legal 
tariffs of charges ;  laws limiting the rate of interest ; penal- 
ties for usury, etc.18  Experience hasshown that many of 
these  attain  their  purpose  very  imperfectly,  and  the 
public opinion of  our time, in favor of  freedom of  trade, 
looks  upon them with disfavor and would  prefer to set 
them aside entirely on the ground of  bein  a hindrance 
to business, as in fact has been done with many of  them 
already.  There  will be need of  more numerous and bitter 
experiences before people will become aware again what 
distinguish  between  extortion and fraud.  The forn1c.r  speculates 
on the opponent's condition of  necessity, the latter on his ignorance 
of  the real  price  or his disinclination  to make the disproportion 
between the latter and the price demanded a subject of  unpleasant 
discussions. 
l8 The different legislations vary extraordinarily in this connection. 
The ancient  Roman  law  directed  its attention  almost  altogether 
upon usury;  the later Roman law added some other matters (extor- 
tion on the part of  the physician, Cod.  10. 52. 9, Dig. 50. 13. 3;  on 
the part  of  the lawyer, the so-called  "pactum  de quota litis"  and 
"paln~arium"  2.  14. 53, 50. 13.  1  Q 12.  Cod. 2. 6. 5, prohibition of 
the "lex commissoria"  in case of  pledge, rescinding a contract of  salt* 
on the ground of  the so-called  "laesio  enormis,"  and  many other 
instances).  Mohammedan law no doubt went furthest in the oppo- 
site direction.  It  imposes a duty upon the vendor to  state the truc 
value,  and allows  only  tradespeople  to reserve a  profit  for them- 
selves over and above the value of  the object.  It forbids entirely 
auction sales,  where the price can be easily  raised  above the real 
value.  N.  von  Tumauw,  "Das  Moslemitische  Recht,"  (Leipzig, 
1855), p. 92,93.  This regulation reminds one of  the prohibition oi 
interest in the canon law. 
dangers to  society individual egoism, freed from all bonds, 
carries with it, and why the past has found it necessary 
to put a check upon it.  Unlimited freedom of  trade is 
a license for extortion, a letter of  marque for robbers and 
pirates with the right of  holding up all who fall into their 
hands -  woe  to the victim!  That the wolves  cry for 
freedom is  easy  to understand.  But when  the sheep, 
as has often been  the case in this question, join in the 
cry, they only show thereby that they are sheep. 
The authority which  I thus claim on behalf  of  legisla- 
tion is in no conflict  with my fundamental conception 
of commerce as the system, based  upon egoism, of  the 
satisfaction  of  human wants.  I do hold  firmly  to the 
view  that egoism  is the motive power  of  all commerce, 
and  that  it alone  is  able to solve  the problem.  The 
idea of  replacing it by coercion is so impossible that one 
should try to  think it out if  only in order to become the 
better  aware  how  inseparably  the  success  of  labor  is 
connected with the reward of  free service.  To regulate 
work by coercion  instead  of  by reward  would  mean to 
change society into a workhouse, and to  limit the national 
work to  the work of  the hands, for only the hands can be 
coerced, not the spirit.  But even in manual labor coer- 
cion- cannot take the place of  remuneration.  Coercion 
makes egoism  an  antagonist  to work;  reward  makes 
it an ally;  for when work is not free the workman has 
an interest to work as little as  possible; when the  work is 
free his interest is to work as much as possible.  In the 
former case he deceives his master, in the latter, himself. 
Coercion is effective only so long as the whip is in sight; 
remuneration works continually. 
But though  I  am convinced  that  there is  no other 
motive power  of commerce .than egoism, I  am just  as 
firmly persuaded on the other hand, that society has the 
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these become dangerous to the success of society.  In 
my eyes there is no error more serious than the idea that 
a contract as  such, as long as  its content is not illegal or 
immoral, has a just claim upon the protection of  the law. 
In the second part of  this work I shall have occasion to 
combat  this error; here  I content  myself  with  a  pro- 
test.  It  is the right as  well as the duty of  society to  set 
its own interests against those of  individual egoism.  But 
the interests of  society are directed to that which suits 
not only one particular person but all; which enables all 
people  to subsist;  and this is, as has already been re- 
marked above (p. 101), nothing else than justice.  Jus- 
tice  is above freedom.  The individual exists not only 
for  himself,  but also for the world  (p. 51) -therefore 
freedom, that which is expedient for the individual, must 
be  subordinated  to justice,  which  is for  the advantage 
of  all. 
The social  problem  just  treated, of  the advance of 
remuneration to equivalent, or of  the realization of  the 
idea of  justice in commerce, is closely connected with a 
phenomenon  to which  I now  pass;  the significance of 
which, however, is not at  all exhausted by the fact that 
it has this one problem to solve. 
5 5.  Organization of  Work in the Form of  a Vocation, 
Business or  Trade.  By vocation ("Beruf")  in the social 
or objective sense, in contradistinction to  the individual 
or  subjective  sense  of  the word, i. e.,  the subjective 
qualification,  the inner voice,  which  "calls"  ("vocare," 
"rufen")  a man to a task, we understand a definite kind 
of  activity, for which the individual puts himself perma- 
nently at the  disposition of  society: his social post.  If the 
vocation is combined with the economic purpose of  the 
subject to make his living thereby, it is called a trade 
or business.  A trade or business is therefore a branch of 
work for which and from which the individual intends to 
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live.  In the phrase for which we have the relation of  the 
business to society; in the phrase from which we have its 
reIat~on  to the subject.  The individual solicits ("wirbt") 
from  society  ("Ge-werbe")  in  order  to  gain  thereby; 
he  serves  ("dient")  it in order  to profit  ("verdienen") 
himself.  This  brings  no  discredit  according  to  our 
present  ideas, which  are essentially different from those 
of antiquity (p. 81).  It is dishonorable  neither  to the 
most  eminent  nor to the most  lowly.  Work  is  no dis- 
grace, and neither is the acceptance of  pay for the work 
of one's  vocation.  We are in the habit of  seeing a dis- 
honorable  element only when  one allows  himself  to be 
paid for a service which does not constitute his vocation. 
When a porter takes a man from the station to the hotel, 
every one finds it proper that he should want to be paid 
for  it.  In any other  person  we  should  call  it mean. 
Why?  The one makes  his  living  from these  services; 
they  belong  to his  vocation,  and  pay  for the work of 
one's vocation is, in the eyes of society, an  equivalent not 
merely  for the particular  service, but at the same time 
for the adoption of a vocation  which is useful to society. 
This ensures his permanent readiness thereto; and only 
he who lives for the work shall live by it. 
He who takes up a definite business declares thereby 
publicly  his  fitness  and inclination  for all services con- 
nected with it.  The public receives  the assurance that 
every one who needs him can count on him, and he gives 
every  one the authority to call upon  him.19  His own 
lo If  he does not possess  the ability he is a bungler, who does  not 
belong to the trade, and whom an intelligent social policy commands 
to keep at a  distance in the interest of  business  as well  as in  the 
interest of  the public.  This was the aim of  the master-piece among 
artisans in the old  organization  of  the guilds.  The same purpose 
is intended at the present time by the State examinations of  lawyers, 
notaries, physicians,  druggists, midwives,  teachers of  private insti- 
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interest, to be sure, and the spur of  competition guar- 
antee as a rule his readiness;  but both motives may fail 
sometimes, and what then?  Has he a right from a sense 
of  comfort or ill humor to  refuse the man who needs his 
services?  Has  the  innkeeper  a  right  to refuse  the 
stranger;  the shopkeeper,  baker, butcher to refuse the 
customer;  the apothecary,  the physician  to refuse the 
patient; the lawyer the client?  Every true nian  of busi- 
ness has the feeling that he has not the right; he is aware 
that he would suffer in public opinion.  Why?  No one 
finds fault with the owner of  a house if  he does not want 
to let or sell his  vacant house.  Why, then, should we 
find fault with the business man when he withholds his 
services  from those who desire them?  Because  by the 
adoption of  his particular vocation he has given society 
an assurance, which  he is not making good.  All  those 
who  pursue a  public  business  are public persons, i. e., 
they exist for the public, and are in duty bound to serve 
them.  Public  opinion sees in their vocation a position 
of  obligation toward society. 
Therefore it withdraws its respect  from the business 
man when he neglects  his business,  when he is lazy or 
unreliable, no matter how respectable he may be other- 
wise.  It  declares him incompetent and puts a low esti- 
mate upon him  if  he does not understand  his business, 
whereas it respects the competent business man, even if 
in other respects it may see a good deal to  object toin  him. 
And this standard of  social service by which it measures 
him  is also his own.  It is that of  the "honor"  of  the 
competent  business  man,  his  "honor"  does  not  allow 
him  to neglect  his business,  to deliver  poor work, etc. 
What has honor  to do with business?  The answer is: 
honor in the objective sense (the respect of  the world) 
is the recognition of  the social worth of  the person;  in 
the subjective sense it is one's own feeling and the actual 
5  ,j  1  SOCIAL MECHANICS-  REWARD  109 
living up to his worth.20  Honor is determined by those 
which fix the value of  the persGn for society, 
and hence also his special social task.  The tasks of  the 
artisan, the physician, the lawyer are different, but to 
summon up  all one's powers in their fulfillmerit is counted 
to them a11  as  an honor;  to neglect them, as a dishonor. 
A good artisan will find it just as  incon~patible  with his 
honor to  deliver careless work as a conscientious physician 
or lawyer to leave his patients or clients in the lurch. 
Whoever does so makes his name suffer.  But "name" 
("Ruf")  and "calling"  ("Beruf")  are very closely  con- 
nected.  The manner in which  a man responds to his 
vocation is that which society as a rule throws into the 
scales first in judging a person;  and according to this it 
determines his ability, i. e., his fitness for society.21 
It  is part of the egoism of society that it does not ask 
what the man is ir, himself, bul: what he is  for it.  To  be 
nothing to  society, to live only for one's self is no satisfac- 
tory mode of  existence, to besure, but at  least a tolerable 
one; but not to  be to  society what one is meant to  be, i.  e., 
to be incompetent, is a feeling so  oppressive and worrying 
that it cannot be completely compensated for by any- 
thing else.  Whereas, on the contrary, loyal, energetic 
fulfilment of  the duties of  one's vocation is able to keep 
one up even under hard blows of  fate.  It keeps before 
him the fact that even if his life has been robbed of  its 
worth and charm for himself, it still has at least worth 
and significance for others. 
Duty represents that side of vocation which addresses 
itself  to society;  the pecuniary  return  represents  the 
20 For a justification of  this definition, see Vol.  11, p. 502 and Vol. 
111, in connection  with  the Social System of  Coercion  ("Soziales 
Zwangsystem").  [See above Ch.  VI,  note 3. -Translator]. 
21 For the connection of  the concept of  ability with that of  virtue, 
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side  which  addresses  itself  to  the  individual.  And 
although the latter aspect may now and then, in the  case 
of  a particular  person who does not need  the pay,  be 
without  any  significance,  still  it is so influential  and 
decisive in its total effect that it is this which makes the 
relation and the person what experience shows they are 
and  are  meant  to be.  He who devotes himself  to a 
definite vocation  pledges  thereby  to society his entire 
existence for the purpose of carrying out the task under- 
taken by him;  and so its interest becomes his interest. 
If  he wishes to prosper he must devote to it his whole 
power, his ability and knowledge, his thinking and feel- 
ing,  his  will  and  endeavor.  He  must  not  wait  until 
society expresses a need, he must anticipate it; he must 
guess  its wishes  and  thoughts  even  before  they  are 
uttered.  He must teach it wants or forms of  satisfying 
them which it did not know before;  like a sick-nurse he 
must know how to listen to every breath of  society, and 
like a  physician he must know how  to feel the lowest 
pulse beat of  the social need, and to diagnose it.  Skill 
or the lack of  skill in judging of  the social need, always 
different and infinitely varying  in place and time, sig- 
nifies for him wealth or poverty. 
What has been said so far shows sufficiently the great 
importance of a vocation for social life.  Every vocation 
represents the organization of  the mode of  social activity 
represented  by  it,  and  hence  contains  for  society  a 
guaranty of  the assured, regulated and constant satis- 
faction of  this need.  Commerce, we  may say, has not 
actually fulfilled its task until it has produced a vocation 
for its service.  Therefore the extension and perfection 
of  the organization forms the standard for judging  the 
stage of  development of  commerce.  The lack of  a par- 
ticular vocation in the economic system of  a given time 
is a proof that the corresponding need was not yet felt 
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then to the extent of  producing an assured form of  satis- 
fying it.  In a country in which there are ten or a hun- 
dred times more distilleries than book stores, circulating 
libraries, and  educational  institutions  for  women,  the 
need which the population feels for brandy is evidently 
far stronger than its desire for spiritual nourishment and 
the education of  women.  The presence or absence of  a 
particular  vocation,  its  numerical  representation,  in 
general  its statistics, form  an absolutely  trustworthy 
index of  the intensity of the need  corresponding to it. 
Where the need is not felt at all or not in the requisite 
measure, the vocation as an organized branch of  industry 
is impossible, but where it has sufficiently  extended itself, 
the vocation is not slow to make its appearance.  The 
same is true here as when nature awakens in the spring. 
So long as there is not the necessary heat, no tree sprouts; 
but as soon as the sprouting takes place, it is a proof 
that the necessary amount of heat has appeared.  If the 
economic system is what it ought to be, then the aggre- 
gate of  human  needs on  the one side must find  a coun- 
terpart,  completely  adequate to it, in  the system  of 
organized branches of industry on the other side.  At the 
present time there is probably scarcely anything that is 
wanting  in  this connection.  Man just  as he  is, as he 
thinks and  strives, with  all the needs of  his body and 
mind,  with  all his interests, the lowest as well  as the 
highest -  what wish, what desire tan he  utter  for  the 
satisfaction  of which  there is not ready at hand some 
kind  of  vocation?  There is only one limit, and this a 
natural  one, which  stands in  the way  of  the absolute 
carrying out of that organization, and that is the immov- 
able object.  There are all sorts of commerce, from trade 
in rags up to that in art, but there is no trade in immov- 
able objects.22  If one wants to buy or farm real estate, 
Accordingly our Commercial  Code restricts the concept of com- 
modity to  movable objects.  Similarly the Roman law restricts the 
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or rent a dwelling, he must apply to a  private person; 
there is nowhere  in the world  a merchant  who  deals 
in  estates or houses.  The first step in this direction 
towards organization has been made by building socie- 
ties  in great cities who build houses for the purpose of 
selling them;  or dwellings for workmen for the purpose 
of  letting them;  a  branch of  industry which  probably 
has a great future before it. 
A  peculiar  kind  of  vocation  is  the business  of  the 
middle-man, as I might call it, i. e., the mediation between 
those who are looking  for objects or services and those 
who  are able to furnish  them  (brokerage,  intelligence 
office)."  In many  relations  in which  commerce  still 
contents itself at  the present day with the middle-man's 
agency, it will probably in the course of  time replace it 
with more direct  methods of  doing business.  The busi- 
ness  of  providing  money  is clearly  tending that way. 
The simplest  and  therefore  also  the original  form  of 
dealing  in  money  is this,  namely,  that he who  needs 
money seeks the private person who is in a position to 
advance it to him.  The next form is when both apply 
to the middle-man, who negotiates the raising as well as 
a  In Rome the business of  the middle-man was very completely 
organized in the most various directions in the time of  the Empire. 
In money transactions it existed long before that time.  The banker 
("argentariusv)  undertook  the  agency,  lending  out  the  moneys 
entrusted  to him  (either in his  own  name or in the name of  the 
lender),  collecting  the interest and crediting it.  Later was intro- 
duced the broker (D. 50. 14.2: "proxeceta faciendi nominis, ut multi 
solent").  The business of  the broker in Rome was, as  the language 
indicates  ("proxeneta,"  "proxeneticum,"  "philanthropia,"  "her- 
meneuticum" 1. 3. ibid.), of  Greek origin.  In the time of  the Empire 
there were  in  Rome, just  as with us, special intelligence offices for 
positions of all kinds, D. 50.14.3: "sunt enim hujusmodi hominum (ut 
in  tam magna civitate) officinae."  They were even more needed there 
than  with  us now, where the same purpose is served by advertise- 
ments in the public papers, 
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the illvestment  of  the  money.  In  the last  form  the 
lender gives up  his money to the banker who undertakes 
to lend at his own risk, and relieves his client from the 
trouble of  search and from the risk of  loss.  Banking is 
the most complete  form  of  dealing  in money,  and the 
advantage for  all  three  persons  involved  is so evident 
that it is likely  it will  gradually in the course of  time 
suppress the two imperfect forms. 
We started in our preceding discussion from the view 
that the formation of  the various vocations runs parallel 
to the development of  human needs;  and the view  is 
confirmed by experience.  But no reason  has yet  been 
given why a particular need should be satisfied precisely 
in  the  form  of  a  particular  vocation.  I  am  almost 
tempted  to omit  it, for  everybody  knows  the  reason; 
namely,  the division  of  labor.  The advantage  which 
this brings to the workman as well  as to society is so 
plain  that it could  not have escaped the notice of  man 
even  in  the lowest  stage of  the development  of  com- 
merce.  In the time in which  A  produces  10a in  his 
special business, and B lob in his, A would  perhaps pro- 
duce only one b, and B only one a.  When the one limits 
himself  to a, and the other  to b,  and both  then inter- 
change a and  b,  the former gains  9a, the latter  9b, and 
this gain of  9a + 9b  is of  benefit  not only to them, but, 
in the cheaper  price  of  the two products, ultimately to 
the entire public.  No sailor  would  be  so foolish as to 
make his own boots, and no shoemaker would be so fool- 
ish  as to make his  own  coat.  Each of  the two knows 
that he will be better off  if  he buys them, and that both 
of them save labor  power  in directing it exclusively to 
one particular  branch  of  work. 
1 sum up the above discussion in the statement that a 
vocation signifies the social organization of  the work as 
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But this does not by any means exhaust the signifi- 
cance of  vocations for the economic system; for we have 
a second and a third principle associated with tile first. 
The second is, a vocation is the organization of  reward. 
The organization  of  reward  consists  in its pron~otion 
from the vacillating and accidental character of a  rate 
measured according to  purely individual estimate to the 
uniformity  and  certainty  of  a  universal  standard  of 
value.  In other words, it is the advance from a purely 
individual standard of  measurement to the realization of 
the idea of  equivalent.  The  influence which the vocation 
exerts in this respect is twofold;  it  determines the amount 
of  the equivalent,  and it secures the practical  mainte- 
nance of  the same.  It accomplishes the former by fix- 
ing, on the basis of  constantly repeated experience, the 
measure and the costs of  the work necessary to produce 
the service.  Only he is able to do this who has devoted 
his whole power and his whole life to the problem.  He 
alone knows what work costs; and the possible errors in 
his  experience, which  may be due to the influence  of 
special individual factors, are rectified by the experience 
of  all  the other  people.  Thus current  prices  are the 
product  of  the experience of  the entire trade, i. e., of 
thousands and millions of  individuals, who have figured 
on the problem and are constantly figuring on it anew. 
It  is not the particular isolated job which they take into 
consideration, but the job in connection with the whole 
of  life, as an aliquot part of  it, hence with reference to 
the  necessary  preparation  thereto,  to  the  continual 
readiness  for  service  that business  demands, and the 
involuntary stoppages in work caused thereby, etc.  The 
honorarium of the physician  and the lawyer must pay 
not merely for the prescription or the opinion, but also 
for the period of  study; the pay of  the porter, of  the cab- 
driver, of  the midwife must indemnify these persons for 
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the involuntary waiting which  is necessarily connected 
with their  business -  the customer must  pay  for  the 
time when the porter stands idle on the street corner, 
when the cabdriver sleeps on the box, and the midwife 
has a holiday.  In the case of  the day laborer alone this 
does not hold good;  the daily wage is for him in reality 
just what he calls it,  the wage of  the day, i.  e., the equiva- 
lent of  the particular period of  time which  he gives up, 
without any reference to a time of  preparation or wait- 
ing outside of  it. 
As the branch of  industry determines the right amount 
of  the equivalent, so it secures the actual maintenance of 
the same.  He who has occasion  to perform a service, 
or to sell or let a thing, only sporadically, may demand 
for it the price that he can get;  but he who makes a 
regular business out of  certain services, or out of  selling 
or letting, has an  interest in taking the price which is his 
due (p. 102). 
Accordingly the vocation may be designated the regu- 
lator  of  compensation.  The  compensation  which  it 
fixes is  in the long run  always the right one, i.  e., an  amount 
which corresponds to  the service, and hence fair and just 
for both parties.  Society has the most vital interest in 
preventing remuneration  from being  reduced  below its 
proper  measure,  for a just  price  is the condition of  a 
just work.  The vocation itself must suffer when it  does 
not get its right.  Therefore he who lowers the prices 
below  this measure is not a  benefactor of  society, but 
an enemy thereof, for he attacks the foundation of  the 
entire vocation or business, viz., the equilibrium estab- 
lished  by experience between  work  and compensation. 
His purpose in the matter, whether he does it  for his own 
profit,  or in order to make a sacrifice, is of  no conse- 
quence.  The popular instinct correctly appreciates the 
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the social ostracism of  the  unlicensed artisan in the era of 
trade guilds, and the license  of  persecution which  the 
system  recognized  ("Bonhasenjagen").  The man be- 
longing to thecraft exercises his business openly in the 
workshop or in the shop, the unlicensed  artisan does it 
secretly  and by stealth,"  and is hunted down like the 
hare in a kitchen  garden;  both depending upon others 
for  their  support.  The pay which  business  yields is 
due to  him who hzs devoted himself to it, for pay is the 
equivalent, as  has been shown above (p. 114),  not merely 
of  the particular work, but of  the entire vocation, from 
which  the work  proceeds;  the equivalent for training, 
preparation  and  personal  and  material  readiness  to 
serve.  Every  bra~ch  of  industry  has  developed  by 
experience an equilibrium between  burdens and advan- 
tages,  duties  and  rights.  He  who  appropriates  the 
advantages alone, without taking upon him  the duties 
of  the vocation, disturbs this equilibrium and endangers 
the branch of  industry;  he is a social freebooter whom 
society has all reason to suppress.  The cheap  prices 
which  he offers are a Greek gift;  they are the cheap 
prices  of  the  poacher -  in  another  man's  preserve 
hunting is cheap. 
Persecution  of  the  unlicensed  artisan  ("Bonhasen- 
jagen")  has disappeared along with the constitution of 
the guilds to  which it  belonged, but the thought which was 
expressed therein, viz.,  the inadmissibility of  competi- 
tion from people who do  not belong to  the business, is in 
my eyes so true that a healthy social policy should never 
lose sight of  it.  Competition within the business regu- 
lates itself, competition from a point zerithout the business 
2'  In a corner ("Winkel"),  hence the term "Winkelschreiber"  (lit. 
corner writer -obscure  writer, penny-a-liner) and "Winkeladvokat" 
(lit. corner lawyer -petty  fogger); or on  the floor ("Boden,""Bon"), 
hence "Bonhase"  (lit. floor hare -  bungler, interloper). 
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is like a race in which some one who has not taken up 
his post together with the rest at  the point of  departure, 
jumps in at  a later place to  gain a handicap with which 
to wrest the prize from the legitimate competitors who 
have to cover the whole course.% 
There is still a third point remaining in the considera- 
tion of the social significance of  the vocation.  It  is the 
advantage which  the organization of  industry gives to 
society by securing the necessary talent. 
As long as it was considered dishonorable at  Rome to 
receive  pay  for  intellectual  work,  the service  of  the 
State and the cultivation of  science formed the monopoly 
of the rich;  talented persons without means found the 
access  to either  practically  closed  (p.  84).  The cir- 
cumstance  that  both  subsequently  became  vocations 
open to the people, was a step in advance not only for 
the individual, but also for society.  We like to  reassure 
ourselves with the proposition that genius overcomes all 
difficulties, but genius also needs bread in order to live, 
and if  the vocation  promises  him  no bread  because it 
has not yet developed into a trade or business, he must 
choose another which will give him this certainty.  The 
musical  genius of  the nineteenth century has his bread 
assured him by his music; the musical genius of  the four- 
teenth century had to beg his in the castles and palaces 
of  the great.  But begging  is  not  for  every  one,  and 
many  a  one at that time may have preferred  to be a 
respectable shoemaker or tailor to  becoming a wandering 
A case in point is presented to  us in the question recently venti- 
lated in Austria, whether judicial officials enjoying a pension should 
be allowed to practice law.  According to my opinion, decidedly not! 
I can see in it only a disorganization of  the legal profession.  If the 
pension  which  the government  allows to retired judicial  officials is 
too small, it must be increased, -but  from the government's  ovn 
pocket.  The above measure allows them the increase at the expense 
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musician.  Nowadays a  genius  is not likely to be lost 
to the world.  Wherever he emerges he is noticed  and 
moved to the place where he finds his proper apprecia- 
tion, and the latter gives him at  the same time his bread. 
A Catalani, a Paganini, a Beethoven, can never in our 
days become anything else than what they have become. 
In the middle ages, if  they had disdained to  become ballad 
singers or fiddle scrapers, they would  have had to take 
up a respectable trade.  In a time which is not prepared 
for a genius, genius is a curse -  an  eagle in a narrow cage 
who, when he moves his wings with boldness and force, 
breaks his  head  against the iron bars.  In the present 
time, however, which has smoothed the paths for genius 
in all domains of  art and science, the genius has himself 
to blame if  he does not become a source of  happiness to 
himself and of  blessing to  the world. 
What  has  caused  this  change?  The assurance  of 
pecuniary return by means of  a vocation.  The vocation 
gives to the competent person who follows it the promise 
of  a competent support.  At the present time Hans  Sachs 
would  not find it necessary to make boots in order to 
write poetry, Spinoza would not have to grind lenses in 
order to be able to philosophize.  Art and science have 
advanced so far that they can offer an adequate living 
to every one who brings with him a sufficient amount of 
endowment.  The charity of  the great, upon which art 
and science had to depend in former times, is replaced 
by the salary and the honorarium (§ 7). 
5 6.  Credit.  Credit  is  the  consummation  of  the 
development of  the system of  exchange.  It  is demanded 
by the purposes  of  commerce, so that it must always 
necessarily  appear  when  commerce  reaches  a  certain 
development.  Without credit commerce would  be the 
most  perfect  and most awkward  thing in the world - 
a bird without wings.  In order to move, it must have 
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the wings of  credit, and as the bird's wings grow as soon 
as it comes out of  the egg, so do the wings of  commerce, 
i. e., credit. 
Political  economists, whom  it behooves to define the 
concept of  credit, are not at  all agreed as to  its  meaning,26 
and this  circumstance has determined  me to assist the 
problem on my own part from the juristic side, by enlist- 
ing the support which  the Roman law, from which  the 
term credit has been borrowed, gives us also in reference 
to its content.  And so in the first edition of  this work I 
gave a lengthy presentation of  the legal development of 
the subject in Roman law.  In rereading the passages in 
question I  am convinced that I overshot the mark, and 
I  have  therefore subjected it to a  revision and abridg- 
ment, confining myself to  what is essential and absolutely 
necessary. 
By  the term "credere"  in the wider sense, the Roman 
jurists  understand  the giving up of  a thing to another 
with  the obligation  of  its subsequent return;  and the 
Roman  Praetor  used  in  his edict  the expression  "res 
creditz"  as a  title comprehending all contracts belong- 
ing to this cat ego^-y.27  To  this relation of  establishing an 
obligation  by giving was attached linguistically  as well 
as historically  the term and the concept "creditor,"  for 
that  was  originally  the only mode  of  establishing  the 
obligation, as we  shall prove later (Chapter VIII, $ 5). 
"Creditor"  was  the one who  had  given  something, 
A  summary of  the various opinions is given by  Knies, "Dcr 
Kredit, Erste Halfte" (Berlin, 1876).  I regard the view of the author 
as incorrect,  arid  it is for this reason especially  that I decided to 
devote more space to an analysis of  the idea of  credit than I  should 
otherwise have done. 
D.  12. 1. 1, " . .  .  credendi generalis appellatio est, ideo sub hoc 
titulo Praetor et de commodato et de pignorc edixit, nam cuicumque 
re1 adsentiamur alienam fidem secuti mox recepturi quid ex hoc con- 
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and  "debitor"  the  one  who  had  received  something 
("creduere,"  "credere"  from  "dare" ; "debere"  from 
"  habere"). 
But the development of  the Roman obligation gave 
a wider content to  .the thing itself  and correspondingly 
a  wider  meaning to the expression  "creditor."  In the 
new  law  every  obligee  is called  "creditor"  even if  he 
gave  nothing,28 and every  obligor  is  called  "debitor" 
even  if  he received  nothing;  the mere  contract, con- 
cluded  with  legally  binding  intention,  is  sufficient  to 
make the parties "debitor"  and "creditor"  respectively. 
In this later stage of  the development of  obligation, 
therefore,  the  "res  creditae"  form  only  a  particular, 
though  a  widely  comprehensive  category of  obligatory 
contract.  This again is divided into two classes accord- 
ing  as the giving  up of  the thing  transfers  the thing 
merely  de facto  (possession)  or de jure  (ownership);  in 
the first case, with the obligation of  returning the same 
thing, in the second, of  returning a similar thing (speci$c 
and  generic  determination  of  :he  object  of  return;  in 
short "species"  and "genus"). 
To this  contrast  there  attaches  a  practically  very 
important  and  influential  difference  for  the  creditor. 
In the first case where he retains the ownership, and in 
most  cases  also  the juristic  possession,  he  is  thereby 
much  more effectually secured than he is in the latter, 
where he gives up both.  In addition to the action "in 
personam,"  which the law places at his disposal, he can 
institute  actions  to recover  possession  and  ownership, 
the latter even against third persons;  nay, according to 
ancient law, he can even procure  for himself  the thing 
by force.  His legal attitude to the thing is exactly the 
same as if  the thing were  still  in his  possession;  this 
"credere"  is juristically  connected with very little risk 
"  D. 50. 16. 10-12. 
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for him.  As examples of  this we have the giving up of 
a thing for the purpose of  care-taking  ("depositurn"), 
or for  temporary  use, whether  paid  for  or gratuitous 
(usufructuary lease,  ordinary  lease,  "commodatum"). 
It is quite different in the second  case.  Here  the 
creditor loses entirely his remedy against the thing itself, 
since he transferred to  the debtor possession and owner- 
ship, and  has only his obligatory claim to  fall back upon. 
The debtor can transfer  the thing  which  he has  just 
received, immediately to another, and if  he is not able, 
when  the time comes, to meet his obligation, it is the 
creditor's  loss.  The  insecurity  which  in  this  case 
threatens the creditor presupposes therefore on his part 
a  much greater confidence in the debtor ("credere"  in 
the sense of  belief) than in the first instance, and it was 
probably this consideration which  induced the Roman 
jurists  to assume  for  this category a  higher  kind  of 
"credere" ; which they designate by the expressions "in 
creditum ire" or "abire,"  "in credito esse," "in creditum 
dare, ac~ipere."~g 
Such a "credere,"  which according to the preceding 
discussion presupposes that the thing to be returned is 
only generically determined, is possible even with regard 
to commodities which differ individually  too much for 
indiscriminate exchange or convertibility.  In commerce, 
however, it is found only in those commodities in which 
proper generic designation gives adequate assurance that 
exactly the same value will  be returned as that which 
has been given.  This is the basis of  the juristic concept 
"'D.  12. 1. 2  g 1, 19 5 1; 14. 4.  5  5  18; 16. 1. 19  5  5; 19. 2.  31. 
"Suum esse"  is designated, as contrasted  with  "in  credito esse," as 
a sign, "quod  vindicari non possit,"  D.  34. 2. 27  5 2.  "In credito 
esse"  is therefore synonymous with the problem of  property.  In 
cases of  the first kind the creditor has the "suumesse"  remaining to 
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of  fungible  things in contrast  to non-fungible.  In the 
former  the  generic  determination  is  the  rule,  in  the 
latter  it is a  rare exception.  This idea  of fungibility, 
i. e., of  the equality of  value of  particular things, reaches 
its highest degree in money, which the Romans designate 
as "certum"  in the highest sense.  Money is therefore, 
quite apart from the other reasons which lead to  the same 
result,  singled  out by its nature to represent  the main 
object of  "credere"  in the above sense.  All other objects 
put together, which are in themselves available for this 
purpose,  cannot  bear  the  remotest  comparison  with 
money in teference to this mode of  their economic appli- 
cation.  In  this  form  "creditum"  attains  its greatest 
importance  for  commerce,  and  the older  Roman  law 
distinguished it from the others by special rules.  To  get 
our modern concept of  credit we  must start from this 
form. 
Money  alone is the object  of  credit in our  modern 
sense.  The shopkeeper who gives goods on credit dots 
not credit the goods -  that would mean that he wanted 
to get them back -  he credits the price. 
But not in all cases where money is handed over with 
the condition of  its subsequent return do we speak of 
giving  credit.  When  a  man  prior  to his  departure 
deposits his  available  funds  with  a  banker  in such a 
manner  that not the coins  ("depositum  regulare")  but 
the amount should  be  returned  to him  in  the future 
(so-called  "depositum  irregulare"),  he undertakes,  it is 
true, an "in creditum abire" in the Roman sense, and he 
puts himself  legally in exactly the same position as if  he 
had given him the money as a loan.  But this case must 
not  be brought under the point of  view of  credit in the 
commercial sense, and Roman jurists, too, distinguished it 
from  the  case  of  loan.  The consideration  which  led 
them to do this was the difference of  motive in the two 
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cases.  The depositor gives the money for his own sake, 
the lender for the sake of  the other.  In both cases, it is 
true, the receiver can dispose of  it for his own purposes, 
but in the one case it is only the effect of  the handing 
over,  in  the other it is the purpose of  it.  The same 
relation exists in the case where one hands over to his 
agent the money required to  carry out some business or to 
defray expenses.  He  transfers  the ownership  to him, 
and relies upon him  to apply the money in accordance 
with his orders.  But this, too, is not giving credit; the 
latter presupposes that the transaction is in the interest 
of  the receiver. 
The crediting of  money in the interest of  the receiver 
may take place in two ways:  in the form of  an inde- 
pendent contract by the handing over of  money, i. e., a 
loan, and on the occasion of  another contract by crediting 
the sum of  money which he owes as a result of  it.  This 
may take place  immediately on conclusion of  the con- 
tract or, by granting an extension of  the time of  pay- 
ment,  not  till  later.  The most frequent  occasion for 
this is found in the conclusion of  a contract of  sale.  If 
the credit of  the selling  price is made a condition, we 
speak of  a purchase on credit, or time.  This is just the 
case of  which we think in the first place when, in every- 
day life, we speak of  credit and trust.  Under this form 
comes the credit which the shopkeeper allows to his cus- 
tomers, and the credit which the merchant needs for his 
operations.  If  he needs a loan of  money it shows that 
he has not sufficient credit in the business world;  for the 
right kind of  business man credit should take the place 
of loans. 
Now Roman law offers a conception for this form of 
credit, which  I wish to communicate to the reader and 
apply for our purposes.  This indeed is my sole reason 
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law.  It  may be expressed briefly in the words that every 
case of  credit  contains an accessory  loan undertaken  in 
connection with the principal transaction. 
If  a  buyer  has not  the money  to pay  the purchase 
price,  he  must  find  some  one  who  will  lend  him  the 
money -  a loan must make the contract of  sale possible. 
Now the seller can give him the loan just as well as  any- 
body else,30and he does this when he trusts him with the 
price.  He does it not out of  benevolence,  but  in  his 
own  interest, in order  to make possible the sale at the 
price demanded by him.  If  he found a buyer who would 
take  the thing  for  cash  at the same  price,  he  would 
not give the credit;  in business no one gives credit who 
does  not  profit  thereby.  Even  in  the case where  the 
seller does not stipulate interest on the price, and receives 
therefore no interest as a matter of  form, he gets it as a 
matter of  fact.  For it is in the price; and the merchant 
who sells "on time," allows therefore quite consistently to 
the buyer  who does  not  wish  to avail  himself  of  it, a 
reduction for cash (deduction, discount). 
The juristic  process  of  crediting  the purchase  price 
must therefore be thought of  in this way, viz., that the 
seller in the capacity of  lender turns over the purchase 
money to himself in his capacity as seller,31  and the price 
is thus paid. 
mA  counterpart to this is found in D. 19.2. 15  5 6, where the pas- 
senger advances the fare to  the boatman before the termination of 
the voyage in the form of  a loan  ("vectura,  quam pro mutuo ac- 
ceperat"),  an accessory  loan, which  serves subsequently, after the 
termination of  the voyage, as a payment of  the fare.  The recipient 
pays it to himself in his capacity of  sailor. 
3l Juristic manipulations  of  this kind are not rare among the Roman 
jurists.  [So, for example, the guardian in his capacity as debtor of 
his ward must pay to himself  in his capacity as the latter's repre- 
sentative, i. e., he must enter it on the ledger as  paid, D. 26.7.  9  p 5. 
Another example in D.  12.1.151.  For the technique of  the law they 
cannot by any means be dispensed with. 
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In order  that the process  here assumed  should  find 
its correct juristic  expression, there would  be need of  a 
special juristic  transaction for the purpose  of  changing 
the purchase debt into a loan debt, and we should know 
very little of  the old  Roman  law if  we  could not main- 
tain with the greatest  assurance that it has  given  the 
transaction this form.  The solemn transfer  of  owner- 
ship  ("rnancipatio")  offered  no  opportunity  for  this. 
Credit  had  therefore  to  be  brought  either  into  the 
form  of  loan  ("nexum")  corresponding  to our promis- 
sory note, or into  the form of  a  literal  or 
a verbal contract.33  After the formless  contract of  sale 
had  become actionable, its binding  force  was  extended 
also  to the subsidiary agreement whereby the purchase 
price was credited.  The negotiation of  the credit, though 
a distinct transaction,  viz., the subsidiary loan, thus be- 
came superfluous."  Procedurally  this found its expres- 
sion  in  the fact that a credited  selling  price  was  sued 
for under the "actio venditi."  The  old conception of  the 
purchase price as a loan to the buyer is still traceable in 
the rule that he has to pay interest on it from the mo- 
ment of  the delivery of  the object. 
The foregoing exposition has had for its object to make 
clear the juristic form of  credit, as it is found expressed 
in Roman law, in order by this means to prepare for the 
following discussion, which  is concerned with its social- 
economic significance. 
An example in the celebrated case of  fraud in Cicero, "De  Offi- 
ciis,"  111,  14: "nomina  facit, negotium conficit." 
33That credit  assumes  thereby  the form  of  a loan is expressly 
recognized  in  D.  14. 6.  3  Q 3.  "Si  in  creditum  abii . . .  ex causa 
emptionis . . . et stipulatus sim, licet coeperit esse pecunia mutua." 
"  The possibility,  however,  of  changing the purchase debt after- 
wards into a loan by means of  a simple contract still remained, D. 12. 
1. 15. 126  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [ CH. VII 
We start from the proposition which served to intro- 
duce the subject of credit above (p. 118), viz., that with- 
out credit commerce would be the most imperfect and 
most unmanageable thing in the world.  The purpose of 
commerce demands credit so greatly that its necessity 
will appear everywhere with compelling force. 
The purpose of commerce consists in the satisfaction 
of human wants.  The form  in which this satisfaction is 
carried  out is the contract of exchange in the widest 
sense, viz., something done or given for something else. 
Therefore, since money has become the normal form of 
equivalent for all things desired,  commerce means the 
procurement, by means of  money, of  something done or 
given. 
But suppose the person in want of  something has no 
money.  In this case if  he is not in a position to procure 
the satisfaction of  his need by the sale of  his b~longings 
-and  that too perhaps only with  the greatest loss- 
he would not be able to satisfy his need, and he would be 
denied  bread, upon  which  the lives of  his children, as 
well  as his own life, are dependent.  Even if  he had the 
most  certain  prospect  of  getting  the money  soon,  he 
becomes temporarily indigent. 
This gap which the system of  exchange in the above 
forrp leaves open is filled by credit.  Credit assists the 
need of  the present by applying to the future. 
The need  of the present  may  be  helped  in the first 
place by a friend.  But friendship and benevolence do 
not constitute a factor of  commerce (p. 83).  The lever 
upon which it counts and must count is egoism, which has 
the advantage that it never fails. 
The loan of  a friend is gratuitous, that of  an egoist is 
paid ; he requires interest.  In  this way the loan subordi- 
nates itself  to the principle of  the system of  exchange, 
viz., performance  for  a  consideration.  Interest is  the 
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equivalent for  the temporary handing  over  of  capital. 
Time is money, in reference to the money's,  as well as 
the man's power of  acquisition. 
But even with this condition attached, the person in 
need  receives the money only when the lender is confi- 
dent  that  he  will  get  it  back  later.  The  economic 
"credere"  of  the money  has as its presupposition  the 
moral  "credere"  in the person.  Credit is belief  in the 
domain of  economics;  the believers are the creditors. 
The lender as the possessor of funds, which he puts at 
the disposition of the borrower, we call capitalist, and the 
funds,  If the present has more than it  needs, it 
lays  by,  under  good  management,  a  surplus  for  the 
future -  it saves.  When  these  savings  become  more 
than  is generally  used  up by  norma1,individual  need, 
we call them capital.  Capital is the surplus of  economy 
which has withstood victoriously the attack of  constant 
need.  It follows from this that the concept is relative. 
A sum of  three hundred marks, or even of thirty, may be 
capital  for a  poor man, i. e., a  saving perfectly  secure 
from these attacks.  For a rich man, ten or a hundred 
times this sum may not yet be capital, fgr capital begins 
where  expenditure  need  no  longer  claim  all  that  is 
available. 
Now  as trade in merchandise brings the object from 
the place where it does not fulfil its function of  serving 
The designation  "caput" for the sum lent (in the sense of  the 
principal  thing as opposed  to the interest,  the secondary  thing) 
dates from the time of  the later  Roman  Empire; the earlier term 
was  "sors."  Like  the expression  "caput,"  so the modern terms, 
capital, capitalist, involve the economic  exploitation  of  money by 
means of interest.  When we are not thinking of the latter, we speak 
of money.  The function of capital is to  bear interest.  A capitalist 
in  the eminent sense of  the term is the man who can live on his 
interest  (income  ["Renten"], hence  "Rentier"  [a  person living on 
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human need to the place where it  does, so trade in money 
does the same with  regard  to capital.  Interest is the 
lever in this process.  It draws money from the place 
where  it has  accumulated  without  finding  economic 
employment to the place where it is wanting and needed. 
Superfluity in one place and want in the other compensate 
each other; what the one has too much of  comes in handy 
to the person who has too little.  The economy of  the 
past, present  and future is equalized  and  divided  be- 
tween  two  persons.  The past  falls  to the capitalist; 
for he had to save to be able to lend;  the present and 
future fall to him who borrows the money;  the present 
in the form of  a deficit, the future with the task of  cover- 
ing this deficit by an eventual surplus.  In  the economic 
world  we find a similar phenomenon  of  equalization to 
that represented in the cosmic world by the equalization 
of  heat over the various seasons, regions, land and sea. 
But the loan  of  the capitalist  who lends us money, 
whether he gives it himself  or opens a credit for us with 
another, is not the only means by which we can relieve 
our need.  With this is associated the second species of 
credit,  mentioned  above (p.  123), in  connection  with 
another contract, viz., the giving credit for  the sum of 
money  in contradistinction  to giving  cash.  The prin- 
cipal occasion for this is offered by the contract of  sale, 
and in view of  this we will designate this species as mer- 
chandise credit in contradistinction to the money credit of 
the loan, following in this the usage of  ordinary life, which 
speaks of  "taking  goods  on credit."  That juristically 
it is not the goods but the purchase price which is given 
on credit, has been remarked above (p. 122). 
In the legal sense the price is credited only when there 
is an agreement to that effect.  If  this is not the case, 
then the purchase, even if  the seller allows the goods to 
be  taken away  without  receiving  payment, is, legally 
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speaking, a  purchase for cash.  The giving credit is in 
this  case purely  a  de jacto  arrangement, a  contractual 
~~~~~~~~i~m,"  to which the seller can put an end at any 
moment, and which does not therefore involve, accord- 
ing to the Roman law, the ownership of  the object pur- 
chased.  The latter presupposes payment or contractual 
credit  of  the  price.  But  this  distinction  is  without 
particular significance for the economic function of  credit 
in our present business life, which is the only thing to be 
taken  into  account  in  the  following  investigation. 
Actually, pure credit de jacto, where the seller can, if  he 
chooses,  demand  the price  of  the  goods  immediately 
after delivery, or send a bill and insist on its payment, 
but does not do so, plays a scarcely less important role 
than credit in the meaning-of the law. 
Merchandise credit in the wider sense is distinguished 
from  money  credit  by  the fact  that the latter is de- 
manded  by  the nature of  the business  itself -  a  loan 
without  credit is a contradiction in terms -  whereas in 
purchase it is an accidental addition which may be want- 
ing.  The contract of  sale began as a sale for cash, and 
it is only in the course of  development that sale on credit 
became associated  with it.  The idea of  credit first saw 
the light  of  day in the loan which  is exclusively based 
upon  it, and it was only later on transferred from it to 
the contract  of  sale.  Even without  the historical evi- 
dence which  the Roman law presents in support of  this 
proposition (p. 125), we should find ourselves driven to it 
from general considerations.  The born lender is the  capi- 
talist, who  has amassed  money by his savings, and his 
interest is to find another with whom he can turn it into 
profit in the form of  interest.  The lender tries to get rid 
of his  money, whereas the seller tries to get it, and fre- 
quently  he  is  so far  from  being  at the same  time  a 
capitalist  that on the contrary  the want of  money  is 
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What  causes  him  to  credit  the  price?  Evidently 
nothing  but  his  own  interest.  If  he  can  sell  just  as 
advantageously  for  cash  as  on  credit,  he  allows  no 
credit.  He allows it only either to make possible a sale 
which would otherwise not have taken place at  all, or to 
get a higher price.  In either case the contract of  sale 
must pay for the credit which he allows. 
In  giving  credit  the seller  undertakes  economically 
the role of  the lender, of  the capitalist.  He saves the 
buyer  the necessity  of  procuring  the money  he  needs 
from the capitalist, who is the special man for the pur- 
pose, and does himself  what originally the latter alone 
did, viz.,  to put  at his disposal  the money  which  he 
needs, and which  is required for the conclusion of  the 
purchase.  That is, he lends it to him, not as the other, 
in the form of  an independent loan, but as an accessory 
loan, which  is inserted as a constituent element in the 
contract.  Whether  it assumes  the  juristic  form  of  a 
loan, as was  the case in  old  Roman  business, and as 
happens  with  us  in the business of  merchants  by  the 
drawing of a bill of  exchange, is indifferent so far as the 
economic  view  of  the  transaction  is  concerned.  The 
seller  does  actually  exercise the  function  of  a  lender. 
The interest, without which the capitalist does not make 
the loan, is found by the seller, in the absence of  express 
stipulation, in  the amount  of  the  price,  which  is  set 
higher, in view of  the credit allowed, than it would be in 
a sale for cash. 
Looked at in this way, money credit and merchandise 
credit come under the same point of  view, viz., the loan. 
Money credit is an independent, open loan; merchandise 
credit  is  an accessory, latent loan.  The practical sig- 
nificance of the transference of  credit from loan to con- 
tract  of  sale  cannot  be  estimated  too  highly;  it 
belongs to the number of  those business factors of  prime 
importance which have given an exceptional form to the 
entire system of  commerce.  By  admitting  credit  into 
the business of  merchandise, exchange has received that 
complete form of  which it is capable, beyond which it is 
capable of  no further progress. 
In order to appreciate properly the significance which 
merchandise credit  has for  commerce, we  must distin- 
guish, I think, two applications of  it:  The one belongs 
to private (not mercantile) exchange, the other to mer- 
cantile transactions;  credit which the private man  (non- 
merchant) takes, and credit which  the merchant takes. 
The former I shall call private credit, the latter mercantile 
(or trade) credit. 
Contracts of  sale concerning movable things in which 
private  persons  are on both  sides form  the  exception 
in business intercourse; as a rule the other party  is a 
merchant (in the widest sense of  the word), who makes a 
business of  buying and selling; a shopkeeper, a dealer in 
old  clothes, an innkeeper, a  bookseller,  an artisan, a 
banker, etc.  In comparison with the enormous number 
of  contracts of  sale which are daily  carried  out in this 
form, those in which one private man sells to the other 
vanish almost into nothing.  In the life of  many persons 
years, even a whole lifetime, may pass without the occur- 
rence of  such a case, and when it does happen once, the 
sale is as a rule for cash.  Only the br,eaking up of  a 
household  in case  of  death, of  change  of  place,  etc., 
brings the private man into the position  of  appearing 
as a seller of  movable property, and the sale takes place 
as a rule in the public form of  an auction sale.  On such 
an occasion the question of  credit confronts him likewise. 
It is an experience with which the Romans already were 
familiar that one can get higher prices in auction sales 
on credit than for cash, and this was the basis in Rome 
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consisted in assigning the giving of  credit to the "argen- 
tarius,"  the Roman auctioneer, who was, by reason of 
his personal knowledge, the proper man to judge the sol- 
vency of  the particular bidder, and who undertook  the 
giving of  credit on his own risk for a certain percentage 
of  the entire income, exactly like the modern auctioneer 
who  undertakes  the  "del  credere"  on a  certain  com- 
mission,  and  after deducting this pays  the owner  the 
entire amount at  once in cash.  The private person wishes 
as far as possible to have nothing to do with the giving 
of  credit, and leaves it to the business man. 
In the sale of  immovable property, the case is quite 
different from what it is in the sale of  movable.  Here 
credit is the rule.  A portion  of  the price is paid;  the 
other portion, as a rule the larger, remains on the estate, 
bearing interest and secured by  reservation  of  the title 
or by mortgage.  The seller advances the buyer the sum, 
which the latter would  otherwise have to borrow  from 
some one else, and assumes the economic function of  the 
lender.  This case of credit  comes  under  the point  of 
view of  real credit in contradistinction to personal credit. 
It has nothing in it of  credit in the sense of  trust.  In 
demanding real security the seller shows that he has no 
trust in the buyer;  he lends him indeed  ("credere"  in 
the economic sense), but he does not trust him ("credere" 
in the moral sense). 
We, therefore, may say that in a private sale credit in 
this latter sense has a very subordinate role;  in a thou- 
sand cases of  credit given by the merchant there is per- 
haps not one given by the private person.  The private 
person makes sure of his object, and he can and must do 
so, for he does not make a living from the sale as the 
merchant does, who in order to increase his sales is obliged 
to call in the aid of this artificial means of  inducement, 
and with whom the loss which he suffers in a particular 
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case  is  distributed  over  a  large  number  of  cases  and 
thereby neutralized.  As his business makes it necessary 
for him to give credit, the advantages of  giving credit 
pay for its risks -  the merchant insures himself. 
We  must  distinguish  between  the private  man  and 
the merchant in reference to the persons to whom credit 
is  given.  As  regards  the creditor  himself  there is  no 
essential difference, to be sure;  he  tries in both  cases 
to make possible by  means of  it the closing of  a deal 
which would  otherwise  perhaps  not  have  taken  place, 
and  he  risks in the one case as much  as in the other, 
except that the risk assumes greater dimensions with the 
merchant.  But in reference to the other  party, credit 
exercises an essentially different function in the two cases, 
which  I  think I can fittingly express by the terms con- 
sumers'  credit  and  trade  credit.  The former finds  its 
motive and its measure in  the immediate need  of  the 
thing which is given on credit.  The condition of  a lack 
of  money to cover the cost is here the exception, not the 
rule.  The management  of  private affairs should be  so 
arranged, and is as a rule so arranged, that there is no 
need of  credit with  the shopkeeper, baker, butcher, etc. 
The respectable  housekeeper makes no debts, does not 
live on  credit, just  as he is not in the habit of  giving 
credit himself.  Cash payment is the principle of  a well 
ordered  household, the necessity of  credit is a proof  of 
disturbance -  whether  due to improvidence or to mis- 
fortune -  of  the normal  relation. 
The case is quite different in trade credit, where it is 
not  a  question  of  obtaining the thing  for  the purpose 
of  satisfying  one's  own  want,  but  for the purpose  of 
selling it.  The respectable merchant may receive credit 
without losing his standing, and he must do  so;  he would 
not be a merchant if he did not utilize it for his opera- 
tions.  The sale of  his goods must furnish him the means 134  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH. VII 
with which  he covers the purchase;  he must buy more 
than  he  can  pay  for at once.  Credit  constitutes  an 
essential  and  absolutely  indispensable factor and lever 
of  his business management;  the measure in which  he 
enjoys it is the criterion of  his competence and impor- 
tance in the mercantile world.  The distinction between 
the  normal  form  of  private  management  and business 
management may be expressed in two words, cash pay- 
ment and credit. 
As a  matter of  fact, however, the use of  credit even in 
private  affairs  has increased in a manner which  hardly 
bears out the last proposition.  It is not limited by any 
means to  the  compelling occasion  which  first called  it 
into life, viz.,  the want of  cash money -  I might call it 
in this form  emergency  credit-but  it is given and taken 
where  this  condition  is not  at all  present.  There is 
many a place and many a business where it is forced upon 
the customer  against  his  will;  cash payment is refused 
as if  it were  dishonorable  for  the seller to accept it; a 
bill can scarcely be gotten from him before the time when 
he is in the habit of  presenting it.  In place of  immediate 
payment  or immediate  presentation of  the bill, the cus- 
tom  has  arisen  of  presenting it periodically  at certain 
dates.  Wherein  does the motive  of  this  consist?  In 
the first edition of this work I placed it in the facilitation 
of the mode  of  payment  which  is effected thereby for 
both  parties -  the  burdensome  and  annoying  small, 
daily  payments  at the grocer's, baker's,  butcher's,  are 
replaced  by  periodically  recurrent  larger  ones -  and 
designated it accordingly as the credit of  convenience.  I 
am now  convinced that this conception does not wholly 
cover the object which  is aimed at in the matter.  The 
credit of convenience is at the same time calculated to 
cover  the emergency  credit; it is  meant  to save cus- 
tomers to whom the latter would apply the embarrass- 
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merit of  asking for it, which would perhaps keep them 
from buying altogether.  In order that it may be given 
naturally to those for whom it is specially intended, it is 
given to all.  The arrangement must be general in order 
to offer its service to those for whom it is intended. 
Such is credit in the domain of  private life.  But the 
full  development of  its force it attains only in the domain 
of mercantile life.  A private person who has an income 
of a thousand a year will not under proper management 
take more than a thousand a year on credit, but even a 
responsible merchant who owns ten thousand often does 
business of  a hundred  thousand and more.  The func- 
tion  which  mercantile credit exercises does not consist, 
as it does  in  private  credit,  in  making  harmless  the 
momentary inequality between the need and the means, 
but in affording the business man the possibility of  using 
another's  capital for his business in order to be able to 
speculate with  it.  Hence we  may  designate  this form 
of  credit as credit  of  speculation.  The goods which  are 
delivered to him without payment  constitute for him a 
sort of  loan of  capital (money value instead of  money), 
the credit which he receives is meant to strengthen his 
resources;  it is given  in  view  of  the success which  it 
helps to bring about. 
But the advantages which credit offers to the mercan- 
tile business  must be dearly  paid  for.  Credit  exposes 
the otherwise  hardy constitution of  business to a seri- 
ous  danger, to periodic  disturbances  and interruptions 
of  its  normal  functions of  life.  Credit  is  similar  to 
narcotics.  A proper use tends to stimulate the powers 
of  man, to animate and increase them, but when used 
to excess they  produce instead  of  refreshment,  relaxa- 
tion and weakness.  The same is true of  credit in trade. 
If it  is  used  properly,  it  raises  the  powers  of  the 
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commerce, but when used  beyond  measure its effect is 
devastating;  destroying those who  take it as well  as 
those who give it.  In regard to  spirituous intoxication, 
our  language  describes  the  condition  of  involuntary 
expiation decreed by nature for excess in the use of  liquors 
by the term "katzenjammer."  In  commerce it is called 
a  "business  crisis";  in more  recent  times  the  term 
"crash"  also has come into use.  Crash is the economic 
"katzenjammer"  resulting from excessive use of  credit - 
"Schwindel"  (swindle,  vertigo)  plays  a  great  role  in 
both. 
The cause of  this danger lies in the fact that credit 
operates with another man's capital.  Of  thesum x which 
the dealer on credit stakes on the card, only one-tenth x 
perhaps belongs to him, and the other nine-tenths to B. 
If  the undertaking succeeds, the whole gain accrues to 
him;  if  it fails,  then  the risk  exceeding  one-tenth  x 
does not fall on him but on others.  If  the whole x were 
his own, he would bear the entire risk himself and would 
therefore be  more  cautious in staking it.  Credit is a 
means  of  encouraging  risks -  the less a man has, the 
more advantageous it is for him to speculate, if  he finds 
people to give him credit. 
With  credit  in business we have reached  the highest 
stage of  the system of commerce which  is based  upon 
economic  reward,  that  term  being  understood  in  the 
widest sense as above explained (p. 98).  But economic 
reward is not the only form in which society applies the 
concept of  reward for its purposes;  there is still another 
to which we will now pass on. 
$ 7.  Ideal  Reward  and Its Combination with Economic 
Reward.  Our  language  does not limit  the concept  of 
reward to  that form of it alone which we have been con- 
sidering till now, namely, money;  for it uses it also in a 
moral sense for every good which falls to  anyone's share 
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as  for a meritorious act.  For example, it 
speaks of the  reward of virtue, of diligence, etc.  Whether 
this  wider  concept  of  reward  has any significance  for 
commerce will appear in the sequel;  that it has impor- 
tance for society, cannot be a matter of  doubt.  Reward 
in this wider sense forms the counterpart of  punishment. 
Society punishes him who has wronged her; she rewards 
him who deserves well at  her hands. 
The use which society makes of  reward nowadays is 
far behind  that of  punishment;  she has taken in  this 
respect, in comparison with antiquity, a considerable step 
backward.  In Rome reward  and punishment,  as the 
two means at the disposal of  society for  the carrying 
out of  her purposes, were regarded by the sociologist as 
fully equal.  A  Roman jufist does not hesitate on the 
question of  the final purpose of  the law to put reward 
on one and the same plane with punishment.36  This is 
highly significant! What has the jurist to  do  with reward? 
Nowadays, nothing;  nowadays, punishment alone is con- 
fided  to him, a legal claim to reward  for distinguished 
and unusual merits belongs  to no one.  But this very 
thing  reflects  the  enormous  difference  between  the 
Roman world and our own, viz., that public reward  in 
Rome had not as with  us a merely social significance, 
but a  legal significance.  The law of  reward -  an idea 
unfamiliar to  us -  corresponded in Rome to the law of 
Punishment  (criminal  law).  Nay, it is not saying too 
much  to maintain  that up to the  codification  of  the 
criminal law at  the end of  the Republic, the law of  reward 
was  more clearly  defined  than  the criminal law.  The 
criminal  law  was  administered  by the Roman  people 
with a freedom which verged on arbitrarine~s.~?  Whether 
D. 1.  1. 1  5 1.  ". . .  bonos non solum rnetu poenarum, verum 
etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione efficere cupientes." 
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they should  recognize a  penalty, and  which one, was 
always a matter of  their free choice.  But whether the 
general deserved a triumph or an ovation, whether  the 
soldier had  a claim to the "corona  muralis,"  "civics," 
"castrensis," "navalis" -the  military decorations of  the 
Romans -  was  a  matter  of  detailed  regulation,  and 
might even furnish a cause of  acti~n.~s  To  the triumph 
and olive wreaths of  the Olympic games, to the mural 
and civic crowns of  antiquity correspond, according to 
their character, our decorations of  today;  our titles and 
ennoblements.  But these are not a matter of  right, but 
of  supreme  grace  or  favor,  and  the  notion  that  they 
represent  the undoubted  proof  of  distinguished  social 
merit is nowhere more effectually  guarded against than 
at  the source of  their bestowal, because there the opera- 
tive motives, levers and considerations are best  known. 
They can be often compared with apples which  cannot 
be reached by those who stand at a  distance, but fall 
in the laps of  those who sit under the tree, or who are 
in a position to be able to shake it.  Whether this form 
of  the matter will in course of  time give room to another; 
whether  the  same  revolution  will  take  place  in  the 
State's system of  reward as has taken place in its penal 
system, by an advance from subjective choice to fixed 
rules and law, which would be no more than a return 
"  Val. Max. 11, 8, 2 " . . .  judicium,  . . .  in quo de  jure  trium - 
phandi .  . .  actum."  Thewholeeighthchapter in this writer treats 
"de jure triumphandi."  For an  action in claim of  a "corona  mura- 
lis," which is said almost to  have led to a military uprising, see Liuy, 
26,48.  For the "jus civicae coronae" see Gellius, VI, 5  5 13.  There 
were other rewards of a juristic  nature which  were connected  with 
definite conditions, for example,  the attainment of  complete  civic 
power and of "patria  potestas"  for an "imperfect  citizen"  (Latini 
Juniani, Ulp.  111, Gaj.  I, 66), the "jus  liberorum,"  so important 
in connection with the right of  succession and otherwise -the  pre- 
mium of  a fruitful marriage. 
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to the method of  antiquity -  this I leave to every one's 
own opinion ; I for my part believe in it.  Whether it is 
reward  or  punishment  (the  function  of  both  being 
simply the realization  of  the idea of  justice) that errs, 
;.  e.,  misses the right  man  and finds  the wrong one, is 
qually  incompatible with the idea of  justice. 
~ut  it is  not  the  personal  representative  of  sov- 
ereignty  alone  who  rewards  social merit;  there  is an 
impersonal power  besides, viz.,  public opinion and  also 
history, which rectify the errors which the former may 
have  committed.  They  have  honors  to confer  with 
which the favots of  the ruler cannot even remotely com- 
pare.  For those which he controls are of  an exceedingly 
evanescent character;  they are buried with their bearer 
-  narve vanity hits the nail on the head when it fastens 
those decorations to the coffin!  But the laurel around 
Dante's  temples is ever green and will never fade;  one 
leaf of it outweighs wagon loads of  grand crosses. 
The species of  reward which  I have considered just 
now I designate as zdeal reward.  I call it ideal in contra- 
distinction  to material reward (money), which bears its 
value in itself, whereas the ideal value depends solely 
upon the ideas which are associated with it.  What are 
three  horsetails,  a  peacock's  feather,  a  ribbon  in  the 
buttonhole,  for  him  who  does  not  know  what  they 
signify, and what are they even for him who does know 
but puts no value upon such honors?  External marks 
of honor possess no higher value for their owner than he 
himself puts upon them; money, on the contrary, retains 
its full value, its economic power, even in the hands of 
him who values it slightly.  It is of  the greatest inter- 
est  to society  that ideal  reward  should  stand  in  the 
highest possible estimation.  The higher the value which 
is put upon it,  the more effective is the lever which society 
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We have defined commerce (supra p.  74) as the sys- 
tem of  the regulated and assured satisfaction of  human 
wants.  In these wants, however, are counted not only 
those of  the body, such as eating and drinking, clothing 
and shelter, but for a certain portion of  the population 
also  the  ideal  interests  of  art and  science.  He  who 
satisfies these fulfils thereby a purpose of  commerce; the 
artist and the scholar therefore serve commerce no less 
than the farmer, the artisan and the merchant.  Art and 
science, too, go out on the market and offer their treasures 
for sale;  the painter his picture, the sculptor his statue, 
the  composer  his  symphony, the  scholar  his  manu- 
script.  By this means, it might seem, they place them- 
selves on a line with all others who hold their products 
or manufactures for sale, vzz.,  the farmer,  the manu- 
facturer,  the artisan,  and  tread the economic level of 
business life.  They accept reward for their work, con- 
sequently  it is  wages  ("Arbeitslohn"),  and  whatever 
applies to the one group applies to the other. 
It is by all means necessary to free oneself  from this 
view.  Not indeed because it degrades art and science, 
but because it distorts the truth in such a  way as to 
prevent one understanding the reality.  The true view 
recognizes two spheres of social work.  In  the  one,  money 
constitutes  the  only  purpose  and  is  the lever  of  all 
operations which  take place  therein;  in the other, the 
individual by his efforts  has another aim in view besides 
money making.  To the second  sphere belong art and 
science, the service of the Church and the State.  Lan- 
guage with its fine discrimination  has correctly grasped 
the difference between the two spheres.  In the one  it 
calls the reward  "wages"  ("Arbeitslohn), in the second 
it carefully avoids using this expression and replaces it 
by  other  terms.  The writer, composer,  physician  re- 
ceives no "pay"  ("Lohn")  or "wages"  ("Arbeitslohn"), 
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but  a  "honorarium,"  the  official  receives  "salary" 
["Gehalt,"  "Besoldung"]  (in case of  extraordinary com- 
pensation, "remuneration"),  the lawyer, "fees"  ("Deser- 
viten").  This is no mere politeness of  expression, meant 
to  conceal the fact that the receiver works for money, nor 
is the difference in designation merely aimed at  the con- 
trast of  physical and intellectual work.  According to  my 
mind, it  is meant to express the relation of  the reward to 
the work.  Reward constitutes for the ordinary workman 
the sole motive of  his work, whereas the physician, lawyer, 
artist,  scholar,  teacher,  preacher,  government  official, 
unless indeed he is a mere workman, seeks the motive of 
his activity and his satisfaction by no means exdusively 
in the money, but also in something superior ; if  the  usage 
of Ianguage had its basis in mere etiquette, science would 
have every reason to free itself  from it, for it would in 
that case rest only upon an  ancient prejudice, which is 
quite obsolete nowadays,  that there is something  dis- 
honorable  in accepting pay for work  (p. 81).  Where 
the pay is purely return for labor, an avoidance of  this 
expression on account of  the social position of  the  receiver 
would be just as  senseless as if  one wanted to  call pur- 
chase money, rent, interest, operations in stocks in case 
of persons of  high  standing, by a different  name from 
that they bear among persons of  lower rank.  Language 
is too intelligent a thing to lay stress upon matters so 
absolutely irrelevant. 
The essence of  salary and all other similar forms of 
reward depends upon the combination of  economic and 
ideal reward.  They add to the two species of  simple 
reward, viz., the purely economic and the purely ideal, 
still a third, which is composed of  both; I will call it the 
mixed.  It is conceivable that in this combination  the 
two elements  are only united  as in  a  mixture with- 
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principles of  wages would apply fully to  salary also.  That 
this is, however, not the case, but that the combination 
influences the economic ~eward  in such a way that under 
certain  circumstances not the least trace is left of  that 
which constitutes  its essence, the giving of  an equiva- 
lent for the work -  of  this anyone can convince himself 
who wishes to make a trial in the three relations men- 
tioned:  art, science, and public (State, Church) service. 
Is the high  compensation of  a  Catholic ecclesiastical 
prince an equivalent for his work?  Does the difference, 
often so great, between the salary of  the president of  a 
hoard and that of  the other board members correspond 
to the difference  in value of  their  labor  power, or the 
difference in the measure of  their exertion?  Is the honora- 
rium of  the writer or composer always regulated accord- 
ing to the value of  his writing or composition?  Schubert 
gave away many of  his immortal compositions for almost 
nothing, while at the same time and in the same place 
Strauss, the composer of  waltzes, received hard cash for 
his waltzes. 
Is it the money that guides the hand of  the painter, 
the sculptor, the poet, the scholar?  Cornelius sacrificed 
many years of  time  and  trouble in the Villa  Barthaldi 
in Rome without any pay, only for the sake of  bringing 
fresco painting into favor again, and yet  he was a  man 
altogether  without  means, and  found himself  often  in 
the most  pressing need.  Alexander von Humboldt lost 
his entire fortune in  the service of  science, and many a 
scholar spends half  a lifeiime of  effort on a work which 
often scarcely brings him enough to pay for the papr, 
the ink and the oil.  Does a shoemaker, a tailor, a manu- 
facturer, a merchant, work many years for nothing solely 
for love of  his work?  The honorarium of  the artist, the 
poet, the scho!ar,  is not a wage;  it lacks the most essen- 
tial characteristic of  wage:  equivalence (p. 101).  It may 
be high where the work is easy, low where the work is 
hard,  and  may  be  wanting  entirely  where  the work 
the highest  grade.  And  these are not merely 
single instances; there are entire branches of  scientific 
literature which find themselves in the position of  being 
obliged  to do without any honorarium,  and they give 
actual proof  of  being able to do so, as for example the 
natural sciences.  Here the special journals exist with- 
out paying their contributors, and the cost of  independent 
treatises  with  engraved  illustrations  not  infrequently 
must in part at  least be defray&  by the author. 
The lever therefore which sets the talent for art and 
science in action cannot be found in economic reward. 
But there exists a reward with which the economic is 
allied,  and  which  sometimes  takes  its place  entirely, 
and that is, the ideal. 
I distinguish two kinds of  ideal remuneration:  external 
and internal.  By the first I understand the reward which 
is  paid  by society or  the power  of  the State (p. 138): 
fame, recognition, honor;  by the second I denote  that 
satisfaction  which  a  work  itself  affords;  such  is  the 
delight in intellectual work per se, the charm of  proving 
one's power, the joy of  discovery, the pleasure in creating, 
the consciousness of  having done a service to the world, 
of having utilized one's faculties for the welfare of  human- 
ity.  The social effectiveness of  ideal reward presupposes 
a  subjective  susceptibility  to it, viz., the ideal  sense. 
Peoples, ages, individuals who lack this sense will never 
achieve anything great in the domain of  art and science 
-the  ideal  flourishes only on ideal soil.  The typical 
motive for art and  science without which  they cannot 
fulfil their calling is idealism, the typical motive for busi- 
ness  is  the desire  for gain.  An  artist  who  cares  for 
nothing else than the gain, who has no other interest in 
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for, is  a  somewhat  superior  type of  artisan, and will 
never create a real work of  art -  where the interests of 
gain and art clash he will give preference to the former. 
The counterpart of this man who allows himself  to be 
guided by economic motives in an ideal sphere, is the 
business man who should wish to pursue ideal interests 
instead of  gain in the  economic sphere.  Both have missed 
their vocation;  they pursue within it an aim for which 
it is not intended;  the former  should  have been  an 
artisan,  a  merchant,  or  manufacturer;  the  latter  an 
artist or scholar.  Business must be pursued in a busi- 
nesslike manner, the ideal in an ideal manner;  and this 
way lies the success of  the individual and of  society.  By 
this it is not of  course intended to  give expression to  the 
foolish idea that the ideal and the practical are  opposites 
which are  incompatible in the same person, so  that he who 
feels called upon to  represent the former must be unprac- 
tical, and he who represents the latter  must be inaccessible 
to  the ideal.  Experience shows the truth of the contrary 
in both domains, and in reference to the practical man, 
art and science have every reason to think gratefully of 
their advancement, frequently made only through those 
sacrifices  by which  booksellers and art dealers of  the 
higher type have made their works possible. 
In art and science the equivalent of  the performance, 
which according to  the preceding discussion is a union of 
the ideal  and the economic reward, varies greatly, and 
the establishment of  a fixed scale, such as is possible in 
pay for work, would  be an impossibility.  The case is 
different in the service of  the Church and the State. 
Here we are presented with a system of  reward in which 
the two component elements, the economic (salary), and 
the ideal  (rank), rise in a  uniform progression from the 
lower  stage to the higher.  There  is  here  a  carefully 
thought  out  and  systematically  arranged  scale  of 
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rewards  The principle of  remuneration here is the offi- 
cial  estimation  of  the importance  of  the office  for the 
purposes of the State, and in monarchies also for the per- 
son of the ruler -  the degree which  each one occupies 
within  it  can  be  estimated  by  the  salary  and  rank. 
Supplementary to this ordinary system of  reward there 
is  besides  an extraordinary  reward,  which  is  measured 
in accordance  with the merits of  each case as it occurs; 
economic  reward  in  the shape of  remuneration;  ideal 
reward  in the shape of  a  title of  honor  (in contradis- 
tinction to the official title), and a decoration. 
But not ir1  all cases where  the State, to which I con- 
fine myself in the sequel -  for the same conditions essen- 
tially apply to the Church and the municipalities alike - 
not in all  cases where  the State pays  for  the services 
rendered it, does the remuneration belong to the above 
described system of rewards.  The clerk in the chancery 
does not receive a  "salary"  but "pay"  ("Lohn")  in the 
sense of  wages;  the common soldier receives no "salary," 
but compensation  ("Lohnung"),  and many services the 
State does not pay  for at all.  If  we  turn over  in our 
mind  all, the services  which  are rendered to the State, 
we shall  find that they rest  upon two levers, corn~lsion 
and reward.  We will briefly  formulate these. 
I.  Compulsion.  Certain  services,  as  for  example 
that  of  the  soldier,  the  juror,  the  witness,  the  State 
compels.  These constitute a civic duty just as much as 
the  payment  of  public  taxes.  What  determines  the 
application  of  compulsion in these is not the indispen- 
sable nature of  the service.  Judges and military officers 
are quite  as indispensable  as jurors  and common  sol- 
diers, and yet the latter are compelled, the former are 
not.  The reason is two-fold.  First, because every one 
not affected by special disabilities is capable of perform- 
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temporary duration no one is hindered because of  them 
in the choice and pursuit of  a civil vocation.  Service of 
the State, on the other hand, in the professional sense of 
the term presupposes a fitness to be gained only by long 
preparation, and the permanent and exclusive devotion 
to it demands the pledge of  one's whole existence.  This 
is  a  sacrifice  which  the  State cannot  without  being 
unjust impose arbitrarily upon this or that person, but 
which  it must make dependent upon the free choice of 
the individual, and make possible by granting a liveli- 
hood  (see below).  Where an indemnity is granted  for 
those compulsory services also (the compensation of  the 
soldier, the fees of  the witnesses, the allowances of  the 
jurors),  it does not come under the point of  view of  re- 
ward, but under that of  living expenses during the time 
of  service (see below). 
11.  Reward.  This takes a three-fold form: 
1.  Purely  economic  reward,  or  wages.  Wages  for 
services rendered to the State are those of  the industrial, 
inferior  and  dependent  services;  and  not  merely  the 
temporary  (those of  the men in the offices paid by the 
day, of  the day laborers and workmen in the construc- 
tion  of  public  works),  but  also  the permanent  (those 
of  the  clerical  employees).  The scale  fixed  for  their 
payment, which  is often in crying disproportion to the 
salary of  the officials, shows that theirs is a purely eco- 
nomic remuneration, an equivalent for the work.  But 
their case is in the popular mind already affected by the 
ideal element.  A faint reflection of  the splendor of  State 
service falls also upon the chanceries and offices, gilding 
the  pens  and  the  inkstands.  The  most  insignificant 
member of the personnel of  the chancery feels elevated 
by the thought of being a member of  the great  machinery 
called the State -  there is need only of  a title: actuary, 
secretary, councilor of  the chancery, to raise the sense 
of  his own dignity to the greatest height. 
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2.  Purely Ideal Reward.  Those positions in which the 
equivalent for the service consists solely in the position 
of power and honor which is connected with them, are 
called posts of  honor, offices of  honor.  Having compre- 
hended in ancient Rome the entire upper sphere of  the 
State government  (the "honores"),  they gave place  in 
later Rome to paid service of  the State (p. 86 f.).  In 
modern Europe, after having been restricted for centuries 
to the sphere of  the service of  the Church and the muni- 
cipality,  it is not  until  recent  times  that they  again 
recovered a highly influential position  in the unsalaried 
popular  representation.  Where  the  representative  of 
the people  receives an allowance, the post  falls under 
the next following category. 
3.  Mixed  Reward.  If  the service is of  a permanent 
nature,  the  economic  reward  granted  for  it is called 
salary, "Besoldung" (payment), "Gage"  (remuneration) ; 
if it is of  a temporary nature, like that of  a popular rep- 
resentative, or an official who has to execute a commis- 
sion, it is called  a  per  diem.  In both  cases,  in my 
opinion, it comes under  the same point of  view, viz., 
that of  support befitting one's station during the time of 
service.  The State exempts the incumbent of  the post 
from the care of  earning his livelihood, permanently in 
the former case, temporarily in the latter.  In the case 
of per  diem  payments no one will doubt it; they are 
from their nature nothing but expense allowances, and 
their amount is therefore determined not by the char- 
acter of the work, whether it be hard or easy, but accord- 
ing to what is demanded to maintain the recipient  in a 
manner  befitting  his  station.  This  point  of  view  is 
quite clear  in  the various  classes  of  per  diem  allow- 
ances.  That it applies also to  salary can be shown I think 
with a conclusiveness leaving nothing to be desired, and 
I do not regard  it as superfluous to furnish  the  proof, 148  THE  CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH.  VII 
since the political economists have brought salary under 
the concept of wages, which, in my opinion, is erroneous. 
Salary is not wages, i. e., it is not an equivalent  for 
service, for it often remains exceedingly far behind  the 
measure determined  by business  as the value of  work. 
Banks and other  private enterprises have often offered 
government officials whom they desired to take into their 
service many times, in many cases as much as ten times, 
the salary which they had hitherto received.  Evidently, 
then,  the  latter  was  no  equivalent  for  their  work.  I 
believe  the same is true regarding  the rate of  salary of 
most  clergymen  and  teachers;  it is  sometimes  even 
below  the income of  a  subordinate official -there  are 
sextons and beadles who are better off  than the clergy- 
men  and  professors  placed  above  them.  The matter 
is  most  plain  in the case of  the military  officer.  It is 
impossible  to see in his pay an equivalent for  the life 
which  his oath to the flag obliges him to risk.  For the 
rich  the pay is scarcely more than pocket money.  The 
money comes so little into consideration that they would 
serve  without any pay, and it is only the circumstance 
that the rich  alone are not  enough  to cover  the need 
of officers which makes it necessary for the State to pay 
a salary at  all. 
Wages  of  labor  vary  according  to the  quality  and 
amount of  the work;  the skilful and  diligent  worker 
earns more than the unskilled and slothful.  In the ser- 
vice of  the State this circumstance exerts no influence 
in  reference to the  salary;  every official  of  the same 
category, whether eminent or mediocre, receives the same 
amount.  The difference of  calibre  between individuals 
may determine promotion and remuneration of  a special 
kind  (p.  145), but it  exerts no influence upon salary. 
For  the salary is as a  rule fixed by law and does not 
accommodate itself to the individual, as wages do to so 
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considerable an  extent.  Whilst the latter fluctuate accord- 
ing  to supply and  demand,  the former  remains quite 
stationary for  entire  periods,  the influences  to which 
labor and wages are subject having no power over salary. 
If  the laborer is incapacitated his wage  ceases;  in the 
case of  an official his  salary continues  as pension.  A 
capable business man must have earned so much by the 
time he reaches old age as to have repaid  the capital 
which he had to spend in preparing for his work and to 
have acquired enough to be able to live.  That with an 
official this is not as  a rule the case, is known.  His salary 
hardly yields support befitting his station for him and 
his family, not to speak of  sufficing to  repay the original 
investment,  or  to allow  provision  for  old  age.  And 
when one of  our first authorities in political economy 89 
applies  to the service of  the State the otherwise  self- 
evident postulate that work must cover its own net cost, 
I think I have two reasons to oppose to this statement. 
First, that so far as I can judge this is actually not the 
case.  An official who does not want to give offence by 
declining to incur  the  expense of  his  station imposed 
upon him for himself  and family by his position and by 
custom, is not in a position to save anything.  Secondly. 
that we need not and must not make this requirement in 
the  service  of  the  State.  The original  investment  of 
the official is paid  for by the fact that he enjoyed the 
life-long advantage  of  being  an official, an advantage 
which  he has over every business  man, and for which 
he does not pay too high by the loss of  his invested capi- 
tal.  The advantages  of  official  position  lie  partly  in 
what I designate as ideal reward: social position, rank, 
power, influence, character of  work, and partly in the 
superiority  of  salary  to wages.  Being  inferior  to the 
39Engel, "~ber  die  Selbstkosten der Arbeit, zwei  Vorlesungen," 
(Berlin, 1866). 150  THE  CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH. VII 
latter in reference to amount, it makes up amply for this 
disadvantage by the following qualities:  lifelong secur- 
ity, independence of  all business disturbances and tem- 
porary incapacity, increase with advancing age, pension 
in case of  complete disability to serve, the service of  the 
State being practically an insurance institution. 
These advantages explain how it is that in spite of  the 
comparatively  low  salaries,  the  service  of  the  State 
exercises even from the economic point of  view so great 
an attraction.  Of  all those who have to work no one 
receives a smaller loaf, but at  the same time no one gets 
a  surer  one  and  one  less  mixed  with  bran  than the 
government official.  To  demand that the salary should 
pay his invested  capital is nothing else than to invest 
capital in an annuity and demand that it be repaid  at 
death. 
For  this  reason,  because  salary as a rule  yields no 
surplus above one's need, and does not make it possible 
to accumulate a capital, the son of  the public official or 
military officer without means, if  it were not for other 
enabling  circumstances  which  I  shall  mention  in  the 
immediate sequel, would not be able to enter upon the 
vocation of  his father.  He would have to pass over to 
the  industrial  class,  and  the grandson would  be  able 
with  the capital which  the son has acquired  to apply 
himself  again to the vocation  of  his grandfather.  For 
the interest of  the service this change would not be advan- 
tageous.  Sons of  official and military families bring to 
the service views more conformable, and a temper more 
suitable to the vocation  than sons of  business people. 
To be sure, they also bring onesidedness and prejudices, 
but  even  in  combination  with  these  the endowment 
which  they bring  into the service  from  their  parents' 
house is, after all, more valuable for it than the freedom 
from prejudice of  the "homo  novus."  Now  experience 
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shows that these classes on the whole recruit themselves 
from their own numbers, even more so than the  considera- 
tions indicated would seem to demand.  There are two 
factors which make  this possible.  One is the free pub- 
lic preparatory  institutions  for certain branches of  the 
public service (military academies, colleges for army sur- 
geons, theological seminaries, boarding schools, founda- 
tions, etc.), as well as the facility for study by means of 
stipends, free board, etc.  The second factor is the rich 
wife.  She constitutes an  important factor in the present 
system of  the government service, a scarcely less impor- 
tant requirement  than the passing of  the examinations. 
Care is taken that the procuring of  it shall not be too 
difficult -  the  daughter  of  the  rich  manufacturer  or 
merchant  becomes  the wife  of  the military  officer  or 
State official;  she  brings him  the money, he brings her 
social position, both are benefited. 
We  have so far brought  out the negative  fact that 
salary is not wages;  let us now convince ourselves that 
the positive side of  salary consists, as was stated above, 
in providing support befitting the station. 
Wages, in the widest sense, give more than a mere 
livelihood;40  salary gives nothing more than that.  But 
note that it provides a livelihood bejitting  one's station, 
and this element is the key to the understanding of  the 
entire matter of  salary.  What is "befitting one's station" 
is determined by the rank of  the office, and this in turn 
is determined by  the power  connected  with  the office. 
It is not the greater or less measure of  knowledge and 
experience required for the capable management of the 
"This opinion, which was proved in a convincing manner by Adam 
Smith in his famous work, Vol. I, ch. 8, was attacked to be sure by 
the well-known theory  of  Ricardo,  according to which labor wage 
should allow only what is absolutely necessary to support life, but 
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various  offices  that  determines  the  amount  of  the 
salary.  In that case the ablest would receive the highest 
salary.  But  we  cannot  sufficiently  warn  the  reader 
against seeing in salary the proper equivalent for any- 
thing, whether it be knowledge,  or talent, or industry. 
Salary aims at  nothing more than support according to 
one's  station.  He who  has to incur  greater  expenses 
than another by reason of  the importance of  the office 
which he fills receives also more liberal means from the 
State for  the purpose.  And  according  to the State's 
classification of  offices, not that is the highest which re- 
quires the greatest measure of  knowledge and exertion, 
but that which  bestows the greatest power,  and hence 
bespeaks the greatest confidence.  The State follows in 
this case the name  popular  opinion, which  is imposed 
upon more by power and influence than by ability and 
knowledge.  A  minister,  general,  ambassador,  nobly 
born  but, as was formerly often  the case in our small 
German  States with  their flourishing  system  of  family 
influences,  at the same time incapable, enjoyed  among 
the  masses much  higher  consideration  than  the most 
distinguished  military  officer  or  government  official 
of  lower  rank.  Great respect  is indispensable  to the 
complete  effectiveness  of  a  high  position,  and  the 
latter  again is conditional on the corresponding rank, 
title, salary. 
The power,  and thereby  also  the  authority, of  the 
State reaches its culminating point in the person of  the 
monarch, and in a constitutional monarchy there corre- 
sponds to this the pecuniary endowment which  is con- 
stitutionally attached to royalty;  I  mean the civil list. 
The idea of  maintenance befitting the station is here so 
evident that there is no need of  saying anything further 
about it. 
I sum up the result of  the preceding discussion in the 
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statement that salary is regulated according to position 
and not according to  work done. 
As a secondary element in the determination of  salary 
is added a fair regard for the increasing need of  support 
with advancing age.  The unmarried does not need  so 
much as  the married ;  the  first years of  marriage, in  which 
the expenses for children do not amount to very much, 
require less than the later when the children are grown 
up.  That is why the salary grows with the years, which 
would  otherwise  not at all be justified  in view of  the 
unchanged amount of  official work  and the diminution 
rather than increase of  capacity for work with advancing 
years. 
If salary is intended to  remove from the official anxie- 
ties for the means of  existence, this extends also to his 
wife and children, for the possession of  a family pertains 
to  complete existence.  In the pension of  the widow this 
accessory function of  salary appears in its independence 
and  receives  official  recognition.  The  pension,  that 
paid  to the widow as well as to the official himself, is 
characterized as a continuation of  the support after the 
cessation of service.  If salary were wages, then pension 
would be an unwarranted abuse, which no conscientious 
financial administration would  tolerate;  but if  on the 
contrary it  is that which I conceive it  to  be, then pension 
is only its  last corollary. 
From the purpose which salary is intended to carry 
out there proceeds the obvious limitation by which an 
official is not permitted to  pursue a business.  If  salary 
were wages like any other, there would be no  reason why 
the State should forbid its official to  obtain an  increased 
income for himself by means of  an additional business; 
we might, on the contrary, suppose that the State  would 
welcome such effort on the part of  the official thus to 
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the salary is the granting of  a livelihood by the State, 
apart  from  other  considerations  (division  of  activity, 
dependence  upon  the ~ublic,  jnjury  of  social position) 
the pursuit of  a business would justify the charge against 
the State that it does not give its servants that to which 
they have a just  claim.  That regard  for an undimin- 
ished conservation of his working power  for the service 
of  the State is not the only ground of  the prohibition is 
clearly proven from the fact that the same applies to the 
wives of  the officials as to the officials themselves.  The 
wife  of  a  president  may not keep a fancy goods shop; 
the wife of  a  mayor  must not engage in the vegetable 
business;  the husband who would tolerate such doings 
would thereby soon lose his own position. 
My last argument I derive from the relative lowness 
of  salaries.  The salary never exceeds the limit of  sup- 
port  in  accordance  with  the  station,  whereas  wages 
often  go  far  beyond  it.  There  are high  salaries,  but 
even the highest do not give more than, and often hardly 
as much as is necessary for  living in  a manner becom- 
ing one's station.  No  minister's  salary approaches the 
income of  a celebrated opera singer, of  a famous surgeon, 
etc.  Therefore  an official  in  the service  cannot  save 
anything, cannot even have  repaid  to him  the capital 
invested  (p. 149). An  artisan, a  manufacturer,  a  mer- 
chant, who has not saved  anything in the course of  a 
long life and strenuous activity, has shown thereby that 
he did not understand his business, or that he managed 
badly.  An  official  who  acquired  a  fortune in the ser- 
vice of the State shows on the contrary that he either 
denied himself what he should have had, or appropriated 
what he should not have.  In normal  relations an offi- 
cial  who  entered  the  service  without  money  leaves 
nothing but a  wife  and children,  and not seldom  also 
debts.  The accounts of the State  are correct only when 
his  finances disappear  with  his  death.  And  we  must 
admit that the State well knows how to calculate.  If 
any blame can be attached to it in reference to its regu- 
lations concerning salary, it is surely not that of  exceed- 
ing the measure of  support befitting the  station, but rather 
that of  falling below it.  And this perhaps in a manner 
which not merely contains an injustice toward the indi- 
vidual but in a great measure also runs counter to the 
true interest of  the service.  A starvation diet may in 
certain circumstances be clearly called for, but whether 
it is the right means for developing a feeling of  duty and 
the ideal sense may be doubted. 
An  interesting  confirmation  of  the view  developed 
above is furnished by the Roman nomenclature for the 
various  compensations  received  for  public  service  in 
Roman times.  The pay of  the subaltern officials is the 
only  one  which  is designated  as real  pay  for  work 
("mer~es");~~  for  every  other  compensation  the  lan- 
guage emphasizes the purpose of  maintenance.42  Thus, 
for example, in military service we  have  the "stipen- 
dium,"  the  "aes  hordearium,"  the  "salarium,"  the 
"c~ngiariuni,"~~  and  in  the  later  civil  service  the 
'1  Lex Cornelia de XX quaestoribus I, 2; I1,33.  (Bruns, "Fontea 
Juris Romani Antiqui," ed. 111, p. 79), Cicero, Verr. 111,  78. 
42The item  "Wohnung" (residence, lodging), which  plays such a 
great role in the modern subject of salary (official residences, allowance 
for rent, real allowance) is not represented in the following list.  Our 
modern expressions, such as "Gehalt"  (salary),  "Besoldung"  (com- 
pensation), "Gage" (wage), "Remuneration," "Deputat" (allowance), 
unlike the Roman, contain no reference to the purpose.  This can 
be seen only in "Teuerungszulage"  (allowance for high cost of  liv- 
ing). 
1.  "Stipendium"  from  "stips," which  signifies  in the usage of 
the later language a  small financial support, but, to judge  from its 
connection with "stipula" (blade of  corn), it seems to have signified 
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"annona,"  the "cibaria,"  the "sportula," the "viaticum," 
the  "vasari~m,"~~  and  likewise  the  "salaria"  of  the 
public teachers of  art and science. 
All the special features of  salary point to this concept 
of  sustenance which we have suggested.  To  what extent 
it corresponds  to the nature of  the relation  is clear. 
He who devotes hiniself  to the service of  the State or 
the Church  must not have  in view  the acquisition  of 
money,  but his vocation.  In order, however, that he 
may  devote himself  to it entirely,  the State and  the 
Church relieve him of  the care for his sustenance -  the 
declared  purpose of  salary consists in making possible 
economically an undivided  devotion to one's  calling. 
Our  investigation  of  the concept  of  reward  is  thus 
brought  to a  conclusion.  It has led  us  to a  relation 
which the usual meaning of  the word  "commerce"  does 
not  embrace,  viz., the service  of  the State  and  the 
Church, but which in reality is quite similar to it.  Like 
commerce it represents the system of  satisfying a want 
of society, and as in the former so here, too, the system 
depends upon the lever of  reward, except that the reward 
assumes here quite a peculiar form.  Whether a private 
object of value of the husbandntan, viz., grain, to money, as it has 
taken  place  in  cattle  ("pecus" -  "pecunia").  2.  "Aes  hordea- 
rium," Gaj. IV, 27: "pecunia, ex  qua  hordeum equis erat comparan- 
dum."  3.  "Salarium" -salt  allowance paid in money.  4.  "Con- 
giarium" -  originally a definite measure of  oil, wine, salt. 
"In  "annona"  and "cibaria"  the meaning  is plain;  "sportula" 
signifies the fruit or food-basket, then in the time of the empire the 
fees of  the bailiff;  "viaticum," travelling expenses;  "vasarium," a 
lump sum for the equipment of the provincial governor, which was 
formerly  given to him in kind.  The element of  conformity  to a 
man's station which I emphasized in salary is here expressly attested. 
See  references  in  Th. Mommsen,  "Rom.  Staatsrecht,"  I, p.  240, 
note 2, p. 241, note 4, where (p. 244, el seq.) more is to be found con- 
cerning these expressions. 
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person employs a physician, an architect, etc., or whether 
the  municipality  or  the State appoints  him,  in  both 
cases it is a question on the one side of  the satisfaction 
of needs, and on the other of the economic exploitation 
of  services, i.  e., of the fact of a contract of  exchange in 
the wider sense, and therefore of an act of commerce 
(P. 74). 
Over  against  exchange  as one  fundamental form  of 
commerce we  placed above  (p. 95) a second, vie., Asso- 
ciation.  Let us turn to it now. 
5 8.  The Second  Principal Form of  Commerce;  Asso- 
ciation.  The contract of exchange presupposes a difer- 
ence in purpose;  the contract of  association, an identity. 
Considered  from the point of view  of  economic move- 
ment, the result  of  the former contract consists in the 
fact  that  two values, whether  objects,  money, or ser- 
vices, change places with each other.  What the one had 
before  the  contract  (even  though,  as in  service,  only 
potentially,  and  as a  still  unpicked  fruit  of  personal 
power) the other has after its performance.  In associa- 
tion, the movement of  persons and things which partici- 
pate in it is of  a converging nature; they all steer toward 
the same goal;  the goal as well as the way is the same; 
the final gain is a common one. 
Why do I combine with another with whom I finally 
have to share profits?  Is it from benevolence?  Com- 
merce knows no benevolence;  all business contracts are 
built upon egoism, and so is association.  This does not 
mean  that  the motive  of  benevolence may  not some- 
times come into play in business association also;  this 
is doubtless just as possible as that one may out of good- 
will sell or let a thing below the price;  it means merely 
that association, according to its function and meaning 
in  commerce, serves not benevolence, but egoism.  No 
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himself.  If  he does share, it shows that he makes out 
better in sharing the profits of  a common business than 
if he had transacted the business by himself. 
Certain purposes exceed  the means of the individual 
to such an extent, and are so dependent upon the united 
exertions of  many, that isolated pursuit is altogether out 
of the question.  For such, association is the only think- 
able and  the necessary  form.  Among  these  must  be 
counted all such  purposes as, at the present day, form 
the problem of  political or religious communities or of 
the State.  At a  time when such communities did not 
exist, the one who desired to pursue such common pur- 
poses was obliged to look about for associates.  Before 
these purposes, for example, public safety,  laying out of 
streets,  schools,  care of  the poor, appointment of  preachers, 
building of  churches, assumed the forms of  political or 
ecclesiastical functions, they were pursued in the form of 
free association, as is still the case at the present  day 
among the inhabitants of  North America.  For all these 
purposes  the individual  has only  the choice of  either 
renouncing them entirely or pursuing them in the form 
of  combination with others.  There are other purposes 
on the contrary which, to judge from experience, can be 
just  as well  pursued  by individuals as by societies, for 
example, mercantile  business and industrial enterprises. 
The motive  which  determines  the individual  to look 
about for an associate in these consists in the fact that 
he is in want of  one or the other of  the requirements 
necessary  for  the undertaking, which he can complete 
by  inviting  another  person.  He possesses  by  himself 
the required  knowledge  and business connections,  but 
he has not sufficient  capital, or conversely, he has the 
capital but not the technical knowledge; or he has both, 
but not the credit in the business world or the required 
business connections, etc., whereas another finds himself 
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in possession  of  that which  he  lacks,  and is ready to 
place  it at his  disposal.  In the contract of  exchange, 
the  difference  of  purpose  has  corresponding  to  it a 
difference in the services rendered  by  the two parties 
(p. 95); in association,  the identity of purpose  is com- 
patible  with  the  difference as well  as identity of  the 
means  contributed  by  the individuals. 
This combination of  the required  means  by getting 
the assistance of another is, however, possible not only 
in the form of association, but also in that of  a contract 
of  exchange.  If a person possesses the money required 
for  the  undertaking  but  lacks  the  technical  or  mer- 
cantile knowledge, he fills the want by the employment 
of  an engineer or a bookkeeper,  etc.  If  he  lacks suf- 
ficient money he adds to it by borrowing from the capi- 
talist;  in  short, everything that  is  necessary  for the 
undertaking  can be  procured  just  as well  by contract 
as by  association. 
What it is that in such a case decides for the one or 
the other form cannot be stated in general terms.  One 
is driven by circumstances to the choice of  partnership 
because  those  to whom  he applied  demanded  a  share 
in  the profit,  or for the sake of security  have  insisted 
I  upon control and co-operation  in the undertaking.  Or 
he may think to avail himself  more certainly of  the zeal 
and the industry of  the persons  whom  he needs if  he 
allows  them  to share in  the  business.  Another  finds 
himself  in a position  to undertake  the business on his 
own  account  and sees  his  advantage in choosing this 
form.  What  the legal  consequences are which  attach 
themselves to the choice of  the one or the other form, - 
the influence of the person invited upon the management 
of the business in the one case or his lack of influence 
in  the other;  the community of  profit  and loss in the 
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once for all in the latter -  this is so well known to every 
jurist that I shall say no more about it. 
Association  is, as has been  remarked  above, a  self- 
serving relation, i. e.,  a business contract; it belongs to 
the system of  egoism, not to that of  benevolence (p. 77). 
He who enters thereon desires his own advantage, and 
not that of  the other -  he  who intends  the contrary 
puts partnership upside  down, just  like the man who 
makes use of  a contract of  sale to make a gift to the 
buyer.46  But the position which egoism attains in part- 
nership is essentially different from that which it has in 
contracts of  exchange.  In the latter the interests of  the 
two parties  are at the opposite poles -  the more dis- 
advantageous  the  purpose is for  the buyer  the more 
advantageous  it is for the seller, and conversely.  The 
policy  of  each  party can be resumed  in the following 
proposition:  his loss, my  profit;  no one can find  fault 
with me for caring for myself only and not for him (p.  93, 
note).  Every one must speak for himself  in these rela- 
tions.  The case is quite different in partnership asso- 
ciation.  Here one's own interest goes hand in hand with 
the interest of  theother; the latter cannot sufferwithout 
the former suffering also:  his advantage, my advantage; 
my advantage, his advantage.  If, therefore, partnership 
is to attain its purpose,  this thought of  the solidarity 
of  interests of  both parties must serve as a guiding star. 
He who makes use of  the partnership relation to pursue 
his own interest instead of the common advantage acts 
against the basic idea of the whole institution -  think 
'6  Such an upside-down partnership the  Roman jurists designate 
after the model of  Esop's  fable a "societasleonina," D. 17.2.29 5 1,2, 
and declare it null and void, ibid. 5 5 2, "donationis causa societas 
recte non contrahitur."  On sale as  a means to  gift, see D. 18. 1.36, 
"pretium . . .  donationis causa nonexacturus non videtur vendere." 
Cod.  ibid.  4.  38.  3, ". . .  emptioni sui deficit  substantia." 
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of such a method of  action as universal, and for commer- 
cial  purposes  this  relation  would  be  practically  elimi- 
nated.  A disloyal  partner  is  an enemy  in  one's  own 
camp.  Therefore his  punishment  according to Roman 
law is infamy, whereas the practice of  deception in con- 
tracts of  exchange was not thus branded.46 
Association  therefore,  although  called  into being  in 
the  service  of  egoism,  raises  the  demand,  seemingly 
quite incompatible with its nature, to regard that which 
belongs to the other with  the same care as one's own. 
By  this means it throws a bridge  between egoism and 
self-denial, and  indicates  the  point  of  neutralization 
where  both  become one.47  Contract of  exchange, gift, 
46 The Roman  jurists  clearly  recognized  this fundamental differ- 
ence between partnership and all other relations.  Partnership is in 
their opinion a sort of fraternal relation  ("societas  jus quodammodo 
fraternitatis in se habet," D. 17. 2. 63. pr.).  The principle of equality, 
therefore  (not external  mechanical  equality, but internal,  ibid.  6, 
29.  pr., go),  holds in partnership,  in contrast  with the freedom of 
reciprocal  taking  advantage  which  is  recognized  in contracts  of 
exchange.  Fraud in entering into partnership makes it null and void 
(D. 4. 4.3  5 3, 16  5 1); conviction of fraud is punished with infamy; 
even after the extinction of  the relation, the "socii"  owe each other 
consideration at the execution (the so-called "benef.  competentiae"); 
while  the relation  exists they are responsible  only  for  "diligentia 
quam in suis rebus."  All these rules, with the exception of  infamy, 
are  found  again in the dotal relation  between husband  and  wife 
(remedy against  overreaching, D. 23.3. 6  5 2; nullity on account of 
fraud,  D. 24.3.22  $2;  "benef. comp.," D. 42. 1.  20; "diligentia quam 
in suis rebus," Cod. 5. 14. 11.  In business contracts not one of  these 
rules holds. 
47 In Chapter  IX, where  I  explain psychologically  how  egoistic 
intention changes into ethical, this idea will afford us the most valu- 
able service.  The disinterested attention of  the will to the interests 
of  other persons is prepared in  those relations in which those interests 
coincide with one's own.  Here it gets accustomed for the first time 
to see itself in the other, it is the "stratagem" of the  ethical, by means 
of  which it inveigles the will into its own camp without  the  latter 
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association, are the three types which exhaust  the rela- 
tion  of  the will  to interest in the sphere of  the law. 
In the contract  of  exchange  the will  desires  its own 
interest at the expense of  the other person's  (egoism) ; 
in gift the will desires the other's interest at  the expense 
of  its own (selfdenial) ; in association it desires its own 
interest in the other's by furthering its own interest in 
the other's and the other's in its own: partnership equal- 
izes all opposition between its own interest and the other's. 
Now  if  in the form of  association it were  merely a 
question of association in the sense it has in private law, 
in particular of  trade partnerships, the ethical advance 
of  the  will  therein  would  have  little  significance  for 
society.  But  association  in  the juristic  sense is only 
a particular case of  a more general concept.  We gave 
it only as a type, as with contract of  exchange and gift. 
Just  as behind  contract  of  exchange  in  the narrower 
sense lie all the relations  of exchange and all commer- 
cial  intercourse,  and  behind  gift all  liberal  contracts 
and the whole system of  benevolence (p. 98), so behind 
partnership association there stands an entire system of 
similar relations; all societies, fellowships,  unions, from the 
lowest to the highest, including  those of  the State and 
Church.48  We embrace  them all in the  one word association. 
The German language uses the particle "ge-"  todenote relations 
of  con~munity  (Old  High  German  "ga,"  "gi,"  "ka,"  "ki,"  "ke"), 
"Geselle"  (companion),  "Genosse"  (comrade),  "Gemeine"  (com- 
munity), "Gefahrte"  (mate), "Geschwister"  (brothers and sisters), 
"Gemahl"  (spouse), "Gevatter"  (intimate friend), "Gehilfe"  (help- 
mate), "Gesinde"  (domestic  servants).  For the first  fundamental 
form it uses the particle "ver"  (Old High German, "far,"  "fir,"  "fer," 
"for"  -away,  forth),  "vertauschen"  (to exchange),  "verkaufen" 
(to sell), i'vermieten"  (to let),  "veraussern"  (to alienate),  "ver- 
schenken"  (to give  away as a  present),  "versetzen"  (to pledge), 
"verleihen"  (to lend), "versprechen"  (to promise).  The Latin lan- 
guage  uses  for  the first  relation  "con"  ("communis,"  "coheres," 
"correus,"  "confidejus~or,"  "collega"),  for the latter "trans"  ("trans- 
dare" -  "tradere,"  "transferre,"  "transigere,"  "transscribere"). 
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Association.  Association is a form of  the most gen- 
eral applicability, and is in fact that which I stated above 
(p. 95):  the second of  the fundamental forms of  social 
existence. 
I  know of  no human purpose,  with the exception of 
family life, which could not be and has not been pur- 
sued  in  the form  of  association.  Everywhere  there 
appears beside  the  individual  a  community  aiming 
towards the same goal; for many individuals this form is 
the only possible one; for others it is the only one that 
adequately meets the purposes of  their existence. 
If  we begin with the lowest purpose which is possible 
for individual  life, viz.,  the satisfaction  of  the bodily 
wants, we find already the competition of  the union with 
the individual in the form of co-operative societies.  It 
is continued for the satisfaction of  the social instinct in 
the social  unions  (clubs), beside  the private entertain- 
ments of  a social nature.  In the system of  industry it 
grows to immense numbers in the form of  manufactur- 
ing and trading associations,  banks,  etc.  There exists 
scarcely a branch  of  industry which  has been  able to 
escape association.  Now come the various interests of 
instruction, education, art and science, benevolence,  which, 
although they are nowadays either exclusively or prin- 
cipally  taken  in  hand  by  the State, were  originally 
simply a matter of  association, and in many cases have 
remained so to this day in competition with State pro- 
vision.  It is hard to tell where the activity of  societies 
ceases -  even when we are dead there is a society that 
finally  takes care that  we  should  be  laid  under  the 
ground, and that those whom we leave behind us should 
not starve. 
And  now  consider  the highest  forms of  association: 
of Church and State, with the municipalities, corpora- 
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inner life of the family and the emotional relations of  the 
individual, the entire wealth of  human purposes comes 
to its realization  in the form of  association.  Without 
any substantial  nature of  its own,  being  nothing  but 
a form, and a form of  unlimited extent, it puts itself at 
the disposition of  society as a ready receptacle to take 
into itself almost every content of  which human life has 
need. 
And  it gains new  content constantly, whether  it be 
that the forms already existing, expecially the munici- 
pality and the State, are enriched by taking on new aims 
hitherto pursued  in another form, or that new associa- 
tions are established for the pursuit of  new or old pur- 
poses.  What  future  this  form  still  has in store  our 
imagination can hardly grasp in detail, but it does not 
require the gift of  prophecy to know that institutional 
progress as well as the progress of  law will  move prin- 
cipally in this direction.  The one half  of  the law, the 
law of  exchange, the Romans developed so completely 
that the modern nations have been able to supplement 
it only in certaiil directions (law of  bills of  exchange, 
insurance, maritime law, etc.), but this leaves them all 
the more to do for the contents of  this second part of 
the law.  How far we are still behind  is shown in the 
history  of  stock  companies  during  the  last  decade. 
Under the eyes of  our lawgivers the joint-stock companies 
have been transformed into organized agencies of  robbery 
and deceit, whose secret history covers more baseness, 
dishonor, villainy than many a penitentiary, except that 
the thieves,  robbers and swindlers instead of  lying  in 
irons are bedded in gold. 
Public Spzrit.  I  now  resume  the thought  which  I 
merely  touched  upon above  (p. 160), viz., the peculiar 
combination of  one's own purpose with that of  another 
which  is  characteristic  of  partnership  or,  as I  shall 
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hereafter call it, association, in contradistinction  to all 
other contractual relations.  The other person's  inter- 
est and one's own here appear as  one, for he who furthers 
his  own  end  at the same  time  furthers  his  partner's 
interests, and trice versa.  The subjective condition of  the 
corresponding  to this  objective  character of  the 
interest and postulated thereby is public spirit.  Public 
spirit  embodies a  very interesting  phenomenon.  I  do 
not mean so much in respect to its effects, as in respect 
to its origin.  For him who is not content to consider 
social phenomena merely as given facts, but is impelled 
to investigate their causes, the existence of  public spirit 
contains a  problem well  calculated  to challenge reflec- 
tion.  Public  spirit within  the system  of  egoism  is  a 
phenomenon just as strange as  a flower on a bare rock - 
from where does either draw its nourishment? 
Public spirit is merely a refined  form of  egoism;  the 
egoism  of  the man who sees far enough to know that 
the foundations of  his well-being rest not only upon the 
conditions imrnediately connected with his own person, 
but also on those which he shares with others.  Public 
spirit is egoism directed to that which we have in com- 
mon with others (common interests as distinguished from 
particular  interests), and it is tested  by subordinating 
the latter to the former, by risking one's own to further 
the common  cause.  This phenomenon  I  regard  from 
an  ethical  point  of  view  as  exceedingly  worthy  of 
notice.  Not so much because it reveals egoism  living 
side by side in peaceful harmony with its own negation, 
self-denial, but because  the hardest problem of  ethics, 
Gz.,  how  comes  man, i. e., the egoist, to self-denial, 
obtains a solution which to my mind is of  mathematical 
certainty.  Self-denial does not come down to us from 
heaven as a being of  a higher order to put an end to the 
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from the bone and sinew of  egoism, the product  of  a 
process which  takes  place  within  egoism itself.  The 
further development of this idea must be postponed  to 
the discussion of the theory of  ethics (Chap. IX), as it 
would take us beyond egoism to which we have to con- 
fine ourselves here.  Here it is sufficient to have indi- 
cated the point from which we shall have to start later. 
The simplest form of  association is partnership, in the 
sense of the Roman law.  The several members share in 
the common undertaking in the same way as they do in 
their own; whatever takes place, takes place through all 
of  them; there is no resolution, no act in which they do 
not  all  co-operate.  The extreme  contrast  to this  is 
represented  by  the  joint-stock  company.  Here  the 
members  have  nothing  to do with  the management, 
which they surrender into the hands of  persons who may 
be members, it  is true, but need not be.  Here, therefore, 
the two elements which in the normal form of  right coin- 
cide in the one person entitled, viz.,  interest and control, 
are separated in such a way that the shareholders have 
the  interest  without  the  control,  and  the  board  of 
directors  the  control  without  the  interest.  Such  a 
separation may also occur elsewhere as is well known. 
The reason in every case is that the owner of  the right 
is  permanently  or temporarily  unable  to perform  the 
necessary acts of  disposal, either by reason of  the lack of 
personal  qualification  (minors  under  a  guardianship), 
or on account of  absence; or through the excessive num- 
ber  of  persons entitled.  The law designates this rela- 
tion as representation. 
Two  cases  are  here  to be  distinguished  from  one 
another.  The one in which the representative is given 
the power merely to  execute a decision made by his prin- 
cipal without having any power of  disposal himself, and 
the other case in which he is intended to make decisions 
in  place  of  the person  represented,  such  being  either 
incapable  of  or prevented  from making  them  himself. 
in which case, therefore, the representative is given the 
power  to dispose of  the affairs of  the other.  Here he 
administers, i.  e., he  exercises the power in the other's 
and  hence  is  designated  as administrator  (also 
manager, director).  Such an administrator, in the legal 
relations of  the individual, is the guardian (curator and 
ward);  and the administrator of a whole  estate  (the 
trustee in bankruptcy).  In the relations of  association, 
of joint-stock  companies as  well as  of all corporations, etc., 
it is the board  of directors.  Two elements  character- 
ize his legal position:  the power of  disposing of  another 
person's right, and the duty to exercise it solely in the 
interest of  the person represented. 
In the last element  lurks the serious part of  the rela- 
tion.  As long as one's own interest sits at the helm of 
the right  the interest is not sacrificed;  but as soon as 
the rudder is confided into strange hands, this guarantee 
which one's own interest gives fails; and there is present 
the danger of the helmsman directing the course whither 
his own  interest and not the other person's  leads him. 
The position of  an administrator contains a great temp- 
tation.  Exciting  his desire by  the constant touch into 
which it brings him with another's property, it opens to 
him as to none other an opportunity to appropriate it - 
no thief  finds it so easy to steal as the administrator of 
another  man's  property,  no  swindler  can  commit  a 
swindle and hush it up so easily as he.  Therefore there 
is need of  the greatest guaranty in this place, where the 
danger  is greatest.  How  the law  meets  this  require- 
ment  in  the case  of  guardians  and administrators  of 
public property and public interests, i.  e., the officials, 
has no interest for us here.  That it has not been equal 
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companies,  no  one  who  understands the matter  will 
have any doubt after the experiences of  recent years. 
What value the account which  the board  of  directors 
give  to the general meeting has is seen in the circum- 
stance that cheating and deception has in no way been 
prevented by it.  You might as well think of  protecting 
a  minor  by making the guardian give him an account. 
That there is need of other means here is clear, and I 
am  convinced  that  the  legislation  of  the future  will 
succeed  in  creating  measures  of  safety  by means  of 
criminal  and  civil  regulations.  Our  present  law  pre- 
sents a  yawning  gap in  this matter.  The joint-stock 
company in its present form is one of  the most imper- 
fect and menacing institutions of  our whole law.  Most 
of  the evils which  broke upon  us in the last years  in 
the domain of  business can either be directly traced to 
this source or are at  least in intimate connection with it. 
I do not at  all here wish to take into account the deeply 
dernoralizing  influence,  poisoning  in their very marrow 
the principles of  honor and honesty, which the business 
of  stocks has exerted.  I want to estimate it  here merely 
from  the economic point of  view, and cannot now sup- 
press my conviction  that however high you may place 
the resulting advantages for commerce, the curse which 
the  joint-stock  companies  have  brought  upon  us  is 
incomparably  greater than the blessing.  The devasta- 
tions which  they caused  in private property are worse 
than would be the case if  fire and flood, failure of  crops, 
earthquake, war  and hostile  occupation had conspired 
to ruin the national welfare.  If  we compare a price list 
of  the time since the last panic (1873) with a similar one 
taken  from  the period  of  the formation of  the joint- 
stock companies, the judgment thus derived will condemn 
our  whole  business  of  stock  speculations beyond  the 
possibility  of  palliation.  We  are presented  with  the 
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picture of  a battlefield or of  a cemetery -  lakes of  blood, 
corpses, graves -  marauders, grave diggers -  the latter 
alone are well off, for they alone have profited!  If  the 
desolating effects of  the joint-stock companies had been 
to the immediate part kipants, we could satisfy 
ourselves perhaps by saying that they should have been 
careful, although their stupidity does not give the right 
to deceive them, nor their carelessness the right to rob 
them.  But all  society  is  affected  by  the misfortune. 
The joint-stock  companies have accomplished  the feat 
of disturbing in all directions, in the most unwholesome 
way, the equilibrium upon which  the whole order and 
security of  our business intercourse is based.  In buying 
and  renting  they  have destroyed  the equilibrium  be- 
tween price and goods;  in speculation, the balance be- 
tween  profit  and  loss;  in  production,  that  between 
demand and supply.  No business man pays for a thing 
more  than it is worth.  We are not afraid  even  that 
the greatest business houses will, merely to make busi- 
ness, buy dearer and sell cheaper than others; that they 
will  produce more than is needed; that they will  ignore 
in  daring speculations the right  relation between  risk, 
profit and loss --.the  simple calculus of  egoism prevents 
all  this in  their  case.  And  yet  the joint-stock  com- 
panies have disregarded all principles of  ordinary busi- 
ness.  What is the explanation?  It  is that the directors 
operate with other people's  money, that therefore  the 
regard for their own interests -  this so invaluable regu- 
lator of  all business -  is not present  with  them;  and 
the feeling of duty,  which is the only thing that can take 
its place, is an altogether unknown quantity to a great 
many people.  What does a board  of  directors care in 
launching an  undertaking whether they pay for materials 
and labor power in excess of  their value?  They pay out 
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until they can get them at a suitable price;  their inter- 
est is to set the enterprise going as quickly as possible. 
What is another's money?  Seed that is scattered!  If  it 
sprouts, very good, a brilliant speculation -  not seldom 
the matter is so arranged that the leaders of  the enter- 
prise appropriate it for themselves; if  it does not sprout, 
the owner bears the loss.  The business of  stocks is the 
counterpart of  credit;  in both, one operates with other 
~eople's  capital.  Everything  I  said above (p.  135) of 
the latter holds in even a greater degree of  the former 
also. 
The problem which I have so far tried to  solve consisted 
in demonstrating the apparatus of  which society makes 
use, by means of  the lever of egoism, to  satisfy its need; 
not, however, as a  given and  ready-made system, but 
as a process gradually developing under the influence of 
the idea of  purpose.  Having arrived at  this point, I will 
finally attempt to convey an idea of  the social problems 
which commerce realizes in its sphere more or less per- 
fectly.  They are the following: - 
(1)  Independence  of  the Person. 
(2)  Equality  of the Person. 
(3) The Idea of  Justice. 
(1)  The  Independence  of  the  Person.  Independence 
does not mean so much, as is commonly supposed, to 
have as  few needs as possible (this is an  independence for 
which in my opinion no one need be envied; the animal 
is far superior to man in this respect, and the unedu- 
cated to the educated) ; but rather to be able to satisfy 
one's needs.  In so far as commerce makes this possible, 
the service which it  thereby renders to  human  society may 
be  designated  as the  establishment  of  human  inde- 
pendence.  We .must  not  object  that  the  condition 
attached to this service, viz.,  the possession  of  money, 
virtually  removes  this advantage  again;  for  however 
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true it may be that commerce is worthless to us without 
money, it is just as true that money has no value with- 
out commerce.  Of  what use are to us mountains of  gold 
among a savage people where we can buy for it nothing 
of that which makes life valuable, whereas at home the 
smallest sums are sufficient to procure for us the noblest 
enjoyments?  In a civilized land the wage of  the most 
insignificant  laborer is sufficient to procure for him  the 
labor products of  thousands of  men.  A farthing which 
we pay fetches us things from all ends of  the world, and 
sets for us innumerable hands in motion.  If  it is true 
that no work is done for nothing in commercial  inter- 
course, that as buyer  of  an article  I  must  pay for  all 
that  was  required  for  its  production,  from  the  first 
moment when the material left the earth to the last when 
it came into my hands, then in the few farthings which I 
pay for a cup of  coffee and a newspaper, I contribute to 
all the costs which were necessary to produce them.  In 
the coffee I contribute to the ground rent of  the owner of 
the  plantation -  to the costs  of  production -  to the 
costs of  transportation on the  sea,  the insurance premium, 
the hire of  the crew -  to the profits of  the ship-owner 
and importer, the comniission of  the agent -  to the tax, 
the  costs  of  transportation  on  the  railroad -  to the 
profits and business expenses of  the shopkeeper and the 
owner of  the coffee-house.  And this is only the coffee; 
in the sugar and milk the calculation begins over again. 
In the case of  the newspaper I pay with my farthing for 
the owner of  the paper, for the printer and his men, for 
the manufacturer of  the paper,  for the whole editorial 
personnel,  for  the correspondents,  for  the  telegraphic 
dispatches,  for  the post,  for  the newsboy.  The items 
for which  I  pay in all  these cases  assume dimensions 
which  defy all calculation and imagination.  But only 
he who is quite devoid of  judgment can believe that they 
are not contained in infinitesimal form in my farthing. 172  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH. VII 
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The phenomenon  here presented is based  upon three 
institutions which we owe to the perfection of  our pres- 
ent system of commerce, viz., the division  of  labor, the 
undertaking of work for an indefinite number of  future 
customers, and the extension of  trade  over  the whole 
earth.  The treasures of  Cresus would  not have been 
sufficient  to procure him  a  cup of  coffee and a news- 
paper  if  he had  wished  to undertake for  himself  indi- 
vidually  all the operations which  are necessary for the 
purpose.  A poor man today is served for a few pennies by 
more people in all parts of  the earth than Cresus could 
conjure  if  he  had  wished  to empty all  his  treasure 
chambers. 
(2)  The  Principle  of  Equality  of  the  Person.  Com- 
merce  knows  no respect  of  persons;  whether  high  or 
low, known or unknown, native or foreign -  all in its 
estimation are alike;  it regards the money alone.  This 
complete  impartiality  of  the  intercourse  of  exchange 
toward  persons -  a self-evident consequence of  egoism, 
which  is  concerned  about  gain  alone -  is socially  of 
truly  inestimable value;  for  it gives every man, who- 
ever he may be, provided  he  has the money, the cer- 
tainty of  satisfying his wants, the opportunity of  living 
in  accordance with  the cultural  conditions of  his time. 
There is nothing which  can deprive a  man of  his posi- 
tion in commerce.  The State may take away from him 
freedom  and honor, churches and  societies may reject 
him, but commerce will not exclude him.  A man may 
be good for nothing else; people may avoid his company 
and contact with him, but he is always good  enough to 
do business with.  Money represents a check drawn on 
society, i. e., on the support of  others, and this check is 
always honored and never refused. 
This complete indifference of  business as regards per- 
sons  is  synonymous  with  the equality  of  persons  in 
business relations.  There is no sphere of  life where the 
principle  of  equality  has been  practically  carried  out 
with such perfection as in business.  Money is the true 
apostle of  equality.  Where it is a question of  money, 
all  social,  political,  religious,  national  prejudices  and 
oppositions lose their force.49 Shall we approve this, or 
shall we deplore it?  This will  depend  upon the point 
of view.  If we look at the motive, there is not the least 
reason for praise;  for the motive is not humanity, but 
egoism.  Rut if we regard  the result, I can only repeat 
here  the same remark  which  I  made  on p.  34;  that 
egoism in serving itself serves the entire world.  Think- 
ing only of itself and  it$ own advantage, it realizes  in 
its sphere, without suspecting or wishing it, a  thought 
which  it otherwise  opposes wherever  it can, viz.,  the 
thought of  the equality of  persons. 
(3)  The Idea of  Jz~stice.~~  The idea of  justice  is the 
equality  which  is demanded  and measured  by thein- 
terests of  society between a deed and its consequences 
for the doer, i. e., between an evil deed and punishment, 
and a good deed and its reward.  This is nowhere realized 
in the latter direction to  the same extent as in the sphere 
of commerce.  In business intercourse each party receives 
49 The present time, it seems, must refute this statement of  mine. 
In Paris the stirring up of  the national hatred against Prussia by the 
press has led, in addition to the various other outbreaks in which 
it man~fests  itself, also to placards in many shops bearing the legend 
"on ne vend pas aux Prussiens"  (we do  not sell to Prussians).  I can 
see in this only a  ioolish  demonstration, which  like many others 
carries the impossibility of  its practical execution on its face.  Will 
any one of  the demonstrants ask a buyer whom he recognizes  as  a 
German whether heisa Prussian, Bavarian, or Austrian?  The power 
of  money will make itself felt in  these shops also, and those placards 
will neither become general nor permanent. 
b0 I discuss this more fully inanother place.  Here I touch upon it 
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on an average, by means of  the consideration, as much 
in return as he has given.  His pay, in wages and price 
of  commodities, is on an  average an  equivalent represent- 
ing the economic value of  the service rendered  at the 
time (p. 101).  The equivalent may therefore be defined 
as the  realization  of  the idea of justice  in the  economic 
sphere.  The  fixing of  punishment is something arbitrary 
and the effect of  a positive determination by the State. 
The standard which the State applies in awarding punish- 
ment is highly elastic and unreliable.  The fixing of  the 
equivalent, on the other hand, is the result of  the most 
careful  investigations  and  experiences, constantly  re- 
newed by all those interested.  Reward  is as sensitive 
as the mercury in a barometer;  it rises and falls at  the 
slightest changes in the economic atmosphere.  If  I ask 
myself where the idea of  justice is most perfectly realized 
in  our social  institutions,  the answer is:  in  business. 
If  I ask where it is realized  the earliest, the answer is 
again: in business.  Business and its remuneration found 
their  suitable  form  earlier than did  the  State and its 
punishments.  If  I ask finally where it is realized most 
uniformly in the whole world, I get the answer a third 
time:  in  business.  Law  and  punishment may  have a 
different  form  on this or that side of  the frontier line, 
but prices and compensations know no State boundaries ; 
although, to be sure,  positive regulations of  the State, 
by  duties and taxes, may prevent their complete equal- 
ization in different States. 
The application of  the concept of  justice to compen- 
sation reveals the explanation of  a peculiar psychological 
phenomenon.  I mean  the resistance of  many persons 
who are anything but miserly to  paying more for a thing 
than it  is really worth, even when the difference  is scarcely 
worth  speaking  of.  The cause of  their resistance  lies 
not so much in avarice (as the unthinking imagine), but 
a s  1  SOCIAL MECHANICS -  REWARD  175 
rather in their feeling of  right;  which  cannot bear the 
thought of  being obliged to give the opponent what is 
not his due.  It is not the economic motive which calls 
forth their resistance, but the moral.  To free  them- 
selves  from  the suspicion  of  avarice, and  to  give  a 
proof  that it is not  the money  as such that concerns 
them, they often add immediately thereafter acts of  a 
purely disinterested generosity.  They fight for a pennv 
and give away a dollar. 
The three ideas which I have now  explained in their 
application to  business are the highest problems of  moral- 
ity  which  ethics  knows,  and  commercial  intercourse 
has realized these problems in a manner with which the 
methods used by  the State in dealing with them cannot 
at all compare.  Long before the State arose from its 
couch,  in  the  morning  twilight of  history, trade  had 
already completed a good part of  its day's work.  While 
the States were fighting one another, trade found out 
and  levelled  the roads  that lead  from  one  people  to 
another,  and established  between  them  a  relation  of 
exchange of  goods and ideas; a pathfinder in the wilder- 
ness, a herald of  peace, a torchbearer of  culture. 176  THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH. VIII 
CHAPTER VIII 
SOCIAL  MECHANICS,  OR  THE  LEVERS  OF 
SOCIAL  MOTION 
2. EGOISTIC -  COERCION 
5 1.  FORM  OF  COERCION  IN  ANIMALS. -  5 2.  MAN - 
INTELLIGENCE ADDED TO  FORCE (SLAVERY. PEACE, LAW) ; 
-THE  POSTULATE OF  FORCE IN THE VARIOUS PURPOSES 
OF  THE  INDIVIDUAL. -  (8 3.  PERSON,  PROPERTY;  54. 
FAMILY;  Q 6.  CONTRACT;  BINDINGFORCE OF  CONTRACTS, 
THEIR FORM IN  ROMAN LAW). -SOCIAL  ORGANIZATION OF 
FORCE  (56.  PARTNERSHIP;  57.  SOCIETY;  58.  STATE) 
-  5 9.  THE  FORCE OF THE  STATE. -  5 10.  LAW. -THE  ELE- 
MENTS OF THE CONCEPT OF LAW:  COMPULSION. -  5 11. 
NORM.  CONTENT.  (5  12.  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  SOCIAL 
LIFE). -  55  13,14. POSITION OF  THE INDIVIDUAL IN LAW. 
-  5 15.  SOLIDARITY OF HIS INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF 
THE STATE. 
The second  lever  of  social  order is Coercion.  The 
social organization of  reward  becomes trade;  coercion 
organized makes the State and Law.  It is in the latter 
forms  of  organization  that commerce  attains its final 
fulfillment;  reward must have law behind it. 
By coercion in  the  wider sense we understand the reali- 
zation of a purpose by  means of  mastering another's will; 
the concept of  coercion presupposes in the agent as well 
as in the passive object of  coercion a voluntary subject, 
a  living  being.  Such  mastery  of  another's  will  is 
possible in a two-fold manner (pp. ll,12,34) : Mechani- 
cally  (mechanical,  physical  coercion,  "vis  absoluta"), 
when  the resistance' which  the foreign will  opposes to 
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our  purposes  is broken  by summoning physical power 
superior to its own.  This is a purely external process 
of  the same kind exactly  as when  a  man  removes  a 
lifeless object which is in his way.  Language  denotes 
the process in both cases as  force, but for the application 
of force to a living being it  alsc uses the expression coer- 
cion, evidently  in view of  the fact  that even  though 
at first force moves  only the body,  it also  indirectly 
moves the will, since it hinders it in its free self-deter- 
mination.  It  is in this sense, for example, that we speak 
of  a strait-waistcoat  ('Zwangsjacke")  in the case of  the 
insane;  of  the  carrying  out of  a  coercive  measure 
("Zwangsvollstreckung") ; of  a bankrupt  sale ("Zwangs- 
versteigerung"). 
In contradistinction  to mechanical  coercion we have 
the psychological, in which the resistance of  the foreign 
will is overcome by itself from within.  We have shown 
above in what  way  this is done.  In mechanical com- 
pulsion the act is undertaken by the person compelling; 
in psychological,  by the person compelled.  In the one 
case it is a question of  breaking  the resistance  of  the 
will negatively, here it  is a positive changing of its motion; 
a  difference which  outwardly does not show, but is of 
great importance psychologically  as well as juristically. 
We have an example of  this in robbery, and the forced 
transfer of  ownership. 
According  to the  difference  of  the purpose  to be 
attained, namely, according as it is negative or positive, 
coercion  is firopulsive or  compulsive.  The former  has 
for its object the prevention, the latter the undertaking 
of  a certain act.  Self-defence  is  propulsive,  self-help 
compulsive. 
This is the formula of  coercion  which we thought it 
proper to lay down by way of  introduction to the fol- 
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organization of coercion for the  purposes of  society.  It  de- 
pends on the realization of  the two concepts, State and 
Law:  it requires  the establishment of the power  which 
shall exert the force of  coercion, and the laying down of 
rules for the right exercise of  the same. 
Such  organized  coercion  does not, however,  by  any 
means exhaust  the  application of  coercion for the pur- 
poses of  society.  In addition to political  coercion, there 
is still  another,  unorganized,  which  historically  every- 
where  preceded  the other,  and  asserted  itself  every- 
where  along  with  it.  I  call  this the social.  Political 
coercion has for its object the realization  of  law, social 
coercion  has for  its object  the realization  of  morality. 
The theory  of  morality (Chapter  IX) will  present  the 
system of  social coercion as a development in connection 
with this question. 
In what follows I shall make the attempt to trace the 
two concepts of  State and Law to  their earliest conceptual 
beginnings;  and in the same way as I have done in the 
system  of  commerce  in  reference  to reward,  I  shall 
attempt to present the genesis of  these two concepts as 
a necessary result of  the practical impulse of  the concept 
of purpose.  The gain which I promise myself  from this 
is in my eyes two-fold;  first, the conviction of  the con- 
tinuity  of  the development  of  the idea  of  purpose  in 
human  society,  and,  secondly,  the  advancement  of 
knowledge of  the complete State and Law. 
It is  without doubt a great advance of  modern phil- 
osophy of  law as distinguished  from the earlier  Law of 
Nature that it has recognized  and forcibly emphasized 
the dependence of  law upon the State.  But it goes too 
far when, as Hegel in particular does, it denies the scien- 
tific  interest  of  the conditions  before  the State came 
into existence.  The independent existence of the living 
being dates from its birth, but science goes beyond that 
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to the first beginnings of  life in the mother's womb; and 
the history of  the development of  the embryo has proved 
itself  one  of  the  most  fruitful  and  most  instructive 
sources of  knowledge. 
Therefore in law also science must not be  hindered 
from making the embryonic state of  law the object of 
investigation, and it stands to  the credit of  the advocates 
of the Law of Nature that they were not satisfied with 
the mere facts of  the law and the State but raised the 
question,  whence  are  the  two?  But  the  manner  in 
which they solved the problem, in making the historical 
State originate in a contract, was a mistaken one.  This 
is a pure construction without regard to actual history; 
a history of  development, which did not take the trouble 
to  investigate  the  development  itself.  Against  such 
a solution of the problem the criticism which the modern 
philosophy of law opposed was perfectly justified.  But 
the problem  itself  has  not  been  thereby  removed,  it 
retains its full claim to a solution;  and if  the historian 
of  comparative jurisprudence  and the philosopher will 
join  hands, the history of  the development  of  law will 
in time be no less instructive to us jurists than that of 
the fetus  has become  for the comparative anatomist. 
The earliest commencement  to our  investigation  ex- 
tends  in  the  case  of  coercion  further  back  than  in 
reward.  Reward originates in man, coercion is already 
found in  animals.  It appears in its lowest form among 
animals; in its highest in the State.  Let us try whether 
we  can fill  the interval between  the two with  an un- 
broken chain of  intermediate links. 
§ 1.  The Animal.  Force.  We  apply  the  concept. 
of  fcrce  ("Gewalt")  equally to inanimate and animate 
bcdies;  we speak of  the force of  the storm, of  the sea, 
of  the falling body; and of violence ("Gewalt") which one 
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processes are inwardly quite different.  When the storm 
uproots the tree, or when the  sea breaks through the dam, 
it is the law of  causality alone which is carried out; but 
when  one animal overcomes  the other and  kills it or 
devours it, it  does it  for a purpose.  Such action, there- 
fore, does not come under the law of  causality but under 
the law of purpose.  But the purpose which force serves 
in the animal is the same as in the world of  man:  the 
preservation and maintenance of  one's life.  Force fol- 
lows out its purpose in the animal, in man, and in the 
State.  The  effects of force depend on the predominance 
of  power; everywhere in nature the stronger lives at  the 
expense of the weaker.  But occasion for the application 
of  force is offered only where the conditions of  life on the 
two sides clash, and the weaker refuses to subordinate 
his share of  life to that of  the stronger.  This leads us 
to  coercion. 
Psychological  Coercion.  In comparison with  the use 
of  physical  force, its employment denotes a very great 
progress.  An  inanimate  weaker  body  cannot  avoid 
the thrust of  the stronger body, but a  weaker  animal 
may escape by flight from the stronger;  and by  thus 
leaving the path open to the opponent who disputes the 
same with it, it preserves its own life.  An animal,  a 
man or a people which  avoids the stronger, establishes, 
by subordinating the conditions of  its own life to those 
of  the other, a "modus vivendi"  between itself and the 
other.  Accordingly,  to yield  to coercion  becomes  a 
means  of  self-preservation for  the one coerced.  The 
weaker dog, which without waiting for the fight  leaves 
the bone to the stronger, sacrifices the bone in order to 
save its life.  Force  is the maintenance of  one's  own 
purpose by  means of denying in principle and suppressing 
in fact the purpose of the other.  Coercion makes com- 
patible both purposes by means of  intelligence and the 
resulting  submission  of  the  one  threatened.  Force 
means  negation  of  the wili,  coercion  is the restriction 
thereof.  That the animal has the degree of  intelligence 
to  understand a mere threat on the part of the other, and 
to get out of its way, has become in the hands of  nature 
one of the most effective means of  making possible the 
co-existence of the weaker  with the stronger.  To the 
weaker, to  whom she denies the strength of  withstanding 
the attack, she gives as a compensation intelligence to 
withdraw himself from it. 
The case of  coercion which we  had till now before us 
we designated above propulsive coercion, and this kind 
predominates in the animal world to such a degree that 
we might  be tempted  to regard  it as  the only  one. 
But the animal world, too, knows some cases of compul- 
sive coercion.  The most interesting case is that of  the 
predatory excursions of  ants, in which one tribe, ordered 
in battle array under the direction  of  its officers, takes 
the field  against  another tribe.  The lot of  the van- 
quished  is  not  annihilation,  but  slavery;  the  van- 
quished enemies are compelled by the victors to  work for 
them. 
$ 2.  Man  -Self-control  of  Force.  Life of  the stronger 
at  the expense of  the weaker, annihilation of the latter 
in conflict with the former,-  such is the form of  life in 
the animal world; assured existence also of  the weakest 
and the  poorest by the  side of  the strongest and mightiest, 
-such  is the form of  life in the human world.  And yet 
man historically found no other point of  departure than 
the animal; but nature equipped him in such a way that 
he was not only able, but compelled, to  raise himself to 
the higher stage in the course of  history.  If the play of 
the world's history were renewed a hundred and a thous- 
and times, humanity would  always come to the same 
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man cannot but establish such conditions as  make com- 
munity of  life possible. 
The history of  force on the earth is the history of 
human egoism, but this history is summed up in the fact 
that egoism becomes wiser by instruction.  In  re4pect to 
egoism's use of  force for its purposes, such learning con- 
sists in its coming to  comprehend how it must use force 
in order to  make the power of  others not merely harm- 
less but useful  to itself.  At every stage in which  he 
finds himself, from the lowest to the highest, guided by 
his own interest, man uses his progressive intelligence to 
increase  his  force  as well  as  to moderate  it.  That 
humanity to which he rises is in its origin nothing else 
than the self-control of  force, as dictated by man's own 
correctly gauged self-interest. 
The  first step  in this direction was slavery.  The  victor 
who spared the life of  his vanquished enemy instead of 
slaughtering him did it because  he understood  that a 
living slave is more valuable  than a dead enemy.  He 
spared him for the same reason that the proprietor spares 
his  domestic  animal;  the "sew-are"  of  the "servus" 
took  place  for  the purpose of  "serv-ire."'  Rut even 
though  the motive was purely egoistic -  all the same 
blessed be egoism, which recognized the worth of  human 
life, and, instead of  destroying it in wild fury, possessed 
sufficient self-control to preserve it for itself, and hence 
for  humanity.  Recognition  of  the economic value of 
human life was the first beginning of  humanity in his- 
tory.  The  Romans call a slave "homo" -  he  is a human 
being who is nothing more than a human being, i. e., a 
human animal, a working animal, not a subject of  rights 
("persona").  This the citizen alone is, but this "homo" 
Roman etymology  (passages in Schrader,  "Instit."  on 1. 3. de 
jure  pers.  5 3.1, which although linguisticaily  mistaken, contains a 
correct idea objectively. 
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signifies nevertheless the first rise of humanity to  humane- 
ness.  In slavery for the first time is solved the problem 
of  the co-existence  of  the powerful  and the weak,  of 
the victorious and the vanquished. 
In the course of  time humanity finds gentler forms - 
tht: lot of  the weak in comparison  with  the strong be- 
comes in the progress of  historical development always 
milder.  The conquered people is not led into slavery, it 
pays tribute;  it buys itself free;  it is incorporated with 
the conquering people, with  inferior  rights, and finally 
with equal rights; in short, the fight ends with a contract 
which regulates the relations of  both parties and allows 
the  weaker  to remain  free,  viz., a  contract  of  peace 
("pacisci" -  to  come  to an understanding,  "pax"  is 
peace).  Peace involves the acknowledgment of  freedom 
in the person of the opponent, for one concludes no con- 
tract with  a  slave.  What determined  the strong man, 
before the opponent lay as  a slave at  his feet, to place his 
sword in its sheath and offer him  fair terms?  Was it 
humanity?  It  was no other humanity than that which 
induced him to spare the life of  the subducd enemy, viz., 
his own interest.  The prospect of  probable or perhaps 
certain victory  if  he continued  the fight was  obscured 
by a regard for the price  at which  it must be bought. 
The question of  the continuation of  the fight  took  the 
form of a  pure question of  interest.  Thus:  is it more 
advantageous to  buy more at  a high price, or less at  a fair 
price?  Does the additional profit pay for the additional 
costs?  To  compress a body into a volume of  x  inches a 
force y may be sufficient, but to bring it into x-1,  y + 10 
may be necessary.  Does it pay to exert a force of 10 in 
order to gain l? Such forms the beginning of  the calcu- 
lation made by every successful enemy.  If  he possesses 
enough self-control  to give a  hearing  to his  intelligent 
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in his own interest not to arouse his opponent to a des- 
perate struggle by proposing  unacceptable  terms,  with 
further prospects of exertions and sacrifices on his own 
part, which stand in no true relation to the profit that is 
aimed at.  The excess of  pressure beyond what is bear- 
able  avenges itself  by a  recoil.  There  is  no  need  of 
humanity to induce force to maintain the right measure. 
Mere politics is sufficient. 
We  have thus indicated  the manner in which  force 
without the help of  any other motive than its own inter- 
ests  arrives  at law.  The form  in  which  law appears 
here is, as  has already been remarked, peace;  the settle- 
ment of  the fight  by establishing a  "modus  vivendi," 
which  both  parties  recognize  as binding.  Force  thus 
sets a limit to itself, which it desires to  respect;  it recog- 
nizes  a  norm to which  it intends to subordinate itself, 
and this norm  approved  by itself  is Law.  Whether it 
actually observes it is immaterial for the significance of 
the process which  has thus been accomplished;  it can 
trample  the law under foot, it can carry on as it likes 
just as before, but the law has been placed in the world 
once for  all, and this fact can never  be  undone again. 
It has laid  down a  rule  for  its conduct, and set up a 
standard by which  to judge  it, unknown before.  If  it 
tramples under foot the work of  its own creation, it is no 
longer  force  that  does  this,  but  despotism-which  is 
force qualified  by opposition to law. 
The process  which  we  have  here outlined  gives the 
impression  of  an a priori construction, but in reality it 
is  derived  from  a  consideration  of  history.  In  the 
sphere  of  international  relations  it is  repeated  at the 
conclusion of  every peace.  Every peace contract puts 
law in  place of the temporary struggle by force.  The 
motive which determines the victor to do this is the one 
given above;  law  relieves  force, which  desires rest  for 
its own  sake and renounces  further advantages which 
stand out of  all proportion to the means that have to 
be spent for their attainment.  The process  has equal 
significance for the development of  law in  the interior 
of States; it makes public law as well as  private.  Who- 
ever will trace the legal fabric of a people to its ultimate 
origins  will  reach  innumerable  cases  where  the  force 
of the stronger  has laid down the law for  the weaker. 
The origin  of  law from force  by means  of  self-limi- 
tation  has  not  merely  an historical  interest but also 
an eminently philosophical  one.  It is an error which 
in  my eyes characterizes our entire modern conception 
in  ethical matters, that being  in  possession  of  insti- 
tutions,  views  and  concepts  gained  by  the  work  of 
many thousand of  years, we carry over our own ethical 
view into the past.  This is true also of  the conception 
of  the relation  between  law and  force.  To be  sure, 
we cannot get away from the observation that the actual 
relation between  the two which we have before us has 
not existed always.  But the question lying so near at 
hand, whether  the difference in external  relation  had 
not in the past a corresponding difference in inner con- 
ception,  is not asked.  We cannot imagine that that 
which is to us quite certain and evident could ever have 
appeared  to man in a  different light.  He might  not 
yet indced, we  think, have recognized  the truth with 
full clearness,  but in any case  he must have  had  an 
imperfect  idea  of  it, obscurely  felt  it.  The "idea"  of 
law, we  imagine,  began  its work  at that  time;  and 
although the hindrances were many which it met with 
in its historical realization, still it was this idea which 
set man in motion  and drove him  irresistibly  farther; 
in short, i he historical  progress of  law is not a  matter 
of quality  but of  quantity.  That  law  and  force  are 
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man has felt correctly from  the very  beginning,-his 
innate  feeling  of  right  having  taught him  this.  And 
if  force  yielded  in  the course of  history to  law,  this 
has its ultimate reason in the compelling power  of the 
idea of  law over the human spirit. 
Such is the picture of  the history of  the development 
of law as drawn by current conception.  But this picture 
is nothing but a projection of our present ideas into the 
past;  historical  facts present  a  quite different picture. 
It is not to the ethical conviction  of  its nobility  and 
majesty that law owes  the place which it holds  in our 
modern world, but to the final results of  a long process 
of  development, and not to  the beginnings thereof.  The 
origin  is naked egoism, and it is only in  the course of 
time that it has given place to the ethical idea and the 
ethical sentiment.  How the latter could have proceeded 
from it will be shown in connection with the treatment 
of  ethics  (Chapter IX).  Here it is a question  merely 
of.the proof  that egoism could have arrived at law with- 
out the help of  ethics. 
The problem  which  egoism  has to solve  consists  in 
bringing  together the two elements which make up the 
concept of  law, viz., norm and force; and this is possible 
in  two  ways, -norm  arrives  at force,  force  arrives  at 
norm. 
The first way is the one which  I  shall present  more 
particularly below ($  6: Self-regulation of  Force in Part- 
nership).  The common interest which  all have  in the 
establishment of  order calls the norm into life;  and the 
preponderance of  the power of  all over that of  the individ- 
ual assures to  it  the power requisite for  maintaining itself 
against  the opposition of  the individual.  The private 
form of  the  relation is  Partnershi$:  a  union  of  equals 
for a  common purpose, and the practical  maintenance 
of  it against  the particular  interest  of  the individual. 
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The political form of  it is the Republic.  Here the point 
of departure is not preexistent power as in the second 
method, but the norm comes first and power later.  The 
other method is the one mentioned above, -force  first, 
norin  next;  law  originating  from  the power  of  the 
stronger, and in its  own interest limiting itself by norm. 
These are the two ways in which  egoism  arrives at 
law  by means of  its own compelling  power,  two out 
of  many ways leading from the domain of  egoism  into 
the kingdom  of  ethics.  Serving  itself,  it works here 
as  elsewhere, without knowing or willing it (Chapter 111), 
for the esrablishmerlt of the ethical order.  It builds the 
edifice of  law into which later, when it finishes its work, 
the ethical spirit enters to set up its  kingdom  there. 
It  could not do it ii egoism had not prepared the path; 
the ethical  spirit  always  comes  in the  second  place, 
egoism everywhere occupies the first.  Where the rough 
work has first to be done, egoism alone has the strength 
to do it. 
It is egoism, as was shown before, which  leads force 
to law  by our second  formula.  Force  arrives  at law 
not as at something foreign to it, which it must borrow 
from the outside, from  the feeling of  law;  neither does 
it arrive at  law as to  something superior to  which it must 
subordinate itself  with  a  feeling of  its own  inferiority. 
Force  produces  law  immediately out of  itself, and as 
a measure  of itself, law evolving as the politics  of  force. 
It does not therefore abdicate to give the place to law, 
but whilst retaining its place it adds to  itself  law as an 
accessory  element  belonging  to it,  and becomes  legal 
force.  It  is the opposite relation of  that of  today which 
we  know as the rule of  law;  here  force constitutes  the 
accessory element of  law.  But in this stage, too, of the 
development of  law the relation of  the two sometimes 
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refusal of  obedience to law, and itself  lays down a new 
law-  the coups d'btats of  the political power ; the revo- 
lution  from  above  which  is  the  counterpart  of  that 
from below.  There it is organized, here it is unorganized 
force, which  rises up against the subsisting law.  Legal 
theory  finds  it Easy  to condemn  these  acts;  yet  this 
very disturbance of  the normal relation ought to give it 
occasion  to look  upon  the  latter  with  different  eyes 
from what it has been  accustomed  to.  Law is not the 
highest  thing  in  the world,  not an end  in  itself;  but 
merely  a means to an end, the final end being the exis- 
tence of  society.  If it appears that society cannot main- 
tain itself under  present  legal  conditions,  and if  law  is 
unable  to render  it the  proper  assistance,  then  iorce 
must step in to do what is demanded; -  these are the 
conditions of necessity in the lives of  peoples and States. 
In conditions  of  necessity,  law  ceases  in the  lives  of 
peoples and States as well as in the life of  the individual. 
In regard to individual necessity,  this is recognized  by 
the law it~elf,~  and up to a certain point it has happened 
similarly  with  States,  and  alterations  in  systems  of 
government have taken  place  accordingly.  In case of 
necessity a dictator was named in Rome, the guarantees 
of  civil freedom were set aside, law receded, and unlimited 
military  power  stepped  into its place.  Corresponding 
measures at  the present day are the right of  the govern- 
ment to declare a state of siege, and to issue provisional 
laws without the co-operation of  the estates of  the realm; 
such measures acting as safety valves, to  enable a govern- 
ment  to remove  the distress  by  course  of  law.  But 
Imperial Criminal Code, art. 54:  A criminal act is not present if, 
without being a case of  self-defence,  it is committed in a condition 
of  necessity for which one is not responsible, and which cannot be 
avoided in any other way, in order to  save the agent or one belong- 
ing to  him from present danger to  life or limb. 
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neither  coups  d'e'tats  nor  revolutions  are any  longer 
effected on the ground of  law.  It  would be a self-con- 
tradiction  of  law  to allow them;  and from the stand- 
point  of  law  they must  be absolutely condemned.  If 
this viewpoint were the highest, the judgment concerning 
them would thereby be sealed.  But life stands superior 
to law, and if  the case be actually one such as we have 
here presupposed, a political condition of  necessity, con- 
straining us  to choose either  law or life,  the decision 
cannot be doubtful:  force sacrifices law and rescues life. 
These are the saving deeds of  the power of  the govern- 
ment.  At the moment when  they are committed they 
spread fear and terror, and are branded by the advocates 
of  law  as a criminal  outrage  against  law's  sanctity; 
but they often need only a few years or decades, until 
the dust which they have raised has settled, to gain vin- 
dication  by  their  effects.  And  thereupon  the  hatred 
and curses which they brought upon their author turn 
into  gratitude  and  blessings.  Judgment  concerning 
them  is involved  in  their results;  from  the forum of 
law  where  they are condemned  they make an appeal 
to the tribunal of  history -the  court which has always 
been recognized  by all  nations to this very day as the 
superior and indeed highest-and  the judgment which is 
thence delivered is the final and decisive one. 
We have thus indicated the point where  law emerges 
into politics and history, and where the judgment of the 
politician, the statesman, and the historian has to take 
the place of  that of  the jurist.  He knows only the stand- 
ard of  positive law;  but they show that whilst  law re- 
mains indeed applicable to normal relations, from which 
it was derived, it is an impracticable thing frequently by 
which  to measure  unusual  relations,  for which  it was 
not  intended  beforehand  and could  not be.  It is, if 
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exceptional law of history that the existence of  law is, as 
a rule, made practically possible.  Force, in its sporadic 
emergence upon its  original historic mission and function, 
appears as the founder of  order  and  the organizer  of 
law. 
In this sense I am not afraid to  speak in favor of  force, 
and free myself  from the traditional juristic and philo- 
sophic conception.  Neither  of  these in my eyes does 
justice to the significance which force has in the world, 
and which,  as I  add, it rightly has.  In the relation 
between law and force  they would lay all  stress upon 
the former whilst assigning to the latter merely a depen- 
dent position as mere servant, obliged to take its orders 
from  law and  carry them out blindly.  But  here  the 
reckoning is made without the host; force is no will-less 
creature, as according to this view it would  have to be. 
Force both knows what it is and feels it; it  demands the 
same regard  from  law  as law from  it.  The  relation 
is not one of  servant and master, but that between hus- 
band and wife.  They must have a  mutual regard  for 
each other in order to live in harmony. 
Force can, if  necessary, live without  law, and of  this 
it has actually given  proof.  Law without force  is an 
empty name, a thing without reality, for it is force, in 
realizing the norms of  law, that makes law what it is 
and ought to be.  If  force had not prepared the ground 
for law, if  it had not broken the resisting will with iron 
fist  and accustomed man to discipline and obedience, I 
should like to know how  law  would have been able to 
found its kingdom;  it would  have built on quicksand. 
The despots and inhuman  tyrants who chastised  the 
nations with iron rods and scorpions have done just as 
much  for educating mankind  in law as the wise  law- 
givers who set up  later the tables of  the laws:  the former 
had to come first in order that the latter might appear. 
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This was the mission of  force, even of the wildest, rudest, 
and most inhuman kind in the earliest periods of  human- 
ity.  It accustomed  the will  to subordinate itself  and 
recognize a superior over it.  Not until it  had learned this 
did the  time come for  law to take the place of  force; 
for earlier, law would have had no prospccts of  success. 
And  actually  this relation of force and law also corre- 
sponded to the conceptions of the people in that stage. 
These did not look upon force with our eyes;  they saw 
nothing improper in such a condition; nought detestable 
and  damnable,  but only  what  was  natural  and  self- 
e\.idcnt.  Force as  such made an impression upon them 
and was the only kind of greatness they could appreciate. 
Force  ("Gewalt")  and  "mighty"  ("gewaltigM) were 
synonymous to their minds;  and that is why instead of 
detesting the violent characters of thcir rulers, who made 
them feel them in unmerciful fashion, they extolled and 
glorified  them,  even  as they  despised  the  weak  and 
gentle.  They  had  an instinctive  understanding  that 
there is need of  an iron fist in a wild time to force resist- 
ing wills  to common action, that there needs a  lion to 
tame wolves, and took no offence at  his devouring the 
sheep and the lambs.  If  we conceive the people in that 
stage as  equipped with our modern feeling for right and 
humanity, it would  indeed  be a riddle to us to under- 
stand how they could allow such cruel deeds as history 
reports of  their rulers in inexhaustible plenty.  But the 
riddle is solved by the fact that the ethical standard for 
judging these things, with which we quite unhistorically 
equip them, was quite a foreign thing to them.  In the 
lack  of  this  feeling  lies  the  compensation  by  which 
history made these unbearable things bearable; they saw 
in such doings nothing else than the elemental sway of 
the forces of  nature.  They thought of them as of  death 
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moral  after-taste  which  makes  those deeds  for  us  so 
horrible. 
Thus  we see that force played actually a quite different 
role at  the origin of  the social order from what it  does in 
the ordered state of  law.  It did this because it had a 
different mission.  But this is not all.  Force  besides 
was  viewed  and judged  subjectively by the people  in a 
different fashion.  For this last remark I claim universal 
truth in the history of  morality; and I cannot sufficiently 
emphasize it; not merely in order to  correct the historical 
error which the opposed view  commit^,^ but in order also 
to remove from Providence the charge of  complete ethi- 
cal despair which this view contains for history.  Those 
epochs of  humanity which had to endure force because 
it alone was able to  solve the problems of that time, viz., 
to break the intractable will of the individual and edu- 
cate him for life in a community-those  epochs had an 
understanding  for  that  which  was  suitable  for  their 
time just  as we have for that which is suitable for our 
time.  Our present  conception, our aversion  to force, 
would have appeared to them in fact incomprehensible; 
it would have seemed to them proof of  senile weakness 
in us.  But if  they could  not have understood us,  we can 
and ought to understand them. 
If truly we might boast of  such understanding I could 
have  spared the preceding  discussion,  but as is  clear 
from what has preceded, we are very far from having it. 
I consider it a fundamental error of  our prevalent con- 
ception of  law that on account of the ideal element of  its 
content it  has too much left  out of consideration the very 
real element of personal energy;  an error against which 
8 I shall explain my attitude toward it later, first in Vol. 11, p.  108 
(nativistic  theory of  ethics), then in Vol. 111 (critique of  the sense of 
right).  [See above Ch.  VI, note 3 -Translator]. 
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I  have already frequently had occasion to speak.4  The 
ideal of  law is the clock-work, which runs its regulated 
course, into which no disturbing hand enters.  How far 
the actual picture  which  history presents to us of  law 
is  from  this will  be clear  from what has been 
said  before.  Law  cannot  dispense with energy.  Law 
cannot do without it in reference to its concrete realiza- 
tion.  For where its  protective institutions fail, the  person 
entitled to a right must enter the lists for it with his own 
power.  Examples of this are:  defence in case of  need; 
self-defence;  instances of  permitted self-help, and war. 
Neither  can  law  dispense  with  it in  reference  to its 
abstract formation -  the process of  legal evolution is not 
a matter of mere knowledge, as in the case of  truth, but 
the result, too, of  a struggle of  interests;  and the weapons 
by which the fight is won are not reasons and deductions, 
but the actions and the energies of  the national  will. 
Even  though  force  may in the course of  time  assume 
more and more frequently forms which  are compatible 
with  the order of  law, still instances happen even in a 
well-regulated  legal environment where it refuses obedi- 
ence to law,  and as naked  energy, whether by govern- 
mental coups d'btats or popular revolutions, accomplishes 
the same work as it did formerly,  when it first built up 
the social order, and laid down the law. 
The following exposition has for its purpose to study 
force during this  first  building  up of  the social order. 
Not  historically,  as history  has nothing  more  to say 
'First  in connection with the history of the origin of  Roman law 
in my  "Geist  des rijmischen Rechts,"  Vol. I,  5 10  (establishment of 
rights by ~ersonal  energy), and in other places of this work, for ex- 
ample, Vol.  11,  §  25, 35,  then in my "Kampf  ums Recht"  (1st ed. 
Vienna, 1872, 7th ed.,  1884).  My own insight into the significance 
and justification  of energy in law 1 owe, 1 think, to Roman law.  No 
other law forces it so irresistibly upon the mind of  the man who has 
eyes for it as this law of  the most energetic people in the world. 194  THE CONCEPT OF PURPOSE  [Ca.  VIII 
about these first beginnings, but from the point of  view 
of purpose.  We must prove that the purposes of  human 
existence postulate force for their realization.  We shall 
imagine man as thrown exclusively upon the resources 
of his own energy.  M'e  shall then present to him  the 
purposes of  his purely individual existence, according to 
the measure of the urgency and indispensability to  which 
the  lay claim for him.  We shall do this in order that,  Y  after we have gained an insight into the insufficiency of 
a purely personal and unregulated force, we may rise to 
its organization in a political form.  Our objective point 
is the State  and the Law ; our starting point the  individual 
himself. 
3.  Propulsive Coercion in Law -  Person, Property. 
The first relation in which the purpose of  human exist- 
ence postulates force is personality.  When its existence 
and life are threatened by foreign attack, it defends itself 
and repels violence with  violence  (propulsive coercion). 
Nature herself, in giving man life and implanting in him 
the impulse of  self-preservation, requires this  conflict. 
Every being she has created must maintain himself  by 
his own power;  the animal as well  as man.  But while 
such defence in the animal is purely a physical process, in 
man it  assumesan ethical form.  Man not merely defends 
himself, but he recognizes that he has a right to  and must. 
From  this  point  of  view  we  call  the  act self-defence 
("Notwehr").  Necessary defence is both a right and a 
du+;  a right in so far as the subject exists for himself, 
a  duty in so far as he exists for the world.  For this 
reason the term obligatory self-defence may be applied 
to man, but not to an animal; for the animal lacks con- 
scious referenye of its existence to itself  and the world. 
To  deny or curtail man's right of self-defence  is to  degrade 
him below the beast.5 
6 And yet it has been done!  See concerning it my "Kampf ums 
Recht"  (7th ed., p.  90).  The Romans with their healthy common 
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~~t  the self-protection  of  the person  embraces not 
merely  what he if but also what he has,  for having is 
extended  being  (p. 52);  and here again language hits 
the nail on the head in using for it the expression self- 
defence ("Selbstverteidigung").  For tlhe person defends, 
in  that which  it has, its self-  its own complete ego, 
extended into the sphere of property. 
Having is, as  is well known in law, two-fold in species, 
"de facto" (possession) and "de jure"  (ownership) ;  and 
accordingly force, in its application to  the maintenance of 
what one has, likewise assumes a double form.  It  takes 
the defensive  in reference  to maintaining  the  "status 
quo" in the holding of a thing; and the offensive, in refer- 
ence to the recovery of  a thing which has disappeared 
"de facto."  In civilized epochs the law allows the per- 
son entitled to use force in the first case only;  in the 
second case, on the other hand, it  directs him to  have re- 
course to the law, by inflicting severe punishment upon 
the use of  arbitrary power in this direction  (self-help in 
contradistinction to self-defence).  For the subject who 
is thrswn upon his own resources, and receives no aid 
from the State, as we are supposing, such a distinction 
is not yet present, and  propulsive coercion extends equally 
to both cases.6  Whether I ward off  the person who seeks 
to gain possession of  an object belonging to me, or take 
it away again from the person who obtained possession 
of it -  in both cases the purpose of  the force exerted is 
propulsive in its nature, for it  has for its object the nega- 
tive attitude of  the opponent in reference to that which 
I call my own. 
Granting that this is so, it will be objected, what does 
this  difference  matter?  For  positive  law  such  wide 
sense teach:  "vim  vi  defendere omnes leges omniaque jura  permit- 
tunt," D. 9. 2. 45  5 4. 
'  I proved it for  the ancient Roman law in my "Geist  desromischen 
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extension  of  the concept  has not the slightest signifi- 
cance.  I  admit it has no significance for present  law. 
But the case is different for the history of  the develop- 
ment of  law.  I,  at  least, have discovered by a consistent 
investigation of the concept of  propulsive coercion in its 
entire extent the meaning of  a phenomenon  in ancient 
Roman law, which one usually passes by without notice; 
whereas it agrees fully with the broad concept of  propul- 
sive force, as laid down here.  Measured by the modern 
standard, every appropriation of  an  object in the posses- 
sion  of  another  on the part  of  the one entitled  to it 
would be characterized as  self-help.  The  ancient Roman 
people looked upon it differently;  they saw in it nothing 
abnormal,  but something self-evident.  But  the point 
of  view  which  enabled  them  to do this was  no other 
than the above of  propulsive force, from which the conse- 
quence of  its legal permissibility drawn by them followed 
of  itself.  From this conception we can explain the form 
which  the protection of  possession and ownership  took 
in old Roman law.  The possessor is entitled to  use force 
not only against the person  whom  he himself  allowed 
temporarily "de jure"  or "de facto" possession, but also 
against the one who took it away from him against his 
will.  And  this force  (and here  lies the decisive  point) 
is not brought by the Romans under the point of  view of 
recovery of  possession, but under that of  maintenance.' 
7 In juristic terms the "interdictum  uti possidetis"  and "utrubi" 
were  "interdicta  retinefzdae possessionis."  The recuperatory func- 
tion of  this interdict was a simple consequence of  the idea of  propul- 
sive coercion as the force directed to the maintenance of  what be- 
longs to one.  The "interdicta  unde vi"  and "de  precario," on the 
other  hand,  were  forms  of  compulsive  coercion.  They  concluded 
with  a  demand  for  restoration,  i.  e., for a  positive  deed  of  the 
defendant,  whereas  all  interdicts  enjoining  "vim  fieri,  veto,  quo 
rnicus  . . ." were based upon propulsive coercion, i. e., they imposed 
nothing  upon  the defendant, but prohibited  resistance against the 
self-help of  the plaintiff. 
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the same way the victorious plaintiff  in an ancient 
procedure of vindication was entitled to take the object 
in  dispute by force;  the verdict given enforced  no act 
on the part of  the defendant, as in later procedure, but 
merely decided the existence of  the plaintiff's ownership. 
The  practical  consequence  of  this  was  self-evident; 
the plaintiff realized his right by expelling the defendant. 
There was no need  of  any activity on the part of  the 
latter, and hence absence or death of  the defendant did 
not exclude the reaiization  of  the judgment in the vin- 
dicatory procedure, whereas the case in the realization 
of a personal claim was different.  Here an action of  the 
condemned was necessary for the purpose. 
$ 4.  Compulsive  Coercion -  The  Family.  In  per- 
sonality the subject is still limited to himself, in property 
he passes beyond himself to the object; for both of  these 
relations propulsive coercion suffices.  Both in the family 
and in the contract the subject forms a relation to the 
person-permanent  in the former case, temporary in the 
latter.  This progress of  the relation conditions also the 
means required  for  its maintenance, viz., the elevation 
of propulsive coercion to compulsive.  The master of  the 
house who establishes the family must have the author- 
ity in the house, if  it is to remain;  and nature herself 
has indicated  this position for him in its essential out- 
lines-  in relation to his wife, by the superiority of  his 
physical  strength  and by the greater  amount of  work 
which falls to his share-in  relation to the children, by 
the helplessness and dependence in which they are for 
Years, -the  influence of  which, even after they are grown 
up, remains in the same relation in which it was formed 
during that period. 
Thus nature herself  has determined  the family  rela- 
tion to be one of  superiority and subordination;  and in 
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latter  relation,  has  provided  that no one  shall  enter 
society who has not already learned this lesson of  superi- 
ority and subordination, upon which relation the exist- 
ence of  the State depends.  The family is for every man 
the preparatory school to the State; for many nations, 
as is well  known,  it was even the model  of the latter 
(Patriarchal State). 
I  shall not now  add any more to the subject of  the 
family relation, as I have here to  consider it merely from 
the point of  view of  compulsive coercion.  The concepts 
of  Duty (Chapter X) and Love (Chapter XI) will bring 
us to it again. 
5 5.  Compulsive Coercion -  Contract.  Not every con- 
tract  requires compulsive  coercion  for  its security;  a 
contract of  sale or exchange which is at once carried out 
affords no room for it, since it leaves nothing to  be gotten 
by coercion.  It must not be objected that the buyer 
has to be protected in the possession of  the object, and 
the seller  in  the  possession  of  the  money.  For  this 
there is no need of  compulsive coercion, propulsive being 
sufficient.  For a state of  intercourse which is limited to 
this  simplest  form  of  exchange,  viz.,  a  cash  business, 
compulsive  coercion  would  be  unnecessary.  But  this 
immediate fulfillment on both sides, which  makes com- 
pulsive  coercion  unnecessary, is not practicable  in  all 
contracts.  It is not practicable in a  loan -  the lender 
must  precede with  his  performance; the consideration, 
viz., the payment of  the loan, can ofily follow later.  It 
is not practicable in a contract of  lease -  whether the 
rent is paid before or after permission is given to use the 
object; one of  the two parties must come first with his 
performance and wait for the consideration.  Thus cer- 
tain contracts necessarily presuppose the postponement of 
the performance on the one side, i. e., its promise. 
Promise denotes a  very great progress in comparison 
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with the lowest form of  contract above mentioned.  By 
putting  mere  speech  (liver-sprechen"  [German  for 
-  speaking in favor  of  the person  addressed, 
p. 162, note), the word, in place of the act, it frees the 
contracting  parties from the hampering  presupposition 
of  immediate  payment  and  possession.  It makes  it 
possible for them in their business transactions to take 
their future payment as the basis of operations, and dis- 
count the future.  A promise is the emancipation of the 
contract from the fetters of the present, and is an order 
og the future for the purpose of defraying the needs of 
the present. 
But in order that the word shall take the place of  the 
act, there must be security that it will be exchanged  for 
the act at the proper time;  or as language, applying the 
idea of pledge to this case, expresses it, that the word 
pledged  or  pawned  shall  be  redeemed.  This  is  the 
'&?jilment"  of  the promise;  the word  that was empty 
hitherto becomes "full,"  the mere thought of  the future 
act becomes a reality.  The guarantee for such fulfilment 
depends  upon  coercion.  The  necessary  condition  for 
the  creditor's  accepting  the  promise  of  the debtor  is 
that the latter should  authorize the creditor to coerce 
him.  It is  demanded  not only by the interest of  the 
creditor, but just  as much by his own interest.  If  the 
creditors did  not desire promises to be  actionable, the 
debtors would have to do so.a 
The juristic  expression  for  this  effectiveness  of  the 
promise is the binding force of  contracts.  The contract 
"binds"  the debtor, the latter is  "bound"  by his word 
if he can be forced  to "keep"  it, i.  e., if  the fulfilment can 
The same legislative point of  view applies here as is enacted in 
D. 4. 4. 24  5  1 for minors, "ne  magno incommode . . . afficiantur 
nemine  cum his contrahente et quodammodo commercio eis inter- 
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be compelled by external force.  The figure by which the 
German language as well as the Latin views promise is 
that of  a bond by means of  which the creditor holds the 
debtor firm.  The bond  is tied ("contrahitur" -  "con- 
tractus"),  loosened  ("solvitur" -  "solutio"),  the condi- 
tion of the debtor is that of  being  bound  ("Verbind- 
lichkeit" [German  for obligation] -  being bound in favor 
of  another, in Latin "obligatio"  from "ob" -  the Ger- 
man  "ver,"  i.  e.,  toward,  and  "ligare"  to bind,  and 
"nexum"  from "nectere"  to  bind, to chain). 
The binding force of  a  promise  is not a thing that 
comes to it from the outside;  it is inevitably posited in 
the practical function of  it.  If a promise were not bind- 
ing, loan would  be as good as useless in business inter- 
course;  only a friend would then be able to get a loan. 
Contracts of  service and lease would be stricken from the 
list of  contracts, for who would be foolish enough to  give 
his services, or allow another the use of  his object, unless 
he were certain of  receiving his pay and his rent?  Who 
would be foolish enough to  pay the  latter in advance if  he 
must expect that the promised act might remain undone? 
Barter and purchase alone would be possible in the primi- 
tive and extremely constraining form of  immediate ful- 
filment. 
In view of  this practical indispensableness of  the bind- 
ing force of  contracts it is scarcely conceivable how the 
doctrine of the Law of  Nature could have considered it  so 
difficult a problem, for the solution of  which some have 
expended the most violent efforts, while still others have 
altogether  despaired  of  reaching  any  solution.  The 
question became a problem only because the element of 
purpose in it, i.  e.,  the  function  of  promise in business, was 
altogether left out of sight, and the attempt was made to 
answer the question merely from reasoning on the nature 
of  the  will.  Furthermore, they presupposed a purposeless 
volition, and argued  not concerning a  will  that wishes 
to attain to something in the world  and  hence makes 
Use  of proper means for the purpose, submitting to con- 
sequences demanded by its own volition, but concerning 
a will that knows nothing of  the conditions of  its own 
volition.  It  forgets in the next moment after it has con- 
cluded the contract that the success of  what it wills is 
a matter not of  temporary but of  continued  volition. 
From this purely subjective point of  view, which  con- 
siders only the possibility of  voluntary acts in the indi- 
vidual, we  certainly cannot  prove  why the same man 
who willed a thing today should not be able to will its 
exact opposite to-morrow.  But the very point of  view 
is altogether inapplicable to  the above question, which is 
not a psychological one, but a problem practical and juris- 
tic.  It involves not what the will can do in itself, but 
what it necessarily must do if  it is to attain its purpose 
in the world.  By its  purpose we mean not all it may con- 
ceivably propose to  itself, including the most foolish and 
senseless things,  but such purposes  as are compatible 
with those of the others in whose community it has its 
being.  How  far this is the case is a  purely historical 
question.  The  middle  ages  recognized  contracts  as 
valid which we today simply reject, and the same rela- 
tion will always be repeated.  To answer the question 
of the binding force of  contracts by an abstract formula 
is no better than to  do  the same in reference  to the ques- 
tion of the best form of  government.  Rights of  contract 
and forms of  government are facts of  history, which can 
only be comprehended in their relation to history, i.  e., 
to the conditions and needs of  the time when they arose. 
BY abandoning the firm ground of  history and undertak- 
ing to answer the question from the nature of  the sub- 
jective will, abstracted from society and history, the doc- 
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of  solution.  Whether it maintains or denies the bind- 
ing force of  contracts, it is equally mistaken in both cases, 
because it is in sharp contradiction with the real world. 
The real world can neither affirm nor deny the question; 
and can only answer it according to its required purposes 
at the time being. 
I  doubt whether any other legal  system proves  this 
statement  so strikingly  as the  Roman  law.  In con- 
nection with purpose, contract rises from one stage to 
the next, even from the lowest to the highest;  and this 
without  skipping  any intermediate  step.  We  might 
suppose we  had  before  us not a historical  but a con- 
ceptual development of  the concept of  contract, so coin- 
cidently do the  twogrow.  This circumstance induces me 
to insert here the history of  the development of  Roman 
obligation.  I  shall  only  offer  thereby  in  a  different 
form  what  I  have  to give,  priz.,  the  inner  conceptual 
development of  compulsive coercion  in the contract - 
concept and history move in perfectly parallel lines. 
According  to the conception of  the ancient Romans 
a mere promise (i'pactum nudum")  produces no actioqg 
i.  e.,  the idea of  the binding force of  a promise is quite 
foreign to ancient times.  The legally enforceable char- 
acter of  a promise,  i.  e., its actionability ("actio"),  is 
conditioned  by  the  fact  that  the creditor  performed 
some act for or gave something to the debtor.  The obli- 
gating reason of the promisedepends upon the act ('Ires") 
of the other party; no one promises who does not have 
to, namely, in order  to get something himself.  Every 
promise is therefore a promise  of  a subsequent act by 
reason  of a previous act that was received, or is juris- 
tically  assumed  to  have  been  received.  The  word 
D. 2. 14. 7  Q 4, " . . . nuda pactio obligationern non parit."  ib. 7 
8 5, " . . . regula:  ne ex  pacto actio nascatur."  Paul. Sent. Rec. 
11,  14. 1, "ex  nudo  pacto inter cives Romanos actio non nascitur." 
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without "res"  is an empty word which obligates no one; 
;t acquires a binding force only through the substantial 
element of possession in the person giving it. 
This is the ancient Roman conception which controlled 
for centuries  the history of the development of  Roman 
&ligation,  and  which  is  testified  to in  language  the 
moment we make our first entry into this sphere.  Ety- 
mology, that guardian of the primitive popular concep- 
tions,  sketches ancient  Roman obligation  for us  in the 
following manner. 
A debtor  ("debitor")  is he who has something from 
("de-habere" -  "debere,"  "debitor")  ; creditor 
("creditor")  is he who has given something ("duere" - 
"dare,"  "creduere,"  "creditor") ; a debt is money which 
was  given  to the  debtor  ("aes  alienum").  All  three 
concepts  therefore, -  debtor,  creditor,  debt, -  point, 
in accordance with their linguistic form, back to the idea 
of  having something from another. 
From this realistic point of departure Roman obliga- 
tion now develops in such a way that it gradually over- 
comes the substantial element of  "res,"  until it finally 
has freed itself  from it entirely, and given rise to mere 
contract as such. 
In order that the reader may understand the following 
outline of  Roman contracts, which  proposes to arrange 
them  in  the order  of  their  conceptual  and  historical 
sequence,  I  will  preface  the  following  observation  on 
the terms to be used. 
A  business  transaction  which  is  carried  out by  an 
immediate performance on both sides, I call bilateral real 
business;  a  transaction  in which  the  performance  of 
one party comes first, while the consideration  does not 
follow at once, but is only  promised,  I  call  unilateral 
real business; a transaction in which neither party per- 
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bilateral  promissory  business;  and  a  transaction  in 
which only one party promises without any consideration 
being  promised  or granted  upon the other side, I  call 
unilateral  promissory  business.  If  besides I  add that 
unilateral real business occurs in Roman law in a double 
form,  viz., with effective and imaginary  previous  per- 
formance  (merely  juristically  assumed), we  have the 
outline of  obligatory business transactions, which in my 
opinion  contains  the  historical  gradation  of  Roman 
obligation. 
I.  First  Stage. -  Bilateral  Real  Business.  The 
simplest form of  contract, economically as well as juris- 
tically, is contract of  exchange, and salewith immediate 
execution  (cash).  In  ancient  Roman  law  this  stage 
is  represented  solely  by  solemn  sale  ("mancipatio"). 
There is no special form peculiar to  exchange; the stage 
of  exchange  seems  already  superseded  in  the  law  of 
contract. 
I I.  Second  Stage. -  EfJeective  Uniiateral  Real  Busi- 
ness.  The  first  demonstrable  case  of  obligation  to 
a future act in the old Roman law is the solemn loan, 
known  as  "nexum,"  distinguished  by  the  immediate 
personal execution which belongs to it.  We might call 
it the promissory note of  the ancient Roman world.  The 
obligating power of  the word, which here as everywhere 
in Roinan law the person must speak who is to receive 
the right by the act, depends upon  the antecedent act 
on his part. 
With this solemn form are connected the forrnless loan, 
and, in the further course of  development, the other real 
contracts, named as well as unnamed.  All of  these hold 
firmly to the ancient  Roinan  idea  that the debtor  is 
not obligated by a word, whether his own or another's, 
but by the combination of word and performance.  For 
this reason, only such individual is entitled to an action 
in one of the unnamed contracts who has carried out his 
part of the contract;  before this is done the contract is 
not  binding on either  party, the word  only acquiring 
force  when a real performance is joined  to it. 
J I I.  Third Stage. -  Imaginary  Unilateral  Real Busi- 
ness.  Obligation develops further  from  this  basis  by 
keeping formally to it, but in reality freeing itself there- 
from.  This takes place  first in lean  ("nexum").  The 
old effective  payment (sale "per aes et libram")  is trans- 
formed into a mere imaginary act, so that one who had 
not received anything in reality could establish  a debt 
by means of  an imaginary loan in which the giving was 
limited  to a  piece of  brass.  With  this was connected 
the "literal" contract, in which a sum is charged on both 
sides  as  "given"  and  "received,"  while  there was no 
need of  actual giving.  As in the former case the real act 
was replaced by an imaginary act, so it is replaced here 
by  acknowledgment;  a  process  of  the same  kind  as 
occurs  in  the history  of  the bill  of  exchange,  in  the 
substitution of  the actual payment of  the value by the 
value clause ("value  received").  The last step in this 
direction is represented by the verbal contract of  Roman 
law.  In form it contains not the slightest reference to 
a previous performance supposed  to have taken place, 
which  seems to have been  altogether eliminated  in  it, 
though according to the juristic idea it lay at the basis. 
Verbal  contract may  be  defined  as a  receipt  of  value 
received  with  accompanying  promise  of  a  subsequent 
act on one's own part.  The verbal contract is the last 
off-shoot of  the old  Roman concept  of  obligation, and 
appears only as an artificial operation.  In it the force 
of the original idea that an obligation to an act can be 
established  only  by a corresponding antecedent  act, is 
already  to such a degree weakened as to have becomc 
an embodiment of  the abstract power of obliga- 
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IV.  Fourth  Stage. -Bilateral  Promissory  Business. 
The obligating force of  a  promise as such, without the 
support of  a previous act, formally certified  or merely 
assumed, as was the case historically in verbal contract, 
comes to actual recognition only in the four consensual 
contracts  of  Roman  law.  Of  these,  however,  only 
three,  viz.,  sale,  lease  and partnership, belong  to the 
category of bilateral promissory  business;  whereas the 
fourth,  "mandatum,"  comes  under  that of  unilateral 
promise  (see  below).  In  comparison  with  the  other 
forms of obligation of  Roman law, they appear as  highly 
limited  exceptional  cases, which  were  taken over  into 
Roman law from international private law  ("jus  gen- 
tium"),  and do not therefore by any means justify the 
conclusion  that the old  Roman conception was super- 
seded in them and abolished in principle.  Neither the 
Roman people nor even Roman jurisprudence ever rose 
to the thought that consensus as such has in it a juris- 
tically  binding  force.  Nowhere  does  the  latter  give 
the slightest  hint  that this corresponds really  to the 
nature of  the thing;  never does it make an attempt to 
extend those four exceptional  cases.  On the contrary, 
it guards anxiously the old boundaries and warns against 
overstepping them as a serious danger.IO 
V. Fifth  Stage. -  Unilateral  Promissory  Business. 
This is the last step in the development of  actionable 
promises which Roman law took, and it is perhaps the 
most interesting of all.  Whereas in all previous stages 
obligation  remains  in  the service  of  the  purposes  of 
commerce and hence of bilateral egoism, it makes itself 
free  from it in this stage, and rises to the thought of 
benevolence  and  self-denial;  or  to speak  differently, 
liberal  or gratuitous contracts (p. 76) are joined  to the 
onerous as actionable. 
lo D. 2. 14. 7  5  5.  " . . . hoc non valebit, ne  ex pacto  ac~io  nus- 
catur," a turn which is repeated four times in this passage. 
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These, too, like onerous contracts become possible in 
two forms; in the form of  immediate performance, and 
in the form of promise.  The object of both may be the 
permanent cession of  property value (donation, alms), or 
temporary service by object or person. 
We now  have the formula  required  to embrace the 
various cases and forms of liberal contracts, and at  the 
same time a standard of  measurement  which  we  may 
apply to every positive  law.  When  I  apply it to the 
Roman  law,  I  do so in  the first place,  naturally,  in 
order to complete the development just  outlined of the 
concept of  promise in Roman law.  But here, too, I am 
not so much concerned about Roman law as about the 
advancement of  the knowledge of  the  law  in general, 
and for this reason I do  not limit myself to  liberal promise 
but combine with it a consideration of  liberal real  per- 
formance in the conviction that only by this means will 
the peculiar  significance and function of  the former be 
manifested with the greatest clearness. 
(1)  Liberal  Real  Performance.  A  gratuitous  service 
is juristically a purely indifferent thing;  as such it gives 
rise to no question of right, and therefore science had 
no reason to stamp it with the seal of  a legal concept." 
Gratuitous  delivery  of  a  thing  for  use,  however, 
touches law at  least in so far as it contains the obliga- 
tion to return the object.  To  enforce it Roman law has 
the  "interdictum  de precario,"  the "condictio certi"  in 
loan without interest, and the "actio  commodati." 
The effect by which a gift makes itself felt in law con- 
sists  in  the  transfer  of  ownership,  a  result  which  it 
shares with each onerous transaction in transfer of  owner- 
ship.  It is not therefore necessary for the jurist to use 
11 Juristic questions can be connected with it only by the accession 
of special circumstances; for example, "dolus,"  erroneous assumption 
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the concept of  gift in order to explain it.  To speak in 
juristic terms, gift comes into consideration only as the 
motive  of  transfer  of  ownership.  The difference  be- 
tween paid and gratuitous transfer of ownership is not 
juristic in its nature but economic;  for gift is, from the 
juristic point of  view, completely covered by the concept 
transfer of  ownership.  This Roman law also recognizes 
perfectly  in  reference  to "traditio."  The  theory  of 
"traditio"  knows  no difference  between  a  paid  and a 
gratuitous  transaction.  The case was  quite different, 
however, in that form of  transaction which according to 
the old Roman law transferred  Roman property  only, 
i.e., such as may be prosecuted  by vindicatory  proce- 
dure,12  e.g., in "mancipatio"  of  "resmancipi."  Theonly 
reason  stated  which  may  determine  the owner  to a 
transfer of  ownership is sale.  For the transfer of  a "res 
mancipi"  by way of  gift the old law had no form, i.e., 
the idea of  gift is  not given legal  expression  to -  an 
ancient Roman was not in the habit of  making gifts.l3 
If,  nevertheless, one desired  to do so, he could do this 
only by wrapping his gift in the form of  "mancipatio," 
imaginary  sale.  The importance of  this phenomenon 
he only can fail to recognize who  in the forms of  the 
law  sees mere forms, and not  the  expressions  of: real 
ideas.  For  him  who  agrees  with  me  in  the opposite 
l2  The establishment of  this view I must reserve for another place 
(the second division of  the third part of  my "Geist  des romischen 
Rechts").  The  effect of  Roman  property  ("dominium  ex  jure 
quiritium")  consisted in "vindicatio."  Its  transference to "res nec 
mancipi"  did not come till  later.  In ancient times its protection 
was  restricted  to "act.  furti,"  which  was direcred,  however,  not 
only against the thief, but also against the receiver of  stolen goods 
(Gaj. 111, 186:  "furtum conceptum"). 
l3  SO  Polybius literally, 32. 12.9, where he tells of  the generosity of 
P. Scipio toward his mother:  "Unheard  of  in Rome, for in this city 
no one gives away of his own accord any of his belongings to  another 
as  a present." 
0 5 1  SOCIAL MECHANICS -  COERCION  209 
opinion,  "mancipatio"  contains  the  proposition  that 
the most ancient Roman law knows no gratuitous trans- 
fer of ownership, but only paid. 
~hus,  gift was forced by the law itself to conceal itself 
in the form of  another transaction, and pretend to be 
what it was not in reality.  The fact that we meet the 
same phenomenon also in other laws at  a lower stage of 
development,14  leaves no doubt possible, according  to  my 
opinion, of the reason of  this phenomenon.  It  was not 
the limitation of  the legal form,  which was adapted only 
lo the most important cases of  transfer of  ownership, 
but the limitation of  human egoism, which had not yet 
been able to  rise to  the idea of  gift. 
This ancient national conception of  gift continued to 
influence for many centuries the attitude of  legislation 
and jurisprudence.  In forms of  law  it shows itself in 
the limiting determinations of  the "lex  Cincia,"  and in 
the prescription  of  "insinuatio"  of  the time of  the em- 
perors.  In juristic  theory  it discovers  itself  in traces 
which  will  be  indicated  later.  Even  in  the  classical 
l4 So, for example, in Lombard law in which  it was a fixed legal 
rule that a gift, especially  when conditional on the death of  the 
giver, was valid only if the donee handed over to  the donor a com- 
pensation  ("Laungild" -  "Lohngeld").  Stobbe,  "Reurecht  und 
Vertragsschluss  nach  alterem  Deutschen  Recht,"  (Leipzig,  18761, 
11,  p.  16.  Two other  examples,  which  I  owe  to Prof. Ehrenberg, 
are "manumissio  per denarium"  according to the Frankish law, in 
which the slave about to  be manumitted offered a  "denarium"  for 
his freedom, which the master  (in order to indicate the character 
thereof as  a merely imaginary payment) jerked out of  his hand with 
a fillip, and the establishment of a relation of  dependence (whether 
one of complete ownership or of  lesser dependence, for example, a 
relation  of  vassalage)  by means  of  an imaginary  consideration 
(designated in the sources as "pretium").  According  to Turkish 
law gift,  except where there is a relation of  kinship, becomes irrevo- 
cable only through a gift in return.  Von Tornaz~w,  " Das  Mosle- 
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period of  Roman jurisprudence we meet with a concep- 
tion  of  gift which  would  do honor  to the most sober 
egoism:  gift is a sort of  exchange;  one makes a gift in 
order to  receive a gift in retum.ls  The  only point where 
liberality comes to  the surface within the law is the testa- 
ment.  But let us not deceive ourselves about the true 
worth thereof.  The liberality of  the last will and testa- 
ment  is  psychologically  far  removed  from  liberality 
among living persons.  What one donates, he sacrifices, 
he takes away from himself;  what he gives in his last 
will, he gives only because he cannot keep it himself; 
or more correctly, he does not give at  all, but, as  language 
fittingly expresses it, he "leaves," i.  e., he leaves it  behind 
because he must.  If  he does not dispose of  it, it falls 
to the legal heir without his assistance;  the testament 
only gives him an opportunity of  putting other persons 
in his place.  The value of such generosity must not be 
put very high.  It happens not rarely that an incor- 
rigible miser, who had not the smallest gift to  spare dur- 
ing  his  lifetime  for charitable purposes,  relatives  and 
friends, bequeaths  the richest  legacies  and makes the 
most  splendid  foundations.  These  bequests  may  be 
very valuable for the beneficiaries  and for society, but 
psychologically they have not the value of  a gift:-the 
gift  of the cold  hand  is compatible  with  an ice  cold 
heart;  it is not a gift of one's own, but from the purse 
of  the legal heir.16  Only the gift of  the warm hand feels 
warm. 
Such is testamentary liberality in its true shape.  But 
even the paltry residue of  liberality which still remains 
l6 D. 5.3.25  Q 11, " .  .  .  ad  remunerandum sibi aliquem naturaliter 
obligaverunt, velut genus quoddam hoc esse permutationis." 
lB  Its  psychological character is very well described by the jurist in 
D. 39. 6.  1. pr. " .  .  .  habere se vuit, quam eum, cui donat, magisque 
eum, cui donat, quam heredem suum." 
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after this analysis was too much for the Romans.  Law 
had no independent form for it in which it could appear 
as such, but they borrowed for it the forms of  business 
intercourse.  For  the heir  they borrowed  the forb of 
~~i~~i~~ti~"  -  his institution is made in the form of  a 
purchase of the estate.  The heir, or some other person 
in his place  ("familiae emptor"), buys the estate.  For 
the legatee they borrowed the form of  "legatum per dam- 
nationem"  (the obligation on  the part of  the heir  to 
transfer to the legatee the quiritarian  ownership  in a 
thing), i.e., of  the strict form of  debt, of  the debt of  loan 
("nexUm").  Thus we may say that the ancient Roman 
law  possesses no particular form specially intended  for 
liberality, either as "inter  vivos,"  or testamentary.  It 
employs for  the purpose the forms of  business intercourse. 
For  gift  it uses  "mancipatio";  for a  promise  of  gift, 
"stipulatio,"  verbal  contract  (see  below) ; for  institu- 
tion of an heir, "mancipatio" ; for a legacy, "nexum." 
(2)  Liberal Promise.  A liberal promise becomes action- 
able in a manner quite different from an  onerous promise. 
The actionability of  the latter is a requirement of  com- 
merce;  on the other hand, that a  liberal  promise  be 
actionable is a thing not at  all demanded from the stand- 
point  of business --  whether it be admitted or rejected 
by  the legislator, trade and commerce will  not feel it. 
Juristic formalism alone, which is attached solely to the 
abstract concept of  promise, can see a  contradiction in 
the fact that the same legislator who grants the power 
of enforcement in onerous promise denies it in liberal. 
The  possibility  and  necessity  of  distinguishing  be- 
tween onerous and liberal promise, which is here empha- 
sized, is confirmed in the fullest measure by the Roman 
law.  For the former it had long possessed a rich supply 
forms; whereas, for the latter, it  had not a single form. 
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also  in an objective disinclination  to the business itself, 
follows from the plea  granted  by the  "lex  Cincia"  in 
both  cases  to a  business  irreproachable  in  form.  In 
consequence a special form for gift in the law of  things 
as  well as  in the law of  obligations is not found in ancient 
Roman law. 
Not until Justinian does the promise of  gift attain to 
independence of  form.  The necessity of  clothing it in 
the business form of  verbal contract, which was in force 
till then, was abolished by him, and the simple, formless 
contract  ("pactum")  in  which  gift  presents  itself  as 
that which  it is, is put in its place.  Roman  law  had 
therefore existed over a thousand years without granting 
juristic  recognition  to the  promise  of  gift  as such;  a 
fact so significant for the Roman conception of  gift that 
it needs no further commentary. 
What determined Justinian to  break with it?  Accord- 
ing to my opinion  it was  the influence of  the Christian 
concepti~n.~~  We need only cast a glance at  the mass of 
charitable  foundations  named  in  the  constitutions  of 
the Christian emperors to be convinced of  the measure 
in which  Christianity, however  high  or low we may in 
general estimate its ethically rejuvenating influence upon 
the decadent Roman  Byzantine world, undeniably exer- 
cised a  morally ennobling effect at least in one direction. 
We speak of  its stimulating influence upon beneficence 
and liberality.  It  is only with the coming of  Christianity 
that the virtue of  charity arose in history to the rank 
of  a factor socially influential and significant.  Not only 
did  the  beautiful  calling  of  mitigating  the  misery  of 
entire classes of  society fall to  its lot, -  a social problem 
which  commerce guided  by pure egoism  leaves every- 
21 The Constitution in which  he makes this disposition mentions 
expressly the Christian institutions.  Cod. 8. 54. 35  5 5, " . . . piis 
actibus vel religiosis personis." 
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where  unsolved, -  but  at the  same  time  the  world 
nlission to  assist in laying the foundations of  the Christian 
church  by  supplyiilg  the  requisite  economic  means. 
T~ make this possible, Christianity had to overcome the 
egoism of Roman law.  And  it has a  right to boast of 
it,--it  is through  Christianity alone and by means of 
Christian doctrines that beneficence and love have come 
to tlleir full right in legislation as  well as in life. 
Roman law knew of two cases only in which gratuitous 
promise was equipped from ancient times with binding 
force.  These were "votum"  and "pollicitatio,"  a vow22 
to the gods and to the  community.  But even  here, 
when in contact with the highest that the Roman knows, 
his deity and his fatherland, he does not fail to betray 
the trait of  egoism; does not forget to  make his account 
with both.  "Votum"  is for him only a sort of  nameless. 
real  contract with  the deity.23 It is not a pure,  dis- 
interested  promise of  gift, but an act for the sake of  a 
consideration;  its binding force, too, is supported by the 
"res."  And "pollicitatio"  also does not obligate without 
further ado as pure liberality.24  It  is in force only when 
motived by a special reason ("justa causa").  This may 
be either because the community has given or is to give 
something,25  or  (and  here, judging  from the language, 
22 Liberality in favor of  a  purpose, in contradistinction  to that in 
fa~or  of  a person,  uiz., gift. 
23 According to  the formula, "do,  ut facias,"  help me, and I will 
give you!  To  be sure, this is nowhere expressly said, but it can be 
inferred with  certainty according  to my opinion  from the many 
formulae in  Brissonius, "De  Vocibus ac  Formulis,"  lib.  I,  c.  159, fl. 
All  "vota"  are conceived  conditionally. 
D. 50.12. 1 5 5, "qui non ex causa reipublicae pecuniam pollicen- 
tur, liberalitatem perficere  non coguntur." 
D. 50.12. 1 5 1. "Si quidam ob honorem promiserit decretum sibi 
"el  decernendum vel ob  aliam justam causam, tenebitur ex pollicita- 
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we  probably  have  a  later  extension)  on account  of  a 
heavy misfortune which befell the community, or when, 
a beginning having been rhade of  carrying the promise 
into execution, it thereby  becomcs a  reality  and  the 
mere word has assumed the form of  a deed. 
I add a third case to these two, but again for the pur- 
pose of stripping it of  the appearance of  liberality with 
which it is clothed.  It is the promise of  "dos."  The 
regular form of  it was, until late in the time of  the em- 
perors,  the  verbal  contract.  It  therefore  took  on  a 
business form, and the Roman jurists maintain the busi- 
ness character  of  "dcs"  (in  contradistinction  to  gift) 
even for the man who receives it.  This they justify  by 
the statement that the man has to bear the burdens of 
marriage, and the purpose  of  the "dos"  is to give him 
such contribution as  is due from the  At the same 
time  there was  unilateral  promise  ("dotis  dictio")  in 
certain cases;  the same form, therefore, as in "votum" 
and "pollicitatio."  But the business element in contra- 
distinction  to the purely liberal asserts itself  here also 
in the fact that this form was limited to the assumption 
of  an antecedent debt;27  and thus here also it was the 
"res"  which  served  as the basis  of  the promise.  Not 
the case of  an  antecedent performance on the part of  the'community. 
"Polliceri"  is "pote"  (strong, powerful)  "liceri"  (to offer, to bid), 
"pollicitator" is he who has made the highest bid to the community 
for  something which it grants  him (honor).  It is therefore again 
real contract, "do,  ut facias."  The obligation  undertaken  by the 
bidder is actually designated  (ibid. 6. pr.) as "aes alienurn,"  and in 
3. pr. as "quasi debiturn." 
* In place of  all other passages  I  shall  name only D. 44.  7. 19, 
where the "lucrativa  causa" of  "dos"  is expressly  rejected and the 
idea of  consideration is emphasized. 
"Dotis dictio"  can be made by the wife,  by her debtor, or her 
father, Ulp. VI, 2,  i. e., by persons who are already obligated either 
"civiliter"  or "naturaliter," and hence do not give it as a gift. 
until the Christian period  is the promise of  a "dos"  as 
such, i. e., without the business form of verbal contract, 
by Theodosius and Valentinian as actionable. 
We  have now  come to the end, and after the long 
digression which we permitted ourselves, we now return 
to the path which we followed earlier.  The point where 
we left it  was the  question of compulsive coercion (P. 198), 
and  the reason  we  quit it was in order to get a  firm 
historical point of  support for this question.  The result 
with which  we  return consists  in  the recognition  that 
the impelling motive  in obligation  is not an abstract 
idea of  will, or, which is the same thing, a formal concept 
of promise, but the practical purpose.  But the concept 
of purpose is highly  relative;  its practical form in law 
is conditioned and determined by that which  is felt as 
a condition and aim of life.  And this too not by a  par- 
ticular  and  peculiarly  formed  individual, but by the 
typical  individual  of  this definite period,  i. e., by  the 
whole of  society.  To  secure this content, these purposes, 
answers to the interests of everyonb, for without them 
no one can live; and in granting them the form of  obli- 
gation in order to  secure them, the law only protects the 
conditions of  life of  all society. 
We have not yet, however, advanced, in the develop- 
ment so far of  our discussion, to the concept of  law.  We 
are still occupied with  the concept that is introductory 
to it, viz., the individual coercion demanded by the pur- 
pose  of  the realization  and  security  of  the  necessary 
conditions  of  life.  But everything  we  have  found  so 
far leads us inevitably to the law.  It presupposes the 
juristic  formation  of  the  entire  content  of  purpose 
developed  so far, which  the individual  would  have  to 
pursue  by  his  own  power  if  we  imagine  him  thrown 
upon  his  own  resources.  Every  one  of  the  purposes 
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given  as  essential  to  life,  demands  coercion.  Such 
demand,  however,  presupposes  law  as  systematized 
coercion. 
$6.  The  Self-regulation  of  Coercion. -  Partnership. 
We have made  the attempt in what  has preceded  to 
go back  to the ultimate  motives  of  coercion  in  civil 
society.  Now, whatever  form  the State may give  to 
it, howevcr  extended may be the application which  it 
makes of  it for its own purposes, the ultimate germ of 
coercion  as a  social  institution,  the beginnings  of  its 
foundation  as an organization,  Iies  in  the individual; 
the purpose  of  ex~stence  of  the individual  cannot  be 
realized  on earth without coercion.  It is the first, and 
in it Iies  therefore the primitive  germ of  law, as legal 
force  (p. 187). 
But by showing that coercion is indispensable we have 
not yet gained much; the decisive point is the assurance 
of  its success.  Of  what use to the owner or creditor is 
the authority of  realizing his right  by coercion, when 
the preponderance of  force is found on the side of  the 
opponent?  Under  such conditions  the exercise  of  his 
right of  coercion  takes the form of  a  two-edged  sword, 
whose sharpness is directed against himself.  The whole 
question  of  the social  organization of  coercion  is con- 
nected with the problem of  bringing the preponderance of 
force  on the side of right. 
We can answer the problem easily enough by saying 
that  this  matter is  attended  to by  the State.  Why, 
then, call it up  as a problem?  I do not want to  disturb 
anybody's comfort who is satisfied with this reply, but 
I for my part cannot be  content with it, if  I am to do 
justice to the problem of  presenting clearly the unity and 
continuity in the conceptual development of  coercion in 
civil society, from its first beginnings in the individual 
up to its last conclusion in the State and the Law. 
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He who  does not regard  his power  as sufficient  for 
maintaining  his right against violent injury or deforce- 
merit,  will  look  around for help,  whether  it be in the 
moment of  danger when the right  is threatened, or as 
soon as it is established.  Both forms of  protection take 
shape daily before our eyes in international intercourse; 
in the first case by alliance, in the second by guarantee. 
The imperfect development of  the idea of  right in the 
life of  nations is responsible for the fact that these two 
rudimentary  forms have been  retained  in this domain 
from the time of primitive law; forms which everywhere 
else were  made superfluous by the organization of  the 
law which succeeded,  and hence were abolished.28  Both 
of  them contain the first beginnings of  the realization of 
the problem  of right;  which is, to create a  preponder- 
ance on the side of right.  But only the first beginnings, 
for the success  of  either is ever highly  problematical. 
The one who menaces can look around for allies just as 
well as the one threatened; he who finds the most is the 
strongest, and it is not right  but accident  that decides 
the  matter.  Guarantee  goes  a  step higher.  But its 
value, too, as the experience of  international law has at 
all  times  shown, is  highly  problematical;  for who will 
guarantee the guarantor?  As long  as his interest goes 
hand in hand with that of  the principal or at  least is not 
opposed  to it, there is no strain in their relations;  but 
it is quite different when their interests part;  here the 
guarantee is put to the test, which it  only too often fails 
to stand. 
I thought I discovered a trace of  them in the private law in the 
five witnesses of  the ancient  Roman  "mancipatio"  and "nexum." 
See my  "Geist  des rijmischen  Rechts"  I  5  llb (4th ed.).  Their 
original  purpose  was  according  to my opinion  that of  assistants 
("testes"  from  "stare")  -assistance  not  with  word  alone, i. e., 
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This seems to indicate for law the way in which it can 
bring the preponderance of power on its side, and secure 
the guarantee by self-interest, i.  e., by means of  reci- 
procity.  This form of  reciprocal security of  right is the 
defensive  and ofensive alliance.  But this means,  too, 
is not yet the right one, for the opponent also, from whom 
we have to  expect the attack, may make use of  the same 
means.  And if  he does so, then it is again not right but 
mere  accident  that decides;  and  again  the strongest 
conquers. 
These are the facts regarded externally.  The case is 
quite different  when looked at from within;  and here, 
indeed, we finally come upon the  vital point in the whole 
organization of  right.  This consists in the preponder- 
ance of  the common interests of  all over the particular 
interests of  one  individual;  all  join  for  the common 
interests, only the individual stands for  the particular 
interest.  But the power of  all is, the forces being equal, 
superior to that of  the individual; and the more so the 
greater their number. 
We thus have the formula for social organization of 
force, viz., preponderance of  the force which is service- 
able to the interests of  all over the amount at the dis- 
position of  the individual for his own interest ; the power 
being brought over to the side of  the interest common 
to all. 
The form in private law of  a combination of  several 
persons for the pursuit of  the same common interest is 
partnershie,  and although in other respects the State is 
very different from partnership, the formula in reference 
to regulating force by interest is quite the same in both. 
Partnership contains the prototype of  the State, which is 
indicated therein in all its parts.  Conceptually as well 
as historically, partnership forms the transition from the 
unregulated  form  of  force  in  the  individual  to  its 
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by the State.  Not merely in the sense that it 
contains a combination of several for the same purpose, 
and thereby makes possible the pursuit of  aims which 
were denied to the power of  the individual -  an aspect 
of partnership which, in its high social significance, we 
have already appreciated above (p.157)-but  in an incom- 
parably greater measure in the sense that it solves the 
problem of creating the preponderance of  power on the 
side of right.  IC  does this by putting in   lace of the 
opposition  of  two  particular  interests  fighting  one 
another without  an assured  prospect of  the victory of 
right, that between a common interest and a partic~lar,~Q 
whereby  the solution comes  of  itself.  In partnership 
all partners present a united front against the one who 
pursues his own inlerests at the expense of  these com- 
mon interests assigned by the contract, or who refuses 
to carry out the duties undertaken  by him in the con- 
tract; they all unite their power  against the one.  So 
the preponderance of  power is here thrown on the side of 
right, and partnership may therefore be designated as the 
mechanism of the self-regulation of force  according to the 
measure of  right. 
Against this deduction I must expect to have it ob- 
jected  that the force of  an individual partner may after 
all be stronger than that of  all the others put together; 
and also that a majority may combine in order to pursue 
their particular interests at  the expense of  the interests 
of the partnership.  Let my answer be that I put at  the 
basis of my deduction the normal function of  society as 
it is posited by its purpose and intention in intercourse. 
In this its normal form it actually accomplishes what I 
credit it with:  it  creates this preponderance of  power on 
the side of the common interest.  It  is true that we have 
PO  Quad  privatim  interest  unius  ex  sociis . . . ,"  and  "quod 
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to recognize those two possibilities  as dangers to which 
partnership is exposed  when  the normal conditions are 
not  present.  Against  the  first  mentioned  danger  it 
offers  help in itself, by the indefinite increase in the num- 
ber  of  its members.  In a society of  ten members the 
individual has nine against him, in a society of a hundred 
he has nine and ninety, in the society of  the State  he has 
millions against him in the form of  the State force. 
The  solution  of  the  problem  to which  our  entire 
investigation  has till  now  been  devoted depends then 
upon the fact,  -and  I now may be allowed to  exchange 
the term partnership for society, -  that  society is stronger 
than  the  individual;  and  that  therefore  where  it is 
obliged to summon its power in order to assert its right 
against  the  individual,  the  preponderance  is  always 
found on its side, i. e.,  on the side of  right. 
I do  not have to  explain why I replaced the term part- 
nership by society.  The  ambiguity of  this word helps to 
carry over the meaning of  my deduction from society in 
the private sense, which is partnership, to society in the 
political sense, eriz., the State.  The admissibility of  such 
transference of  a proposition found in one connection to 
another  presupposes that the agreement of  the two in 
name has a corresponding identity also in content; and 
that it is not accident  therefore, but the right  recog- 
nition of  their inner equivalency, that induced language 
to cover  both with  the same name.  A  comparison  of 
private society with political will show the relative simi- 
larity of  the two.  The fundamental features of  both are 
exactly alike, as follows: 
1.  Community of  purpose. 
2. The presence  of  norms,  which  regulate  its pur- 
suit;  in the one,  in  the form  of  a contract, the  "lex 
privata,"  in  the other in the form of  a  law, the "lex 
publica." 
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3.  In their content:  their legal status, the rights and 
duties of the whole as well as  of  the individuals. 
4.  Realization  of  these norms  against  the  resistant 
will of the individual by means of  coercion. 
5.  Administration:  the free pursuit of  the purpose 
with the means  at the disposal of  society within  the 
limits set by the above norms, and all that is connected 
therewith, namely,  the creation  of  a  special  organ for 
purposes when the number of  members is 
large  (board of  management,  government).  Belonging 
to this is the distinction  between  those  by  whom  and 
those for whom  the administration is carried on (func- 
tionaries,  officials -  shareholders,  citizens,  subjects). 
Also the danger thence arising of  applying the common 
means in opposition to the interests of  the society and in 
favor of  its administrators;  a danger to be feared no less 
in  political  society than in private (p. 167).  Furthcr- 
more, and as a means of  protection against this danger, 
the control of  the administrators by the society itself 
(general assembly; assembly of  the estates  of  the  realm). 
The  conceptual  transition  from  private  society  to 
political  is brought about by an intervening link, viz., 
public  association. 
5 7.  Public Association.  Public ("offentlich")  is that 
which is open ("offen").  A public garden, river, square, 
theatre, hall, a public school, lecture, gathering, is open 
for every one;  every one has free admittance, whether 
with or without pay makes no difference as regards the 
concept.  The  Romans derive the designation of  the con- 
cept from  the  word "populus" ; "populicum," "publicum" 
is that which is intended for all, for the people, i. e., is 
Open  to  The  opposite of  "open"  is  "closed," 
80 D. 43. 7. 1, " . . . ad  usum omnium  ~ertinet";  26.  10.  1 8 6, 
"quasi  Publicam esse . . . hoc est omnibus patere'";  Inst. 3. 19  6 2, 
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"locked" ; the opposite  of  "  publicurn"  is "  privatum," 
di proprium"  ("quod  pro  privo est," i. e., that which  is 
intended  for a particular  individual), that which every 
one has for himself alone, and from which he accordingly 
excludes  everybody  else.  The  whole  contrast  turns 
about community and exclusiveness of  relation, and it 
forms the cardinal point of  public and private law, with- 
out, however, being exhausted in the contrast of  these 
two.  The difference  between  a  private  house  and  a 
public hall has nothing to do with law; both are equally 
private  property,  but  their  economic use  is different. 
The one serves for the owner exclusively, the other for 
the whole public. 
The contrast in reference to  society is found also in the 
form of  partnership and a~sociation.~~  The juristic dis- 
tinction between the two in reference to their structure 
is unimportant for our purposes;  we are interested only 
in the distinction which is conditioned by the difference 
in their purposes, namely, that of  being closed and being 
open. 
Partnership, like all other relations of  private law, has 
the characteristic of being exclusively intended for those 
subjects who called the legal relation into being (prin- 
8'  The "universitas"  of  the Romans.  Both expressions, the Ger- 
man as  well as  the Latin, have the same fundamental notion of  the 
unity of  what are distinct ("in unum vertere" -to  unite).  "Verein- 
baren"  (to  agree)  is  used  only  in the  objective  sense,  "Verein- 
barung"  (agreement) -  contract.  "Vereinigen"  (to unite), on the 
other hand, is used both in the objective and subjective sense ("uber 
etwas sich vereinigen" -  "sich  vereinbaren,"  to come to an under- 
standing in reference to  something, to  agree;  "zu  etwas sich verein- 
igen" -  "sich  verbinden,"  to  unite for  some purpose).  "Verein" 
(association)  is used  only in the subjective sense.  To replace the 
expression "Verein," which is already firmly fixed in the language, by 
the term "Genossenschafl"  (lit. comradeship) is to my mind  not at 
all called for. 
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ciple of  exclusiveness).  Every one of the several partners, 
like each joint-owner, has his definite portion, which may 
be  represented  in  the form  of  a  fraction.  Each  is  a 
part-ozemer;  and in so far as he is that, he is entitled to 
his  part and protected  therein  quite as exclusive'y as 
is the sole owner in the whole of  the property which he 
by himself owns.  Every part forms, so to  speak, a juris- 
tic cell complete in itself.  A consequence of  this is that 
a partner does not by withdrawal or death lose the por- 
tion which falls to his share from the management of  the 
business up to that time. 
The relation is quite different in the case of  associa- 
tions.  The legal status of  the associate members cannot 
be  expressed in the form of  a definite share.  They are 
not called "part-owners," but "members"  ("itfit-glieder") ; 
and for this very reason they have no claim, in case of 
withdrawal or death, to be paid  the quota of the joint 
property  which would fall to their share in accordance 
with the number of  members at the time. 
The difference in the manner in which the individual 
members are benefited  by  a  partnership  and  by  an 
association coincides with the difference between "frui" 
and "uti."  "Frui" is divisible, "uti"  is indivisible;  or to 
express ourselves more clearly, in "frui"  the competition 
of  a  number  of  persons  is represented  in  the form of 
definite parts (quotas), every new share makes the parts 
smaller, every  part  that falls out makes  them  larger. 
"Uti,"  on  the other hand, every one of  those entitled 
enjoys in its entirety.  If the thing can be  done as, for 
example, with public roads, then hundreds and thousands 
may participate without the abridgment of  the "uti"  of 
any single one.  The former is the relation  in partner- 
ships, the latter in associations.  When the fruit or the 
income of  a thing is divided among eleven competitors 
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suffers  from it;  his  own  part  becoming  so much  the 
smaller.  On  the other hand, the advantages which  an 
association  offers to its members suffer  no diminution 
by the admission of  new members; but, on the contrary, 
these are rather increased as a rule.  A large association 
is enabled to offer more to its members than a small one. 
For this reason an association is not merely willing and 
ready to receive new members, but it welcomes them and 
must do  so.  And this is the case whether its purpose be 
confined to the interests of  the individual members (self- 
interested associations), or whether the object of  the asso- 
ciation  is the promotion of  general  interests  (unselJish 
associations,  associations for  the  common  welfare).  For 
every addition of  new members raises the powers of  the 
association, both of  its individual  members as well  as 
of  the society as a whole, and hence also the means for 
the  prosecution  of  the  purpose;  and  every  addition 
strengthens the moral  element  of  the association,  the 
inner  marrow of  it, so to speak, i.e., the belief  of  the 
members  in  its  utility  and  necessity.  In  short,  it 
strengthens the raison d'2tre and future of  the association; 
promoting an tsprit de corps, by flattering the me~nbers' 
vanity, and thus lending new stimulus to their interest 
and zeal.  Therefore the admission of  new  members is 
provided for in the statutes of  all associations;  an asso- 
ciation  that would  exclude  new membership would  be 
doomed from the start, by denying itself what is essen- 
tial  to an association:  its public  and  open character. 
Associations animated by the right spirit rather zealously 
endeavor to gain new members;  every association seeks 
to expand, to grow as far as possible in power, prestige 
and influence.  Exclusion  is  the essence of  partnership, 
expansion  is the essence  of  association.  This impulse 
of  expansion  is common  to all  associations,  the most 
important  as well  as the least  important:32 State and 
church, political,  ecclesiastical, scientific, social -  the 
State conquers, the Church makes propaganda, associa- 
tions solicit members.  The name is different, the thing 
is the same. 
But there are certain  associations,  and they existed 
in  great  numbers  particularly  in former  times,  which 
were, according to their original plan, intended as asso- 
~iations,  and grew up  as  such, yet later took the form of  a 
hybrid of  association and partnership.  These are such 
associations as, to express it briefly  in juristic  terms, 
grant  their  members  "frui"  in  addition to "uti";  as, 
for  example,  in a  municipality,  definite  shares in  the 
common  lands,  forests, etc.  As  long  as in the  latter 
case  the communities possessing  these  advantages are 
so large that the present members are not injured by the 
admission of  new ones, they have no reason for opposing 
such admission.  But when  this is no  longer the case, 
a change necessarily takes place;  and the remedy which 
egoism hits upon is that the old members keep the "frui" 
exclusively for themselves, and allow the newcomers only 
a share in the enjoyment of the "uti."  In othcr words, 
two groups of  members are formed within the same asso- 
ciation, each with different rights;  there are members 
82 In those very associations which llve without any serious pur- 
poses on trifles only, on names,  flags,  colors,  committees,  parade, 
conventions,  vanity,  jealousy,  this impulse  often  puts  forth the 
most  edifying blossoms.  There is a peculiar  bit of  folly  in man- 
kind,  a particular  "mania  sine delirio"  which  is quite con~patible 
with intellectual health in other respects, eviz.,  the folly of  making 
associations.  It takes the place of children's toys in grown-up chil- 
dren.  In England, where the impulse of  association has developed 
in the richest and healthiest manner, it seems also to have put forth 
these delightful  excrescences  in  luxurious  plenty  (I am referring 
here to the  piquant  persiflage  of  Boz  Dickens  in  his  "Pickwick 
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having  full  rights  and  members  having  only  partial 
rights.  This form of  the relation is so offensive and pro- 
voking to those having the narrower rights that it was 
always the cause of  the most violent conflicts;  from the 
days  of  the  Roman  Patricians, who  in  this  manner 
excluded the Plebeians from the "ager publicus," to our 
own century.  The  relation suffers from an inner contra- 
diction;  it is a  hybrid  formation of  partnership  and 
association which,  as  the opposition  is  irreconcilable, 
unceasingly  fight against ezch  other, until  association 
finally obtains the upper hand. 
With association our development of  the concept has 
reached the level of  the State.  As far as its form is con- 
cerned the latter stands on a line with all other associa- 
tions, though, with  the exception of  the church, it far 
surpasses them,-  by itssocial function, and by the wealth 
of  the content with which in the course of  its develop- 
ment it  equips itself in rising progression.  In adding the 
element  of  publicity (i.  e., of  being open to the outside 
world) to the other elements which partnership already 
has in common with  the State (p. 222), association re- 
moves the only difference which still remained between 
the two.  With this last step the organ of  association 
receives that utility  and completeness which  makes it 
fit for the pursuit of  all purposes of  society; for the recep- 
tion of  every content, the richest as well as the poorest. 
Association is the form of  organization of  society in gen- 
eral.  There is no purpose society has to  realize for which 
this form cannot be used and has not historically been 
used; and there is no purpose which hasnot, after having 
been first realized by the individual, finally gained con- 
trol of  this form or will not gain control of  it.  This form 
is as inevitably required for social purposes as the exclu- 
sive form of private right is required for the purposes of 
the  individual.  If  a  certain  relation  is  intended  for 
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individual use, its legal expression is found in closing and 
shutting it against the outside world, in the ~rinci~le  of 
exclusiveness; if  it is intended  for  society,  it finds  its 
expression in resting open to the outside world, and in 
admitting every one who is fit to  co-operate in the reali- 
zation of  society's objects. 
Association belongs to public law, or, more correctly, 
it  is  altogether coincident  with  it, just  as private  law 
coincides  with  the individual.  It is arbirrary in  my 
opinion to limit the concept of  public law to the State 
and  the Church.  It is true that these two embrace a 
vital  content  of  such  wealth  and importance  that in 
comparison  with  them  every  other  association  is as a 
mouse compared with  a lion.  But mouse and lion are 
bott mammals, and you may turn and twist as you like, 
you cannot get away from the fact that State and Church 
are associations for the common welfare.  The difference 
between  the  particular  species  is  not  structural,  but 
merely functional;  it is based not upon  a difference in 
their juristic  mechanism but upon a difference in their 
purpose;  it is a difference not of  form  but of  content. 
We  grant that the State-  I include in the sequel the 
municipality  also in  this  term -in  the course  of  its 
development gradually  appropriated  almost  the entire 
content  of  the  lice  of  society.  Still, always  the fact 
remains that not only was the State's original content 
in  the  beginning  of  history  relatively  modest,  and 
limited essentially to the maintenance of  security within 
and  without, but also  that the living needs of  society 
constantly produced  new  objects, in addition  to those 
whicll the State had already absorbed.  These new pur- 
Poses, being foreign to the State, led a separate and inde- 
pendent existence in the form of  associations until they 
had  attained  the necessary  degree  of  maturity;  and 
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hitherto and emptied their entire content into that form 
which it would seem was intended to take up everything 
within  itself,  viz., the  State.  What  was  instruction 
formerly?  A  private  afair.  What was  it next?  The 
business of  association.  What is it now?  The business 
of  the State.  What was the care of  the poor formerly? 
A  private  matter.  What  was  it  next?  The  business 
of  association.  What is  it now?  The business  of  the 
State.  Individual,  association,  State -  such  is the his- 
torical  step-ladder  of  social  purposes.  An  object  is 
first taken up by the individual;  as it grows larger it is 
taken over by associated  interests;  when  it grows  to 
its f,ull  size it falls to the lot of the State.  If inference 
from the past to the future be justified,  the State will 
in the  final future take up within itself all social purposes. 
The association is the pioneer which levels the roads for 
the State, -what  is now association is after thousands 
of  years the State.  All  associations for  the common 
welfare bear within them an  order on the State; it is only 
a question of  time when the latter will honor it. 
5  8.  The State.  Separation  from  Society.  After  a 
long and roundabout way we have finally found what 
we are looking for, viz., the final  form of  utilizing  force 
for human purposes;  the social organization of  coercive 
force:  the State.  We might  have arrived  at it  more 
easily.  It depended  only  upon  ourselves  to take up 
at once the idea of  social  coercion  in the ready-made 
form  of  the  State.  Why  the  roundabout  way?  In 
order to show how  and why, so long as right had not 
extended to the State, we could not solve the problem 
of  right.  In the State, right for the first time finds what 
it was looking for:  mastery over force.  But it attains 
its goal only within the State;  for on the outside, in the 
conflict  of  States  among  themselves,  might  stands 
opposed  to right  in the same hostile  manner as, before 
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the  historical  appearance of  the State, the two  were 
opposed  to each othp in the relation  of  individual to 
individual; where the question of  right takes practically 
the form  of a question of might. 
Starting from the question how society comes to solve 
the problem which is placed before it (p. 70),  I  gave the 
answer in Chapter VI I, as first, by means of  reward, and 
secondly by means of  coercion.  But the social  organi- 
zation of coercion  is synonymous with  State and Law. 
The State is society as the bearer of  the regulated and 
disciplined  coercive force.  The sum total of  principles 
according to which  it thus functions by a discipline of 
coercion, is Law.  By defining the State in this manner 
I do not mean that this formula exhausts all its  activities, 
and that it is not also something else besides.  I  have 
just  proven  the contrary by showing how the State in 
the course of  its development continually enriches itself 
with objects previously  foreign  to it.  But no matter 
how manifold and numerous the purposes may be which 
it has already taken up into itself -  and will yet take 
up, -  there is one purpose which surpasses all  the rest 
and which was directed to it from the very beginning, 
nay, called the State into being, and which never can be 
wanting.  This is the purpose of  law, the formation and 
securing of  law.  All other problems of  the State recede 
into  the  second  place  in  comparison  with  this  one; 
neither  do they emerge historically until this first and 
most  essential  one  is settled;  and  they have its  per- 
manent solution as  a necessary condition -  the cultivation 
of law is the essential function of  the life of  the State. 
This leads us back to that relation between State and 
society already touched upon before (p. 67).  I  believe 
I cannot express it better than by saying that the State 
is coercive society.  In  order to  be able to coerce, society 
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which the regulated and assured exercise of social coer- 
cive force takes.  In short, it is the organization of social 
coercion.  According  to this, one might say, State and 
society would  have to coincide;  and just  as the latter 
extends over  the entire  earth  (p.  68), the State  too 
would  have to embrace the whole earth.  But yet the 
State  remains behind societ,y; for the latter is universal, 
the former particularistic.  The State only solves those 
problems which arise for it within limited geographical 
bounds  (political  district, territory);  the sphere of  its 
sovereignty ends everywhere with the boundary-posts. 
The problem of  the organization of  social coercion is 
therefore the point where State and society part; where 
the former finds itself obliged to  remain behind the latter, 
which knows no boundary on earth.  But, as if  it knew 
that its limitations were imperfectly drawn, the State 
is always extending  and widening  its boundaries.  In 
the course of  historical development  the greater com- 
munity always swallows up the smaller, and when the 
smaller are swallowed up and only the larger remain, a 
struggle for life and  death is again provoked between them 
until they, too, are  welded into  greater political complexes. 
In this way States are ever increasing in size.  From 
the  duodecimo  of  the  small  communities  of  classical 
antiquity the State swells to octavo;  from  octavo to 
quarto;  from quarto to folio -  every increase denotes 
the extinction  of  as many  hitherto independent com- 
munities.  We  may  censure  history  because  she will 
not tolerate the small peoples in the lives of  nations; 
because the small ones, if  they do not understand how 
to  become big themselves, must make room for the great. 
We may commiserate the generations which were chosen 
to experience  such  catastrophes-history  knows  why 
she has  inflicted such  hardship  upon them;  and  she 
provides  for  it  that  the  grief  and  misfortune  of  cne 
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generation is  compensated for in a later one; and not sel- 
dom does the grandson bless what the grandfather cursed. 
~h~  impulse  of  expansion  of  States  by  conquest  is 
society's  protest  against  the  geographical  limitations 
which are imposed upon her by the organization of social 
coercion.  Till now  there has never  been a period  on 
earth when this impulse of extension did not stir in every 
vigorous nation.  Will the distant future bring a change? 
who  can say?  If the small span of  time which humanity 
has  lived  till  now -  I  call it small  even if  it should 
amount to a hundred thousand years or more-if,  then, 
this small span of time permits any inference to be made 
concerning  that infinite time which  is still before  us, 
then the future of man seems to consist in an ever pro- 
gressing approximation  of  State and society.  Though 
the idea of a universal State, embracing the whole world 
in the form of a central force, uniting and controlling all 
the  single  States  in  the  manner of  municipalities - 
though this may belong to  the Utopias of  the philosopher, 
for whom it is easier to follow up ideas to their ultimate 
consequences than it is for humanity to realize them,- 
still  the  approximation  of  State  and  society  seems 
assured. 
The organization of  social coercive force embraces two 
sides;  the establishment of  the external mechanism  of 
force, and the setting up  of  principles to  regulate its use. 
The form of  solution of  the first problem  is the State 
he,  that of  the second  is the Law.  Both  concepts 
stand in the relation  of  mutual dependence: the State 
force has need of  the law, the law has need of  the State 
force. 
9.  State Force.  The absolute requisite of the State 
demanded by the purpose of  the State itself, is the 
Possession of the highest force, superior to every other 
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power, of  the individual or of  the many, must be "under" 
it; and it must be "over"  the other.  Accordingly Ian- 
guage denotes the former side of  the relation  as sub- 
mission  ("Untertanigkeit,"  "unter-getan,"  "untertan," 
"sub-ditus"),  the latter as sovereignty ("supra,"  "supra- 
nus," "sovrano"),  the State force itself which possesses 
it, as authorities ("Obrigkeit") ; and the act by which  it 
extends this power over a domain not subject hitherto, 
as subjection ("Untenverfung"), conquest ("Er-ober-ung"). 
All  other requirements of  the State recede  before  this 
one.  Before  this is achieved  all others are premature, 
for in order to fulfil them the State must exist first, and 
it does not exist until it  has solved the question of  power 
in  the  above  sense.  Powerlessness,  impotence of the 
State force, is the capital sin of  the State, from which 
there is no absolution;  a sin which  society neither for- 
gives nor tolerates, it  is  an  inner contradiction : State  force 
without force!  Nations have borne the meanest abuse of 
State force, the scourge of Attila and the Czesar madness 
of  the Roman emperors; nay, they have not seldom cele- 
brated as heroes despots  before whom they crawled in 
the dust, feasting with intoxication on the sight of  the 
elemental  magnificence  of  accumulated  human power, 
a wild irresistible might which, like a hurricane, throws 
down  everything before  it, while they  forgot and for- 
gave  that they  were themselves the victims  (p.  191). 
Even in  a  state of  de!irium,  despotism still  remains  a 
political  form,  a  mechanism  of  social  force.  But 
anarchy, i. e., impotence of  the State force is no longer a 
political  form, it is an absolutely  antisocial  condition; 
the decomposition,  the dissolution of  society.  Every 
one who puts an end to it, in whatever way it may be, 
with  fire and sword, the native usurper  or the foreign 
conqueror, does a service to society; he is its savior and 
benefactor;  for an intolerable form of  political system 
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is  better than no system at all.  Nor is it 
easy for nations to  get back from a condition of  political 
barbarism  to one of  political  order.  It needs an iron 
hand  to accustom them again to discipline and obedi- 
ence;  the transition passes  through despotism;  which 
puts the arbitrariness of State force over against anarchic 
violence.  When the Roman people in the period of.the 
civil wars had forg?tten discipline and order, the Roman 
Caesars appeared, to establish  anew  the force  of  the 
State and replace it in its rights, and terrorism mounted 
the throne along with them.  The  horrors and inhumani- 
ties  in which  they indulged were only the orgies of  the 
State force celebrating its  home-coming ; the bloody proof 
that it had come into power again and had no force on 
earth to fear  any more.  This proof  given,  then only 
could moderation make its appearance. 
Revolution  bears  quite  a  different  character  from 
anarchy.  Although  outwardly similar to it in that it 
also contains a disturbance of  the political order, it is 
fundamentally  different  from  it, because  it does  not 
negate order in general, but only the existing order.  It 
desires order, but a different one from the one existing 
hitherto.  If  it succeeds we call it revolution;  if  it does 
not  succeed, we  call  it rebellion, insurrection.  In the 
success of the first lies the sentence of  condemnation of 
the political powers;  in the failure of  the second lies its 
own doom. 
The preceding investigation postulates the predomin- 
ance of the power of  the State over every other power 
within  its jurisdiction,  but  it has not  shown  how  it 
happens  that there  is such  predominance -  we  must 
"ow  get clear on this matter.  One might suppose that 
the thing can be settled simply by means of  our principle 
mentioned above (p. 220) ; that the power of  all surpasses 
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the  security  of  the  common  interest  in  partnership 
against the particular interest, because the power of  all 
entered the lists for the former, but only the power  of 
the individual for the latter.  The same opposition  of 
interests and of  the powers  in  their service is repeated 
in the State; on the one side the purpose of  the State, 
the interests of all, and for its defence the force of  the 
State -  the power of  all; on the other side the particular 
interest and the merely private power. 
But the logic of  this opposition of  the power of  all and 
that of the individual is valid only when it is an  individual 
or a minority  that is opposed to the power of  all, but 
not when it is the majority that is so.  For in this case, 
if  the question of  power in the State were  decided  by 
mere numbers, the predominance of  power would neces- 
sarily go over to the side of  the majority, and then the 
force of  the State would always be powerless against the 
majority.  But the experience  of  all  times  has  shown 
that  the force of  the State  may have the ectire population 
against it, and yet be in a position to maintain  its own 
power.  Numbers alone, therefore, do  not decide the mat- 
ter, else the force in the State wouid always be with the 
niajority of  the given moment, and the political  power 
would be in a constant state  of  fluctuation and vacillation. 
Happily,  however,  the matter  is different.  The firm- 
ness of  the State  depends upon the fact that the influence 
of  the numerical  element on the question  of  power  is 
counteracted  by  two other  factors:  the  organization 
of  power in the hands of  the State force, and the moral 
power which the idea of  the State exerts. 
The force  of  the State, as regards  its substance,  is 
nothing  but a  quantum of  popular  power -  physical, 
spiritual, economic, collected  for certain social purposes. 
And this power, too, as need scarcely be stated, is always 
much  smaller  than that which  remains  on the side of 
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the people.  Quantitatively, therefore, the natural bearer 
of the peer, the people, is always superior to  the official 
bearer  thereof, the State.  But this propcrtion  of  the 
two is essentially altered by the fact that the power of 
the people is raw substance, whereas that of  the State 
is  organized.  The predominance  of  organized  power 
over unorganized is the predominance of  the man who 
has  only  one  sword, but  well  sharpened  and  always 
ready,  over the one who has several dull ones, and has 
to look for them when he needs them, and does not know 
how  to use them. 
The practical  moral  for  the State is  therefore  self- 
evident;  it consists positively  in  the highest  possible 
perfection  of  the organization  of  its own  forces,  and 
negatively  in the prevention  of  any organization  that 
threatens  it on  the part of  the forces of  the people. 
If every art  has its  technique, then the State  organization 
of  forces may be designated as the proper technique of 
the political  art;  and if  we  call that person a virtuoso 
who has developed technique to perfection, we may also 
speak in  reference  to the  above species of  technique 
of a virtuosoship of States.  Techniqueis not the  highest, 
for the idea stands above it, which it is meant to serve, 
but it is the condition of  the highest.  How important 
it is can be shown by the example of  the history of  Rome, 
and by a comparison of  the former German empire with 
that State of  modern  times  which  has understood  as 
no other has how best to make up for the insignificance 
of its forces by an exemplary organization:  I speak of 
Prussia. 
This is the positive side of  the problem.  The negative 
side of it consists in preventing  the organization, dan- 
gerous to the State, of  hostile e!ements;  or, since organi- 
zation  proceeds  in  the  form  of  associations,  in  the 
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administrative vigilance, for all associations.  The forces 
of  associations are qualitatively not different from those 
of  the State, and in respect to quantity there is no ele- 
ment in the associations themselves which puts a definite 
limit upon the accumulation of  forces.  The association 
may have more wealth than the State, and if  it extends 
beyond  the limits of  the  State territory  it may have 
more members than the State.  If we consider in addition 
the fact that the association  employs for  its purposes 
the  same  mechanism  as the  State, we  see  the great 
danger which the former contains for the latter.  Being 
its most  efficient  aid in  the pursuit  of  social  purposes 
when  it stands on the State's side (p. 229), it is trans- 
formed  into its most dangerous  enemy when  it takes 
an opposite direction. 
The State is the only competent as well  as the sole 
owner  of  social  coercive  force -  the  right  to coerce 
forms the absolute monopoly of  the State.  Every asso- 
ciation that wishes to  realize its claims upon its members 
by means-of  mechanical~coercion  is dependent upon the 
co-operation  of  the State, and the State has it in its 
power to  fix the conditions under which it  will grant such 
aid.  But this means in other words that the State is 
the only source of  law, for norms which cannot be enforced 
by him who lays them down are not legal rzdes.  There 
is therefore no association law independent of  the author- 
ity of  the State, but only such as is derived therefrom. 
The State has therefore,  as is involved  in the concept 
of  the supreme power, the primacy over all associatiolls 
within  its domain;  and this applies to  the Church also. 
If  the State grants associations  the right  of  coercion 
within  their spheres, it holds good  only  as long as the 
State thinks  this  advisable -a  "precarium"  of  the 
State law which, all assurances to the contrary notwith- 
standing, can always be taken back by it; for contracts 
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of  this  sort, contradicting as they do what is essential 
to the existence  of  the State, are null and void.33  The 
opinion that the will of  the individual is sufficient  to 
transfer to  another, whether it be individual or associa- 
tion, the power of  coercion over himself, needs no serious 
refutation.  If  it were well founded, the creditor could 
reserve to himself  by stipulation the right of  Shylock, 
and an association, the entire property of  members in 
case of withdrawal;  the State would  only have to play 
the bailiff, who would carry out these agreements.  The 
autonomy of individuals as well as  of  associations finds 
its limit in the criticism of  the State, which  is guided 
by regard  for  the welfare of society;  to it belong  the 
forces of  coercion,  and the judgment  of  the purposes 
for which it will use them. 
As  a  second  element  upon  which  the predominance 
of  the State over the elementary power  of  the people 
depends, was  named  above  (p.  236), the moral  power 
of  the idea of the State.  I understand by this all those 
psychological  motives which  fall into the scale in  the 
cause of  the State when we think of  the State and the 
people as in mutual conflict, viz., insight into the neces- 
sity of  political order;  the sense of right and law; anxi- 
ety for  the danger  threatening  persons  and  property 
incurred  in  every  disturbance  of  order,  and  fear  of 
punishment. 
We have now concluded our view of  the external aspect 
in the organization of  the social  force of  coercion, and 
turn to the internal,  viz., the Law. 
8 10-  The  Law -  Its Dependence upon Coercion.  The 
currellt definition of  law  is as follows:  law is the sum 
'3  The same thing applies here as the Roman jurist says in D. 43. 
26. 12, of the non-obligatory  character  of  such contracts against 
Ownership,  "nulla  vis  est  huius  conventionis,  ut  rem  alienam 
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of the compulsory  rules  in force in a State, and in my 
opinion it has therewith hit  the truth.  The two ele- 
ments  which  it contains  are that of  rule, and that of 
the realization of it through coercion.  Only those rules 
laid down by society deserve the name of  law which have 
coercion, or, since,  as we  have  seen,  the State alone 
possesses the monopoly of  coercion, which have political 
coercion behind them.  Hereby it is implicitly said that 
only  the rules  which  are provided  by  the State with 
this function are legal rules;  or that the State is the only 
source of  law. 
The right of  making their own laws (autonomy) for 
their own affairs, which many other associations besides 
the State  have  actually exercised, is not opposed  to 
this  view, for it has its juristic  reason  in the express 
grant or the tacit toleration on the part of  the State; 
it does not subsist by its own power, but by derivation 
from  the State.  This  applies also  to  the  Christian 
Church.  That its own  conception  may be  a different 
one, and the mediaeval  State may have recognized  it; 
that the  "jus  canonicum"  may  have  been considered 
during a thousand years as  an independent source of  law, 
can no more be decisive for modem  science (once the 
latter is convinced that this conception is incompatible 
with the essence of  the State and of  Law) than the Church 
doctrine of  the motion of  the sun around the earth for 
modern astronomy. 
In so far, however, as the Church, without  the help 
of  the external power of  the State, is able to realize the 
commandments  which  it imposes  upon  its  members 
by the moral lever of  the religious feeling, we can say 
that these rules, although  they are devoid  of  external 
coercion  and hence  are not  legal  norms,  nevertheless 
practically  exercise  the function  of  legal  rules.  But 
if  we should want to call these rules law for this reason, 
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we  could  do  the same with  every  other  association, 
even one that is forbidden by the State; and we should 
then have to speak of  law in a robber band.  The jurist 
who does not want  to !ose  all  firm ground  under  his 
feet must  not  speak  of  law  in  such a  case;  for  him 
there is no other criterion of  law than the recognition and 
of  the same by the force of  the State.  The 
true pedagogue  may be able, by means of  moral influ- 
ence, by means of  praise and blame, to replace the rod, 
but this psychological restraint does not for that reason 
turn into a rod.  If  general recognition and actual obedi- 
ence of certain rules of  human conduct were sufficient 
to lend them the stamp of  law, -  a point of  view from 
which  an attempt was  recently  made to come to the 
assistance  of  the law  of  the Church, -  then morality 
and ethics would also have a claim to this name.  These 
are not without general recognition and obedience either, 
and  all  distinctions between  law,  morality  and ethics 
would  thus be removed.  Coercion put in execution by 
the  State forms  the absolute criterion of  law;  a  legal 
rule without legal  coercion is a contradiction in terms, 
a fire which does not burn, a light that does not shine.34 
Whether  this  coercion  is  put  into  execution  by  the 
court  (civil and criminal court) or by the administrative 
"  And yet one of our most famous jurists has not recoiled from this 
monstrous  idea  of  a  legal  rule  without  legal  coercion.  Puchtu, 
"Pandekten,"  8 11, note  g, thinks that  when  legislation  removes 
custom as a source of  law, the consequence merely is that "it  is de- 
prived  of its effect  upon  the  judge."  Customary  law,  therefore, 
according to him, continues to subsist as law;  only the judge does 
not apply it!  You  might as well  say, when  fire is extinguished by 
water,  it still remains  fire, only  it does not  burn.  Burning  is no 
more essential for fire than is for law the judge's enforcement of  its 
~bservance.  What  misled  Puchtu  was the possibility above men- 
tioned of a voluntary obedience to norms within a definite sphere. 
If this were sufficient to lend the norm the character of  a legal rule, 
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authorities  is  indifferent.  All  rules  which  are  realized 
in this way are  law, all others, even though  they are 
actually followed in life ever so inviolably, are not law; 
they become  law  only when  there  is  added  to them 
the external element of  ~olitical  coercion. 
But there is an  objection against the conception devel- 
oped hcre which has often been raised, and which seems 
to prove it  entirely untenable.  The criterion of  the 
organization of  coercion for the realization  of law fails 
entirely  in International Law, and in another division, 
namely in Public Law, it fails at least in so far as  con- 
cerns the duties of  the monarch within an absolute or 
constitutional monarchy.  The observance of  the limits 
which  the constitution places  upon  the sovereign, and 
the fulfilment  of  the duties which  it imposes upon him 
are not secured by coercion. 
What attitude must  the  theory  of  law  take  up in 
relation to these facts?  It may  pursue three different 
courses.  The first  consists  in  completely  denying  to 
international  law  and  the  above-mentioned  regula- 
tions of  public law the character of  legal  rules, for the 
very reason that they cannot be enforced, and allowing 
them  only  that of  moral  precepts  and  duties.  This 
course  was  actually  taken  by  some,  but  the view  is 
altogether mistaken according to my opinion.  It is not 
only  in  contradiction  with  linguistic  usage,  which 
denominates  those  rules  uniformly  among  all  peoples 
as laws, but it misunderstands also their nature, which 
language clearly appreciates.  All  those rules make the 
same claim upon unquestioning  observance as all other 
legal rules, and their disregard is felt, like the disregard 
of  the latter, as a violation of  law, and not merely as  im- 
moral  conduct.  That this conception  is  true can  be 
seen in the manner of the popular  reaction  against  a 
violation  of  their rights.  War and uprising, which  are 
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the means used, are the forms of  self-help in public law 
\vhich, in default of  legal protection,  the people in de- 
fence of their rights take into their own hands, as the 
individual did  for  a  similar reason in former  times in 
defence of his  private  rights.  For  the legal  character 
of  international  law speaks also the circumstance that 
of  nations are not infrequently placed under 
the  guarantee  of  third  disinterested  powers,  a  thing 
which would  have no sense at all in moral obligations. 
There is, besides, the circumstance that the decision of 
national disputes is not infrequently given  over  to the 
judicial  arbitration of a third power;  and a jz~dge,  even 
an  arbitrator,  presupposes  a  legal  matter  and  a  law 
according to which the question is to be decided.  The 
legal  character  of international  law, as well  as of  the 
constitutional  regulations  concerning  the  monarch, 
cannot be an  object of  doubt. 
Whereas this view, in order  to save the element of 
coercion in the concept of  law, completely denies those 
rules the character of  legal propositions, a second view, 
in  order  to retain  this  character,  lets the element  of 
enforceability  fall  in  the concept of  law.  The former 
sacrifices the element of  law, the latter that of  coercion. 
Where this view leads has been shown above.  The  charac- 
teristic mark of  distinction between the rules of  law and 
those of  ethics and morality  is  in this way  destroyed; 
under the broad point of view of  generally recognized and 
actually followed  rules, which  is common  to them  all, 
all the three fuse into a homogeneous mass, into a soft 
pulp. 
The third course, which I regard as  the only correct one, 
consists  in  holding  firmly  to coercion  as an essential 
requirement of law, but with this must be combiqed the 
knowledge that the organization of  it in those two cases 
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The organization of  coercion  cannot  keep  equal  pace 
here with  the legal rule;  the latter has the same form 
conceptually, and makes the same claim upon unques- 
tioning  obedience  practically  as everywhere else;  bat 
coercion remains behind the rule.  If it desires to become 
active in order  to realize the rule  practically,  it finds 
itself  limited  to the imperfect form which it bore origi- 
nally, but which everywhere else has made room for the 
perfect  form; it can only  use  unregulated  unorganized 
force.  But just  in this, in the self-help  of  nations for 
the purpose of  maintaining their rights, is found the con- 
nection of  the two elements of  law, the inner one of  rule 
and the outer one of  coercion.  And  he who  does not 
hesitate to date back with  me the existence of  law even 
to the epoch  of  self-help  and law  of  might, which  was 
once lived by all natI0ns,~6  will  not be in doubt how  to 
judge  the above phenomena.  There are cases in which 
law ran absolutely not create the organization  of  coer- 
cion which  it ordinarily  strives after.  In international 
law  this would  presuppose  the formation of  a  superior 
court above the particular nations, from which they would 
have to take the law, and which would have the power as 
well as  the good will to carry out its sentence with armed 
force if  necessary.  We have only to think  the matter 
out clearly to be convinced  of  the complete impractica- 
bility  of  the idea.  What States are to hold  this office; 
which  will  make them judges  of  the world?  The idea 
woulc!  be wrecked at  the outset.  And suppose the judges 
themselves came into conflict with one another.  Where 
u~ould  the whole  central  force  be?  It would  dissolve 
itself.  The case  is  no  different  in  public  law.  The 
highest  bearer  of  force,  who  is to coerce  all  the other 
bearers  of  the same standing under him, cannot again 
1"  proved it for the oldest Roman law in my "Gzist des romischen 
Rechts," Vol. I, 5 11. 
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have  another  above  himself  to coerce  him.  At some 
point  in the politicai  coercing  machine  there must  be 
a  limit to being  coerced, and  coercing  alone  remain,36 
just  as conversely  at some  other  point  coercing must 
cease,  and  being  coerced  alone  remain.  In all  other 
organs  of  the State force  being  coerced  and coercing 
coincide;  they receive  their impulses  from  above and 
continue them down, just  as in clock-work, where one 
spring  drives  the  other.  But  the  clock  cannot wind 
itself up; for this there is need of  a human hand.  This 
hand is in a monarchical form of  government, the monarch ; 
it sets the whole wheel-work in motion;  he is the only 
person  in the State who coerces  without being  himself 
coerced.  We may limit his power  ever so much, nega- 
tively, by a  constitution  (counter-signature and respon- 
sibility of  the ministers, consritutional  oath of  the ser- 
\,ants of  the State, etc.), and we  may I~ositively  try to 
secure on his side obedience to the laws by means of  the 
moral guarantee of  an oath on his part to uphold the  con- 
stitution, but positive  legal  coercion  against  him  is an 
impossibility;  for  he  holds  the same  position  in  the 
State as the general in battle.  The latter would not be 
general  if another  had  power  over  him -  there is no 
higher  point  above  the highest,  as there  is  no  lower 
below the lowest. 
The impossibility  of  having  his  political  duties en- 
forced, which  characlerizes the status of  the monarch, 
is found also in other positions,  for example in that of 
jurymen in reference to the duty imposed upon them to 
BO The practical Romans recognized it correctly.  They allowed no 
judicial coercion against the bearers of  the State force, viz., the judges, 
as long as they were in office.  Gell. XIII, 13, "neque vocari, neque, 
6  venire nollet, capi atque prendi salva ipsius magistratus majestate 
Posse "  D. 2.  4.  2,  "In  jus vocari  non oportet . . . magistratus, 
qui  impertum habent,  qui  coercere aliquern  possunt  et jubere  in 
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judge  according  to  their  conviction.  For  conviction 
and conscience there is no control and therefore no coer- 
cion;  the only guarantee of  which the law can make use 
for  this duty is the oath.  Must it for this reason  be 
designated as moral?  The institution of  the jury  is a 
legal  institution, and that, too, of  the very first rank; 
the fundamental idea is legal pzrrpose, and all other regu- 
lations which  are intended  to bring about the realiza- 
tion  thereof  bear  without doubt the character of  legal 
rules.  According to  intention, therefore, the idea of  legal 
duty is  applicable also to the obligation  of  jurymen. 
Like the obligation of  the monarch in a nlonarchical gov- 
ernment, it forms the conclusion of  the entire institution, 
the highest point which the idea of  purpose reaches within 
it;  but here again coercion remains behind  the idea of 
law, not indeed  because it would  not like to follow it, 
but because it cannot. 
We arrive therefore at the result that there are points 
within  the  legal  order  where  coercion  fails.  If  we, 
nevertheless,  confer  the character of  legal  rules,  laws, 
upon  the rules which legislation  lays down in reference 
to them, it is because of  a double consideration:  first, 
because the entire institution of  which they form only a 
small  part  is  of  a  legal  character,  and  then  because 
according to the intention of  the legislation they lay claim 
to the same unquestioning regard  and validity  as are 
realized  in all other rules by means of  coercion.  The 
monarch  who  violates  the  constitution,  the  juryman 
\T  110  condemns or acquits the accused against his better 
knos ledge,  transgresses  against  the  law,  not  against 
morality;  though the law cannot reach them. 
5  11.  The Law --  The Element  of  Norm.  The sec- 
ond  element  of  the concept  of  law  is norm (p.  240); 
the latter contains the inner side of  law, coercion  the 
outer. 
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The content of  norm is an idea, a  proposition  (legal 
rule), but a proposition of  a practical  kind, i.  e., a direc- 
tion  for human  conduct.  A  norm  is  therefore  a  rule 
according  to which  we  should  direct  ourselves.  The 
rules of  grammar come also under this concept.  They 
are distinguished from norms by the fact that they do 
not  concern  conduct.  Directions for conduct  are con- 
tained  also in propositions derived from experience con- 
cerning the element of purpose in conduct, viz., maxims. 
Norms are distinguished from the latter by the fact that 
they are of  a  binding nature.37  Maxims are guidances 
for free  conduct;  their observance is placed in the judg- 
ment  of  the agent himself;  that of  the norm is not; it 
designates a direction for another's will, which he should 
follow, i.  e., every norm is an imperative (positive -  com- 
mand, negative -  prohibition).  An imperative has mean- 
ing only in the mouth of  him who has the power to impose 
such  limitation upon  nother's ~i11;~8  it is the stronger  "i 
31  The  language  expresses  the idea  of  binding  in this relation. 
German  "Verbindlichkeit"  (legal  bond, [from "binden,"  to bind]), 
Latin "obligatio"  (from "ligare" -  to  bind), the old Roman "nexum" 
(from  "nectere"  -to  bind),  "contrahere"  (to draw the band  to- 
gether,  tighten),  "solvere"  (to loosen  it), 'Ijus"  (=  that which binds, 
from  the  Sanskrit  root  'yu" -to  bind,  tie;  see  my  "Geist  des 
romischen  Rechts,"  Vol. I, p. 218, 4th ed.). 
The idea of  imposition is expressed in the  language.  In Latin in 
"lex"  (leg-ere -to  lay;  "lex  publica" -  "Gesetz"  [something  set 
down, statute];  "lex  privata" -  "Auflage"  [something imposed, an 
order] in a  will  or contract)  ;  in  "imperare"  ("endo  parare" -to 
impose; the imperative refers  linguistically  as well as actually to an 
"imperium"),  German "AufEage"  (imposition, injunction), "Obliegen- 
heit"  (that which is imposed or incumbent upon one, a duty).  For 
the relation of  dependence on the part of  the subordinate party the 
language  makes  use  of  the terms  "horen"  (to hear),  "horchen"  (to 
hearken).  Thus "die  Horigen"  (bondsmen), "gehorsam"  (obedient), 
"gehorchen"  (to obey).  Similarly in Latin "obedire"  from "audire." 
Transferred from persons to things in "das Gehoren"  (belonging to) 
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will that designates the line of  conduct for the weaker. 
An imperative presupposes a double will;  it passes from 
a  person  to a  person;  nature herself  knows no impera- 
tives.  According  as the imperative merely designates 
conduct in a  particular case, or a  type of  conduct for 
all cases of  a certain kind, we distinguish  concrete and 
abstract  imperatives.  The latter  coincide  with  norm. 
Norm is accordingly to be defined as an abstract impera- 
tive for  human conduct. 
The ethical world-order contains three classes of  such 
abstract imperatives:  of  law, of  morality, and of  ethics. 
What is common to  them is the social purpose;  all three 
have society as the subject of  their purpose, and not the 
individual.  With reference to this purpose, I call them 
social  imperatives."  In morality  and ethics these are 
laid down as  well as  realized by society;  in law these two 
functions are  exercised by the State, the former 
the latter exclusively.  Thedifference between the impera- 
tives of  the law and those of  morality and ethics is that 
the former have the element af  external coercion con- 
nected with them by the power of  the State and adminis- 
tered by the same. 
All  coercion  presupposes  two  parties:  the one  who 
coerces and the one who is coerced.  To which  one of 
these is the coe~cive  norm of  the State directed?  The 
question has been  raised  by criminologists with special 
reference to criminal laws, and has received a three-fold 
answer from them;  41  the people, the judge, the State. 
The latter view would presuppose that one can direct 
an imperative  against  oneself.  This is  incompatible 
"  More of  this in Ch. IX, Vol. 11, p. 105,227,238. 
40 Modified by customary law so far as its validity is not excluded 
by legislation. 
"See  further concerning  it in Binding, "Die  Normen  und  ihre 
~bertretun~,"  Vol. I, p. 6 and fl. (Leipzig, 1872) 
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the concept of  an imperative,  which  presupposes 
(P. 248)  two opposing wills -  a stronger and a weaker. 
The idea which gave occasion to  this view is the obliga- 
tion incumbent upon the State and recognized  by it to 
prosecute and punish crime;  but the form of  expression 
is mistaken. 
One may resolve firmly to  do  some thing, and carry out 
one's  resolution  inviolably,  and even  acknowledge  to 
another one's obligation to do it, but the concept im- 
perative cannot be applied to it without destroying it; 
imperatives to  oneself are a contradiction in terms. 
There remain therefore the people and the judge  or, 
since we extend our circle of  vision  to the whole  law, 
including  police  and  administrative  law,  the  State 
authorities.  To  which of these does the law direct its 
imperatives?  Or are they perhaps directed to both? 
It is clear in the first place that there are imperatives 
which are directed exclusively  to the authorities.  The 
regulations which govern the organization, the manage- 
ment and the jurisdiction of  theauthorities,  haven~thing 
to do with the private person,  and though  in some of 
these one has the right to protest or complain against 
their disregard, there are a!so  other regulations in which 
this is not the case; where obedience is secured only by 
the right of supervision and review on the part of  superior 
authorities.  The political  coercion  for  the realization 
of all these imperatives (laws, ordinances), whether those 
issued by legislation or by the State force, takes place 
altogether within the coercive machinery of  the State; 
it is the working of the machine within, without any exer- 
tion of  force on the outside. 
Over against these pure!y  internal coercive norms, as 
I shall call them, are the external, the effectiveness  of 
which shows itself  passively in the private person, who 
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private person, or on  the initiative of  the State force 
itself  by a threat of coercion or of  punishment.  They 
find  therefore  their  practical  object  without doubt in 
the private person; the latter is to be enjoined to act or 
forbear  in accordance  with  the norm.  In this sense, 
therefore,  we  can  say that they  are directed  to the 
people. 
But there are doubtless many legal regulations which 
direct  no imperatives at the private  person, either ill 
respect to their form or content,42  and yet they are in- 
tended to  be applied to him by the judge.  I name as  an 
example, in civil law, the propositions having to do  with 
the development of  legal concepts ; the regulations of  the 
age  of  majority;  concerning  the influence of  error on 
acts in the law;  concerning the interpretation of  laws 
and acts in the law; in criminal law, the regulations con- 
cerning  criminal  responsibility,  and state of  necessity. 
Where is coercion here, which is to  constitute the criterion 
of  all legal norms?  We are confronted here, it seems, by 
the necessity of  recognizing  that  there are legal rules which 
are not imperatives;  and thus our whole definition of 
the legal  norm, which  identifies it with  an imperative 
wielded by the State force,  would fall to the ground. 
But the imperative shows itself  here also;  it asserts 
itself in the person of  the judge, who is expected to apply 
all  these  norms.  Majority  and  minority  signify  this 
for him -  treat the one who is of  age differently from 
the minor;  compel  the former  to fulfil  the contracts 
concluded by him but not the latter.  Error, irrespon- 
sibility mean this-do  not compel the fulfilment of  the 
contract, or the carrying out of  the punishment.  Inter- 
pretation  signifies-  take  the doubtful  words  in  this 
42 I am alluding in this observation to  the possibility  of  divesting 
the imperatives of  this form by raising  them to juristic concepts. 
See concerning this, my "Geist des romischen Rechts," 3 $41. 
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sense.  The propositions  connected  with  the develop- 
ment  of legal concepts  signify -  recognize the case or 
the crime, or do not recognize it, and condemn and carry 
out your sentence accordingly, according as the concep- 
tual elements are present or not. 
With  the person of  the judge,  or, more  properly,  of 
the authorities, who carry out the imperatives of  the 
State, we have reached the point where the idea of  coer- 
cion is proven  to be absolutely  true in law, and valid 
without exception.  The criterion of  all legal norms is 
their  realization  through  coercion by the State authori- 
ties appoipted for the purpose;  whether  it is that the 
upper coerce the lower;  that they are themselves con- 
strained to coerce;  that the judge or the administrators 
coerce the private person, or that, as in monarchy, the 
monarch  alone coerces without  being  himself  coerced. 
Considered from this point of view all law presents itself 
as a system of coercion realized  by  the State;  as the 
machinery of coercion organized and wielded by the State 
force.  All  norms  without  exception  come  under  this 
point of  view;  even those to which attention was called 
above  (p.  246)  in reference to the ruler and the jury. 
There coercion fails indeed  in its power  over the two 
latter, but they concern there, too, its exercise on others. 
If we  repeat from this standpoint of  our considera- 
tion of the State and of  law the  above question: To  whom 
are the imperatives of  the State directed?  The answer 
can only be: to  the organs which are entrusted with the 
management  of  coercion;  from  the monarch  and  the 
highest pinnacles of  the hierarchy of  officials down to the 
lowest levels.  Every legal rule, every political imperative 
is characterized by the fact that some bearer of  political 
force is entrusted with  its practi~al  realization.  Coer- 
cion  against  the private  person,  though  it belongs  to 
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political authority exercises either within, downward or 
outward is an absolutely safe one;  provided  that  the 
imperative  is  equal  to  the  requirements  which  the 
government expects of  it. 
All such imperatives whether concrete or abstract are 
legally binding on him to whom  they are directed;  he 
who does not observe them sets himself  in opposition 
to the law.  All  State decrees, on the other hand, to 
which  the State itself  denies this enforceability  by its 
authorities are not imperatives of  a  legal kind.  They 
are mere announcements, expressions of  opinion, invita- 
tions, desires, requests of  the State, even if  they appear 
in abstract form in legislation in the midst of  other legal 
regulations.  Such, for example, in Oriental law books, 
are prescriptions of a religious and moral nature, which 
are not legal norms.  It is not the expression of  a norm 
by the State that lends it the character of  a legal norm, 
but only the circumstance that it obligates its organs to 
carry the same out by means of  external coercion.  A 
code of  morals or a  catechism  colnpiied by the State; 
a direction for study published by a board of  examiners; 
a system of  spelling published by the ministry of  educa- 
tion, are not binding;  none of  this has the signification 
of  a  legal norm.  Only  that corm can  lay claim to a 
legal  title whose realization  by rneans of  coercion the 
State has imposed upon its organs. 
Our result is therefore that the criterion of  a legal norm 
does not consist in its external effectiveness in the direc- 
tion  of the people,  but in its internal operation in the 
direction of the State authorities.  The former remains 
far behind the latter; and we shall therefore, if  we wish 
to express the concept of  legal norm correctly in juristic 
terms, not go wrong, if we  define it in reference to its 
form as containing an abstract imperative directed to  the 
organs of the State force.  And the external effectiveness, 
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i.e.,  the  observance  of  the same  on  the  part  of  the 
people, as far as there is ~ccasion  for it,  must be desig- 
nated from this purely formal-juristic  point of  view (not 
from the teleological) merely as secondary in comparison 
with the other as primary.  All legal imperatives with- 
out exception are directed  in  the jirst  instance to the 
authorities, the entire civil code, the criminal code;  all 
finance laws, police laws, military  laws and ordinances, 
etc., are nothing  but regulations  for  the management 
of the coercive force of  the State.  But so  far as the latter 
is put actively at  the disposal of the private person for his 
interests (private criminal  prosecution), or so far as it 
can passively  be put into execution against him on the 
basis of  such a request to punish an  offender or without 
one, they extend their operation to him also; they vin- 
dicate him and they obligate or bind  him.  In reference 
to the purpose of such norms we may say that they aim 
at the private person; the above statement that in form 
they are directed solely to the organs of  the State force 
is not invalidated thereby. 
But not all legal  imperatives of  the State force are 
legal norms;  we must rather distinguish between  con- 
crete and abstract;  the latter  alone  are  legal  norms. 
And even within the latter we have to point out a dis- 
tinction  which  is of  the greatest  importance  for  the 
complete realization of  the idea of  law in society.  It is 
that of the unilaterally and bilaterally obligating force of 
the legal norm.  The object of  the State in issuing a 
legal norm can be only to bind thereby the one to whom 
it is directed, but not to bind itself;  so that it reserves 
to itself the privilege in a particular case of  disregarding 
the norm if  it so chooses.  But  it can also issue  the 
legal norm with the object and the assurance of  binding 
itself thereby.  With  this form  only, if  it is actually 
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certainty of  an unfailing realization of  the norm as once 
laid down. 
The exposition  following is intended  to show  these 
three particular stages in the rise of  the political impera- 
tive to the complete form of  the legal norm. 
first  Stage. -  Individual  Cornmal?d.  The  simplest 
conceivable form of  command is that of  the individual 
command.  Callcd forth by the immediate need of  the 
particular case, by the impulse of  the moment, it  emerges 
only to disappear again at once, exhausting  its entire 
effect  in  the particular  case, without  leaving  a  trace 
behind.  A  force which  we  think  as limited  to this 
form of command  must always first  will  itself  before 
setting another's will in action; the latter is related to it 
as the lifeless instrument which does not move unless it  is 
played  by some  one.  The picture  which  this lowest 
stage of the political  imperative  presents  before us is 
that of the constant exertion and activity of  force; force 
in perpetual motion, solely directed  to the moment, to 
create by a command what it demands. 
The  concept  of  an  individual  command  does  not 
require that it be directed to a single individual.  Call- 
ing out persons of  a certain age for the purpose of  con- 
scription is an individual command;  for it exhausts its 
effect in and with this particular case, and does not hold 
good  for  the following year.  UThether all those liable 
to service are invited singly or through the designation 
of  their class, by means of  an announcement affecting 
them  all, is conceptually  immaterial.  Conversely, the 
circumstance  that the command  is limited  to a  single 
person is not sufficient to make it  an  individual command. 
A judicial order of  fine or imprisonment is dirwted to a 
single person; yet it is not an individual command, for it 
has its basis not in a free, spontaneous act of  will of  the 
State, called forth solely by this case, but in a previous 
6  11  1  SOCIAL  MECHANICS-  COERCION  255 
abstract volition of  it -  which only appears here in con- 
crete form -  Gz.,  in the law.  Not the will of  the judge 
but that of the law compels the debtor to pay, and sends 
the  criminal  to prison;  the judge  only  fills  out  the 
blank  which  the legislator  drew  up;  his  command  is 
concrete, but not individual.  The concrete is the correla- 
tive  of the abstract, the individual is the opposite of it; 
the concrete, regarded in its generality, is called abstract; 
the  abstract  in  its realization  becomes concrete.  He 
who makes use of  the expression concrete thereby implie 
the idea that corresponding to the particular  which he 
designates in this way there is a universal which  only 
appears  in  connection  with  it.  Conversely, he  who 
makes use of the expression abstract implies that the 
universal which he has in mind can become actual in a 
particular case.  But on the other hand, he who desig- 
nates  a  thing as individual desires  to express in that 
term that it is not a mere repetition of  a type, of  the 
abstract, but that it denies it in some point which  is 
peculiar to it.  Applying this to the commands qf  the 
State we say then that only those are to be designated 
as individual which concern in a particular case a regu- 
lation rrot  already  provided for in an abstract way, or 
laid down as necessary by the law, but based upon the 
free and spontaneous volition of the State force.  The 
individual  commands  of  the State stand therefore  on 
the same line as the abstract; both have as their source 
and presupposition the same moving force of  the State. 
Only the scope within which they are active is different; 
in the former it is the temporary instance, in the latter 
the permanent  relation;  there it individualizes, here it 
generalizes.43  Our  German  legal  phraseology does not 
"The  latter  expression  is  used  by  the  Roman  jurist  in  D.  1. 
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express this conceptual contrast, whereas the Roman did 
so early, i.  e., it comprehended it consciously  .44 
The expressions which our German legal terminology 
presents,  nriz.,  statute  ("Gesetz") , ordinance  ("Verord- 
nung") , enactment  ('  'Verfiigung") , are,  in accordance 
with the application which usage makes of  them, indiffer- 
ent for  the above distinctions.  At the same time the 
language itself seems to have had in mind the idea of  the 
abstract in the formation of  the first two, and that of 
the individual  in the third;  and it would be desirable 
that  usage  should  be fixed  in this sense.  We dispose 
("verfiigen")  of  things or persons, over whom we have 
power;  "verfiigen" is the Latin "imperare"  ;45  the fitting 
in, adaptation and subordination of  them to our purposes. 
The idea which the language has in mind here is a par- 
ticular act of  the use of  force which is spent in the tem- 
porary purpose.  So the State, too, disposes ("verfugt") 
of  its  forces;  and  an enactment  ("Verfiigung")  of  it 
would  therefore be  linguistically  a  command  which  is 
exhausted in the single case.  In this sense we  should 
have  to designate  as  "enactments"  ("Verfiigungen") 
of  the State those commands which  do not consist in a 
simple carrying out of  a prescribed legal norm, in a mere 
application of  some thing already laid down in advance, 
but which are based upon the free use of  the State force 
adapting itself to the peculiar relations of  the single case. 
"As  early as the time of  the Twelve  Tables we  meet  with  the 
opposition between  "leges,"  by means of  which the Roman people 
issued a general ~rdinance,  and the "privilegia,"  by means of  which 
it issues an individual ordinance for or against a  particular  person, 
as was  the case  in  the "testamenta  in  comitiis  calatis"  and  thc 
"arr~~ationes."  The opposition  is found  again  in  the  Praetorian 
Edicts  in the form  of  "edicta  perpetua  jurisdictionis  causa  pro- 
posita"  and "edicta  prout  res incidit  proposita."  In the Imperial 
Constitutions  their  division  into  "constitutiones  generales"  and 
"per~onales"  comes at  least close to this contrast. 
46 See above p. 245, note 36. 
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In a State in which the legislative power and the execu- 
tive are not combined in one person, that is, in a republic 
and  in a constitutional monarchy, in contradistinction 
to an absolute monarchy, an enactment ("Verfiigungu) 
which is opposed to the existing laws is possible only in 
the  form of  a  law;  for the legislative  power  alone is 
able to remove out of the way the obstacle which, in 
the form of  a  law, stands in  the way of  the proposed 
measure.  The statute may be compared  to the "com- 
position" of  the compositor in a printing establishment. 
Both are types for the purpose of multipiication.  The 
particular cases of the statute correspond to the several 
impressions of the printed sheet.  If it is intended that 
in  a particular impression a given passage should read 
differently from the "composition,"  this can be brought 
about only by the compositor's  changing  his  type for 
this  particular  case.  The same  thing  can  be  accom- 
plished  in law in a legal manner only by the legislature 
excluding for the particular case the legal rule which ordi- 
narily would apply to it,  and substituting another for it. 
Upon this is based the concept and the indispensable- 
ness in State law of the individual statute.  The  individual 
statute shares in respect to its validity  and effect the 
character  of  an enactment  in  the above  sense.  But 
whereas the latter can be issued by the executive power 
of the government, the former necessarily presupposes 
an act of  the legislative power;  it is in reality  a  law, 
though not abstract but individual;  and it is required 
only in the case when the proposed measure is incom- 
patible  with  the already existing  law.  The individual 
statute is  "contra  legem,"  the individual  enactment is 
"secundum legem." 
The distinction between an individual statute and an 
individual enactment is too little regarded  by juristic 
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not meet:  with the statement that individual privileges, 
such as, for example, the granting of  concessions, rights 
of corporations, etc., are individual  statutes.  They are 
such only when they are opposed to the existing law; as, 
for example, a change in the succession to the throne in 
a  given  case,  or  the  prolongation  beyond  the  legal 
period  of  the protection  of  copyright, otherwise  not. 
The former I am in the habit of  designating as adminis- 
trative  privileges, the latter as legislative.  The former 
can be issued in a constitutional monarchy by the power 
of the State alone, the latter only by  the co-operation 
of  the estates of  the realm.  In reference to expropria- 
tion, both forms occur in different States.  Where legis- 
lation has laid down definite  principles  concerning ex- 
propriation, by which it is intended that the government 
should have the right  to undertake  the same, (whether 
it be exclusively through the administrative authorities, 
or in co-operation with the court), the undertaking of  it 
contains merely a particular act of  the application of  a 
law.  Only where this is not the case, do we have a law 
of  expropriation. 
The interest which the individual command possesses 
for our present purpose consists merely in the fact that 
it contains  the conceptual  introduction  to the norm. 
Taking force as our point of  departure, as we did above, 
the individual command presents itself  as the first and 
lowest  form employed by force  to establish  order.  It 
is in  this way  that the Romans conceive of  the begin- 
ning of  their communal life,46  and this is the meaning of 
the Roman  "imperium":  it is the government  free to 
48 SO,  for example, the description of  the jurist Pomponius in D. 1. 
2. 2  5  1, "Et quidem initio rivitatis nostrae populus sine lege certa, 
sine jure  certo  primutn  agcre  instituit,  omniaque  manu  a  regibus 
gubernabantur."  So  Tacitus,  "Annals,"  111,  26,  " . . . nobis 
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do as it pleases;  the personality of  the magistrate in 
LO the legislative power of  the people. 
The people issue the abstract commands, the bearer of 
the "impetium"  issues the individual tcommands.47  The 
history  of  the political development of  Rome exhibits 
in quite a considerable degree this contrast, the sphere 
of  the "imperium"  becoming constantly smaller, that 
of the "lex"  ever larger.  Only in times of  danger does 
the "imperium,"  in the form of  the dictatorship, again 
temporarily take up its old form. 
Second  Stage. -  Unilaterally  Binding  Norm.  The 
individual command  shows us force in a  state of  con- 
tinual activity, the abstract command, the nornz, shows 
it to us in a state of rest; a single norm takes the place 
of  thousands upon thousands of  individual commands; 
but provision for the obedience of  the command is the 
same here as there. 
The change of the individual command for the norm 
brings with it,  therefore, the great advantage of  economy 
of force, of  convenience, and of  facilitation of  labor; and 
this advantage was sufficiently evident to bring about this 
progress  in  practice.  Self-interest  impelled  force  to 
substitute for the imperfect form the more perfect, vie., 
that  of  the  abstract  imperative.  Egoism  unnoticed 
guides force into the path of  law. 
The concepts  which  are  brought  to light  by  this 
progress are those of  norm, statute  and law;  and here 
Romulus ut libitum imperitavit,"  and with general application to  all 
peoples,  Justinus  I, 1, "Populus  nullis  legibus  tenebatur,  arbitriu 
principum pro legibus erant." 
"  This is also the original contrast between "judicia legitima," i.  e., 
"legis  actiones,"  and  "judicia  imperio continentia," i.  e.,  the inter- 
national judgments based upon the individual instruction ("formula") 
of the "praetor  peregrinus,"  the model of  the later Roman formu- 
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our next aim will be to master the views which language 
has expressed in these terms. 
The form in which the norm makes its appearance is 
its  statement  in  public.  This  is  demanded  by  the 
purpose in view;  for that which is intended to be gen- 
erally  observed  must  also  be  made  generally  known. 
Our  German  language has the two expressions, statute 
("Gesetz")  and ordinance ("Verordnung").  The former 
is derived  from  the idea  of  setting  ("setzen"),  and is 
found again in the expression "Satzung"  (statute). What 
does setting here mean?  Does it mean  the public set- 
ting, or exposition thereof, so that every one may see it? 
The element  of  publicity is in no way indicated.  The 
idea  seems to me  to be rather the following.  Setting 
means cessation of  motion;  that which is set down is at 
rest.  In  this  sense  language  uses  the  term  "Satz" 
(sentence) of  a  thought  expressed.  In order  that the 
latter  may  be  brought  into  the  form  of  a  sentence 
("Satz"),  the thinking antecedent to it, the search for 
the thought or the terms, in other words, the intellectual 
motion, must have reached its conclusion.  In the sen- 
tence, thinking comes to  rest ;  it has gained its permanent, 
fixed  form.  The same idea of  the fixed, of  that which 
has come  to rest, appears  again  in  "Gesetz"  [statute] 
(hence also "festsetzen"  [to lay down as a rule]), and in 
the modern  "jus  positivum"  ("ponere"  to place,  set). 
The laying  down  of  the  rule  denotes  the end  of  the 
search:  rest  in  contradistinction  to previous  motion; 
with  the statute ("Gesetz")  force, which was till  then 
continuously in motion, is set at rest.  A related figure 
is that of  setting up  ("stellen"),  which  the Latin  lan- 
guage  uses  in  "statuere"  (hence is derived  "statuta," 
statutes),  and  "constituere"  ("constitutio"),  and  ours 
in "feststellen"  (to establish).  On the contrary, in the 
term  "legen"  (to lay),  from  which  are formed  "lex" 
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(law)  and  "Auflage"  (impost,  injunction),  language 
seems to have had in mind rather the idea of  imposing 
(uauferlegen")  than that of  simple laying down ("hin- 
legen").  In  "Verordnung"  (ordinance)  it  seems  to 
have thought not so much of  the original establishment 
Of  order ("Ordnung"),  as rather of  the perfection of  the 
same;  to which "Verordnung"  adds something. 
The content of the law is formed by a norm  or rule. 
Both terms point to the same idea, viz.,  determining the 
direction to be followed.  "Norma" is a square; "norma 
juris"  is a legal rule.  The word  "regere,"  to determine 
the direction,  has shown  itself  extraordinarily  fruitful 
for legal  terminology in Latin as well  as in the modem 
languages.  "Regula"  is the impersonal rule, "rex"  the 
personal;  "rectum"  is that which keeps the right direc- 
tion,  the straight.  From  this is derived  the  German 
"Recht,"  whereas  the Romance  languages  borrow  the 
designation  of  law  (Recht)  from  the compound  "diri- 
gere"  ("directurn,"  "diritto,"  "droit");  also  the  Ger- 
man word "richten," which is the Latin "regere"  in form 
as well as in content.  The idea at the basis of  the word 
"richten"  is that of  the way which every one has to fol- 
low;  it is the "way of  law"  (legal proceedings), the foot- 
path  ("Richtsteig").  He who leaves this way becomes 
guilty of  an "error"  ("Verirrung"),  a  "transgression" 
[misdemeanor]  ("~bertretung") -  he  transgresses  the 
law in  stepping  beyond  the right  way  ("delinquere," 
"delictum") -  a "lapse"  [offence] ("Vergehen"), he goes 
astray, and the judge  ("Richter")  is there to show him 
the right  way.  He is judged  ("gerichtet")  by  being 
guided  back  in  the  right  direction  ("richtige  Richt- 
ung").  In "crime"  ("Verbrechen") alone language has in 
mind  not the direction,  but  the order;  "Verbrechen" 
(crime) is the breaking ("brechen")  of  the civil order. 
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norm as their presupposition.  The law sets it up.  The 
judge applies it.  Law comprehends all the norms.  Of- 
fence, crime, misdemeanor,  disregard them. 
Every norm contains a  conditioned  imperative, and 
consists therefore always of  the two elements, the con- 
ditioning  (presuppositions,  facts  of  the case)  and  the 
conditioned (imperative).  A norm can therefore always 
be  rendered  by the formula,  if  . . . then.  The pro- 
tasis  contains the motive  and the justification  of  the 
apodosis ;  the "if"  is always a  "because,"  containing 
the reason  which  induced  the legislator  to the given 
regulation.  The proposition that when a "filius familias" 
contracts a  debt he  is not  liable, takes the following 
form in the consideration of  the legislator, viz., in  the 
peculiar relations of  the "filius  familias,"I see a reason 
which  excludes  his  responsibility  for  the  loan.  The 
norm is always and without exception  directed  to the 
authorities entrusted with its realization (p. 252 f.), who 
must prove for this purpose whether the conditions are 
present in the given case (question of  evidence), and then 
carry the imperative into execution.  A  norm  directed 
only to  a private person and not to the authorities is an 
absurdity.  It is  an absolute  criterion  of  every  legal 
rule that in the last instance the authorities are always 
seen to be behind it, enforcing the same if  necessary. 
In the concept of  the norm as such  is involved  the 
condition of  binding only the one to  whom it is directed, 
but not also its author.  He who lays down the norm 
can also recover  it.  In this relation, i.  e., in reference 
to its abstract  validity,  it is always  dependent  upon 
his will -  there is no unalterable law.  But the author's 
attitude to the norm as long as it subsists, i.e., in refer- 
ence to its concrete realization,  is a  different  matter. 
The intention with which he issues it may be that he 
means to refrain from any encroachment upon it, and 
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hence to respect the norm himself.  In this case, when 
he acknowledges himself  as bound  to it, I designate it 
as a  bilaterally binding norm.  This is the form of the 
norm  in  an ordered  condition of  law;  the sovereignty 
of  the law.  If  the object of  its author does not go so far 
as to grant the norm this security of  realization indepen- 
dently of  his will;  if  he means rather to bind by it only 
those upon whom he imposes it,  and not himself, I desig- 
nate it a unilaterally binding norm. 
This is the shape law takes in the stage of  despotism. 
The despot, i.e., the master of  slaves, as language charac- 
terizes  him  (from  TOT, "potestas,"  and  6;w  to  bind, 
hence master of  the bound), has not the object of  putting 
a  limit upon himself  by means of  the norms which  he 
issues;  he  rather  reserves  to himself  the  privilege  to 
disregard  them in every case where they prove  incon- 
venient  to him.  Can we speak of  law at all in such a 
condition?  In so far as we understand by law mert:ly 
a sum of compulsory norms, yes.  In so far as we apply 
the standard of  that which the law can and should be, 
viz.,  the  assured  order  of  civil  society, no.  But  the 
germs of the law in the latter sense are after all already 
present  here also.  I mean by this, naturally, not alone 
the mere form of  it, the norm, but also the substantial 
element of  the law, wiz., the  purposes which it has to 
realize. 
These are first order, i.  e., uniformity of  social action. 
It may be interrupted, it is true, at any time by arbi- 
trary acts, but so far as this does not happen, there is 
already order, i.e., a uniformity of  action regulated by 
norms and secured by the fear of  authority. 
The other element of  law is equality.  It is posited in 
principle in the norm as such;  for every abstract prop- 
osition  is  based  upon  the  affirmation  of  the equality 
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of the despot may shape the particular categories  for 
which  he  issues  his  regulations,  within  a  particular 
category he proclaims in ~rinciple,  by means of  every 
law, t5e theory of  equality.  To be sure, he is free to 
negate it in applying the law, but the fact that he set 
it up himself is not removed thereby.  In thevery norm 
which  he himself  tramples under foot  he expresses his 
own  sentence;  and this is the point where  the moral 
element of  the legal norm makes itself  felt for the first 
time  in the shape of  fear of  open contradiction  with 
itself,  and of  self-condemnation;  where  the  thought 
occurs to its author of  respecting the law for its own 
sake.  At the moment  when force  invites the law to 
announce its commands, it opens its own house up to 
the law, and there at  once commences a reaction of  Ian 
upon force.  For the law brings with it,  as  its inseparable 
companions, order  and  equality;  and  whilst  at first 
merely a scullion in the house of  force it becomes in the 
cour'se  of  time the major-domo. 
The third and last element which  is realized  by the 
unilaterally  binding norm to a  certain degree, though 
not absolutely, is the concept of  right  in the subjective 
sense. 
Is there such a thing in despotism?  We must dis- 
tinguish  between  the  merely  conceptual  possibility 
and the practical  actuality  of  it;  and in reference  to 
the former again  between  public  and private  law.  A 
share by the subjects in the authority of the State is 
excluded by the concept of  despotism, just as much as 
a  share by the slaves in the authority of  the master is 
excluded by the concept of  slavery;  despotism knows 
no  rights  of  cztizenship.  But the recognition  of  legal 
relationships  among  the  subjects  is  compatible  with 
tyranny and demanded  by its own  interest  in estab- 
lishing and maintaining a definite system;  i.e., private 
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law  is theoretically  compatible  with  despotism.  It is 
exactly  the same as  when  the slaveholder  prescribes 
an order to  his slaves which they are to observe in their 
among themselves, since he himself is interested 
therein. 
But in this very circumstance lies at  the same time the 
imperfection  of  this status.  Put forth solely  by  the 
interest of  the master, his order remains even in its execu- 
tion  in constant dependence upon him;  the slave who 
complains of  a disturbance of  order in his person,  of an 
injustice done him,  obtains justice  only so far as the 
master has no interest in denying him recognition.  In 
this sense, therefore,  there is no private law in despotism; 
it lacks the security for its realization,  which it obtains 
only  so far as the humor, partiality, or avarice of  the 
autocrat do not oppose it. 
One might suppose that this danger diminishes in the 
same  measure  as the personal  contact  of  the  despot 
with his subjects becomes more difficult and less frequent 
by reason  of  the extension of  his State's domains;  and 
that therefore security will increase with the size of  the 
empire and distance from the throne.  This would  be 
true if  the tyrant that sits on the throne did not at the 
same  time occupy  the judge's  bench.  As the  master 
so the servant.  The difference is only that the former 
picks out preferably the great for his prey, and the latter 
principally  the  small.  The  former  spares  the  small 
because  they do not tempt him, the latter spares the 
great  because  he fears  them.  Therefore the powerful 
find themselves relatively safest at a distance from the 
throne;  the  weak  in  its  proximity.  Security  under 
despotism is based solely upon the endeavor not to  attract 
attention and not to  come in contact with the autocracy; 
it is the security of  the deer, which depends solely upon 
not being discovered by the hunter. 'THE  CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH.  VIII 
Under such conditions the development of  the feeling 
of  right is an impossibility.  If  it consisted  merely  in 
the knowing of the right there would be nothing in its  way, 
but the essence of  the feeling  for right consists in willing; 
in the energy of the personality that feels itself  to be 
an end in itself;  in the impulse of  legal self-assertion, 
nhich has become an  irresistible need, a law of life.  But 
the elevation of  the feeling to this power is a matter of 
deed, and  that too not of  the individual or of  a short span 
of  time, but of  the whole nation and of  a long historical 
practice;  it is therefore as unthinkable in a despotism 
as the growth of  an oak on a bare rock -  soil is lacking. 
For this reason also there is no advantage in a few indi- 
viduals  becoming  familiar  with  this fact  by  personal 
contact with a foreign country or by a knowledge of  its 
literature;  it only  serves  to estrange  them  from  the 
conditions which they find at  home, if  they are satisfied 
merely to know this, or to make them martyrs if  they 
wish to carry their better knowledge out into practice. 
The attempt to  gain the multitude for their cause would 
be as hopeless as to plant an oak branch on a bare rock, 
or to introduce the palm in the far north;  in the hot- 
house it may flourish but not in the open.  The great 
multitude under a despotism knows only sentiments of 
dependence, submissiveness and subjection.  The phil- 
osophy of  life by means of  which it gets along with the 
existing conditions takes shape  in a policy of dull, unresist- 
ing  resignation to the inevitable, which  spells apathy. 
This mood, embodied in dogma, is fatalism;  the  necessity 
of  all that happens, but not the need of  a uniform  law 
which, in addition to  dependence, embraces for him who 
knows it  and observes it  also independence and security. 
They feel nought but the inevitableness of  incalculable 
chance, of  fate, which excludes every possibility of  pro- 
tecting oneself  against it, and leaves nothing but blind 
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submission.  In  the domain  of  law  we  designate  the 
condition in which accident rules instead of  law, arbitrari- 
ness, and we pronounce  thereby an ethical sentence of 
upon  it.  But we  must not forget that 
we thus apply a standard which is foreign to the stage 
to which we transfer it (p. 192).  As the blind man who 
knows not light can have no idea of  shadow, so neither 
can he who knows not law have an idea of  arbitrariness; 
an understanding  of  arbitrariness  presupposes  one  of 
law. 
Third  Stage. -  The  Bilaterally  Binding  Force  of 
the  Norm.  We have adopted  above (p. 240), the cur- 
rent definition  of  law  which  designates it as the sum 
of the valid coercive norms in a State.  But the preceding 
discussion  has shown us how  inadequate the  two ele- 
ments of  political  coercion and the norm are to bring 
about  that condition  which  we  call  the state  of  law. 
What is it  that  is  still wanting?  The  element emphasized 
above under the name of  bilaterally binding norm;  that 
the  authority  of  the  State itself  should  respect  the 
norms issued by it; that as long as they exist it should 
grant them actually the all-inclusive validity which has 
been  in principle  attributed  to  them.  Only  in  this 
way is chance banished in the application of  the norms; 
and in place of  arbitrariness comes uniformity, security, 
reliability of  the law.  This is what we understand by 
legal order, present  to our mind when we  speak of  the 
sovereignty of  right and law;  and such is the demand 
that we make of  the law  if  it is to correspond  to that 
idea of it which we carry within us.  It is the problem 
of the legal  State. 
Law, therefore, in this full sense of  the word  ,mans 
the bilaterally  binding  force  of  the statute; self-subor- 
dination on the part of  the State authority to the laws 
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Language has given this idea a  still sharper turn in 
the concepts of  arbitrariness and justice.  To  determine 
the meaning which language attaches to these means to 
present the popular side from which they originated. 
He who orders his conduct in accordance with right 
or law acts rightly or lawfully,-legally;  in the contrary 
case  he  acts  against  right  or  law,  uulzlawfully, -ille- 
gally;  he commits a violation of  the law, an injustice 
("Unrecht")  .48  All these expressions permit of  applica- 
tion to the State authorities as well as to the subjects. 
The former, too, may be guilty of  conduct opposed to 
right or law;  of  an injustice.  But the State authorities 
occupy a different position with respect to law from the 
subject.  The former have the function and the power 
to realize the law, i.  e., to  force to  obedience him who re- 
sists;  the task of  the subjects is exhausted in carrying 
it out.  The former have to order other people's  acts in 
accordance with the law, the latter have to order only 
their own;  the former  have  to command,  the latter 
have to obey.  This difference in position  lends to the 
injustice which the State authorities commit, in contrast 
to that of  the subject, a peculiar  character;  and lan- 
guage has felt this correctly in naming it arbitrariness. 
The  subject  who  transgresses  the  law  acts  illegally 
("gesetzwidrig"),  not arbitrarily  ("willkiirlich").  Arbi- 
The corresponding Latin expressions  are "ju~lum,"  "znjustum" 
"injuria" from "jus,"  "legztimum"  from "Iex."  "Rechtlich"  (just) 
has, as is well known, a different sense, similarly "loyal" formed from 
"lex"  ("loi").  Both of  these express the inner  disposition  ol the 
wzll  in  harmony  with the purpose  of  the  law-  the intention, in 
contradistinction to  the outer observance of  the law, legal conduct in 
accordance with  the law, which may be due merely to the knowl- 
edge  of  the coercion  which  will  follow  in case  of  disobedience. 
The just, loyal man acts lawfully from his inner impulse, even when 
he does not have to  fear the law.  Loyalty is the aim of the law, legal- 
zty is only a preparatory stage thereto. 
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trariness is the injustice of the one placed  in authority; 
it is distinguished from that of the subject in that the 
former has the power on his side, whereas the latter has 
;t against him.  If the subject instead of  violating the 
abstract norm acts against the concrete command of the 
person in authority, he makes himself guilty of  a viola- 
tion  of  the  law, of disobedience.  Just  as the two last 
cannot be applied to  the person in authority, 
so  the expression  arbitrariness -  and as we  shall see, 
that: of justice also -  cannot be applied to the subject. 
~t~mologically  "Willkiir"  (arbitrariness)  is the will 
which  chooses its own  content  ("kiirt"  from  "Kiir," 
"Kur"--choice),  hence  freedom  of  choice.  But  an 
essential  element  therein  besides  the will  itself  is the 
existence of  a law.  The will power which has no law 
over it is not arbitrary, but simply power.  The power 
of  the will becomes arbitrary only when the law appears 
at its side.  Hence  there can  be  no question  of  arbi- 
trariness in the history of law in the stage of  the unilater- 
ally binding power  of the legal norm (p. 267);  and for 
this  reason  we  could  not introduce it until now.  As 
shadow did not exist before  light, so arbitrariness did 
not exist before law.  As a purely negative concept  it 
presupposes  the opposite of  law, whose  negation it is, 
i.  e., it presupposes knowledge on the part of  the people 
of the necessity of  the bilaterally binding force of  the 
State norms.  In the light of  this conception the con- 
dition above described of  the stage preparatory to law 
may seem to us like the rule of  pure arbitrariness, but 
we must not forget that we introduce into it in this way 
an internal element  which  was  foreign to it (p.  192). 
The negro who is sold by his prince as a slave, or slaugh- 
tered in the celebration of  a festival, does not feel this as 
arbitrariness, but as a mere fact.  He regards the power 
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hurricane or the hail storm.  Only he feels arbitrariness 
in whom  the feeling of  right is alive, and in the same 
measure as it is thus alive within him; susceptibility to 
arbitrariness is the index which measures the develop- 
ment of  the moral force, and the feeling for right. 
But the significance of  the term "Willkiir"  (arbitrari- 
ness,  free will)  extcnds  further than I  have  assumed 
hitherto, where I applied it only to disregard of  the law 
on  the  part  of  the  State  authorities.  Our  language 
uses the term in a double sense, in a good  ("in  bonam 
partem")  and a bad  ("in  malam partem")  sense.  In 
the former sense it is used for an action which the law 
permits, in the latter for an action which it  forbids.  In 
a  physical  sense  we  call  a  voluntary  ("willkurlich") 
movement that which we ourselves undertake of  our own 
resolve, and not nature in us.  The contrast which we 
have in mind in this connection is our dependence upon 
the law of  nature.  "Willkur"  (option, free will) in this 
case is therefore the freedom which we have beside  the 
law  of  nature.  In the  juristic  sense  our older  legal 
terminology  used  the expression  "Willkuren"  for  the 
voluntary  agreements  of  communities,  corporations, 
etc., which they  made  to fix  the  relations  subject  to 
their  control.  "Willkur"  in this  case  was  therefore 
synonymous  with freedom  beside  the law; the concept 
was  equivalent  to the  foreign  word  autonomy  now 
current in that sense, which has the same meaning ety- 
mologically  (ah&  vdps -  a  law  unto oneself).  Lin- 
guistically both denote the same idea; "Willkur"  in the 
good sense and autonomy, both mean the determination 
of  the will beside the law. 
In contradistinction to this, "Willkur"  in the bad sense 
(arbitrariness, despotism) must be defined as the deter- 
mination of the will against the law; but with the limita- 
tion that it is the determination of  the will in violation 
5  11 1  SOCIAL MECHANICS-  COERCION  271 
of the law on the part of  the one who comnzands, and to 
whom  the very power  which  he possesses  leaves  free 
scope  beside  the law.  The scope of  power  which  the 
will possesses beside the law is therefore the common ele- 
ment in which  the two meanings of  the term coincide, 
and this is what the language had in mind when it  brought 
the two applications under one concept notwithstanding 
their difference, which is considerable in other respects. 
It  is in the latter sense that we use the expression, as 
is well known, not merely of the State authorities, but 
of  every one who can command, i.  e., who has the task 
and the power of  establishing order.  So we  use  it of 
the father in reference to his children-we  accuse him 
of  arbitrariness when he shows preference to one child 
over  another, or when  he  punishes  it without  cause. 
The same is  true of  the master  as against  the slave, 
of  the teacher as against the pupil. 
But, it will be objected, the father who does this does 
not transgress any law,  for there is no law that forbids 
him.  This very fact shows that we  must extend  the 
concept of  law, if  we wish to retain this term, from the 
legal to the ethical.  The ethical determination of  the 
paternal relation prescribes certain norms to the father, 
as the source of  power, to  which he is bound according 
to our ethical feeling.  If  he disregards them, we desig- 
nate this disregard  of  the ethical  norms by  the  same 
term  arbitrariness as we apply to the disregard of the 
legal norms by the bearers of  political authority. 
The necessity of  extending the conception of  the norm 
in  this way is shown in the political relation to which 
we  now  return.  We speak not only of  arbitrary deci- 
sions of  the judge and arbitrary acts of  the government 
where we apply the standard of  positive law, but also of 
arbitrary laws.  But the legislating authority does not 
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law, but above it.  Every law which it issues, no matter 
what its content, is in the juristic sense a perfectly legal 
act.  In the iuristic sense, therefore, the legislature can 
never commit an arbitrary act, for it would mean that 
it has not the right to change the existing laws;  which 
would  be  a  contradiction  within  the legislating  power 
itself!  But just  as the father is bound morally, though 
not legally, to  use the power entrusted to him in accord- 
ance with the meaning of  the paternal relation, so is the 
legislator  bound  to use  his  power  in the interests of 
society.  His right, like that of  the father, is at the same 
time a duty; for him, too, demands arise from the task 
put before  him  which  he must  satisfy;  norms  which 
he must observe;  and he, too, can therefore be guilty 
of  misusing the power entrusted to him. 
But not every misuse  of  power  is arbitrariness.  A 
bad  or mistaken law is not yet on that account arbi- 
trary.  A  thing is arbitrary only in  two cases.  First 
in such decisions as are in their nature "free"  and "posi- 
tive" ;  i. e., such as require a regulation not prescribed by 
general legal principles, as, for example, fixing the terms 
of  prescription.  Here we use the expression in the good 
sense  mentioned  above, viz.,  as the  determination  of 
the will in reference to  a point concerning which the will 
of  the legislator is not bound by the principles by  which, 
according  to our view,  he should  allow  himself  to be 
guided.  In the bad sense, on the other hand, we use the 
expression arbitrary of  those legal determinations which 
imply that the legislator, according to our opinion, has 
set himself  in opposition  to the general  principles  of 
law.  In this case we raise the charge against him that 
he  has disregarded  the  norms  which  we  consider  as 
binding upon him.  We also use the expression unjust 
as meaning the same thing.  The category of  arbitrary 
("wilkiirlich")  legal determinations embraces therefore 
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two  entirely different  kinds  of acts:  positive  acts, for 
which  there  is no  binding  standard  according  to our 
opinion, and unjust acts, in which the standard is dis- 
regarded. 
With the expression unjust, which we  have purposely 
avoided  using  till  now, we  introduce a concept which 
stands in closest  connection with that of  arbitrariness, 
viz., the concept of  justice  ("Gerecht").  Linguistically 
it denotes that which conforms to right ("das dem  Recht 
Gemasse").  If  we  apply  the  term  "Recht"  (right) 
in the juristic sense to positively  valid  "Recht"  (law), 
"gerecht"  (just) would  be  synonymous with  "lawful" 
("gesetzlich"), -  "in  accordance  with  law"  ("recht- 
massig").  Every one feels, however, that it also bears 
a narrower sense.  No one says of  the subject who obeys 
the law that he acts justly,  or of him who violates it 
that he acts unjustly.  He who has to obey can no more 
act justly  than arbitrarily.  Only he can do either of 
these two who has to command, i.  e.,  who has the power 
and  the  authority  to establish  order -  order  of  the 
State, the legislator and the judge;  order of  the house, 
the father; of  the school, the teacher; in short, every one 
in authority in relation to  his s~bordinates.~g  The Latin 
language expresses this thought  properly  in  "justitia" 
language  also  makes  use  of  the expressions  "gerecht" 
(just, correct) and "ungerecht"  (unjust, incorrect) in a wider sense, 
which  does not  interest  us here, namely  in application to a judg- 
ment  (scientific,  esthetic,  ethical)  which  one  utters  concerning 
another person or his acts.  Here, too, the decisive characteristics 
of the concepts emphasized above are found  again, namely, in the 
first  place,  the superiority of  him  who  judges  to the one  who  is 
judged -  he sets himself up as the other man's judge, he places him- 
self above him -  and in the second place, the assumption that he ia 
bound to certain norms which must lie at the basis of  his judgment. 
If he observes them, he judges justly  ("gerecht"),  if  he ignores them, 
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(i.e.,  the  power  or  the  will  which  "jus  sistit,"  i.e., 
establishes right and order), whereas our German word 
"Gerechtigkeit"  (justice) does not emphasize the charac- 
teristic element.  Accordingly  justice  and arbitrariness 
are correlates.  The former denotes that the person who 
has the authority and the power  to establish order in 
the circle of his subordinates agrees to be subjected by 
the norms to  which we regard him as bound, the latter 
that he does 
We have seen above (p. 271) that this obligation may 
be of two kinds, legal and moral.  For the judge it is of 
the former kind, for the legislator  of  the latter;  the 
former stands beneath the law, the latter above it; the 
forrner  is directed by justice ("rechtlich")  to apply the 
law, and he is just ("gerecht")  if  he does it.  He is not 
reponsible for the injustices of  the law itself;  these fall 
to the account of  the legislator.  For  the latter, who 
must set up the law for the first time, the standard of 
justice cannot be derived from the law itself;  he must 
first seek and find justice in order to  realize it  in the law. 
It is desirable to express in language this bifurcatiorl of 
the concept of  justice;  and the nearest expression that 
offers itself is that of judicial  and legislative justice.  But 
the concept of  justice,  as has been  shown  above, does 
not coincide with that administered by the State.  The 
contrast above mentioned  cannot  therefore  be  named 
with reference to institutions which belong to the State 
only.  The most appropriate designation would  be for- 
mal and n7aterial justice. 
The  former alone comes within the scope of  the present 
investigation, for we have not here to do with the ques- 
tion whence the State  authorities must takes1  their norms, 
so A slight modification  follows, p. 275. 
61 1 will treat this question in connection with the ethical element 
(Chapter IX). 
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but with  the consideration  that they must  observe  the 
norms which  they themselves set up.  The fact, how- 
ever, that a proper understanding of the species depends 
upon a knowledge of the genus, imposes upon me the 
necessity  of  discussing  the concept of  justice  here,  at 
least in so far as  is demanded by our object. 
The practical  aim of justice  is the establishment  of 
equality.  The aim of material justice is to  establish in- 
ternal equality, z. e., equilibrium between  inerit and re- 
ward, and between  punishment and guilt.  The aim of 
formal justice  is to establish external equality, i.  e., uni- 
formity in the application of the norm to all cases when 
it is once established.  The solution of  the first problem 
is, in the State, the business  of  the legislator.  But he 
can direct the judge,  where the conditions permit  and 
demand it, to  apply the standard of internal equilibrium 
himself.  In this case it assumes the character of  a for- 
mally binding standard for the judge.  The problem of 
the judge  coincides  with  the second problem, adminis- 
tration of justice.  Why it is his problem  only, and not 
also that of all the other organs which are entrusted with 
the execution  of the laws, viz., the government, will  be 
shown later. 
A  decision  of  the judge  ("Richter")  which  conforms 
to the law we call just  ("gerecht").  An enactment of 
the administrative authorities in a similar case we do not 
call just, but lawful.  In the contrary case we pronounce 
both  alike  arbitrary.  It follows  from  this  that arbi- 
trariness  and  justice  are not  simply  correlative  con- 
cepts;  the negative  does  not  here coincide  with  the 
positive,  but reaches  out beyond  it.  The concept  of 
justice  is  limited  to those  authorities  for  whom  the 
determining idea is equality  in the law, wz., the  legis- 
'ator and the judge.  The  concept of arbitrariness,  on the 
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of the State, to every administrative board, and even to 
the executive power of the government.  The latter can 
act arbztrarily, when it obstructs the course of  the law,  . .  -- - 
but it cannot act  jzistly;  for it  has no part in the adminis- 
tration  of  justice  (see  below).  Conversely  we  apply 
the concept of  justice to God, whereas the idea of  arbi- 
trariness is incompatible with His nature.  There,  . arbi-  . 
.  - 
trariness without the possibility of  justice;  here, justice 
without the possibility of  arbitrariness: the two concepts 
are therefore not coincident. 
Is the concept  of  justice  then based  upon  the prin- 
ciple of  equality in the law?  What is there so great in 
equality that we measure the highest concept of  right - 
for  this is what justice  is-  by  it?  Why should  law 
strive after equality, when  all nature denies it?  And 
what value has equality independently of  any particular 
content?  Equality may be as much  as anything else 
equality of  misery.  Is it a consolation for the criminal 
to know that the punishment which has overtaken him 
will  also strike all others in the same position?  The 
desire for equality seems to have its ultimate groundtin 
an ugly trait of  the human heart;  in ill-will and envy. 
No one shall be better or less badly off  than I ; if  I  am 
miserable, every body else, too, shall be so. 
But the  reason we want equality in law is not because it 
is something worth striving aftcr in itself, for it is not so 
at  all.  We see to  it that with all the equalizing powers of 
the law inequality finds its way back  again by a thou- 
sand paths.  But, indeed, our  reason  for wanting it is 
because it  is the condition of  the weyare of  society. When 
the burdens which society imposes upon its members are 
distributed  unequally,  not  only  does  that part suffer 
which  is too heavily  laden, but the whole  of  society. 
The centre of  gravity is displaced,  the equilibrium  is 
disturbed,  and  the  natural  consequence  is  a  social 
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struggle for the purpose of  re-establishing  equilibrium; 
which under certain conditions becomes a highly danger- 
ous menace, and is always a shock to the existing social 
order. 
Leibnitz finds the nature of  justice in the idea of  sym- 
metry ("relatio quaedam convenientiae"), and illustrates 
it by comparing the "egregium opus architectonicum.  "s2 
~ut  the symmetry which  he requires seems to be  less 
the practical object of equal distribution of  gravity and 
a resulting  fixity of the social  order than the zsthetic 
satisfaction  of  the  feeling  for  beauty,  and  the  har- 
monious impressions aroused by such order, as in the case 
of  a work of art.  But where it  is not a question of  beauty 
but of the carrying out of  practical purposes, the deter- 
mining point of view is not  the ssthetic but the prac- 
tical.  Here the demand for equalization can be justified 
only  by  proving  that  the  nature  of  those  purposes 
demands the same, and how it does so.  We must prove, 
therefore, how the problem which society has to solve 
becomes conditioned by the realization of  equality.  The 
Roman "societas" will give us the answer to this question. 
The Roman jurists recognize the principle of  equality 
expressly as the leading point of  view, as the principle 
of  organization of the "societas,"  yet not as an external, 
absolute, arithmetical equality, which would assign every 
participant exactly the same share as the next one.  For 
they  intended  an internal, relative, geometrical equality, 
which measures  every share  in  accordance  with  each 
one's contrib~tion.~~  Theirs was not therefore any idea 
62  I take the citation (Leibn. Theod. I, 5 73) from Sfuhl's "Rechts- 
philosophie," 11,  1, 2d ed., p. 253.  Stahl's own exposition seems to 
me quite mistaken. 
D. 17. 2.6,78,80.  To  establish equality in this sense is the task 
of  the  "boni  viri  arbitrium," 6  cit.  The nature of  "bonae fidei 
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of  abstract  equality  among particular  individuals, but 
that of  equilibrium between the stake and the profit; in 
other words, the idea of  the equivalent (p. 100) in special 
application to society.  A society which desires to flour- 
ish must be sure of  the complete devotion of  the par- 
ticular  member  to the purposes of  the society;  and in 
order to have this it must grant him the full equivalent 
for his co-operation.  If  it does not do so, it endangers 
its own  purpose.  The interest of  the injured member 
in  the carrying  out of  the common  purpose  becomes 
weakened, his zeal and energy are impaired, one of  the 
springs of  the machine refuses to work, and finally the 
machine itself comes to a standstill.  Inequality in the 
distribution of  the advantages of  society, and injury to 
the individual  which  results therefrom  is an injury to 
society itself. 
It is therefore the practical interest in the continuance 
and success of  society  which  dictates the principle  of 
equality in this sense, and not the a priori  categorical 
imperative of  an equality  to be realized in all  human 
relations.  If  experience showed that society could exist 
better with  inequality,  such would  deserve  the prefer- 
ence.  The very same thing is true also of  civil society, 
no matter what the species of  equality which the law has 
to maintain  in order to realize the practical  interest of 
that society.  The  determining standpoint in this matter 
is not that of  the individual, but of  society.  From  the 
former  we  arrive at an external,  mechanical  equality 
which measures all by the same standard -  small and 
great,  rich  and  poor,  children  and  adults,  wise  and 
foolish;  and which, by  treating  the unequal  as equal, 
in reality brings about the greatest inequality ("summum 
jus  summa  injuria").  Under  such  conditions  society 
cannot exist.  It would  mean  practically  to deny the 
diffelcnces which  actually  are and must be  within  it. 
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A demand for equality of this sort is no better than were 
the demand that the various members of the human body 
should be formed exactly alike.  They must be different 
in order that we  may speak of  a  body.  The same is 
true in the social body.  The equality which is to  be real- 
ized within it can only be relative, viz.,  commensurate- 
ness between capacity to perform and the act imposed; 
between  the problem  and the means  for  its solution; 
between merit and reward;  between guilt and punish- 
ment.  Its motto reads, "suum  cuique" -  the "suum" 
is measured  according  to the peculiarity of  the condi- 
tions.  This is the basis of  the concept of  true justice. 
The equality which it endeavors to attain is the equality 
of  the law  itself;  the equilibrium  between  the deter- 
minations of the law and circumstances.  We call that 
law just in which, according to our judgment, this equi- 
librium is present.  We call it unjust where it  is wanting. 
That  law  is unjust  which  imposes  the same  burdens 
upon the poor as upon the rich;  for it then ignores the 
difference in the ability to perform.  The law is unjust 
which inflicts the same punishment for a light offence as 
for a heavy one;  for it then disregards the proportion 
between  crime  and  punishment.  The law  is  unjust 
which  treats the person  of  unsound  mind  like him  of 
sound mind; for it pays no regard to the nature of  guilt. 
One may admit this and yet deny the practical signifi- 
cance for society of  justice in this sense.  If  ethics does 
not do so the reason is not because it tacitly means to 
admit this practical  importance, but because  the idea 
of it is quite foreign to  ethics.  The point of  view which 
the  latter adopts for justice  is  the ethical,  the  same 
apodictic imperative of  the moral feeling upon which it 
bases  its entire system  of  morality.  I  shall come  to 
terms with  it when  I  treat of  the theory of  morality 
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standpoint of  the welfare of  society.  Theresult of  that 
discussion will prove decisive for justice as well as for all 
other questions of  morality.  But on  the present occasion, 
too, we must not and do not wish to omit emphasizing 
the practical  side of  justice.  Not in order to treat it 
in exhaustive fashion, for that is excluded at once by 
the subordinate significance which  the question has for 
our present purpose, but in order to direct the reader's 
own reflections to the matter. 
The surest way to get a clear view of  the matter is 
to put the question negatively;  what is the effect politi- 
cally, economically and morally of  unjust laws?  I be- 
lieve it would  not be difficult  for the reader to prove 
the injurious  effects in  all  three  directions, and  thus 
arrive at  a positive recognition of  the measure  in which 
the strength, the welfare and the success of  the com- 
munity  depend  upon  justice. 
I select a particular case, not because it is specially 
important, but  because  the  recognition  of  the  true 
relation may most easily escape notice in this very case. 
It belongs to the economic side of  criminal justice.  I 
leave the ethical point of  view altogether out of  considera- 
tion, and confine myself exclusively to the utilitarian. 
Punishment in the hands of  the State is a two-edged 
sword.  If  it  is  improperly  used,  it  turns  its  edge 
against  the  State itself  and injures  it  along with  the 
offender.  With  every offender  which  it condemns  it 
deprives itself of  one of  its members;  every time it con- 
fines one in prison or in a house of  correction it cripples 
his energy.  The recognition of  the worth of  human life 
and human strength has an eminently practical signifi- 
cance  for criminal  law.  If  Beccaria  in his  celebrated 
work on crime and punishment (1764) had not raised his 
voice  against  immoderate  punishment, Adam Smith 
would have had to do it in his work on the causes of  the 
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wealth of  nations (1776).  If it had fallen to his lot to 
treat of  this matter, he  would  have  brought  out  the 
truth that the society which sacrifices the life or the time 
of its members  to the penal  purpose  without absolute 
necessity is acting quite as much against its interest as 
the owner who injures his animal by ill-treatment.  As 
in the primitive times of the human race the recognition 
of  the value of human life and human strength was the 
first step to humanity, because  such recognition deter- 
mined the victor to spare the life of  the captured enemy 
instead of  slaughtering him (p. 182), so the same recogni- 
tion can and should pave the way to humaneness in the 
relation of  society to an internal enemy.  Its own in- 
terest  properly  understood  demands the most  careful 
consideration in threatening punishment.  Where a fine 
is sufficient there should be no imprisonment; and where 
the latter is sufficient there should be no capital punish- 
ment.  In the first penalty, the guilty party alone suffers 
loss, society does not.  In the last two, society  has to 
purchase the evil which it inflicts upon  him at the ex- 
pense of  its own loss ; every excess recoils upon itself. 
The purpose of  the investigation so far was to fix more 
precisely  the  meaning  of  the  concepts,  arbitrariness, 
equality,  justice,  which  resulted  from  our analysis of 
bilateral norm, and to distinguish their use as applied 
to the legislator from that applied to the judge, as the 
sole difference with which we are here concerned.  We 
shall now return to the bilateral norm. 
UJe defined the concept  (p. 267) as the subordination 
of the State authorities to the laws which they them- 
selves issue.  What here is the meaning  of  subordina- 
tion?  How can the State force subordinate itself since, 
from the very  meaning  of  the term, it has no power 
superior to it?  Or  if  the subordination consists merely 
in  self-limitation, who  will  secure  it?  How  do  they 282  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH.  VIII 
arrive at the idea  of  imposing a  measure up  them- 
selves, a  limitation  upon  the use  of  their  power?  Is 
this act of  theirs beneficial?  Is it proper  for them to 
apply it in all directions?  Or is there not a sphere in 
which the unilaterally binding law, and even the individ- 
ual imperative, has its complete justification? 
Such  are the questions  concerning  which  we  must 
seek  enlightenment.  I  arrange  their  contents  under 
the following three points of  view: - 
1.  Motive. 
2.  Guarantees. 
3.  The Limits  of  the  subordination  of  the  State 
authorities to the law. 
1.  The Motive.  What motive can induce the author- 
ities to subordinate themselves to the law?  The same 
motive  which  suffices to determine  a  person  to self- 
control, viz., self-interest.  Self-control pays itself.  But 
in  order  to know  this one must have experience and 
insight.  Those who have no insight learn nothing from 
experience;  one  must  have insight  to understand  the 
teachings of  experience, and moral strength to practise 
them.  If  we  assume  these  two  conditions  as given, 
if  we think of  authority as joined with insight and moral 
strength, the problem which we put to the authorities 
is solved; they make use  of  the law  because  they  are 
convinced  that their  own  interest properly  understood 
demands it.54  AS the gardener cultivates the tree which 
he has planted, so they  cultivate the  law, not for the 
sake of the tree, but for their own sake.  Both of  them 
know that it must be attended to and cared for if  it is 
to bear fruit, and that the  fruit  is  worth  the trouble. 
MA voluntary  confession of  absolutism that is worthy  of  notice 
is the saying in Cod. 1.14.4  of  Theodos. I1 and Valentinian I11 (429), 
"Digna  vox est majestate regnantis legibus alligatum se principem 
profiteri, adeo de auctoritate juris  nostra pendet  auctoritus." 
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Where the State authorities obey the orders of  their own 
there alone are the orders secure of  their 
proper effect.  Where the law is supreme, there alone the 
national  well-being  prospers,  commerce  and industry 
flourish, and  the  innate spiritual  and moral  force  of 
the people unfolds in its full strength.  Law is  the intel- 
ligent  policy of  power; not the short-sighted policy of the 
moment, and momentary interest, but that far-sighted 
policy which looks into the future and weighs the end. 
Such  policy is conditional  on self-control.  But self- 
control in the State authorities just as in the individual 
is  a  matter  of  practice.  It requires  many  centuries 
before the State authorities, starting from the point of 
unlimited  power, which we assumed, arrive, after long 
vacillation and many relapses  to the original manner, 
at  the firm and inviolable observance of  the law. 
2.  The  Guarantees.  There are two, one internal, the 
other external;  one is the feeling  of  right, the other the 
administration  of  justice. 
Just as the sense of  order cannot develop in the ser- 
vant  if  the  master's  conduct  in  reality  makes  order 
impossible, so the sense of  right cannot develop in the 
State's  subjects  if  the  authorities  themselves  tread 
under foot  the law which  they issue -  respect  for law 
cannot win  its way  below  where it is wanting  above. 
The sense of  right needs to be realized in order to grow 
up strong; it cannot develop if  the world itself shows a 
contempt for the demands which it makes.  The same 
is true here as in the sense of  beauty, which develops 
only by the ~ulti~vation  of  beautiful objects;  by making 
trial of  itself  in the formation of  the beautiful.  Objec- 
tive  and  subjective,  internal  and  external,  stand  in 
closest relation, mutually  conditioning  and advancing 
each other; the sense of  beauty flourishes only in and 
with the beautiful, the sense of  right or law only in and 
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The point where the development of  the sense of  right 
first begins is private law.  Themost limited vision suf- 
fices to see the sphere of  interest of  private law;  the 
simplest  understanding  comprehends  what  it has  at 
stake in private  law.  And  in confining itself  purely 
to the sphere of its own ego, it arrives at the abstrac- 
tion  of  right in the  subjective  sense.  This is the point 
of  view from which egoism is able to comprehend, and 
did begin to comprehend, legal  order.  It is not right 
in the abstract that concerns it, but its right.  Its right, 
however,  does  not  extend  beyond  that which  imme- 
diately affects it. 
But egoism is an apt pupil.  One of  the first experi- 
ences it has consists in observing that when  it ignores 
the right of another its own right is  ignored  and  en- 
dangered, and that in  defending another's  right  it is 
defending its own.  Private  law  is  that part  of  the 
law, the practical significance of  which  for the commu- 
nity is felt first of  all, and in which the sense of  right 
has actually come to be first realized. 
In the domain of  public law, and  strangely enough also 
in criminal law, the sense of  right does not develop until 
very much  later.  That it should  be so in regard  to 
public  law  is easily  understood;  but in criminal  law 
this fact is surprising.  Of  what use is all the security of 
private law, if  the penal power of  the State be not con- 
fined  within  fixed  limits?  By  means  of  an arbitrary 
exercise  of  the latter  the State authorities could  put 
to  naught the whole private law; they protect it  against 
the private person  through  the civil  judge,  but they 
negate it  through the criminal judge.  But even though, 
owing  to the unusually  stubborn  resistance  which  it 
meets at  the hands of  the State authorities, the sense of 
right does not realize  its demand  of  legal security in 
these  two spheres until very  late, once it has arrived 
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at  power on the floor of  the latter, it is driven irresistibly 
onward  by its own strength, until it finally realizes  in 
its full extent its demand that right be secured. 
This is the final point of the development.  The objec- 
tive, actually realized, and the subjective sense of  right 
are both on  the same height, and condition  and sup- 
port each other mutually.  The security of  right depends 
in the last instance  entirely  upon  the moral  force  of 
the national sense of right.  Not  upon the form of  gov- 
ernment;  you  may think  it out as skilfully  as you 
please, yet we  can imagine no form  which  would  as a 
matter  of  fact  take away  from the State authorities 
the possibility of trampling the law under foot (p. 245). 
Not  upon the oaths, by which we  think it is  secured; 
experience shows how often these are broken.  Not upon 
the nimbus of holiness and inviolability with which theory 
clothes the law;  despotism is not overawed by it.  The 
only thing that impresses it is the real power which stands 
behind the law -  the people, who recognize in the law the 
condition of  their existence, and feel an injury done to 
it as an injury done to  themselves; the people, from whom 
it may be expected  that in case of  necessity  they will 
fight for their rights.  I  do not mean  to say that this 
low motive of  fear is the only thing which  induces the 
State authorities to observe the law.  I mean only that 
it is the last and extreme motive which does not deny 
its services even when  the higher motive of  respect for 
the law for its own sake fails.  The security of  the law 
in  the upward  direction  is situated  similarly  with  its 
security in the downward direction.  The fear of  the law 
must be replaced  by respect  for it.  But where this is 
not the case there still remains fear as the last resort. 
And  in this sense I  designate the fear which  the State 
authorities have of  the reaction of  the nation's sense of 
right  as the ultimate guarantee of  the security of  the THE  CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH. VIII 
law, and I do not fail to see either that when once the 
sense of  right has attained to its full influence among 
the people, it  will not fail to exert its purely moral influ- 
ence upon the powers of  the State also. 
Accordingly  the  security  of  the  law  depends  ulti- 
mately on nothing else except the energy of  the national 
sense  of  right.  The power  and  prestige  of  the  laws 
stand  everywhere  on  the  same  level  with  the moral 
force of the sense of  right;  a  lame sense of  right in the 
nation  means an insecure  law;  a healthy and  strong 
sense of right means a secure law.  The security of the 
law is everywhere the work and the merit of  the people 
itself.  It is a  good  which  history  does not give as a 
gift  to any people.  It must  be won  by every nation 
as the reward  of  a painful  struggle often accompanied 
with bloodshed. 
The value of  security for the law is so evident that it 
may  seem  superfluous  to waste words concerning  it; 
and in reference to its value for the external order of 
life, particularly  for trade, commerce, business,  this is 
not really necessary.  For no one need be told that the 
value  of  things  does  not  depend  solely on  their  real 
utility;  that the value of  soil, for  example, does  not 
depend on its fertility alone, nor that of  property, claims, 
etc., on their amount, but essentially upon the legal and 
actual security  of  their  maintenance.  If  it were  not 
so, real estate in Turkey would have the same value as 
with us;  but the Turk knows very well why it is more 
advantageous for him to  transfer his estate to  the mosque 
and take title ("Vakuf")  from the latter  on  payment 
of  protection  money  (an annual tax), than  to remain 
the owner of  it himself;  the mosque alone enjoys legal 
security  in  Turkey!  Similar transfers  often  occurred 
among us in the middle ages, as is well known.  In the 
time of  the later Roman Empire, this purpose was one of 
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the  motives  for  transferring  one's  claims to powerful 
In contrast with the economic value of  legal security, 
which  I  shall not develop  further in this place,  is its 
moral  value.  I  find  this  in  the importance  of  legal 
security for the development  of  character.  Among the 
characteristic phenomena of communities under a despotic 
government  is  the striking absence of  characters.  All 
the despotisms in the world put together have not pro- 
duced as many characters in the course of  the ages as 
the small city of Rome in its good days produced in the 
course of  a century.  Shall we seek for the reason of  this 
in the national character?  The national character itself 
is formed by the process of  time;  why is its develop- 
ment  in  Rome  so completely  different  from  that  in 
Turkey?  There  is  only  one  answer.  Because  the 
Roman people understood early how to gain possession 
of  legal security.  It must not be said  that this is an 
argument in a circle; that the law is made the condition 
of  the national character, and this again the condition 
of  the law; for there is the same reciprocal influence here 
as in art (p. 283).  The people make art,  but art in turn 
makes the people;  the people make the law, but the law 
in turn makes the people. 
Without objective security of  the law there is no sub- 
jective  feeling of  security, and without the latter there 
is no development of  character.  Character is the inner 
firmness and stability of  personality;  in ordcr that the 
latter  may  develop,  it must  find  favorable conditions 
outside.  Where  the  national  morality  consists  in 
ss Cod. 11, 14.  "Ne  liceat potentioribus patrocinium  ligitantibus 
Przstare vel actiones in se transferre."  In the middle ages cession 
to the clergy (I, 41, ch. 2, X de alien.).  In Turkey more than three 
fourths of the entire landed estate has come in this way into the 
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accommodating and subordinating oneself  to others, in 
a  policy  of  cunning, craft, dissimulation and dog-like 
submissiveness,  no characters  can  be  formed.  A  soil 
of  this kind produces only slaves and servants.  Those 
of  them who  conduct themselves  as masters are only 
servants in disguise, domineering and brutal toward their 
inferiors, cringing and cowardly toward  their superiors. 
For the development of  character man needs from the 
beginning  the feeling  of  security.  But this inner, sub- 
jective feeling of  security presupposes an external objec- 
tive security in society; and this man possesses through 
the law.  Man on the law is as firm and unshaken  in 
his confidence in it as the believer in his confidence in 
God.  Or, more precisely, both of  them put their trust 
not  merely  in something  outside  of  them,  but rather 
they feel God and the law within them as the firm ground 
of  their existence,  and as a  living part of  themselves; 
which therefore no power on earth can deprive them of, 
but can only destroy in and with them.  This is in both 
of  them the source of  their power.  The anxiety of  the 
ego  in  the world,  which  is the  natural  feeling of the 
animated atom thrown entirely upon itself, is removed 
with  trust in the higher  power which  supports it.  It 
feels the power within itseif and itself in the power.  In 
place  of  anxiety and fear  develops a  firm, immovable 
sense  of  security.  An  immovable  sense  of  security; 
this is, in my opinion, the correct expression for the state 
of  mind which law and religion produce in man when they 
correspond to  the ideas we form of  them.  The law gives 
him the feeling of  security in his relation to man, religion 
in his relation to  God. 
The security which these two grant is at  the same time 
dependence.  There  is  no  contradiction  in  this,  for 
security is not independence -  there is no such for man 
-  but legal dependence.  But dependence is the reverse 
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side, security the obverse.  Therefore  I  cannot accept 
the well-known definition of  Schleiermacher, who defines 
religion as the feeling  of  dependence upon  God, for  it 
makes the reverse side the face.  It may be suitable for 
that  stage  in the development  of  the religious  sense 
which corresponds to the stage of  despotism in the his- 
tory of  law -  here the feeling of  dependence in reality 
correctly designates the relation -  but it does not hold 
for the final conclusion of  the development.  This final 
conclusion consists, in religion as well  as in law, in the 
fact that the feeling of  security overcomes the feeling 
of  dependence.  In this sense, therefore, i. e., from  the 
psychological standpoint,  law  may  be  defined  as the 
feeling of  security in the State;  and religion, as the feeling 
of  security in  God. 
To the sense of  right  as the inner guarantee of  the 
secured existence of  the law I opposed above the adminis- 
tration  of  justice  as the outer  guarantee.  The peculiar 
character of  the administration of  justice  in contradis- 
tinction to the other tasks and branches of  the State's 
activities, is based  upon  two factors;  the inner pecu- 
liarity of  the purpose, and the outer  peculiarity of  the 
means and forms by which it is carried out.  In respect 
to the former, the distinction of  the administration of 
justice from the other branches of  the State's activities 
consists in the fact that its intention  is exclusively  to 
realize the law, -  its motto is the  law and nothing but the 
law.  The administrative authorities of  the State, too, 
to be sure, are in duty bound to apply the law as far as it 
extends, but with them there is a second factor associated 
with the law, vie., its adaptability to the end.  In contra- 
distinction to these, the authorities who are entrusted 
with the administration of  the law in the narrow sense, 
i.  e., the judicial  authorities, have their eye exclusively 
upon  the law.  The judge  must in a  certain sense be THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [ CH. vII1  0 11 I  SOCIAL MECHANICS-  COERCION  291 
nothing else than the law become alive in his person and  - 
endowed  with  speech.  If  justice  could  descend  from 
heaven and take a pencil in its hand to write down the 
law with such definiteness, precision and detail that its 
application should become a work of  mechanical routine, 
nothing more perfect could be conceived for the adminis- 
tration of  justice;  and the kingdom of  justice would be 
complete  upon  earth.  For  absolute  equality and  the 
strict dependence  of  the judicial  sentence upon  it are 
so far from being incompatible with the idea of  justice 
that on  the contrary they form its highest  aim.  The 
idea of  adaptability to an end, on the other hand, is so 
opposed to this constraint by a norm determined in detail 
-  - 
in  advance,  that complete  freedom  from constraint of 
any norm would  be  more  advantageous  than absolute 
constraint.  To transfer  the idea  of  constraint  in  the 
administration of  justice  to the other  branches of  the 
activity of  the State would  bring  the whole State into 
a condition of  torpor and rigidity. 
Upon this contrast of  the two ideas, of  the constrained 
character of  justice and the freedom of  adaptability to  an 
end, is based the inner distinction between the adminis- 
tration of  justice, and the executive function of  the gov- 
ernment ; and langiage expresses this properly  .b6 
56 In  the  expression  "Rechtsp$egeW  (administration  of  justice), 
"Recht"  (justice) is emphasized as its subject, and "Pjege"  (admin- 
istration), i. e., the zealous care and effort applied to  the law, as its 
task.  In "Justiz"  (administration of  the law) is emphasized "jus- 
titia," justice, i.  e., what is in accordance with law, as its highest aim. 
In "judex"  is emphasized  "jus  dicere,"  and in "Richter"  (judge), 
direction in a straight line in accordance with the prescribed rule of 
conduct.  On the other hand, "Regierung"  (government) contains 
the idea of  mastery ("regere,"  ''rex"), and "  Verwaltung"  (adminis- 
tration) that of  force which rules ("waltet")  freely  (from "valdan," 
"waltan,"  to be strong, to  compel, related to "valere").  An admin- 
istrator  ("Verwalter")  is he who has to observe the interest of  his 
principal.  The methods he is to follow are not prescribed for him, 
To the internal difference, or difference in purpose, 
between the administration of justice and the executive 
function of  government  corresponds  the difference in 
external organization. 
Among all civilized peoples there appears at  a certain 
stage in the development of  the law the separation of the 
administration  of  justice  from  the other  branches  of 
activity;  the judge  is a figure which meets  us 
everywhere.  This does not exclude the external com- 
bination  of  the judicial  and  administrative  functions 
in one and the same person.  The important  thing is 
only that the two spheres should be internally distinct, 
i. e., that the principles indicated for the one are different 
from  those  indicated  for  the  other.  But  experience 
teaches that the internal distinctness of  the two spheres 
is essentially furthered and secured if  external separation 
according to persons, separation of the judicial from the 
executive, is added  to internal.  This is so because  it 
exceeds the power of  man so to develop in his mind and 
to master  two  entirely  different  modes  of  conceiving 
and of  acting as to be able, according to the difference 
of  the subject, to apply  now the one,  now the other, 
without the one influencing the other.  The separation 
of  the administration of  justice from the executive func- 
tion must be an external one according to persons and 
offices  if  it  is to be quite sure of  its purpose. 
The reason for this requirement is not merely the prin- 
ciple of  division of  labor, i. e., the consideration that the 
law, on account of  its extent and difficulty, requires a 
special person.  The principle  of  the division of  labor 
holds also of  the executive function.  The public works 
but they consist in the interest, utility and welfare of  his superior. 
It is left to his own intelligence to  do  the right thing in a given case. 
The Roman antithesis is expressed in the  terms "jus"  ("jurisdictio") 
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require a different person  from  the mint;  forestry re- 
quires a different person  from mining;  and the State 
appoints different  officials for all these  different  pur- 
poses.  The  separation of the judicial from the executive 
function was already carried out historically at a time 
when the law  had not yet by any means attained so 
rich and fine a development as  is supposed in the assump- 
tion.  Compare, for  example, Rome and Germany, where 
the "judex"  and the "Schoffe"  (lay judge)  long preceded 
the  higher stage  of the  development of  the law; and in our 
institution of the  jury at  the present day,  the requirement 
of a special knowledge of  the law is entirely ignored. 
The separation  of  the judicial  from  the  executive 
function cannot therefore be referred to the principle of 
the division of  labor; and there must be another reason. 
It  lies in the peculiarity above mentioned of  the problem 
of the law in contradistinction to all the other problems 
of the activity of  the State.  The separation of  the judi- 
cial as a separate branch of  State activity means  the 
retirement of  the law into itself for the purpose of  solv- 
ing its problems with security and completeness. 
The mere fact of  the external separation of  the judi- 
cial function from the executive, quite apart from the 
institutions and guarantees to  be named forthwith which 
accompany the same, is of  great value for that purpose. 
By separating the judicial  function, the State authority 
recognizes in principle that the law is a distinct problem, 
and that the considerations determining its solution are 
different from all those other problems which the State 
reserves for itself.  In handing over the administration 
of justice to  the judge they actually declare before all the 
people that they wish to renounce that privilege.  The 
establishment of  the judicial office signifies self-limitation 
in principle on the part of  the State authorities in refer- 
ence to that portion of  the law which is handed over to 
p  11  1  SOCIAL MECHANICS-  COERCION  293 
the .?dministration of  the judge.  It means empowering 
the judge to find the law independently of  them and in 
accordance  altogether with his own coavictions, and the 
assurance of  the binding force of  the sentence handed 
down by him.  They  may lay the boundaries asnarrow or 
as  wide as  they please; within these boundaries they have 
given the judge independence.  Disregard of this  fact  will 
bring them in open contradiction with themselves, and 
will stamp their proceeding as a breach of  the law, as 
a  murder of  justice.  The State authorities  who lay a 
hand upon that order of  justice  which they themselves 
have created pronounce their own condemnation. 
According  to what has just  been said, therefore, the 
purely  external  separation  of  the  judicial  from  the 
executive function denotes a highly important develop- 
ment along the path of  the law.  It  represents, if  I may 
be  allowed  a  juristic  comparison, the emancipation  of 
the administration of  justice  from the State authorities 
by means of  division of  labor.  Justice changes its  abode, 
and the mere removal has the consequence that if  the 
State authorities desire to lay violent hands on it, they 
must first cross the street; whereas, as long as it lived 
under the same roof with them, they could have done the 
thing within the four walls without being noticed. 
Now let us examine more closely justice's  household, 
and the arrangements which it  contains.  It  is composed 
of four constituent parts: 
1.  lllaterial law, which is handed over to the 
2.  Judge for his exclusive application.  It  is applied to 
3.  Two disputing parties, and 
4.  In the form of  a fixed and prescribed mode of  pro- 
cedure (law-suit.) 
of  these four elements the first contains nothing which 
is peculiar to the administration of  justice;  it  is common 
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only in  this, that the judge  is expected  to be  guided 
exclusively by the law (p. 289),  and this requirement makes 
it necessary that the law should be fixed with the great- 
est possible completeness and precision.  The effort to 
bind the judge to the law as much as  possible is respon- 
sible for an arrangement which is repeatedly met with 
in the history of  law in very different stages of its  develop- 
ment.  It consists in the requirement of  express refer- 
ence to the law, whether on the part of  the party who 
desires to set the activity of  the judge in motion (Roman 
procedure of "legis acti0,"~1  bill of  indictment of  modem 
criminal  procedure),  or  on the  part  of  the  judge  in 
handing down the sentence (modern criminal procedure). 
We might designate it as the system of  procedural legal- 
ism.  This prescription raises the conformity to material 
law of  judicial  procedure to a procedural requirement of 
the act in question;  the procedural  act is not possible 
unless it can show its legitimacy in material law.  Being 
calculated to exclude judicial  arbitrariness and to keep 
constantly  before  the judge's  mind  the fact that his 
power  extends only as far as the law permits, this ar- 
rangement purchases this advantage at  the cost of  mak- 
ing the development of  the law beyond the prescribed 
frame in practice difficult in a high degree,  and handing 
it over  exclusively  to the legislature -  a consequence 
which may seem desirable for criminal law as  a guarantee 
of  legal security, but which  contains a decided evil for 
civil law.  For the latter, the obligation of  the judge  to 
assign  reasons  for his decision .contains a  much  more 
useful form of  the same idea.  It forces him to justify 
his judgment objectively without restricting him to the 
immediate content of  the law. 
[The procedure by which, by  the solemn act of  the parties them- 
selves, a legal issue was made in a legal controversy at  Roman law.] 
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Another form of the law, which follows the same pur- 
pose  as the above, except that it does it in a still less 
appropriate  way,  is  the  casuistical.  This,  instead  of 
giving  the  judge  general  principles  and  leaving  their 
correct application in a particukar case to  his own insight, 
gives  him  detailed  regulations  for every  case,  juristic 
recipes  for the decision  of  all  possible  law-suits, which 
are intended to free him from all further searching.  The 
impossibility  of seeing  beforehand  the infinite  variety 
and manifold  formation  of  cases, stamps this attempt 
of absolutely fixing the judicial  decision as a wrong one 
from the start.  The idea in the mind'of  the author is 
to make the application of  the law a purely mechanical 
thing, in which judicial  thinking should be made super- 
flous by the law.  We are reminded  of  the duck con- 
structed by Vaucanson, which  carried out the process 
of  digestion  mechanically;  the case  is thrown into the 
judging  machine  in front, and it comes out again as a 
judgment  behind.  Experience has judged  here also - 
the brain of  the judge  cannot be replaced by the legisla- 
tor.  The result which  he  obtains through attempts of 
this kind consists in reality only in stupefying the judge. 
I now turn to the three other requirements of  the ad- 
ministration of  justice.  These are peculiar  to it.  The 
form in which the law is applied in the administration 
of  justice  is  based  upon  the fact  that it takes  place 
between two conficting parties, by following a prescribed 
procedure  (law-suit),  through  the judge.  The  point 
about  which  the whole  administration of  justice  turns 
1s  the law-suit. 
A  dispute  presupposes  two  disputing members,  the 
Parties.  In a civil action, they are the plaintiff  and the 
defendant,  in a criminal action, the State authorities and 
the defendant  The conflict must be settled by a third 
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This is the task  of  the judge;  and the position  which 
the State assigns to him must be such as to enable him 
to fulfil this task.  To assign the judge the role of  one 
of  the parties (of the State  which prosecutes the criminal) 
in addition to his role as judge, as was the case in early 
criminal  procedure, was  a  form of  the relation  which 
hindered  in the highest  degree  the requirement  of  im- 
partiality in the judge;  to be a party and to be impartial 
is an impossible combination. 
The relation of  the parties to the judge is that of  legal 
sz~bordination; their  relation  to each  other  is  one  of 
legal  equality.  The State, too,  when  it appears  as a 
party  in  a  civil  or  criminal  case,  subordinates itself 
legally  to the judge;  it stands on the same line  with 
a  private person, and becomes a party like any other. 
In those relations where this seems to it inappropriate, 
it must by law not assign the decision to the judge, but 
reserve it to itself.  If  it has once done the former, it 
must take the consequences also, and go to law like every 
other party, i.  e., it must subordinate itself  entirely to 
the judge and the rules of  the case. 
The relation of  the parties in the case to each other 
is that of  legal equality.  The weapons  with which they 
fight each other must be apportioned equally, light and 
shade must  be  equally distributed.  It is  the first  of 
all  requirements  which  the organization  of  procedural 
law  must  realize, that of  procedural justice,  which here 
again  coincides  with  equality  (p.  275).  All the other 
requirements  are  secondary  in  comparison  with  this, 
and have adaptability to an end as their object. 
Parties, judges,  law-suits, form accordingly the three 
peculiar  criteria  of  the  administration  of  justice.  It 
follows  from  this that martial  law  or lynch  law  does 
not belong to the administration of  justice.  The State 
authorities are not  in  this case  seeking  justice  from  a 
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judge  who is placed  above them;  they declare  it them- 
selves.  The court-martial which  they order represents 
themselves;  it has only the name of  court, in reality 
it functions like an administrative authority.  How far 
the State must extend  the scope of  the administration 
of justice  in the true sense of  the word  is a question of 
policy.  Up to recently  the latter was confined to the 
administration  of  civil  and  criminal  law.  We  knew 
only the civil and criminal judge, the civil and criminal 
process.  But  the  progress  in  public  law  which  our 
modern  period  has made, gave a wider  extension also 
to the administration of  justice  (court for State contro- 
versies,  administrative  justice),  and  will  do so in  all 
probability more and more in the course of  time. 
Now, no matter how  precisely  the law  may  be  laid 
down which is to be applied materially and procedurally, 
the entire success of  the administration of  justice depends 
ultimately upon two requisite conditions in the person 
of  the judge;  the securing of which must therefore form 
the  chief  aim  of  legislation.  One  is  intellectual  in 
its  nature;  the necessary  knowledge must  be his and 
the requisite readiness in its application;  in short theo- 
retical and practical  mastery of  the law.  The arrange- 
ments of  the present day which are intended to secure 
this are well  known;  the study of  the law, the State 
examinations  and  probational  service.  The second  is 
moral in its nature, and a matter of  character; he must 
have  the necessary  firmness of  will  and moral courage 
to maintain  the law without  being  led  astray by con- 
siderations of  any kind, by hate or friendship, sympathy 
or fear.  It is the quality of justice  in the subjective 
sense,  "constans  ac  perpetua  voluntas  suum  cuique 
tribuendi"  (1. 1.  10.  pr.).  The true judge  knows  no 
respect  of  person;  the parties who appear before him 
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persons in the mask of  plaintiff and defendant;  he only 
sees the mask, not the individual behind it.  Abstraction 
from all concrete  accessories, elevation  of  the concrete 
case to the height of  the abstract situation as decided 
in the law, treatment of  the case in the manner of  an 
example in arithmetic where it is  immaterial  what  it 
is  that is numbered, whether  it be  ounces or  pounds, 
dollars or  cents, -  this is what  characterizes the true 
judge. 
Knowledge may be bought, character cannot.  There 
is no arrangement  which  can  secure  against  partiality 
in a judge. 
But in this direction also a great deal  can be done. 
Legislation may follow one of  two ways in this matter. 
It can  either  try  to prevent  partiality  in  the  germ 
by  removing  as far  as  possible  the  occasions  which 
might  induce it (prophylactic method), or it can com- 
bat  it directly, either by  counteracting  it psychologi- 
cally or  by trying at least  to make  it as harmless  as 
possible in its consequences (repressive method). 
The psychological  counterpoise  which  presents itself 
first to the  law, for  counteracting  the temptation  of 
the judge to partiality, is the moral one of  the oath, the 
well-known judge's  oath which we meet  among all civi- 
lized  peoples,  and  from  which  our  present  "Gesch- 
worene" and "jury"  has its name.  But the effectiveness 
of this  means  depends upon  the conscientiousness of 
the individual ; if  he has no conscience it fails of its pur- 
pose.  For such there is the fear of  the disadvantageous 
consequences of  violation of  duty which the law threatens 
(disciplinary investigation, civil liability, criminal pun- 
ishment).  But this means too has only a limited effec- 
tiveness, it strikes  only the gross violations of  duty,  which 
are plainly  seen  to be  such on the surface;  partiality 
escapes it under the guise of  free subjective conviction. 
On  the other hand, legislation has no dearth of  means 
for making  the consequences of  partiality  harmless up 
to a certain degree, partly  by  the constitution  of  the 
court, partly by the procedure.  The evil consequences 
of  partiality  may  be  avoided  by  the  former  method 
through  the  appointment  of  a  bench-court.  Where 
the majority of the judges of  a country are animated 
by the spirit of  loyalty and conscientiousness, the method 
of appointing a bench-court  gives a guarantee, accord- 
ing to the law of large numbers, that the conscientious 
judge  will  dominate  in  them,  and  co-operation  with 
him will put a certain limitation upon the less conscien- 
tious also.  With a single judge, on the contrary, there 
is  room  for  chance;  here  the judge  of  no .conscience 
stands by himself;  the equalizing and restraining influ- 
ence of  his colleague is absent, and at most  there still 
remains his  regard  for the higher  court.  But for  this 
very  reason  the latter is of  two-fold  value  as against 
the single judge.  With  adequately filled  bench-courts 
appellate  courts are scarcely necessary, but in the case 
of  a single judge an appeal should never be denied.  The 
standard of  the amount of  the object in dispute, accord- 
ing to which the permission of  appeal to a higher court 
is regularly  measured, is scarcely to be justified.  The 
interest of  justice is measured  not merely according to 
the value of  the object, but also according to the ideal 
value of  the law, and as I feel I would rather submit the 
most important matter to the single decision of  a bench- 
court  than the most  insignificant  to the decision of  a 
single judge. 
In addition to the repressive method  just  discussed, 
there  is  open  to legislation  the above-mentioned  pro- 
phylactic, which is calculated  to remove as far as pos- 
sible  the occasions and  inducements  to partiality  on 
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in a limited measure only.  The sword of  justice presup- 
poses in the person  who is called upon to wield  it the 
moral courage to strike the guilty one with it and take 
upon himself  his iil-will, hatred and enmity.  Say what 
you  will,  these  possible injurious  consequences cannot 
be taken away from the judge;  and in this sense we can 
say that the just  judge  must  "carry  his swn skin to 
market." 
But legislation can and must see to it that the risk 
which  the judge  has to stake for  justice  shall not  be 
higher than is absolutely necessary;  and that he should 
not be required to jeopardize his existence.  The annals 
of  the  administration  of  justice  exhibit  splendid  and 
elevating examples of  the fearlessness, steadfastness and 
moral heroisrn of judges, but society has the most vital 
interest in not straining its  demands on the moral strength 
of  the judge  too far.  The judicial  office  must  not be 
founded on the presupposition  of  heroism and martyr- 
dom, but on a moderate proportion of  human strength. 
The father must be spared the torture of  condemning 
his own children to  death as did Brutus of  old.  The  judge 
should not be expected to sit in judgment over his wife 
and child, and if  he desires it,  the law, as is actually the 
case, should forbid it.  No one should judge in a matter 
affecting himself;  and even when an enemy or a friend 
or a  near  relative  stands as a  party before  him,  the 
judge himself  as well  as the party should be given the 
privilege of  proposing the withdrawal of  the judge from 
the case.  The law must not cease for a moment its en- 
deavors to keep away from the judge all palpable temp- 
tations and allurements;  not only for his own sake, but 
also in the interest of  society. 
In this direction the establishment of  bench-courts, - 
and we  come to the second invaluable point of  superi- 
ority of  these over the single judge, -  is of  quite extraor- 
dinary value. 
The sentence of the single judge is his own.  He must 
answer for it, and take upon himself  the hatred, ill-will 
and persecution of  the person injured by it.  In a bench- 
court of justice  the part of  the particular judge  in the 
verdict cannot be known;  and if the legal obligation of 
official secrecy in reference to the vote is observed, the 
public  knows  nothing  about  it.  No  one  can  hold  a 
particular member responsible for the verdict with cer- 
tainty.  And this uncertainty, this veil which the "court 
of justice"  throws over the part of the individual, does 
the same service  for weakness  as the secret  ballot  in 
elections.68 For this very reason legislation should make 
it a most stringent obligation to preserve official secrecy 
in  the internal proceedings  of  a  judicial  college,  and 
visit every breach of this secrecy with a. heavy penalty. 
Official secrecy is one of  the most effective guarantees 
of  judicial independence. 
Among  all  the  powers  and  influences  which  may 
become dangerous to the impartiality of  the judge,  the 
influence of  the State authorities  which  gave him  his 
office takes by far the first place in the case of  the pro- 
fessional judge,  with whom  I am primarily  concerned. 
The office to which he is called constitutes as a rule the 
econonlic basis of  his whole existence.  If  they can take 
it away from him at will, they are in a position, when 
they desire a definite judicial decision in their interest, 
to put before him the alternative of  submitting to their 
wish or losing his position and his income. 
In Rome they adopted in later times this form of  voting ("per 
tabellas")  not only in elections but also in popular courts and jury 
courts ("quaestiones  perpetuae").  Where the strength is wanting 
not to  allow oneself to be influenced, it  is already a gain when weak- 
ness is given the possibility, by means of  secrecy, of  free self-deter- 
mination.  It is deplorable that we  should  have to count  with 
weakness, but it is after all better  to obtain a  tolerable result  by 
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The judge's independence of  the mere pleasure of  the 
State authorities, the security  of  his  position  by  law, 
and the use of the same strictly in accordance with the 
directions laid down in the law, are therefore the indis- 
pensable guarantee of  legal security, and constitute an 
infallible sign  whether  the State authorities  take  the 
recognized principle of the independence of  justice seri- 
ously or not.  To the impossibility of  removing a judge 
our  time  has  frequently  added  the  impossibility  of 
transferring the judge  against  his  will;  and it cannot 
be denied that the latter forms a valuable complement 
to the former. 
But the protection against the loss of  his position alone 
is not sufficient to give the judge  independence unless 
the office  itself  makes  him  economically independent. 
Adequate pay of  the judicial office according to the point 
of  view which we established above (p. 152) for salary, 
is a requirement of  the first rank for a healthy formation 
of  the  administration  of  justice.  Economy  in  the 
management of  the State is nowhere applied with greater 
injury than here.  And  it is a shameful  proof  of  the 
imperfect political insight of  many popular representa- 
tives in Germany that instead of taking the initiative, 
in the interest of  society, to raise the salaries -most 
glaringly incommensurate with  the higher  cost  of  liv- 
ing -  of judicial  officers  to the proper  measure,  they 
have even in a number of  instances opposed in an irre- 
sponsible manner the proposals of  the governments for 
this purpose.  The experience of  other countries could 
have  taught them  that the people must pay  two-fold 
and three-fold, in the form of  bribe, what the State econo- 
mizes in the salaries of  its officials. 
The three means just  mentioned, namely, security of 
position,  secrecy  in  voting,  and adequate salary, are 
sufficient  to enable the judge  to state his  convictions 
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freely in regard to a private person as well as the authori- 
ties of the State.  A judge so placed is inviolable.  But 
he is not yet for this reason  inaccessible.  The way of 
intimidation alone is closed to the tempter, but he can 
steal  upon  him  by another way also;  and this secret 
path can be used by the State as well as the private per- 
son.  And  in the case of  the former it is particularly 
dangerous.  Not merely  because  the means which  the 
State commands  (preferment, honors)  are far superior 
to those of  the private person,  but for another reason 
also.  The mere attempt to bribe the judge on the part 
of a private person carries the stamp of  illegality on its 
face.  The mere offer  denotes the tempter, and reveals 
him in his true colors.  The State, on the other hand, 
does not need  to make an offer.  It does not have to 
name the venal judge  a price for his compliance.  The 
possession of  the price in its hands performs  the same 
service -  servility  and  ambition  divine  its  thoughts 
from a distance and meet it half  way. 
There is no means of  protection against thzs danger. 
You cannot take away from the State by law the power 
freely to dispose of  those means.  This could be done 
only by applying the principle  of  length  of  service to 
preferment,  bestowal  of  rank  and  decorations.  Nor 
can you blindfold justice so tight as to prevent it from 
casting  ogling glances at the external reward  beyond. 
But where the judiciary  of  a country is inspired on the 
whole by the spirit of  loyalty to duty and conscientious- 
ness, -  and we shall see later to what extent this spirit 
is developed and strengthened by the vocation itself - 
there  the danger arising from the servility and lack of 
character of  a  small  fraction of  the judiciary  is really 
not very great.  The danger would be great only if  the 
the State authorities had it in their power  to pick out 
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for a  given  action.  Under  these  conditions  it would 
really not be difficult for them to bring together the use- 
ful  instruments; and arbitrary officials have always made 
use of  such means to carry out their aims.  The Star 
Chamber of  Henry VII  and the High  Commission of 
Elizabeth  in  England,  the  "Central  Commission  of 
Investigation"  appointed  by  the earlier  German  con- 
federacy in Mayence (1819) "for the purpose of  further 
investigating the revolutionary activities and demagogic 
associations discovered in several States of  tlie confed- 
eracy,"  and the Central Commission of  Investigation in 
Frankfort  (1833)  devoted  to the same purpose,  have 
shown by a warning and memorable example what  the 
nations  may  expect  when  despotism  and  absolutist 
tyranny select their own judges.  But they oweit to  these 
very experiences that the  more recent constitutions have 
forbidden on principle all such regulations.  This is the 
basis of  the eminently political side of  the doctrine of  the 
judiciary and the province of  courts, which the jurist loses 
sight of  only too easily when he treats them in a purely 
dogmatic way. 
But the arrangement has its weak side.  The latter 
is found in the State authorities appointing the judges 
to the courts.  The State authorities cannot, it is true, 
select their own court, but they appoint the judges  who 
form the court.  Their legal constraint as far as the court 
is concerned may therefore be paralyzed by their admin- 
istrative freedom in reference to the choice of  persons. 
The State authorities transfer the inconvenient  persons 
to another court and put others more compliant in their 
places.  Then they have the court as they wish it. 
There is no security in my opinion against this danger. 
The State authorities offer  the  inconvenient judge  a 
better place and he goes.  The regulation  that a  judge 
cannot be transferred against his will offers no adequate 
protection  against this.  He simply makes room  for his 
successor for whom  the place  was intended.  But the 
State authorities will  not allow  any encroachment of 
their  right to fill  judicial  positions  according  to their 
judgment.  And all the means that might be invented 
to prevent  the possibility  of  applying  this right  dis- 
honestly in the manner  indicated  are seen in  advance 
to be impracticable.  There is nothing  left, therefore, 
except  to recognize  that the possibility of  the govern- 
ment  exercising an influence on the administration  of 
justice cannot be removed by law, and protection against 
this danger should be looked for simply in public opinion 
and the feeling of  justice and honor of  the government 
itself.  For the government to fill the judicial positions 
in a court of  justice with a special purpose in view is a 
step so striking and so evident in its motive that they 
must expect to see the people judge it as on the same 
line with  open violation  of  justice.  Whether  the gain 
is worth the cost, that is the question.  We need not go 
too far into the past to find support for our statement. 
I have spoken so far exclusively of  the professional 
jz~dge,  i.e., the permanent, learned, and salaried judge. 
And  the result of  my discussion consists in the conclu- 
sion that it is not possible to make the administration 
of justice completely independent of  the State authori- 
ties in this form of  the judicial office.  On the other hand 
there is one form of  court which really solves this prob- 
lem completely, and that is the  jury.  The juryman has 
nothing either to fear or to hope from the government. 
His appearance, i.e., the choice of  a particular juryman, 
is  too  sudden  and  incalculable,  his  function  too brief 
to make an attempt at subornation on the part of  the 
government  practicable.  Time  and  place  put  insur- 
mountable  difficulties in  the way.  If  the ideal of  the 
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government,  there  would  be  no  more  perfect institu- 
tion than the jury.  But dependence upon the govern- 
ment is not the only dependence which we have to fear 
in the judge.  Whether he allows himself  to be guided 
by his political and religious prejudices, by a side glance 
at public opinion and the press, by the blame or praise 
of  his friends, by the authority of  one of  his fellow jury- 
men, or whether his judgment  is influenced by regard 
for the government, what difference does it make?  We 
cannot speak of  real independence either in the one case 
or in the other.  In all these cases the judge is not what 
he should be. 
The only consideration, then, for deciding in favor of 
the one or  the other  institution is, which  of  the two 
promises the relatively higher measure of  independence 
and the greater security for carrying out the law.  And 
here, I think, the  decision should not be doubtful.  Obedi- 
ence to the law is the first virtue of  the judge;  but the 
obedience of the judge, like that of  the soldier, must first 
be learned.  As military discipline becomes by long serv- 
ice not merely a habit, but second nature, to the extent 
that an old  soldier feels antipathy to insubordination 
and disorder, so it is with  the judge's obedience to the 
law.  It is the beautiful fruit of  all continued exercise 
of  a  given virtue  that habit  not  merely  facilitates it, 
but makes it a necessity, so that a person cannot leave 
it without losing in his own esteem.  This is true in a 
higher degree when the exercise of  this virtue  consti- 
tutes the vocation and the duty of  an entire class.  Here 
there is added besides, the habit of  the class and  the 
power  of custom developed therefrom, i.  e., the special 
ethics and honor of  the class.  And the disposition re- 
sulting therefrom  becomes so powerful and compelling 
within the class itself that no member can ignore it with- 
out  suffering considerable  injury.  The  fulfilment  of 
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the duty incumbent upon  the class  becomes  a  matter 
of  honor,  i. e, a  condition of  the respect of  others and 
of self-respect.  It is only the class that develops the 
qualities of  its profession to such an extent  that  the 
novice who enters it is seized by the class spirit and the 
feeling of  class honor, and is guided in the right path 
even before he has gained the conviction of  their neces- 
sity through  individual experience.  It is the treasure 
of  peculiar  experiences and views  which  accumulates 
gradually, and in which every new member participates 
without his knowledge and desire, guarding and preserv- 
ing it in turn, and handing it on after him.  It is the 
unwritten law of  the class developed in the form of  the 
class spirit. 
The two  factors  just  developed,  viz., the  constant 
practice of  a virtue elevated to a duty and a life-work, 
and the supporting, educating and compelling influence 
which the tradition of  the class exerts upon it, these two 
determine the superiority of  the professional judge  to 
the occasional, as is the juryman.  The advantage which 
the former has in comparision is not merely the technical 
advantage of the specialist over  the amateur in greater 
knowledge, readiness  and  cultivation  of  judgment,  but 
it is also moral, namely  the habit  of  subordination  to 
the law, the exercise of  the will in a definite direction. 
AS  the soldier has to learn subordination in the strict 
school  of  military  discipline, so must  the judge  learn 
obedience to the law in the practice of  the administra- 
tion of  justice.  Practice in  judicial decision is the school 
ofjustice.  That which makes the judge must be learned, 
namely, strict obedience to the law, closing one's eyes 
to all respect of  persons, equal measure for the vulgar 
and the respectable, the rascal  and the man of honor, 
the  rich  usurer  and  the  poor  widow; closing the ear 
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lamentations of  their dependents, from whom the judge's 
decision will take away a husband and father.  It is not 
the bad man in him he must suppress, but the good; and 
this is the hardest test which the service of  justice im- 
poses,  similar  to that  demanded  of  the  soldier  who 
must shoot his comrade.  For it is not the base motive 
that entices one in this case from the law but the noble, 
-humanity,  sympathy, mercy.  Now let us suppose - 
to fill  our measure to the brim -  a case in which the 
law  which  the judge  must carry out is in diametrical 
opposition to his own feeling of  justice.  Imagine a case 
in which the law recognizes capital punishment, and the 
judge is doubtful in his own mind whether the act should 
be punished at  all, and you will form an idea of  what it 
means to pay obedience to  the law.  Can we expect that 
a novice should be equal to this task, who takes his seat 
as a juryman  today to leave it forever  the next day? 
You  might just as well expect the same discipline from 
a national guardsman as from the professional soldier. 
As  the latter is different from the former, so is the pro- 
fessional judge different from the juryman.  The former 
is the professional soldier in the service  of  justice, with 
whom  the exercise of  justice  has become  a  habit and 
second nature, and who must pledge his honor for it. 
The latter is the militiaman, to whom his uniform and 
arms are something  strange, and who, when  he  must 
play the soldier for once, feels himself  not the soldier, 
but the citizen.  He may wear everything which denotes 
the  soldier outwardly, but he misses that which makes 
the soldier inwardly:  the  full  sense of  discipline and 
subordination. 
It is for experience to decide whether  the judgment 
which I have thus expressed of  the juryman is too harsh. 
Experience shows us cases everywhere in which the facts 
of  the crime were as clear as daylight, and yet the jury 
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acquitted  the accused.  It is an open contempt for the 
law, which they presumed to disobey because it did not 
agree  with  their opinion. 
But if  the jury  is to have the power to measure the 
guilt of the accused not according to the law, but accord- 
ing to their subjective feeling, as  actually happened once 
in Rome in the popular court for criminal law, let this. 
power  be given  them  constitutionally.  But as long as 
this has not been done, as long as it is not the business 
of  the jury to sit in judgment  over the law  instead of 
over  the accused, every  such  act is arbitrary and an 
open revolt against law and order.  Whether it be the 
State  or  the jury  that tramples  the law under  foot, 
whether it  is done to punish  the innocent or to acquit the 
guilty, it is all one;  the law is disregarded.  And it is 
not  merely  a  particular law that is  disregarded.  It  is 
possible  indeed  that  it really  challenged  opposition, 
though even this palliation in many cases does not apply. 
But in this particular law  the respect  and  majesty  of 
law in general is injured;  its power is put in question, 
and the belief  in its inviolability shattered.  The secu- 
rity of  the law, which rests upon the certainty that the 
law  will  be  applied  uniformly  in all  cases, ceases.  In 
place of  the objective law, the same for all, we have the 
changeable, incalculable, subjective feeling of the jury, 
arbitrariness and chance.  Here the accused is acquitted; 
there, for the like offence, he is condemned.  The one 
goes free, the other goes to prison or mounts the scaf- 
fold. 
And who will assure us that a court which  places it- 
self above the law to acquit the guilty will not some other 
time do the same to condemn the innocent?  Once the 
firm path  of  the law is  abandoned, the way opens to 
the right as well as to the left, and no one can tell in 
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broken through its dam will take its course.  It is only 
a  question  of  what  mood  will  get the upper  hand in 
the masses in a time of  excitement.  Today the Royalists 
condemn  the  Republicans,  tomorrow the Republicans 
the Royalists.  Today the Conservatives condemn  the 
Liberals,  tomorrow  the  Liberals  will  condemn  the 
Conservatives.  The  correction  of  the  law  by  the 
jury  is  a  two-edged  sword  which  may  in  certain 
circumstances  strike  in  quite  a  different  direction 
from  that intended and expected  by many of  its sup- 
porters. 
To sum up  my judgment  of  the institution of  the 
jury, I can only say that apart from the single factor of 
its independence of  the government, the jury in all other 
respects combines in itself those qualities which a judge 
should  not  have.  Without the  knowledge  of  the  law 
which study alone can give; without the sense of  legality 
which the class alone can inculcate;  without the feeling 
of  responsibility  which  the  ofice  alone  can  develop; 
without  the  independence  of  judgment  which  prac- 
tice  alone  can  form, -without  all  these  qualities  the 
men  from  the  "people"  take their places  in  the box, 
perhaps  already  prejudiced  by  the  judgment  which 
has been  formed  on the case  in the public  mind  or 
by the press.  They are easily led  and determined by 
the art of  the defender, who knows how to hit the point 
where  he  has to apply  his  lever, namely  their  heart, 
their  humanity,  their  prejudices,  their  interests,  their 
political  tendency.  They  are accessible  to the  influ- 
ence  of  authority in voting,  and swayed by the con- 
fidence with which a view is presented to them, though 
it be different  from  that in favor of  which they would 
have  otherwise  decided.  For  they  console  themselves 
with  the thought  that the others must  know  better, 
and throw the burden of  responsibility from thernqelves 
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upon the shoulders of those others  "Good  people but 
poor n~usicians,"  they are mere militia of  the adrninis- 
tration of  justice.  One real soldier is worth more than 
a  dozen  of  militia. 
And is all this to be outweighed by the one factor of 
independence of  the government?  We  ask  ourselves 
in  astonishment, how  could  an  institution  so wholly 
imperfect  gain such successes,  and find an open door 
everywhere?  It is  clear  that  powerful  causes  must 
have assisted in the process.  And it is actually so.  The 
institution of  the jury  freed our administration of  jus- 
tice  from  a  two-fold  pressure  which  weighed  heavily 
upon it hitherto;  that of  absolutism and of  the medi- 
aval theory  of  evidence -  a service in both  cases  of 
incstimable worth.  In both directions it was necessary 
to break completely with  the past;  and there was no 
means  more  appropriate for the purpose than the  in- 
troduction  of  the institution above named.  The jury- 
man who is quite independent  of  the government took 
the place of the dependent judge for that branch of  the 
administration of  justice  in which  the influence  of  the 
governmental authorities was most to be feared, namely, 
the criminal law.  In this way absolutism lost its most 
effective means  of  suppressing all  endeavors  directed 
against it.  And  the feeling of  the security of  law and 
the possibility  of  assured  legal progress  took the place 
of  the earlier feeling of  the insecurity of  law. 
This gave us Archimedes' point  for lifting the hither- 
to existing  world  out of  its hinges.  From  this fixed 
point of vantage has proceeded, according to my opinion, 
all that stamps our  present  legal  status internally as 
well  as externally.  Internally, the strengthening of the 
national  feeling for right, and the removal of  that dull 
submissiveness with which in the last century the people 
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the general dihsion of  the knowledge of the sacredncss 
and inviolability of  the law, as the palladium  of  civil 
society, as the power  before  which  the bearer  of  the 
highest  governmental  authority must  bow,  as well  as 
the most insignificant subject.  To this feeling for right 
we  owe that jealous  watching over  the law, our hard- 
won  treasure, and  the  determination  and  courage  to 
maintain the same, and on the part of  the government 
the corresponding  fear  of  violating it.  Externally, the 
realization of  the idea that the administration of  justice 
is independent of  the arbitrary control  of  the govem- 
ment, through the constitutional security of  the judicial 
office  (irremovability of  the judge,  prohibition of  cabi- 
net justice).  Trial by  jury  formed  the watchword  of 
the reform of  our law.  In the eyes of  the people it was a 
question directed to the governments, "Shall  it be jus- 
tice or despotism?"  And it  exerted its wholesome effects 
even before  it came, by the mere fact of  its being  in 
sight, by the fact that it existed in other places.  The 
legal institutions of  one nation reacted  from a distance 
upon the whole civilized  world. 
Trial by jury therefore marks the transition from abso- 
lutism to government by law, and this service we  shall 
ncver  forget.  With all  the defects that cling to it, it 
was not paid for too dearly.  But the temporary justifi- 
cation of  an institution is one thing, the permanent is 
another.  The former I willingly grant for the jury, the 
latter I contest.  And I am convinced that a time will 
come when, in safe possession of  the security of  the law, 
we will say to the jurymen,  "The  Moor  has done his 
duty, the Moor  can go."  For he is a  Moor  and will 
remain one, and all the art of  his supporters will not be 
able towash him white.  To  be sure, much soap will be 
expended uselessly  before people will  be generally con- 
vinced  of  the fact. 
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The second service, too, which  the institution of  the 
jury  has done us,  wiz., the removal  of  the medizval 
theory of  evidence, is a highly valuable  one, but, like 
the first, of  a  temporary  nature.  One might  suppose 
that this service can be contested on the ground that 
there was  no real  need  for  this institution;  that the 
theory  of  evidence  might  have been  removed  by law 
for the professional judge.  This would be unjust accord- 
ing to  my opinion.  It  is of  no use to  pour new wine into 
old bottles.  The break with the old theory of  evidence 
could be accomplished much more easily and safely by 
means of the lay judge than by means of  the professional 
judge for whom its application had become a second na- 
ture.  Not merely the theory, but the habit also had to be 
removed.  But in  this  matter, too, there is noreason 
why the Moor should beretainedafterhehasdonehi~dut~. 
The disapproving  judgment  which  I  have just  now 
passed upon the institution of  the jury is not based on 
the fact that the juryman is as a rule a  layman.  The 
decisive point for me is not the contrast of  layman and 
jurist, but that of  the sporadic judge and the permanent. 
Against  the layman as a constant judge  placed  by the 
side of the jurist, i. e., the lay judge,  I  have nothing to 
object.  I  believe,  on the contrary, that this form  of 
taking a man from the people to assist in the adminis- 
tration of justice has its future.  But the vitality of  the 
institution  of  lay  judges  is conditioned,  according  to 
my opinion, by two requirements  for its organization. 
One is that the service of  the lay judge should be long 
enough  to educate him  in the exercise  of  the judicial 
function.  The  second condition is that provision should 
be made by law for maintaining a fixed body amid the 
change of the particular members, which should be in a 
position to preserve the tradition, and to hand down to 
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legality.  In short, the institution should be so organ- 
ized that it  be assured of  the two decisive advantages of 
the permanent  judicial  office, viz., a  long schooling  in 
the administration of  justice,  and the moral disposition 
of  the  individual  and  the  class  discipline  controlling 
him,  are developed  therefrom.  The institution 
of lay judges  would, in  these circumstances, give  us a 
solution of  the problem which we sought for in vain in 
the salaried professional judge (p. 303) ; namely, it  would 
present us with a permanent judge  who could be com- 
pletely  independent  of  the  government.  Experience 
must show whether the essential condition of  the insti- 
tution, viz., the necessary number of  intelligent laymen 
who are in a position to devote themselves for a length of 
time without pay to the service of  justice, will be created 
everywhere. 
3.  The Limits of  the  Subordination  of  the Government 
to  the  Law.  By  the  law  the  government  ties  its 
own  hands.  How  far should the government do this? 
Absolutely?  In this  case  every  man  would  have  to 
obey  the  law  only.  The government  would  have no 
right to  command or forbid any thing which was not pro- 
vided for in the law.  The law of  the State would thus 
be placed on the same line as the law of  nature.  As in 
nature so in the State, the law would be the only power 
which  moves  every  thing.  Chance and arbitrariness 
would  be completely  suppressed on principle, and the 
machinery of  the State would go like clock-work, which 
carries out all the prescribed motions with unfailing cer- 
tainty, regularity and uniformity. 
This would  be the just  State, as it seems, as perfect 
as one can think it.  Only one quality would  be miss- 
ing-vitality.  Such a State would  not be able to exist 
a  month.  In  order  to be  able  to do so,  it would 
have  to  be  what  it  is  not,  clock-work.  Exclusive 
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domination of the law is synonymous with the resignation, 
on  the part of  society, of  the  free  use  of  its hands. 
Society  would  give  herself  up with  bound  hands  to 
rigid  necessity,  standing helpless in the presence of  all 
~ircumstances  and requirements of  life which  were not 
provided  for  in  the law,  or for  which  the latter  was 
found to be inadequate.  We derive from this the maxim 
that the State must not limit its own  power  of  spon- 
taneous self-activity by law any more than is absolutely 
necessary -  rather too little in this direction than too 
much.  It is a wrong  belief  that  the  interest  of  the 
security of  right and of  political  freedom  requires the 
greatest  possible  limitation  of  the government  by the 
law.  This is based upon the strange notion that force is 
an evil  which  must be combated  to the utmost.  But 
in reality  it is a  good, in which,  however, as in every 
good, it is necessary, in order to make possible its whole- 
some use, to take the possibility  of its abuse into the 
bargain.69  Fettering force is not the only means of  pre- 
venting  that danger.  There  is  another  means  which 
does the  same service : personal responsibility.  This was 
the  method  of  the  ancient  Romans.  They  had  no 
scruples in granting their magistrates such a fullness of 
power as, to  us, savors of  monarchy; but they demanded 
of  them  a  strict  account when  they  laid  down  their 
office.60 
Rut however wide the scope which  the law allows to 
freedom, there will  always be the possibility of  unusual 
cases in which the government finds itself placed before 
the  alternative  of  sacrificing  either  the  law  or  the 
'O  I have in mind the happy saying of  Czcer,, "De Legib."  111, ch. 10, 
concerning the tribunate, "Fateor in ipsa ista potestate inesse quid- 
dam mali, sed bonum quod est quaesitum  in ea, sine isto malo non 
haberemus." 
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welfare of  society.  What shall be the choice?  A well- 
known  saying advises,  "fiat  justitia,  pereat  mundus." 
This sounds as if  the world existed for the sake of  jus- 
tice, whereas in reality justice exists for the sake of  the 
world.  If  the two stood in a relation of  opposition to 
each other the maxim would have to read, "pereat jus- 
titia, vivat mundus."  In reality, however,  this is not 
the case, for the two as a rule go hand in hand.  The 
motto should read, "vivat justitia, ut floreat mundus." 
But it is quite a different question whether the gov- 
ernment must respect  the existing  law  absolutely and 
without any exception.  And I do not hesitate at  all to 
answer this question most decidedly in the negative. 
Let us take a concrete instance.  A fortress is being 
besieged, and it appears that in order to withstand the 
siege it is necessary to  demolish some buildi~lgs  in private 
possession.  Now  let us suppose that the constitution 
of  the land  had  declared  private  property  absolutely 
inviolable, without taking into consideration such cases 
of  necessity as the one in question,  and that the owners 
of  the buildings refuse to give their consent to  have them 
demolished.  Must the commander  of  the fortress, in 
order by all means not to  encroach upon private property, 
sacrifice the fortress and with it perhaps the last bulwark 
upon which the preservation of  the whole State  depends? 
A  commander  who did  this would  lose  his head.  So 
the breaking through of  a dam, or a fire, or similar cases 
of  necessity  present  a  common  danger,  which  can  be 
warded off  only by encroaching upon private property. 
Shall  the  authorities  respect  property  and  allow  the 
devastating element to take its course? 
Natural feeling suggests the decision at  once to every 
one, but it is our problem to  justify it  scientifically.  The 
justification lies in the point of  view that the law is not 
an end in itself, but only a means to an end.  The end 
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of the State as well as of  the law is the establishment 
and  security of  the conditions of  social life (see below, 
5  12).  Law exists for the sake of  society, not society 
for the sake of  law.  Hence,  it follows that when  in 
cases,  as  in  those  above  mentioned,  the 
relations are such that the government finds itself facing 
the alternatives of  sacrificing either the law or society, 
it  is  not  merely  empowered,  but  in  duty bound,  to 
sacrifice  law  and save society.  For  higher  than  the 
law which it violates  stands the consideration  for  the 
preservation  of society, in the service of  which all laws 
must stand, the "[ex summa," as Cicero ("De Legibus" 
111, 3) calls it in his well-known saying, "Salus  populi 
summa lex esto."  A private person may, in such a case, 
where there is a conflict between saving his own life and 
encroaching upon the right of  others, sacrifice the former, 
although the law does not demand it of  him  (right of 
inevitable necessity).  He sacrifices himself  only.  But 
if  the government did the same thing, it would commit 
a mortal sin.  For it must carry out the law not for its 
own sake but for the sake of  society, and as the sailor 
throws the cargo overboard when it is a question of  sav- 
ing the ship and the crew, so the government may and 
must deal with the law if  this is the only way to  preserve 
society  from  a  great  danger.  These are the  "saving 
deeds," as our language fittingly calls them; a designa- 
tion which  embraces  their whole  theory,  their  justifi- 
cation as well  as their requisite conditions.  It is true 
that  conscienceless  statesmen  have  played  wantonly 
with  them;  that the welfare of  the State often served 
only as a  pretext or a cover for arbitrary acts of  despo- 
tism ;  but in principle the authority of  the government 
to  do  these  acts  can no more  be  disputed  than  in 
the above case  the  right  of  the sailor  to throw  the 
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accompanying  the state  of  necessity which  the  govern- 
ment thus exercises, and which can no more be denied to 
it than to the private person.  The government not only 
may apply it, but it must.  But the two are conditioned 
by each other; it  may where it must. 
At the same time, however, the open violation of  the 
laws is a deplorable proceeding which legislation must 
spare the government as far  as possible.  It  can be done 
by bringing the right of  inevitable necessity itself under 
the form of  law, as is done more or less in all modern 
laws and State constitutions.  The regulations having 
this  object  in  view  may be  designated  as the  safety 
valves of  the law.  They open an  outlet to necessity and 
thereby prevent a violent expl~sion.~' 
61 A  detailed  discussion  of  them is unnecessary,  it is sufficient 
simply to  enumerate them.  They  are  the following:  Encroachments 
of  the State force upon private property -and  first of  all upon 
possession by administrative measures without previous legal  pro- 
cedure  (condition of  necessity, for example, in case of  danger from 
fire or flood, war, etc.).  Deprivation of  ownersl~ip  by course of  law, 
i.  e., expropriation-  whether in the form of  an individual statute 
(p.  257),  i. e.,  the statute of  expropriation, or by  carrying out through 
judicial or  administrative authorities the norms laid down in  advance 
for the given case.  Temporary suspension of certain statutory regu- 
lations (for example, the protest of  promissory notes in France dur- 
ing the last  war) or of  normal  legal  aid  ("justitium"  in Rome), 
proclamation of a state  of  war or of  martial law (in Rome the naming 
of  a  "dictator";  "Senatus  consultum:  videant  consules,  ne  quid 
detrimenti capiat res publica").  Removal of  subsisting rights by 
legislation (for example of  serfdom, of  the rights of  banishment and 
coercion;  "novae  tabulae"  in Rome, etc.).  Encroachments upon 
such rights by a statute with retrospective force.  All these measures 
come under one and the same point of  view, and it shows a defect 
in the power of  abstraction when one grants the admissibility on 
principle of some of  them and denies it  to others, as has often been 
the case in legal literature as  well as  in legislation.  Note in reference 
to  the  question  of the regulation of the retrospective force of  a statute, 
even in the case of  a man so  radical otherwise as  F. Lassalle, "System 
der erworbenen Kechte," I, pp. 3-11. 
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The  qestion whether  the  requisite  conditions  are 
present  for such encroachments is one concerning  the 
politics of the particular case, and need not be discussed 
here.  That the government  must  reimburse  in  these 
cases  the  private  person  affected by  these  encroach- 
ments is a requirement that follows from the nature of 
the social relation.  The social  relation  is based  upon 
the principle  of equality in the sense developed above 
(p. 277), and it is in accordance with this principle that 
that which is for the good of all must also be borne by all. 
The right of  pardon  also comes under the category of 
disregard  of  the  law  by  the  government.  Formally 
considered, it appears as an interference with the order 
of law.  The punishment of the criminal, which is threat- 
ened by the law and which has already been recognized 
against him, is afterwards remitted.  The law is there- 
fore  in  reality  not carried  out.  The right  of  pardon 
seems  therefore  incompatible  with  the  idea  of  the 
administration  of  justice.  What becomes  of  the  law 
when  it is applied  in one case and not in  the other? 
What becomes of  equality before the law when the recog- 
nized penalty is carried out in the case of  one criminal 
and not in the case of  another?  It is pure lawlessness 
that sits in the place of  law in the right of  pardon, the 
recognition in principle of  arbitrariness in the adminis- 
tration of the criminal law. 
What answer have we to this?  It may be arbitrari- 
ness that sits in the place of  law, but it need  not -  and 
it must not be.  The place must not be given to arbi- 
trariness but to  justice;  to justice, which  finds that its  . . 
spirit was not properly understood in a particular  case 
by the law, and must therefore be given the opportunity 
of rectifying its error and thereby saving an innocent 
man from suffering.  In this sense we may define pardon 
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has been recognized  to be imperfect;  in short, as the 
self-correction of  justice. 
But the imperfection of  the criminal law may be seen 
not only where it  is the task of  the right of  pardon to  ob- 
viate it, but also in the opposite direction.  It  is possible 
that the comprehensive catalogue of  crimes which legis- 
lation has drawn up on the basis  of  long experiences 
appears defective in a particular case.  Refined wicked- 
ness may invent new crimes which are not provided for 
by law, and for the punishment  of  which  the existing 
law may offer a handle but no penalty commensurate 
with the seriousness of  the offence.62 What shall be done 
in this case?  Shall justice declare itself powerless against 
the fiend who threatens society in a manner surpassing 
in danger all the crimes of  the law which  are provided 
with  penalties,  and who shows an abyss of  depravity 
which  leaves that of  the ordinary robber and murderer 
far behind?  Shall justice declare itself powerless before 
such a fiend, because the written law does not give it the 
possibility of  inflicting upon him the penalty he deserves? 
The answer of  the jurist is, Yes.  His motto is the well- 
known saying, "nulla  poena sine lege."  The unsophis- 
ticat>d  sense of  right  of  the people demands punish- 
ment here also, and I agree with them completely.  That 
saying just  quoted, which  assumes the character of  an 
absolute postulate of  justice,  has really only a limited 
justification.  It is meant as a guarantee against arbi- 
trariness, and this task it fulfils.  But the highest aim of 
law  is not to keep away  arbitrariness but  to realize 
justice;  and in so far as that principle  stands in the 
way of  this it is unjustified.  The problem is to combine 
"  I name as an example the well-known case, Thomas in Brerner- 
haven:  A chest provided with an explosive apparatus was placed on 
board for the purpose of  destroying the ship selected for its transport, 
with a view to collecting the high insurance money. 
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the two purposes;  and it is a question of  finding a form 
which  will  afford  a  guarantee that the release  of  the 
judge  from  the  positive  law will  be  to the advantage 
of justice  alone and not also of arbitrariness.  For this 
purpose there is need  of establishing a highest  court of 
justice  above  the  law,  which  will,  by  the  manner  in 
which it is constituted, exclude in advance all apprehen- 
sion that it might  become  some day an instrument in 
the hands of  an arbitrary government. 
The idea which  I have just expressed  is already real- 
ized in fact.  In Scotland a court of justice of  this kind 
exists.  But even if  it did not exist anywhere, for me it 
is not a question of what is, but of  what should be; of 
what the purpose of law and the idea of  justice require. 
If  it is true that in criminal as well as in civil  law  the 
law  alone  must  rule,  then  there  must  be  no  pardon. 
If  the latter is admitted, as is the case among all civil- 
ized  peoples,  then  the  principle  of  the exclusive domi- 
nation of  the law in criminal administration  is thereby 
given up.  The principle of  right acknowledges thereby 
that it cannot get along with the positive law alone, that 
it must have the higher justice  which stands above the 
law, in order that it may harmonize in a particular case 
the penalty with the requirements of  the sense of  right. 
If this  holds in  one  direction, why  not in  the  other? 
Either the law alone absolutely in both directions, or jus- 
tice above the law in both directions.  The highest court 
of justice  recommended  by me for  unusual cases,  such 
as legislation has not taken into consideration, is nothing 
but the logic of the right of  pardon followed up in the 
opposite direction.  The two are different  in direction 
only, not in principle.  A further step would  consist in 
assigning  to this highest  court standing above the law 
the exercise of  the right of  pardon also in the name of 
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would thereby receive the exalted mission of mediating 
between the formal justice of  written law and the mate- 
rial justice standing above it ;  63  and there would  thus 
also  be created  an organ for  the development of  the 
criminal  law  in  the  way  most  appropriate  for  it, 
viz.,  by means of  adjudications.  Perhaps, too, in that 
case the jury would be less frequently misled to acquit 
a  criminal  against  the plain  facts.  In addition to the 
two  formulae,  "guilty"  and  "not  guilty,"  they would 
have  to  be allowed  a  third  form  of  judgment,  viz., 
reference  to the highest court, the "court  of  justice" 
("Gerechtigkeitshof"),  as I should like to call it.  Simi- 
larly in cases like the one mentioned above (Thomas), 
the public prosecutor  should be given the right to  pro- 
pose a penalty not provided for by law. 
In the form just  outlined,  the higher  judge,  placed 
superior to the one who  adjudicates strictly according 
to the written  law,  removes  the imperfections  of  the 
law in the spirit of  the legislator, by deciding the par- 
ticular  case  as the  legislator  would  have  decided  it 
when he issued  the law.  But this form of  the matter 
must not be confused with the absolutely free and unre- 
strained  use of  the penal  power which  was applied by 
the Roman people in the "comitia  tributa," and which 
I  do not by any means  intend  to advocate.  To be 
sure, it offered  the advantage  of  the unlimited  possi- 
bility  of  individualization,  both  in  reference  to  the 
question  what  shall  be  considered  a  crime,  and  the 
degree of  punishment.  But this advantage was  com- 
pletely neutralized by the fact that it was not a judicial 
authority, but  the sovereign  people,  accessible  to all 
kinds of  influences, that exercised this power of  punish- 
ment  freely  without  being  bound  by the restraint  of 
G3"Inter  aequitatem  jusque  interpositam  interpretationem,"  as 
Constantine expresses himself in Cod. 1. 14. 1. 
any law.  The guarantees which  are found in the sep- 
aration  of  the judicial  office  from  the other  functions 
of  the government  (p. 291)  are here  entirely wanting. 
I am not defending individualization of  criminal admin- 
istration  in  general  (this is found  also  in  the despot, 
who pays attention to no law), but individualization  by 
a judicial  authority.  The idea  of  individualizing  the 
administration  of  justice  in  this  latter  form  has been 
realized in the later civil procedure ("Formularprozess," 
formulary procedure);  not indeed in the person  of  the 
ordinary judge,  who could  naturally  not  be  entrusted 
with this power, but in the person of  the praetor who, 
by  his  position  and the advice of  the jurists  who  as- 
sisted  him  ("consilium"),  offered  a  guarantee  for  its 
proper use.  In his quality of  chief of  the entire admin- 
istration of the civil law was  actually included  that of 
legislator.  It was his task and his duty to keep the law 
up to date;  and as he did so by laying down new  legal 
principles  in his  edicts, he  also considered  himself  jus- 
tified and called upon to exclude the severities of  the old 
law in its application to a particular case.  He rejected 
charges which the old civil law recognized;  he allowed 
pleas which were  not  provided  for  in the written law; 
and he  restored  lost  rights  ("restitutio  in  integrum"): 
in short, he exercised in the particular case what amounted 
to a  criticism  of  the existing  law.  He was  the  living 
organ  of  the law, as the Roman jurists call him ("viva 
vex  juris  civilis"),  the  personification  of  the  idea  of 
justice;  not the justice  of  the judge  who  is bound  to 
the law, but of  the legislator who stands above the law, 
who  always excludes  it when  it seems to him  opposed 
to  justice.  The  praetor  accustomed  the  Komans  to 
the  idea  of  an individualizing  justice  that  frees  itself 
from the existing law;  and they had  so little fault to 
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to maintain itself  for centuries, but was even extended 
in the time of  the emperors.  Not merely did the em- 
perors  assume  it for  themselves  ("constitutiones  per- 
sonales"),  but they also granted to some specially trust- 
worthy  jurists, by means of  the "jus respondendi,"  the 
power of  laying down the law in a particular case ("jura 
condere") .64 
Such an institution is foreign to our present admin- 
istration of  the civil law.  It has maintained  itself with 
us only in the right of  pardon.  In the administration 
of  the civil  law we  require  the inviolable  application 
of  the law;  and we  take the severities and the unfair- 
nesses  into the  bargain.  The security of  the formal 
justice  of  the judge  stands higher with us than the ad- 
vantages of  an uncertain material justice, behind which 
arbitrariness could  conceal itself  only too easily. 
I  have now  concluded  my disc~ssion  of  the form  of 
law.  We have seen how 
1.  Force  rises  from  an individual  command  to an 
abstract command, viz., the norm, and how then 
2.  The unilateral  norm rises to the bilaterally bind- 
ing norm,  vic., law,  and how 
3.  The law  produces from  itself  the mechanism for 
its realization  (administration of  justice). 
Combining  these  three  factors,  the  picture  which 
we  have  gained  so far of  the law presents itself  as  the 
political  mechanism  for  realizing  the  coercive  norms 
"Auctoritas  conscribendarum  interpretandarun~que legum," 
Cod. 1.17.1  8 4;  "legislatores" Cod. ibd.  2.  20; "Juris conditores," 
Cod. 1. 14. 12;  "Quibus  permissum est jura  condere," Gazus, I, 6. 
It is to this that the "inter  zequitatem jusque interposita interpre- 
tatio"  of  Cod.  1. 14. 1 (p. 322,  note)  refers, by  which  Constantine 
removed the regulation.  The essence  of  it can  be  stated  in  one 
word;  legislative force for a single case (which is pending in court); 
individualizing  justice  in contradistinction  to abstract justice  by 
recognized  by the State as binding absolutely (i.  e., upon 
itself  also). 
From the form of  the law we now proceed  to its con- 
tent;  or, since the content is determined solely by the 
object, to its Purfiose. 
5  12.  The  Purpose  of  the Law,-The  Conditions  of 
Social  Life.  The two elements of  right in the objective 
sense  (law)  that have been developed so far, wiz.,  norm 
and  coercion,  are  purely  formal  elements  which  tell 
us nothing about the content of  law.  By means of  them 
we know only that society compels its members to cer- 
tain  things,  but we  know not why and for what  pur- 
pose.  It is the external form  of  law, remaining always 
alike and capable of  receiving the most varied  content. 
It is  through  the  content  that we  learn  the  purpose 
which law serves in society, and this forms the problem 
of  the  following  exposition. 
An  insoluble  problem, I  hear one exclaim, for  this 
content  is  ever  changing,  it is  one  thing  here  and 
another thing there, a  chaos in unceasing flux, without 
stability, without  rule.  What is forbidden here is al- 
lowed there, what is prescribed here is prohibited there. 
Belief  and superstition,  barbarism  and  culture,  ven- 
geance  and  love,  cruelty  and  humanity -  what  else 
shall I name?-all  these have found a willing reception 
in the law.  Unresistingly it seems  to  yield to all influ- 
ences which are powerful enough to make it serviceable 
to them, without havinga fixed support of  its own.  Con- 
tradiction,  external  change,  seems  to  constitute  the 
essential content of  the law. 
The result  would  be  truly  hopeless  if  the  problem 
of the law were to realize truth absolute.  Under this snp- 
position we  could not help admitting that the law is con- 
demned  to eternal el-rcr.  Every successive period,  as 
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preceding  it,  which  believed  it  had  found  absolute 
truth in its legal  principles,  and would  then again  in 
its turn be accused of  error by the period succeeding it. 
Truth would always be a few steps in advance of  the law 
without ever being overtaken, like a butterfly chased by 
a  little boy -  no sooner  does  he  steal up close  to it 
than it flies  away again. 
Science too is condemned to everlasting search.  But 
its searching is not merely searching, it is constant find- 
ing.  What science has actually found remains forever. 
And  its search is absolutely  free.  In the domain  of 
science there is no authority which  lends to error the 
force of  truth, as is the case in law.  The principles of 
science  can  always  be  attacked;  those  of  law  have 
positive validity.  Even he who recognizes  their  errors 
must  submit to them. 
He  who  brings  such  charges  against  the  law  has 
himself  to blame, for he applies an improper standard 
to the law, that of  truth.  Truth is the aim of  knowledge, 
not of action.  Truth is always one, and every devia- 
tion from it is error;  the opposition of  truth and error 
is absolute.  But for action or, which is the same thing, 
for the will, there is no absolute standard in the sense 
that only one will-content is true and every other false. 
The standard is relative.  The content of  the will may 
be different  in one condition from what  it  is  in  an- 
other, and  yet  be  right  ("richtig"),  i.  e., appropriate 
to the purpose, in both. 
The rightness  ("Richtigkeit")  of  a  content  of  the 
will  is determined  by the purpose.  Language  charac- 
terizes an act as either "correct"  ("richtig")  or "incor- 
rect"  ("unrichtig")  in accordance with the element of 
"direction"  ("Richtung")  to a purpose which is involved 
in every act of  the will, i.e., the aim of  the will.  Cor- 
rectness  is  the  standard  of  practice,  i.e., of  conduct; 
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truth is the standard of  theory, i.  e., of  knowledge.  Cor- 
rectness  denotes  the agreenlent  of  the will  with  that 
which should be;  truth, the agreement of  the idea with 
that which  is.  When  a  physician  prescribes a wrong 
medicine we do not say that he chose an untrue medi- 
cine  but an improper  ("unrichtig")  one.  Only  where 
the finding  of  the truth is thought of  as a practical prob- 
lem, that is as  something requiring investigation, strug- 
gle, taking pains, in short,  exertion of  the will, do  we apply 
the expression  "correct"  ("richtig")  also to the problem 
which  is concerned  solely with  truth.  We say of  the 
pupil  that he calculated his example correctly, of  the 
physician that he diagnosed the condition of  the patient 
correctly.  We  are not considering  here  the truth as 
such, but the subject who  seeks it, and has made its 
discovery  his  aim.  From  the  subjective  standpoint 
we designate the attainment of  the end as correct. 
The  expression  "correct"  ("richtig")  contains  the 
ideaof direction, i.  e., of  the  way one has to  follow in order 
to reach  the end, wiz.,  to attain one's aim.  It is the 
same  idea  that language  employs so fruitfully  in  law 
as we  have  seen  above  (p.  261)  ("Richter"  [judge], 
"Richtsteig"  [foot-pthl,  "Weg  Rechtens"  [way of  law, 
legal proceedings], "recht" [right] -  "reht," i.  e., straight, 
"regere,"  "rex,"  "regula,"  "rectum,"  "regieren,"  "diri- 
gere,"  "directum,"  "diritto,"  "derecho,"  "droit").  All 
these  expressions  are  not  derived  from  the  peculiar 
essence of  law  as such, but from that which  the law, 
as prescribing  human  conduct,  has  in  common  with 
all conduct, viz.,  the maintenance of  the straight, right, 
correct way, the direction to an aim and a purpose. 
This  explains  why  we  use  the  expression  "right" 
("recht")  in a non-juristic sense also for correct, proper. 
So we  say  of  the  physician  that he  found  thc  right 
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here, too, (as in the word  "correct"  ["richtig"]) we even 
go a  step further.  We use the expression  "right"  for 
truth also, in so far as it stands in relation with purpose. 
We say of  the pupil that he did his problem  "right," 
and  of  a  person  who  makes  a  statement or passes  a 
judgment we say that he is "right."  We call a person 
"rechthaberisch"  (positive, dogmatic), who  defends his 
views obstinately.  In all these cases it is a question of 
truth, to be sure, but of  truth from the point of  view of 
a  practical purpose (seeking, finding, asserting, defend- 
ing, denying). 
I  return now  to the statement I  made above.  The 
standard of  law is not the absolute one of  truth, but the 
relative  one  of  purpose.  Hence  it  follows  that  the 
content of  law not only may but must be infinitely vari- 
ous.  As the physician does not prescribe the same medi- 
cine to all sick  people,  but fits his prescription  to the 
condition of  the patient, so the law cannot always make 
the same regulations, it must likewise adapt them to the 
conditions of  the people, to their degree of  civilization, 
to the needs of  the time.  Or, rather, this is no mere 
"must,"  but a historical fact which happens always and 
everywhere  of  necessity.  The  idea  that  law  must 
always be the same at  bottom is no  whit better than that 
medical  treatment should be the same for all patients. 
A universal law for all  nations and times stands on the 
same line with a  universal  remedy  for all sick people. 
It is the long sought for philosopher's  stone, for which 
in reality not philosophers but only the fools can afford 
to search. 
This view,  although  false  in  its innermost  essence, 
and in irreconcilable contradiction with history, because 
it transfers to the will what is applicable only to knowl- 
edge, has nevertheless a certain semblance of  truth in it. 
Certain  legal  principles  are found  among  all  peoples; 
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murder and  robbery  are everywhere forbidden;  State 
and property, family and contract are met every~here.~~ 
consequently, in these cases, oile may urge, we actually 
have absolute  truth; these are, you will say, evidently 
absolute "legal  truths," over which history has no power. 
you might as well call the fundamental arrangements of 
human civilization, vk.,  houses, streets, clothing, use of 
fire and  light, truths.  They are possessions of  experi- 
ence having reference to  the assured attainment of certain 
human  purposes.  Securing  the public  streets against 
robbers is  just as  much a purpose as  securing them against 
floods by means of  dams.  The thing done for a purpose 
does not lose its purposive character because this quality 
of it is placed beyond all doubt, and is therefore in this 
sense true. 
Now a science which, like the science of  law, has the 
purposive  as its object, may indeed separate all those 
institutions which have stood the test of  history in this 
way  from  the others which  can boast  only  a  limited 
(temporal or spatial) usefulness, and combine  them in 
a separate class, as the Romans did with "jus gentium" 
and "naturalis ratio" in contradistinction to "jus civile" 
and "civilis ratio";  but it must not forget that here too 
it has to do not with the true but with the useful.  How 
little this has been observed,  I shall  have occasion  to 
show  in  the second  part of  this work.  The "legal," 
which is regarded in the science of  law as the properly 
true because it always remains in the law, and which is 
contrasted  with  the  "useful"  ("zweckmassig")  as the 
"Theconcept  of  the Roman "jus gentium."  "Quod vero naturalis 
ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud ornnes pereque cus- 
tOditur vocaturque jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utun- 
'U'?"  D.  1. 1.9.  "Ex  hoc jure gentium  introducta  bella, discretze 
gentes, regna condita, dominia distincta, agris termini positi, cedi- 
collocata, commerciurn, ernptiones venditiones, locationes con- 
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temporary and evanescent, will be found there to be a 
species of  the latter.  It will appear as the part which 
is precipitated and condensed in a fixed form in contrast 
to that which is still fluid and movable.  It  is the useful 
which  has stood the test of  many thousands of  years; 
the lowest stratum lying deep down at  the bottom, which 
bears all the rest, and is therefore fully secure in its posi- 
tion.  But  the  process  of  formation  of  this  deepest 
layer was  no different  from  that of  the more  recent. 
It is nothing else than the useful, stored up, tested by 
experience and placed beyond all doubt. 
Everything found on the ground of  the law was called 
into life by a purpose, and exists to  realize some purpose. 
The entire law is simply one creation of  purpose, except 
that most of  the particular creative acts reach back into 
such a distant past that humanity has lost remembrance 
of  them.  It  is a matter of  science, in the history of  the 
formation of  law as  well as in the formation of  the earth's 
crust,  to reconstruct  the  actual  processes,  and  the 
means are found in the idea of  purpose.  Nowhere  is 
purpose so  certain of  discovery as  in the domain of  law for 
him  who is not afraid  to investigate  and reflect.  To 
look for it  is  the  highest problem of jurisprudence, whether 
in the dogma of  law or its history. 
Now what is the purpose of  law?  To the question, 
what is the purpose of  animal activity, I gave the answer 
above (p. 5), the realization  of  the  conditions  of  his 
existence.  I  now  make  use  of  that  thought when  I 
define law in reference to its content as the form of  the 
security of  the conditions of  social  life, procured by the 
power of  the State. 
The justification  of  this definition requires an under- 
standing of  the concept  "conditions  of  life,"  here laid 
down as a basis.  It is a relative concept and is deter- 
mined  by  the  requirements  of  life.  What  are  the 
of  life?  If  life means mere physical exist- 
ence, the concept is limited to  the bare necessities of  life, 
food, drink, clothing, shelter.  Even here it retains its 
relative  character, for it is determined quite differently 
in  with  the individual  nceds.  One  needs 
more than, and different things from, another. 
~ut  life means more than physical  existence.  Even 
the poorest  and the lowest  demands more of  life than 
its mere preservation.  He wants well-being, not merely 
existence, and no matter how differently  he may think 
of it-  for this larger life begins with one person where it 
ceases with another -  the idea of  it which he carries in 
his  mind,  his  ideal  picture  of  existence  constitutes for 
him the standard by which he measures the value of  his 
actual life; and the realization  of  this standard forms 
the aim of his whole life, and works the lever of  his will. 
The subjective  requirements  to which  life  is bound 
in this wider sense I call conditions of life.  I understand 
by  this  term, therefore, not  merely  the  conditions of 
physical  existence,  but all  those  goods  and  pleasures 
which  in the judgment  of  the subject give life its true 
value.  Honor  is not a  condition of  physical  life, and 
yet what is life for a man of  honor without  it?  Where 
the two come in conflict he sacrifices his life to save his 
honor, as. the best proof that life without honor is worth- 
less for him.  Freedom  and nationality are not condi- 
tions of physical existence, but no freedom-loving people 
ever  hesitated  to go to death for  them.  The suicide 
lays hands on himself when life has  lost its value  for 
him, although  perhaps  he is not at all  in want  of  its 
requirements.  In short, the goods and en- 
joyments  by  which  a  man  feels  his  life  conditioned 
are not merely sensuous and material, but also immate- 
rial  and  ideal.  They embrace everything that forms 
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activity, education, religion, art, science.  The question 
of  the conditions of  life of  the individual as well as of 
society  is a  question  of  the  national  and  individual 
education. 
In laying  down  this  concept  of  the  conditions  of 
life at  the basis of  my above definition of  law, I intend 
in the following to prove two rhings:  first, that it is a 
correct  concept,  and  secondly,  that  it is scientifically 
valuable and  fruitful. 
The correctness of  the concept will be proved  by the 
fact that all legal principles, no matter of  what kind and 
where  found, can be  reduced  to it.  Its value will  be 
shown by the circumstance that our  insight  into the 
law is advanced by it.  A  point of  view which  is cor- 
rect and nothing more is only a vessel, into which  you 
put an object  to take it out again.  The object  itself 
remains  as it was,  without  its  knowledge  being'ad- 
vanced thereby.  A point of  view  is of  scientific value 
only  when  it proves  to be  productive, i. e., when  it 
advances  the  knowledge  of  the  object,  when it dis- 
closes sides of  it which were formerly overlooked.  Let 
us try whether  our point  of  view  will  stand the  test 
in both directions. 
I  expect some objections to  its correctness.  If  the 
law has as its object the conditions of  social life, how 
can it contradict  itself  to such an extent as to forbid 
in one place  what it allows or commands in another? 
Which  suggests  that a point  capable  of  such various 
treatment cannot belong to  the conditions of  social life, 
and is simply incidental, to be used as society's pleasure 
dictates. 
The objection overlooks the relativity of  purpose.  As 
the physician does not contradict himself when he pre- 
scribes today what he forbade yesterday, in accordance 
with a change in the condition of  the patient, so neither 
does  the  legislator.  Conditions  change  in  society  as 
well as in the individual;  what may be dispensed with 
here  is necessary  there;  what is useful in one place is 
injurious in another. 
In order  to make  clear  the extraordinary  contrast 
in the attitude of  legislation to one and the same ques- 
tioI,, resulting from  the relativity  above mentioned,  I 
shall select the two following examples.  The first con- 
cerns  the question  of  instruction.  Our  present  State 
has *nade elementary instruction obligatory.  Formerly 
it was left to the pleasure and inclination of  the indi- 
vidual, except that the State took care of  institutions 
in which  any one could  acquire an elementary educa- 
tion.  In a  still earlier period  not even this was done. 
In some of  the slave States of  North America,  before 
the Civil War, it  was forbiddenon pain of  death to  teach 
negroes to read and write.  Here we have an attitude 
of  the State to one and the same question varying in 
four different ways; securing  the  purpose  in  form  of 
compulsion;  furthering  the same  by  political  means, 
but  without  compulsion;  complete indifference  of  the 
State, and  lastly,  prohibition  to pursue  the same by 
certain classes of  society on pain of  death.  If  we apply 
our  idea of  conditions of  life to this matter, we  shall 
find that the last form of  this subject, from the stand- 
point  of  the American  slave States, signifies that the 
slave  State is incompatible with  the education  of  the 
slaves.  If  the slave can read and write, he will  cease 
to be a working animal, he will become a human being 
and claini  his human rights, and thereby threaten the 
social order built upon the institution of  slavery.  Where 
life depends  upon  darkness,  the  introduction  of light 
is a  capital  crime.  In antiquity this danger  was  not 
feared because  the belief  in  the lawfulness of  slavery 
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indifference of  the State to instruction, signified  from 
the standpoint of  that time that school education does 
not belong  to the conditions of  social  life;  the second 
form, support by the State, means that it is desirable; 
the third, compulsory  education, that  it is  indispen- 
sable.  Which of  these conceptions is the true one?  All 
four were true, each one in its time and place. 
The second  example concerns  the attitude of  legis- 
lation to  religion.  When Christianity arose, the heathen 
State raged  against  it with  fire  and  sword.  Why? 
Because it believed  that it could  not co-exist  with  it. 
It persecuted it because  it saw in the latter a  danger 
to one of its conditions of  life, viz., the State religion. 
A  few  centuries  later  the same State, which  formerly 
prohibited  the  Christian confession  on pain  of  death, 
imposed  it by force with  the most cruel means.  The 
view  that it could  not co-exist with it was now trans- 
formed into the view that it could not exist without it. 
Formerly it was, "Woe  to the Christians," now it was, 
"Woe  to the heretics."  The prisons and the funeral 
piles  remained;  only  the  victims  changed  who  were 
thrown  in.  A  thousand  years  later  the  government 
arrived  at the view, as a  result  of  severe and bloody 
battles, that the existence of  society is not merely corn- 
patible with freedom of  belief,  but is impossible with- 
out it.  Which of  these conceptions was the true one? 
Again all three, each one for its time. 
The second  objection which  I  must  expect  is this. 
Far from being true that law always serves  the condi- 
tions  of  social  life,  the opposite  is the fact;  namely, 
that it is frequently in diametrical opposition to the true 
interests of  society. 
I admit this perfectly.  But if  I am allowed once more 
to use the comparison of  the physician, I answer that the 
same thing  often applies objectively  to his prescriptions 
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also,  and  yet  this  does  not  overthrow  the  fact  that 
szlbjectively  their purpose is to advance  life.  The physi- 
cian  may make  a  mistake in the choice of  his  means. 
so may  the legislator.  He may be influenced  by pre- 
judices  of  all  kinds,  but  this  circumstance  does  not 
remove  the fact that he believes  he is securing or ad- 
vancing  the existence of  society thereby.  In Rome to 
draw away the seed of another's land to one's own field 
by means of incantations ("segetem  pellicere"),  and to 
lay  a  charm upon  another's fruit  ("fruges  excantare") 
Mias  forbidden in the XI1 Tables on pain of  death;.just 
like robbing a  field by night and removing the bound 
ary.  Why?  The Roman peasant believed  he could  not 
maintain himself  against these imagined or real dangers 
to the security of  his property.  Security of  real  prop- 
erty  and  agriculture was considered by him  as a  con- 
dition  of  social  life.  Therefore  a  capital penalty  was 
dcrnandcd for every one who laid hands on it. 
It was the same case in the$middle  ages with witches 
and sorcerers.  All  society trembled  before  the  devil, 
who was  in  a  compact with  them;  they seemed  more 
dangerous  and  uncanny  than  robbers and  murderers. 
For  the  Church  there  was,  in addition to the idea  of 
their  common  danger,  the  religious  motive  that  the 
kingdom of  Heaven must be protected against the works 
of the devil.  Society, as well as the Church, was firmly 
convinced  that  witches  and  sorcerers  threatened  it in 
the  foundabion~  of  its existence.  We may  find  fault 
with  them  for  having  been  able  to give  themselves 
UP to  such  a  belief,  but  the  matter is  not changed 
The motive  which  guided  them  subjectively 
Was the  security  of  the conditions of  social  life,  and 
the point of  view suggested by me is meant in this sub- 
jective  sense only.  It is not meant to signify  that a 
thing  is an objective condition of  life, but that 
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But even in this subjective sense it does not seem to 
apply  to society  absolutely.  Experience  shows  that 
the government does not by any means always serve 
the interests of  the whole  population,  but frequently 
only those of  a single powerful class.  And consequently 
legislation  also does  not make  the law to correspond 
uniformly to  the interests of  society, but, above all, to 
those  of  a  privileged  class.  The concept of  the con- 
ditions of  social  life seems in this case,  where the in- 
terests of  a  single class are put in place of  the interest 
of  society, to disappear entirely.  I shall lay this objec- 
tion aside for the present to answer it later (5 14). 
The last objection which  I  think I must fear is the 
following.  The definition which has been laid down for 
the law  as a  whole  must  apply  to every  constituent 
part  of  it,  to evcry  statute, to every  ordinance.  A 
stamp act, a  law concerning the tax on brandy, regu- 
lations concerning the declarations of  duty, concerning 
the measures of  controlling the tax in distilleries, brew- 
eries, etc., concerning the stamping and naming of  new 
coins -  all these must be conditions of  social life. 
This objection is just as if  one intended to refute the 
statement of  the necessity of  nourishment for the pre- 
servation  of  human  life  by  proving  that the  special 
form  in which  nourishment is taken by a particular  in- 
dividual is not at all required for that purpose.  The 
answer to  this must be, the fact is necessary, the manner 
is free.  That a particular  individual should take this 
particular food and this particular  drink, in this parti- 
cular quantity, at this particular  time, is a  matter of 
individual choice ; but that he should take food and drink 
generally  is a peremptory  demand  of  nature.  That 
the State should just select a tax on stamps and brandy 
and the monopoly of  tobacco and salt, to procure the 
necessary revenue, is a matter of  free choice, but that it 
12 1  SOCIAL MECHANICS-  COERCION  337 
should  procure  these  means  generally  is  an  absolute 
requirement of  its existence,  and consequently a  con- 
dition of social life.  If it has once decided on a definite 
form of taxes then all the measures  it takes to secure 
their  payment or to facilitate their collection  are only 
the necessary  consequences of  such choice  once made. 
Whoever desires the purpose must also desire the proper 
means.  I  can think  of  no legal  ordinance, no matter 
how  detailed  and petty, in which  I  would  not under- 
take to  show its  connection with my point of  view.  Coins, 
measure, weight, construction and maintenance of pub- 
lic roads, cleaning the sewers, keeping fire buckets, taxes 
of all kinds,  reporting servants and strangers in hotels 
to the police, and even the most annoying police regu- 
lations  of  former  times,  as for example, the \isking  of 
passports -  all  these  are  reduced,  according  to their 
purpose, to the security of  the conditions of  social  life, 
no matter how faulty the choice of  the means might be. 
If  we  consider  all  the requirements  upon  which  the 
existence  of  society depends, they  can  be  divided, in 
reference to the attitude of  the law toward them, into 
three classes, which  I  shall designate as the extra-legal, 
the mixed-legal and the purely legal. 
The first division belongs to nature, whether she offers 
them to man freely and without trouble, or whether he 
has to win  them  from her by means of  toil.  The law 
has no share in  them.  The law  has power  only over 
man,  not  over  nature.  Thev  are excluded  therefore 
from the following discussion, as extra-legal  conditions 
of life. 
The second division belongs exclusively to man, and 
for him also there is the difference between those needs 
which are offered freely and those which must be gained 
by force.  The individual acts voluntarily  in the serv- 
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of  the latter, and this is the case on the whole in four 
fundamental conditions of  social  life,  viz.,  preservation 
of  life, reprodz~ction  of  the same, labor, and trade.  For 
there are three ~owerful  motives  at work  in man for 
these purposes, viz., the instinct of  self-preservation, the 
sexual impulse and the instinct of  acquisition.  Society 
need feel no anxiety in reference to these, and may find 
consolation in the words of  Schiller (in his "Die  Welt- 
weisen") : 
"Until one day philosophy 
The structure of  the world will hold 
It  is held now in motion 
By hunger and by 120ve." 
'The  instinct of  self-preservation, the sexual instinct 
and the instinct  of  acquisition are the three  powerful 
allies of  society which  enable it to dispense with  force 
in reference to the services which they render it. 
Exceptionally,  however,  these  three  instincts  may 
refuse their service.  In regard to the first, this is the 
case in the suicide ; in regard to  the second in the celibate ; 
in regard to the third in the beggar and the vagabond. 
Suicides, celibates, beggars, offend against the principles 
of human society no less than murderers, robbers, thieves. 
To  be  convinced of  it one need only refer their attitude 
toward  society  to the  Kantian  generalization  of  the 
maxim of  individual conduct.  If  their conduct became 
universal, it would be all over with society. 
This is true first in reference to  preservation of  individ- 
ual  life, secured  by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation. 
If  it were thinkable that the pessimistic view of  life of  a 
recent phil~sopher,~"'that  from the standpoint of  the  ego 
or the individual, the negation of  the will or resignation 
of the world and renunciation of  life is the only rational 
"E.  von  Hartmann,  "Philosophie  dcs  Unbewussten,"  (Berlin 
1869), pp. 613, 626. 
procedure" -could  become  general ; if  we  could  imag- 
ine that the "longing for absolute painlessness, for noth- 
ingness-  Nirvana," -should  descend  from  the  rigid, 
icy  region  of  a  philosopher  despairing  of  the solution 
of  the world-problem, into the valleys and the plains, 
where  fresh  life  is  pulsating,  and where  the masses, 
even  though  unceasingly  struggling  with  life,  do yet 
take joy  in it,-if  it were thinkable that a time would 
come,  "when  not  this  or  that  particular  individual, 
as before, but humanity would long for nothingness, for 
this would constitute a danger to society 
equalled by none of  all  those others which  it has met 
in its course.  For the present, society is fortunately 
still  in a  position  to be able to leave the care for the 
preservation  of  life  to the instinct of  self-preservation. 
The danger with  which  suicide  threatens its existence 
is so vanishingly small that it need feel no apprehension 
on this score. 
The case is somewhat different with  reproduction  of 
life, secured by the sexual instinct.  The  sexual instinct, 
to which nature has handed over the care of  this matter, 
is not sufficient to secure it by itself.  Man can deceive 
nature in reference  to this matter.  He can  limit the 
number of  births, the mother can destroy the germ of 
life, kill  the new-born  babe, the  parents can expose it 
or castrate it.  Here there is a danger threatening the 
State, which it is obliged to meet, and the penal regula- 
tions  against  abortion,  child  murder,  exposure  and 
'nutilation  of  children, which are found in the criminal 
laws of all civilized nations, show that the State is well 
aware of the danger which threatens it.  It  is not merely 
regard  for the child, whose  prospects for life are thus 
taken  away, that has dictated  this measure.  This is 
the religious standpoint, which I do  not deny, but which 
it  is not at  all necessary to introduce in order to justify 
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the conditions of  social life is quite sufficient to explain 
them.  Society  cannot  exist  if  the  new  generation  is 
threatened. 
Our modern law is content with negative regulations 
against endangering the new generation.  But examples 
are not wanting in which legislation has tried to further 
it positively.  This was the object of  the stringent "Lex 
Julia"  and  "Papia  Poppza"  of  Augustus, which  was 
called forth  by the decrease of  the free population during 
the Civil Wars and the corruption of  morals that became 
prevalent in Rome.  This law endeavored to  tax celibacy 
and childlessness by incapacitating the celibate and the 
childless, wholly or partially, from testamentary inheri- 
tance, and by otherwise reducing  them  to an inferior 
position in favor of  married persons blessed  with chil- 
And  Louis XIV went so far in the interest of 
more rapidly increasing the population in Canada that 
hc even compelled single persons to  marry by force.68 
From the same Rome which in the time of  Augustus 
carried on a campaign against celibacy and childlessness, 
went forth in later times  the command of  the Church, 
which  forbade  its servants  to marry.  I  do not  mean 
"The  comparison which  Tacitus, "Germania,"  ch. 19, institutes 
between Roman and German custom.wil1 serve to explain the meas- 
ure  of  Augustus:  "Numerum  liberorurn  finire  aut quemquam ex 
agnatis  necare  flagitium  habetur,  plusque  ibi  boni  mores  valent 
quam alibi bonae leges." 
G8According to  Parkman,  "France  and  England  in  North 
America,"  he laid  down the marriageable  age for the male sex at 
18  to 19, for the female at 14 to 15.  Every  father, who  did not 
marry his children at  the respective ages of  20 or 16 years at  the latest, 
was punished.  When the sh~ps  came with female  volunteers from 
France, all young men had to provide themselves with wives within 
fourteen days.  \k"hoever  evaded this duty was deprived of  the few 
joys and advantages of  Canadian life.  He was not allowed to  hunt, 
to  fish, to  go in the woods, to  trade with the Indians, nay, they went 
so far as to  provide him with degrading marks. 
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to ignore in this matter the weight of  the ecclesiastical 
policy, \%hich  caused  the Church to introduce celibacy. 
And I am also fully sensible of  the ethical point of  view 
that renunciation stands higher  than indulgence.  But 
it is one thing when a person, for reasons which we cannot 
help  acknowledging or perhaps  even admiring,  volun- 
tarily renounces marriage, and it is a'nother  thing when 
continence  is forced by law.  I  leave  the question 
unanswered  whether  it can  be  practically  carried  out 
as is conceived, and how dearly the individual must pay 
for it.  I am not the spokesman of  the Catholic priest, 
demanding  for him  in his name the right of  a human 
being, but I place myself solely upon the standpoint of 
society.  And from this point of  view the judgment can- 
not, in my opinion, be otherwise  than that celibacy is 
in its principle an anti-social institution.  It may in its 
limitation to a particular class of  persons be practically 
tolerable for society, but we need only think it as general 
to be  convinced  that society  is incompatible  with  it. 
In Russia  there is a  sect of  Old  Russians who  try to 
secure sexual continence not merely  morally by means 
of vows, but mechanically by means of  castration.  They 
deserve the credit of  consistency, from which the Roman 
Catholic Church shrank;  but the Russian government 
deserves  the praise  of  not having  been  deterred  from 
persecuting them with all the means at  its disposal despite 
the shield  of  religious  conviction  with  which  the sect 
covers itself. 
The third of  the fundamental conditions above men- 
tioned is labor.  The hours cf society would be numbered 
if all workmen (taking the expression in the widest sense, 
in  which it embraces all persons active for the purposes of 
should conclude one day to put their hands in 
their  pockets.  Provision  is  made  here  too  that  this 
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securing  by  legal  prescription  than  self-preservation 
and reproduction;  it is guaranteed by the needs of  the 
individual  and  his  instinct  of  acquisition.  But  in 
a  limited  way  the government  may have occasion  to 
interfere in this matter;  ~ermanently  against begging 
and  vagabondage,  temporarily  against  the  conspired 
suspension of  work on the part of  whole classes of  labor- 
ers for the purpose of  compelling higher wages (strikes). 
From  the  abstract  standpoint  of  personal  individual 
freedom interference would not be justified  in any of  the 
three cases.  That it does take place as a matter of  fact 
shows that this point of  view cannot practically be carried 
out.  The appeal of  the individual to  his freedom is met- 
by the command of  social self-preservation. 
The same thing  applies  to business  exchange  as to 
work.  It  constitutes a condition of  social life, but society 
has no need of  commanding it by law.  His own interest 
is sufficient  to determine  the farmer  to bring  his corn 
and cattle to market, and the merchant to sell his wares. 
But the possibility of  taking advantage of  necessity for 
the  purpose  of  raising  prices  offers  to legislation  an 
opportunity  of  interference  here  also.  I  have already 
expressed myself  before (p. 103) concerning the necessity 
and justification  thereof.  The most dangerous case of 
this kind  in former  times  was  usurious trade in corn, 
which  legislation  prohibited  with  heavy  punishment. 
Telegraphs and railways have made it possible to strike 
out this species of  offence from the criminal law books. 
This shows clearly that the leading motive of  thelaw book 
is not the unethical character of  the subjective purpose, 
but the objective danger to the community arising from 
the act. 
The four  fundamental requirements of  the existence 
of  society just  considered, viz., self-preservation, repro- 
duction,  work  and  trade,  I  designate  as  mixed-legal 
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conditions, because their security does not depend upon 
the law in the first instance, but upon nature, upon the 
of the three natural impulses above named.  The 
law  y comes to assist them in exceptional cases when 
they  fail.  In contradistinction  to these are the purely 
legal.  These are those for the security of  which society 
is  beholden  exclusively  to the  law.  We need  only 
think of  the requirements  of  these  two classes  in  the 
form of a  command, to be convinced of  the fundamen- 
tal  distinction of  the two.  Legislation has no need  of 
issuing such  legal  prescriptions as, eat and drink, save 
your  life from danger,  reproduce  your  species,  work, 
sell, but we meet everywhere with the commands, "Thou 
shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt pay thy 
debts, thou shalt be  obedient to the government, pay 
taxes to the State, perform military service," etc.  To  be 
sure, in these commands also the State  does not prescribe 
any thing that is not demanded by the true interest of 
its members.  We have only to think of  them as absent 
to become aware of  this fact.  No one would  be surc 
of his life  or property without them, it would be the war 
of all against all.  But even if  we thought  of  society 
as devoid of  all moral principles, if  we thought of  it as 
composed of  nothing  but egoists  of  the purest water, 
or of criminals as in a convict  colony, or of  robbers as 
in a  robber  band, egoism would  immediately raise  its 
voice,  and  demand  for  the  relation  of  the  comrades 
among  themselves the inviolable observance of  almost 
the same principles as the State prescribes in the form 
of  law.  And  it would  punish  their violation  no  less, 
Or  rather far more harshly  and cruelly  than does  the 
State  through  the  criminal  law.69 As  a  matter  of 
"An  inkresting  proof of this is furnished in the cases of  secret 
justice  administered by comrades among the military and 
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experience, popular justice is always more cruel than State 
justice.  The former, when  it seizes  a  person  stealing 
sheep, simply strings him up, the latter merely throws 
him into prison for a short time.  The organization of 
the criminal law by the State  constitutes no less a benefit 
for the criminal than for society.  Our present adminis- 
tration of the criminal  law  does  rather  too  much  for 
him in this matter than too little.  But the indulgence 
which it shows the criminal  is bought  at the expense 
of  the State. 
How does it happen then that egoism trangresses the 
law which  serves its own  purposes?  The egoist would 
not do  it,  if  he expected that it would be done by every 
body, but he counts upon its not happening.  In other 
words, he wants the law in so far as it limits others in 
his interest, he does not want it  in so far as  it limits him 
in the interest of  others.  He wants the advantageous 
consequences but not the disadvantageous ones. 
It  is the opposition of  social egoism to  individual.  The 
formcr determines him to desire the law, and when the 
State has not the pbwer to carry it out he even enforces 
it  himself  (lynch  law), the  latter  determines  him  to 
transgress it.  The law has social egoism as its ally, indi- 
vidual  egoism  as its opponent.  The former  pursues 
the common interest, the latter, the individual  interest. 
If  the  two  interests were mutually exclusive, so  that 
every one had the choice of  desiring either the interests 
of  society or his own, his choice would  not be doubtful. 
single  person,  who will  not give  himself  up, they administer jus- 
tice to  him, in case of  repetition of  the offence, on their own account. 
And they do  it so effectively that there is no fear of  a relapse.  In 
barracks it  is usually done in a dark room, on warships the execution 
takes place during the noonday meal of  the officers, over the cannon 
in steerage.  It always happens so that the subordinate officers are 
on  the  quarter deck, and from the steerage there rises up  to  them only 
the joyful and clear singing of  the crew. 
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~~t  the realization  of  the law  by the State, i. e., the 
legal order, enables him to desire both.  When he trans- 
gresses the law he desires his own interest, otherwise he 
desires the law in additioh. 
~f  all  legal measures  have as their purpose securing 
the ~onditions  of  social life, then society is the subject of 
this  purpose.  A  strange subject, it  will  be objected, a 
mere  abstraction.  The real subject is man,  the indi- 
vidual ; every legal measure is ultimately for his  benefit. 
perfectly  correct.  All  legal  measures,  whether  they 
belong to private law, criminal law, or public law, have 
man as their purpose.'O  But social life, in joining  man- 
kind into higher groups through the community of  per- 
manent  purposes, extends thereby the forms of  human 
existence.  To  man as a single being considered by him- 
self  (individual), it adds the social  being, -man  as a 
member of  a higher unit.  When we elevate the latter 
(State, Church, associations) instead of  the former as 
subjects of  the laws relating to them (juristic persons), 
we do not lose sight of  the fact that they only intercept 
the advantageous effects of these laws to  hand them over 
to the natural person, man.  The mechanism  by which 
the purpose of  the law is realized  for rnan is various, 
immediate and mediate;  and the jurist in the latter case 
cannot dispense with the concept of  a higher legal subject, 
standing above the particular  individual.  How far he 
can proceed in the application of  this concept is a ques- 
tion  of technical jurisprudence  which  does not interest 
US here."  For the sociologist  this does not come into 
consideration.  Having allowed  the jurist  the free use 
"A Roman jurist  carries over the idea of  purpose in the active 
sense to nature.  Nature  made everything  for the sake of man, 
"Omnes fructus  natura hominum causa comparavit," D. 22.1.28 B 1. 
I  treated  the question  in my "Geist  des  rornischen  Reihts," 
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of his concept of  the "subject  of  the law,"  he may and 
must claim in his turn the right to use the concept of  the 
"subject of  the purpose  of  the law," as his OWV  problem 
demands.72 
In this social-political sense I  have designated society 
as the subject of  the purpose of  the law, and stated the 
problem of  the latter to be the security of  the conditions 
of  social  life.  But we  may  again  distinguish  within 
society in this widest sense special subjects.  These are 
first,  the  four named  above, viz.,  the individual,  the 
State, the Church, associations.  All of  these are at  the 
same time juristic  subjects in the sense of  the jurist, - 
bearers of  rights, persons.  But they do  not exhaust the 
content  of  the  law.  There still remains  a  surplus of 
legal measures which does not relate to  any of  these four 
legal  subjects.  If  we raise the question  of  the subject 
of  these  extra laws,  as we  must  in all  laws,  nothing 
remains but to name the indeterminate multitude, the 
masses, society in the narrower sense.  We shall use the 
term social in the sequel for these laws and institutions. 
The whole law refers to these five subjects as its pur- 
pose.  They  are the  personal  centres  of  the  purpose 
of  the whole law, around which all its regulations and 
principles are grouped.  In the relations, purposes, and 
problems of  these five subjects the whole life of  society 
is represented.  It is the schema  of  the purpose of  the 
law which is valid for all times.73 
l2 In reference to  the ethical element I shall do  this later (Vol. 11); 
here I confine myself to law. 
73 The Roman classification above mentioned  of  "jus  privatum" 
and "jus publlcum,"in D. 1. 1.1  52,  which is  based upon the differ- 
ence of  the subject for whose  purpose the law in  question is made, 
embraces  under the last category ("quod  ad statum rei Roman= 
spectat")  State and Church ("in  sacris, sacerdotibus magistratibus 
consistit").  The  systematic  status  of  associations  ("collegia," 
"corpora,"  D. 47. 22)  is not precisely  stated.  To what extent the 
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I &all endeavor in the sequel to illustrate and to test 
by means of  three fundamental concepts the classification 
of  the whole  law  as I  drew it up by  reference  to the 
subject  of  its purpose.  I  believe,  however, that I  can 
leave the Church and the associations out of  considera- 
tion, because what I  am going  to say about the State 
or  the individual can without difficulty  be  applied  to 
them, where there is at  all an occasion to do  so.  I will 
therefore  limit  my  schema  to  the  three  categories, 
Individual,  State, Society. 
1.  The  Legal  Relations  of  Things.'*  In  refer- 
ence to  the economic functions of  things as they are 
determined by human need, the Roman law distinguishes 
two  forms,  which  we  may designate  as primary  and 
secondary  functions.  The normal  form  of  the first  is 
property, of  the second the "jus in re." 
But in one direction the first relation goes beyond the 
form of  property, namely in reference to "res publicz." 
The primary subject of  these is doubtless not the State, 
the city or the community as a  juristic  person, but the 
indefinite  multitude  of  individuals  who  make  use  of 
them, viz., the masses, the people.  The subject in this 
case  is one  to which  the concept  of  property  as the 
Roman jurists conceive it, namely as the exclusive right 
of a deJinite (physical or juristic) person, does not apply. 
They bring it instead under the category of  public use 
("usus publicus").  It is not merely an actual function, 
but is protected by law  (by "actiones  populares").  It 
Romans were familiar with the concept of  society as  here laid down 
 ill be shown later. 
"  I had worked over completely the following part for the second 
edition, but  the new  exposition  assumed  such  proportions that  I 
thought it proper to publish it independently in another place.  The 
presentation  contains a  short extract from it in which I 
limit myself to suggestions. THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH.  VIII 
is a peculiar  legal function  of  the thing.  I call it public 
right." 
According  to our division  in three subjects, we  have 
ttree forms of  the functions of  a  thing as determined 
by human need. 
(a)  Individual property  (subject : physical  person). 
(b)  State  propertjr  (s~ibject  : the  State, the  Church 
or corporation, respectively). 
(c)  Public  right  (subject:  society  in  the narrower 
sense)  .76 
In the non-juristic sense in which the term property 
is so frequently used in life, and in which  it is applied 
also by political economists, public right might be called 
social  or  popular  property.  The same relation is found 
also in  the  Church  and in associations  in reference  to 
those  things  which  are assigned to the general  use  of 
its members  ("usus  publicus"), such as the use  of  the 
church  building, of  the union  local, of  the periodicals 
kept there, etc., in contrast to their property  ("bona," 
"patrimonium  universitatis"). 
All  the three forms named  have as their object  the 
security of  the conditions of  social life in the wider sense. 
None  of  them  can be dispensed  with.  Not individual 
profierty -  for  we  have  shown  above  (p.  47,  et  sep.) 
how  physical  self-assertion produces economic, in other 
75 Proved  and expounded in  detail in my "Geist  des  romischen 
Rechts,"  111, 1, p. 360  (4th ed.). 
I'JThe Romans place  the above distinction in the thing,  and dis- 
tinguish  (a) "Res  singulorum,"  "propriae,"  "familiares,"  "res,  quz 
in bonis alicujus ,sunt,"  "res  sua,"  "suum,"  "privatum,"  etc.  The 
expression  "res  privatae,"  which  has become  very  common today, 
is found only in Gaius so far as I know in 1. 8.1. pr.  (b) "Petunia," 
"patrimonium  populi,"  'Ires  fisci,"  "fiscales."  (c) "Res 
"res,  quae in usu  publico habentur,"  "publicis  usibus in perpetuum 
relict=,"  "publico  usui  destinatae,"  "communia  civitatum,"  "re4 
universitatis." 
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words, private  property,  as a  necessary  consequence. 
~~t  State profierty -  for the State must always have a 
supply  of economic means ready to use for its purposes, 
and  this  is  exactly  what  constitutes  the  function  of 
property.  Nor  can  public  right  be  dispensed  with - 
for  the  community  of  public  roads,  places, 
rivers, human intercourse is unthinkable.  The exclusive 
institution of  private property  would  make  all  spatial 
communication impossible. 
The security of the last function is today  taken care 
of by the police.  The Romans were intelligent enough 
to  the public itself the right to  represent its  interests 
by giving every one the power to  complain ("actio popu- 
larisH)against  the person  who encroaches upon the use 
of the "res publicz" by means of some illegal measures.77 
The destination of  a thing for the use of  an indefinite 
number of persons (social property in the above sense), 
which  is  the characteristic  mark of  "res  publicz,"  is 
found  also  in foz~ndations  for  the  public  welfare.  The 
juristic form which is applied to them, and the practical 
necessity of  which  I  do not intend to dispute, I mean 
the personification of  the foundation ("universitas bono- 
rum"), must not deceive us here either concerning the 
true relation.  The property  of  the merely  imaginary 
juristic  person  is an empty phrase.  It is not for the 
benefit of the latter, but of  the individuals who, accord- 
ing to  the terms of  the foundation, are  to  enjoy its  advan- 
tages  (beneficiaries).  Such property is nothing but an 
constructed for the purpDse of  realizing  this 
object in a juristically convenient manner, without any 
practical  reality  for  its subject.  The latter is merely 
the  bearer  of  rights  in  the interest  of  others,  not the 
Subject of the purpose.  The subjects of  the purpose are 
.  - 
77 Quite appropriately the Byzantines designated  the right lying 
at the basis of this popular  action as popular  right  (bl~arov  6s$orrn6~). THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH.  VIII 
the beneficiaries,  and  Roman  law  recognized  this  by 
giving  them  the right of  "actio  popularis"  as in  "res 
publicz." 78  Putting the juristic  form altogether  aside 
and applying exclusively my idea of  the subject of  the 
purpose, I arrive at  the result that foundations for the 
public welfare must be placed on the same line as "res 
publicae"  in  reference  to  the  economic  function  for 
which  they are intended. 
To  be sure, their resemblance to the latter is not true 
in the sense that their use is absolutely free to  every one, 
as  in "res public=.''  There are some in which this is the 
case,  for example, picture  galleries established  in  the 
form of  a foundation, which  any one who desires to do 
so may visit, just as  he can make use of  the public roads 
and springs.  But there are also those in which certain 
conditions  must be  fulfilled  in order  to participate in 
them, which do not depend upon the beneficiary himself, 
for example admission to  a home for widows, or the award 
of  a  scholarship.  But this difference  must not hinder 
us, after we have once applied  the idea of  the subject 
of  the purpose, from recognizing  society in the above 
sense as the subject in these also.  The interest which 
the  foundations have  for  society  will  justify  me  in 
pointing out their essential elements. 
By "foundations"  language understands the devotion 
of  things or capital in favor of  indefinite persons, but for 
a permanent and not a temporary purpose.  The  element 
of  indeterminateness of  the beneficiary distinguishes the 
foundation from a  liberal assignment of  property to a 
Cod. 1.3.  46  5 6.  . . .  "cogere pium opus aut piam liberalita- 
tern  omnimodo impleri et cuicumque  civium  idem  etiam  facere 
Iicentia erit; cum sit enim communis pietatis ratio (a  purpose for the 
public welfare), communes et populares  debet etiam affectiones con- 
stitui harum rerum executionis,  habituro unoquopue  licentiam ex 
nostra  hac lege  movere  ex  lege  condictitia  et  postulare  relicts 
impleri." 
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determinate person ("inter vivos," gift; by testament, in- 
stitution of an heir, legacy).  The element of  permanence 
of the purpose, or rather of continuity, the recurrence 
of the appropriation from the income of  the foundation's 
capital, distinguishes the foundation from single gifts to 
a number of  indeterminate persons, which are at once 
consumed ; public alms ("Spenden"), as  they may fittingly 
be  In both of these elements benevolence rises 
from the sphere  of  individual  generosity,  inspired  by 
personal relations or qualities (friendship, poverty, p. 78 
f.), to that of  abstract generosity.  It is not a definite 
single  person  to whom  generosity applies itself  but a 
class, wide or narrow (the poor, the local poor, the local 
poor  of  a  particular  confession;  widows,  widows  in 
general,  widows  of  servants of  the State, of  servants 
of  the State of  a particular class;  students, students of 
the State university,  students of  a  particular subject). 
We  may call them acts of  social  liberality in contradis- 
tinction to those of  individual. 
In  reference  to the purpose  the foundations extend 
much  farther than alms.  The latter is  limited  to giv- 
ing support to those who need  it.  It is public charity, 
and  its  acceptance,  like  that of  ordinary charity, is 
a confession of need  on the part of  the recipient, and 
hence  has  something  embarrassing  and  humiliating 
'' From  medireval  Latin  "spendere"  (expendere -to  spend, 
"expensa,"  "spensa,"  "spesaU -  expense, costs, to which is related 
our German "Speise"  [food], "spise,"  "spisa").  In Rome such alms 
("largitiones")  to the people  (grain, meat, wine, oil, etc.) were very 
frequent, as is well  known.  Concerning  their  social  significance, 
See my "Geist des romischen Rechts,"  11, 1, pp. 249-253.  Modern 
forms of the same thing are the distribution of  soup, wood for fuel, 
etc., in times of  necessity  by special associations  (in former times 
this  Was  done by the monasteries, the removal of  which produces a 
Sensible loss in the care of the ~oor).  To  the same category belongs 
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about  it  (p.  79).  But  the  purpose  of  foundations 
extends as far as the need of  human life.  It embraces 
in  addition  to physical  needs  (nourishment,  clothing, 
shelter,  medical  care, -  poor  establishments,  homes 
for widows, prphan asylums, hospitals)80  also  spiritual 
(affording the means for artistic or scientific education 
or enjoyment, -  libraries, art institutions, scholarships). 
In reference to  the juristic form the jurist distinguishes 
foundations that have a personality of  their own  ("uni- 
versitates  bonorum")  from  those  without  such.  The 
latter  embrace  those  foundations  in which  the money 
set aside for the purpose is given to an already existing 
personality (State, community, church, university, etc.) 
by imposing  upon it the permanent application of  the 
money in accordance with the terms of  the foundation, 
as is for example the regular form today in scholarships 
for  students.  The  first  may  be  called  independent 
foundations,  the latter, dependent.  In both  cases  the 
capital  of  the foundation exists as the property  of  a 
person.  In the  former  the person  is the foundation 
itself, in the latter it is the trustee.sl  To  the foundations 
of  the latter  sort belong also, according to the juristic 
conception, those which  consist in the construction  of 
The  "piae causae,"  "pia  corpora"  of  later Roman  law.  The 
earliest is the "tabula  alimentaria"  of  Trajan, the greater number 
date from  Christian  times.  Examples  in  Cod.  1.  2. 19,  "xeno- 
dochium,"  "orphanotrophium,"  "ptochotrophium,"  "gerontoco- 
mium,"  "brephotrophium."  The Greek names indicate their  late 
origin.  They contain a new proof  of  what was  above  mentioned 
(p. 214): the influence of  Christianity in promoting the benevolent 
feelings. 
For the non-juristic reader I observe that a trustee ("Fiduziar") 
is one to whom a  right is given not that he may have himself the 
benefit  thereof, but that he  may exercise  it in behalf  of  another. 
He is the possessor  of  the right  not for his own interest, but solely 
as trustee  ("Rechtstrager"  [bearer of  a  right],  see  my "Geist  des 
romischen Rechts,"  111,  1, p. 217 ff., 3d ed.). 
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ures  publics."  In the present  time  they are rare, in 
Rome they were very frequent, for example the construc- 
tion of public springs, theatres, erection of  statues, etc. 
h/~~h~~~edan  law  has even  formed a  special  concept 
for this.82 
1f finally I speak of  the form of  the establishment of 
foundations, I  do so merely in order to make clear  a 
concept of  the Roman law referring to foundations;  I 
refer to the "pollicitatio"  (p. 215).  The jurist  as a rule 
emphasizes  in it only the formal juristic element of the 
binding force of  a unilateral promise, whereas he leaves 
outof consideration thesocialsignificanceof ''pollicitatio." 
It consists in the fact that "pollicitatio"  is the form of 
fozuzdation "intervivos."  It  is the counterpart of testamen- 
tary foundation.  The two together are combined in the 
idea of  social  .liberality.*  Whereas the ancient Roman 
law had not yct risen (p. 208) to  the independent juristic 
recognition of  liberality to  an  individual  "inter  vivos"  (gift), 
it recognized early social liberality among living persons 
as an independent  concept.  And  it even disregarded 
in this matter the technical objection which the theory of 
contract  opposed  to "pollicitatio"  in  the requirement 
of  mutual  consensus.  The Roman  does  not sacrifice 
himself for the individual, but he does so for the com- 
munity.  And the Roman law corresponds to  this feeling 
in refusing its form to the former and putting it at the 
disposition  of  the latter. 
"WBkf'om" -  dedication  or devotion to the common  welfare 
0'  for purposes pleasing to God.  A second species of  "wakf"  is the 
one for children  ("wgkf  ewlod").  We should call it family settle- 
ment.  Mohammedan  law  emphasizes  expressly  the  permanence 
and ethical character of the purpose.  It forbids, for example, devo- 
tion for the welfare of unbelievers.  See von  Tornauw, "Das  MOS- 
lemitische  Recht"  (Leipzig, 1855), pp.  155-159. 
83  66 1-iberalitates in civitates collatae,"  D.  50.  12. 3 8 1.  "Dona- 
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The Roman law never developed an independent form 
for the testamentary foundation  (the establishment  of 
a foundation as the only content of a will and testament). 
This purpose could be attained only in an indirect way 
by the institution of  an heir who would make the founda- 
tion a real fact.  As the lax custom of  drawing up wills 
in later Christian  times brought  to light testamentary 
dispositions directed immediately to  this end (for example 
the institution of  "captivi,"  "pauperes,"  etc., as heirs), 
there was still need  of  a circuitous course adopted by 
Justinian  (substitution of  the  Church  and  the com- 
munity as the heir entrusted with  the execution of  the 
disposition)  to invalidate  the  objections  which  were 
opposed  to their  legal  possibility.  After  our  modern 
theory had risen, as a result  of  many struggles, to the 
recognition of  the permissibility of  a direct testamentary 
establishment of  a foundation, the legal concept of  social 
liberality, which in Roman law received in "pollicitatio" 
its first partial recognition, reached its final form.  And 
theory  must  take account of  this fact by enunciating 
the principle that the subject in liberality may be not 
only a person in the legal sense ("persona certa," physical, 
juristic),  but  also  society  ("persona  incerta").  The 
goods which  are given  to it in this way -  no  matter 
what form technical jurisprudence may appply to them- 
must  be marked  from  the political-econon~ic point  of 
view as social wealth or property. 
In reference to the secondary functions of  things, we 
have  again  our  three  different  subjects  in  servitude, 
namcly, 
(a) For the individual, personal and land servitude. 
(b) For the State, State ~ervitude.~~ 
According to  Roman law the usual personal servitude is possible 
for juristic persons, hence also for  the State-scarcely  a happy idea, 
.lnd  surely not worthy of being retained in modern legislation.  Its 
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(c) For society, public use of private  lands, protected 
by law.% 
2.  Obligation.  I  assume  the  concept  as  known 
and confine myself merely to pointing out the different 
forms  which it assumes according to our three subjects. 
The subject  may  be  (a)  The  Individual.  In  this 
case the relation  belongs  to private  law.  The means 
of making it valid is to prosecute the claim by way of 
a civil  process.  The specifically juristic expression for 
this  is  obligation.  For  the  two  following  classes, 
for political and social obligatory relation, this expres- 
sion is not used;  it is one  entirely peculiar to private 
obligation. 
(b) The State.  The State too can conclude ordinary 
contracts of  private law.  In this case the principles of 
private law are valid for the State also, actively as well 
as passively.  The State (the treasury) may sue and be 
sued.  It is different, on the other hand, when the legal 
bond has its ground in the peculiar purposes and prob- 
lems of  the State, as for example, the payment of  taxes 
and duties (active), and of salaries (passive).  Here the 
legal bond belongs to public law, and it is made valid 
not by means of  civil action, but in forms especially pro- 
vided for it. 
unnatural character is shown among other things in the fact that it 
was not possible to  admit here the feature which goes hand in hand 
with personal servitude,  namely, its duration till the death of the 
person, but they were compelled to  restrict it by positive prescrip- 
tion to a maximum (100 years), D.  7.  1. 56. 
&The  legal ground may be twofold, statute and permission of the 
Owner.  The former, for example, in a towing path, D. 1.8.5; 41. 1. 
30 8 1;  the latter  in public passages through courts and landed estates, 
9. 3. 1 Q 2, " . . . locus privatus, per quem vulgo iter fit."  9. 2. 31. 
The  counterpart of  the private thing in public use is the public thing 
In private use, "tabernae public=, quarum usus ad privatos pertinet," 
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As  the term  "Obligation"  is applied  specifically to 
private  law,  so the  term  "Pfli~ht"~~  (duty)  and  the 
adjective  "pflichtig"  (bound  to render  a  certain  per- 
formance, liable)  pertain  to public  law.87  TO  be sure 
we apply the expression "Pflicht"  (duty) also to  the rela- 
tions of private law, but the manner in which it is done 
proves the correctness of  the definition here given, and 
shows at the same time the fine power  of  distinction 
residing in language.  We speak of  duties of  guardians, 
parents, children, husband  and wife,  but not of  duties 
of  the buyer, the seller, the lessor, the lessee.  In so far 
Old High German "fliht,"  Middle High German "phliht"  from 
"pflegen" -  to  care  for,  manage,  administer,  hence  "Pfleger" 
( =  guardian,  especially  "Giiterpfleger"  [trustee]),  "Pflegekind" 
(foster-child), "Pflegeeltern"  (foster-parents). 
""Staatsbiirgerpflicht"  (duty of  a  citizen),  duties of  jurymen, 
judges,  officials,  "steuerpflichtig"  (bound  to pay  taxes 
dutiable [article]), "wehrpflichtig"  (liable or bound to serve in the 
army), "pflichtig"  (bound,  liable), etc.  All  these expressions are 
found in our new German imperial codes.  I compared the latter 
for the terminology observed in them and have arrived at  the fol- 
lowing result.  In the codes concerned  with  public law  (Constitu- 
tion of  the German Empire, Judiciary Act, Code of  Criminal Proce- 
dure) are found the terms "Pflichte~~"  (duties), "pflichtig"  (bound), 
"verpfllchten"  (to  bind),  "Verpflichtung"  (legal  bond),  "ver- 
pflichtet"  (bound).  On the other hand, "Verbindlichkeit"  (obliga- 
tory relation), is so far as I remember  not found.  In the statutes 
dealing with private law (general German Bills of Exchange Code and 
the German Commercial Code) are found "Verbindlichkeit"  (obliga- 
tory  relation),  "Wechselverbindlichkeit"  (obligation  arising out of 
commercial paper), "verpflichtet"  (legally bound),  "Pflicht"  (legal 
duty), for  example,  "Haftungspflicht"  (liability), duty of  timely 
presentation, duties of  trade brokers, of  the board of  directors of a 
joint-stock  company,  etc.  For the contractual  basis of the obliga- 
tory relation both use regularly the word "Verbindlichkeit"  [obliga- 
tory relation]  (to enter, undertake), but also "Verpflichtung"  [legal 
bond] (to enter, undertake).  "Verpflichtung"  is therefore the gen- 
eral expression, "Verbindlichkeit"  the special  expression  restricted 
solely to private  law.  The application of  the expression "~flicht" 
(duty) is governed by the point of  view presented in the text later. 
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as, in  certain  relations of private  law, as for example 
in those above mentioned of  guardians, parents, etc., the 
law prescribes for the person, in the interest of  society, a 
fixed  form  of obligatory relation which cannot be changed 
by the autonomy of the party (that part of  private law 
which the  Romans  designate  as  "jus  publicum  quod 
privatorum  mutari  nOn  potest"),  we  speak  of 
duties also in these relations.  And this without consider- 
ing  the circumstance whether one has entered into the 
relation of his own free will like the husband, or by com- 
pulsion as the guardian, since it  is indifferent as far as the 
obligatory status is concerned.  But the case is different 
where the person himself  determines the character and 
measure of his legal bond, as in contracts.  In this case 
we  say indeed that the person binds himself  ("sich  'ver- 
*flichte0');  that  he  takes a  legal  bond  upon  himself 
("Verpflichtungen  iibernehme");  but  we  do  not  call 
the latter "duties"  ("Pflichten").  But in so far as the 
State's legal constraint  is added to the frce will of  the 
individual establishing the obligation, this merges into 
duty ("Pflicht").  The seller, unlike the guardian, does 
not take a duty but an obligatory relation upon himself, 
to do a certain thing.  But after he has established it, it 
changes into a duty before the tribunal of  the judge if  he 
refuses to  carry it out.  The latter would have to say to 
him, if he  wanted  to express himself  correctly, "Since 
You  have put yourself under an  obligatory relation ("Ver- 
bindlichkeit"), since you have undertaken a  legal bond 
("Verpfli~htun~"),  you  have  the  duty  ("Pflicht")  to 
it out."  The same difference is expressed by the 
in the terms "obligatio"  and "oportet."  "Obli- 
gatiO" like all verbals in "io"  denotes primarily  an act, 
the act  of  binding oneself  on the part of  the debtors 
('8c1'u1dner")  ("ligare"  toward another -  'lob-ligare7'). 
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by  the  act  ("obligatum  esse,"  being  bound,  obliged). 
To this state of  being bound which the party has taken 
upon  itself,ss the law  attaches as its consequence  the 
"oportet,"  the command to  carry it out.  It  is the same 
difference  between  the private  and public  side  of  the 
relation that is expressed  in the terms "Verpfli~htun~" 
(legal bond) and "Verbindlichkeit"  (obligatory relation) 
on the one hand, and  "Pflicht"  (duty)  on the other. 
Those  two  expressions  and  "obligatio"  refer  to  the 
party, "Pflicht"  (duty) and "oportet"  refer to  the judge. 
When the party makes use of  the latter expression, he 
does so with an  eye to the judge. 
(c) Society.  The law imposes a number of  legal bonds 
upon  us which  have  as their  subject  ("Destinatar") 
neither a definite individual, nor the State (municipality, 
Church), but the whole people, society.  They are such 
as have for their purpose the good of  the community, - 
public safety; as  for example, the obligation of  maintain- 
ing in repair  the roads in  front of  our lands, the dikes, 
etc.  Nowadays their enforcement  is left  as a rule  to 
the police.  Among the Romans, the point of  view that 
this matter concerns the interests of  the people  ("popu- 
lus")  and constitutes a social duty found its legal expres- 
sion in the "actio popularis,"  to which every citizen was 
entitled as a representative of  the people.sVn view of 
An "obligatio lege introducta"  (D. 13.2. 1)  is a product of  later 
times,  which  would  have seemed  as contradictory  to an ancient 
Roman  as the so-called  "pignus  legale."  Both concepts,  that of 
obligation as well as that of  pledge, presuppose in the original con- 
ception an  act of  will of  the subject.  Upon this primitive national 
conception  was  based  the necessity  of  the  many  "cautiones"  of 
Roman procedure.  Plaintiff, defendant, representative, had to bind 
themselves by their own deed.  With us the law imposes upon them 
the legal  bond in question -  "Velerbindlzchkeit"  (private obligatory 
relation) has become "Pflicht"  (legal duty). 
D.  47.  23.  1, actually designates the "jus  popull"  as its basis. 
Example, the "actio de posito et  suspenso"  against the person who 
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the ,-hanged  form of  this matter at  the present time, we 
might designate this third  class as police obligations in 
contradistinction to private and public. 
ln addition to the expressions for obligation which we 
have met so far, the German language possesses a  few 
other terms, which refer to a special form of  the relation. 
They are the following: - 
compulsion.  The expression  denotes  the  obligation 
of a  person  not so much  to do a  thing himself, as to 
have  it  done.  Compulsory  vaccination  obliges  us  to 
vaccinate our children;  compulsory  education, to edu- 
cate them;  compulsory  testimony, to be heard as wit- 
nesses.  The application of compulsory methods for the 
purpose of  carrying out these obligations comes  under 
the category of  execution, not under that of  punishment. 
The  "penalties"  threatened  in case of  insubordination 
are nothing else than means of  pressure to break down 
resistance.$O 
Burden.  The  original  meaning  of  the  expression 
seems to have been an obligation imposed upon a  per- 
son not directly, but through the medium of  real estate, 
a form of  taxing a person, which constitutes a peculiarity 
of  the old  German  law  as against  the  Roman.  The 
subject in whose  benefit  the burden is imposed  might 
be  an individual (perpetual charge,  charge  on realty), 
the State  (Church, n~unicipality  ; State and communal 
endangers  the  public  passage  by    lacing  obstacles  or suspending 
objects from his house. 
The Roman concept of "multa"  in contradistinction to  "poena." 
The example of  the Romans, who fixed  a maximum for "multa,"  on 
the attainment of  which  no further coercive measures were applied, 
has been imitated in the Law of Civil Procedure of  the German Em- 
pire, 1  355, in compulsory testimony.  The disadvantages which it 
entails  upon the refractory  witness  have not  the significance of a 
punishment, but of  means of  pressure for the purpose of  carrying 
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charges,  tithes),  society  (service-burden  of  repairing 
dikes, of  road-repair, and of  the building of  churches). 
Some of these burdens were later transferred  from the 
real estate to  the person (for example, quartering charges, 
communal charges), and the name burden should then 
have been replaced by another.  But, as  often happens, 
the existing name was retained although it  was no longer 
suitable.  The  expression  was  extended  even  to the 
recently  proposed  legal  obligation of  municipalities  to 
support  the  schools,  and it was  called  school  charge, 
although  it would  be  more  correct  to speak of  school 
duty ("Pflicht"). 
Debt.  In modern legal phraseology we understand by 
this term a private obligation referring to  money (debts = 
money  debts).  Payment  ("Zahlung")  corresponds  to 
it as its fulfilment  (counting ["zahlen"]  of  the money; 
SO  "numerare"  from  "numerus").  Consequently  the 
expression  debtor  and  its  correlative  creditor  would 
have  to be  limited  to this connotation.  But juristic 
terminology  did not bind itself  to this, and uses both 
expressions of  the persons having respectively the right 
and the duty in general, as the Romans did in the use of 
their  "creditor"  and "debitor";  which were also origin- 
ally confined to money debts. 
Service.  We  speak  of  "Dienstleistungen"  (deeds  of 
senlice) when  it is  a  question of  particular temporary 
acts.  We  speak  of  "Dienst"  (service)  and  "Dienst- 
verhaltniss"  (relation of service) when the entire serv- 
ice  power  is engaged  (attendants, domestic  servants, 
footmen,  service-hire,  State and  Church  service,  mili- 
tary service).  "Burden"  ("Last")  rests on the thing, 
"service"  ("Dienst")  on the person. 
3.  Crime.  Crime (including also offences  and misde- 
meanors punished  hy  fine or imprisonment)vl has been 
9'  Etqmologically  "Ver-brerhen"  (crime) is  characterized  as the 
breaking ("Brechen") of  order, "Vcr-gehen"  (offence)  as going beyond 
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defined as  an act involving a public penalty, or one that 
is in violation  of  the criminal law.  The definition  is 
jt contains the external criterion by which crime 
may be recognized, but it is purely formal.  It enables 
us to  human acts in accordance with a definite 
positive  law as being crimes or not, without giving us 
information concerning  the  important  question  what 
crime is and  why the law attaches a penalty to it.  In 
short it gives us the external mark,  but not the internal 
essence  of  crime. 
Other  definitions have tried  to remedy  this defect, 
but, according to my opinion, with little success.  One 
regards  the essence of  crime as being  the violation  of 
subjective  rights  (of  the  individual  or  State).  But 
crimes against  morality, perjury,  blasphemy,  etc., do 
not  violate  any subjective  right.  Another  definition 
regards  crime  as the violation  of  the freedom  secureti 
by the State.  But freedom isnot violated by the crimes 
mentioned.  Still another regards crime as the violation 
of the legal order.  But the legal  order emljraces also 
private law, and private law is not protected by pe~lalty; 
and not every act contrary to law is a crime.  The same 
objection applies to the definition of  crime as the revolt 
of  the individual  will  against  the general.  For  in  so 
far as this general will has assumed a  legal  form  (and 
beyond this there can be no question of  its  legally binding 
it coincides with the legal order.  This definition 
exactly the same idea as the one before, except 
that it is not so good because less definite.  If we apply 
it as it reads, then deviation from the prevalent fashion 
Or  the domestic mode of  living is also a crime, and if we 
("Hinaus-8ehen"),  "~bfr-tretun~''  (misdemeanor)  as stepping beyond 
("Hinaus-trelen") the path  of  right.  Similarly  the Roman  "delk- 
lum"  from "de-linquere,"  "linpuere,"  leaving the way prescribed  by 
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supply the missing element  "legal,"  then all violations 
of private  law  must also be characterized  as a revolt 
against  the general  will.  The  larter  commands  the 
debtor to  pay his debt.  If  he does not do so, he revolts 
against it. 
The purpose of the criminal law is no different from 
that of  any law, viz., the security of  the conditions of 
social  life.  But the manner in which  it pursues  this 
purpose is peculiar.  It  makes use of  punishment.  Why? 
Is it because all disregard of  law is a revolt against the 
authority of the State and  therefore deserves  punish- 
ment?  In that case every violation of  law  should be 
punished;  the refusal of  the seller to  fulfil his contract, 
of  the debtor to pay his debt, and innumerable other 
cases; and then there would be only one kind of  punish- 
ment, viz., for disregard of  the law, and only one kind 
of  crime, viz., the insubordination of  the subject to the 
commands or prohibitions of  the government. 
Wherein lies the reason of  the fact that whereas the 
law  punishes  certain  acts which  are in opposition  to 
it, it leaves others unpunished?  In the one case as well 
as in the other we are dealing with disregard of  the law, 
and hence, if  the latter is the sum of  the conditions of 
social  life, we  are dealing with an attack upon  these 
conditions.  Society can no more  exist if  contracts of 
sale are not carried out, and loans are not repaid, than 
if  one man  kills or robs  the  other.  Why punishment 
in the one case and not in the other? 
Self-preservation  also,  and  reproduction  and  work 
are conditions of  social life.  Why does not society secure 
these by law?  The answer is, because it has no need of 
doing so (p. 338).  The same consideration which causes 
society to  take refuge in the law at  all, namely the recog- 
nition that it needs it, guides it also in reference to the 
criminal  law.  Where  the  other  means  are  sufficient 
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for the realization of  the law, the application of  punish- 
ment would be an irresponsible measure, because society 
itself would be the sufferer by it (p. 280).  The question 
for what cases legislation  shall fix a  penalty is purely a 
question  of  social  politics.  I  do not  mean the social 
politics which directs its attention merely to the external 
goods, but politics in the full sense of  the word, which is 
synonymous with the practical estimation and security 
of all conditions, including the moral,  of  the prosperity 
of  society.  The Roman law  thought it necessary,  for 
good  reasons, to set a limit in their own interest and in 
the interest of  the children upon the liberality of  man 
and wife toward each other.  It  forbids for  this reason 
gifts between man and wife.  But it assigns no penalty 
to  the  transgression  of  this  prescription.  Why not? 
Because the nullity of  the gift is quite sufficient for the 
purpose, and punishment would  be useless.  The same 
thing applies to the case of  the seller refusing to carry 
out the contract of  sale, or the debtor refusing to repay 
the loan.  Enforcement of  the contract is quite sufficient, 
and there is no need of  punishment.  There as here the 
disregard  of  the law,  the revolt  of  the particular  will 
against the general, ends with  the powerlessness  of  the 
individual  will;  it can  go  no  further  than  the  mere 
attempt.  The anticipation of  this result is sufficiefit as 
a rule to stifle the attempt itself  in the germ.  To one 
case of attempted resistance there are millions of  cases 
of unresisting submission to the law.  Resistance is to 
be feared as a rule in well ordered conditions of  the law 
only where either the fact or its legal judgment  can be 
an object of  dispute. 
But suppose these conditions changed, and the civil 
law assumed dimensions in certain directions,'for  example 
in reference  to  the reliability of  weights or the genuineness 
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and solidity into discredit abroad, and as a consequence 
diminish  the  export  trade, what  would  the  legislator 
have to do in such a case?  Would he have to put his 
hands in his pockets for the academical  reason  that it 
is a violation of  the civil law and not of  the criminal law? 
The difference  between  the  two  and  their  limits  he 
determines himself.  He does not have to take his con- 
cepts of civil and criminal law from theory, but theory 
must shape itself  according to his views.  The criminal 
law begins where punishment is required by the interest 
of  society.  And when loyalty and honesty in business 
cannot be kept straight without it, the law must make 
use of  punishment. 
This is the condition in which we find ourselves today 
in  Germany.  Too long  has our  legislation  looked  on 
idly while  irresponsibility,  dishonesty,  deception,  have 
raised their heads ever more insolently in contract rela- 
tions,  and have brought about a  state of  affairs which 
makes an honest man almost disgusted  with life.  The 
idea of  the "genuine"  has almost disappeared in Germany 
in the case of  most articles, not merely in articles of  food. 
Almost. anything  we  take into our  hands  is  spurious, 
counterfeit, falsified.  Germany once had a large export 
trade in linen.  Now the German linen industry in for- 
eign markets has been crowded out almost everywhere, 
and  rightly  so.  The thousands  of  dollars  which  dis- 
honest  weavers  or  mandfacturers  gained  by  the  mix- 
ture of  cotton have  lost  the German  nation  millions, 
quite apart from  the injury  done  to our  good  name 
abroad.  If  these falsifiers had been threatened in good 
time  with  the penalty of  imprisonment, we  should be 
better off.  Our  forefathers in the free imperial  cities, 
simple artisans and tradesmen, without any knowledge 
of  the difference  between  civil  and  criminal  offences 
against  the law,  showed  in  this respect  a  much  truer 
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insight of what was necessary than we with all our edu- 
cation in theory.  They did not hesitate to inflict pun- 
ishment  upon  breach  of  contract, and  under  certain 
very  heavy  punishments;  as  for  example 
exile and exposure on the pillory ;92 and they cared for solid 
work, good means of  nourishment and honesty in trade 
and intercourse  by means of  all kinds of  institutions. 
We &all  probably have to have many bitter experiences 
yet  before we  can become  as intelligent as they were, 
and free ourselves from the academic prejudice that the 
sphere of contracts is a privileged  wrestling ground for 
civil injustice, which is regarded in principle as inacces- 
sible to punishment. 
Once more,  then, the question of  the legislative use 
of  punishment is purely a  question of  social politics in 
the above sense.  It is comprehended  in the maxim:- 
use punishment wherever society cannot get along with- 
out it.  As  this is a  matter of  historical  experience, of 
the conditions of  life and morals of  the various peoples 
and times, the sphere of  punishment in contradistinction 
to that of  the civil  law or, which is the same thing, the 
sphere  of  crime  in  the widest  sense,  is a  historically 
changing  one, just  as the sphere of  law in relation  to 
morality.  There  was  a  time  in  Rome  when  certain 
contract relations, as for example "fiducia"  and "manda- 
turn,"  were entirely devoid  of legal  protection, and de- 
pended solely upon the protection of  custom ("infamia"). 
Then came the protection of  the civil  law  ("actio  fidu- 
ciae,"  "mandati"),  and  finally  the protection  of  the 
criminal law  ("crimen stellionatus"). 
But no matter how variable rhe extent of  crime may be, 
the concept  is always the same.  It always represents 
"  Rich material in Wilhelm Sickel, "Die  Bestrafung des Vertrags- 
bruchs  und  analoger  Rechtsverlctzungen  in Ueutschland"  (Halle, 
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to us,  on  the  part  of  the criminal, an attack on the 
conditions of  social life;  on the part of  society it rep- 
resents its conviction, expressed in the form of  law, that 
it can ward it off  only by means of  punishment.  Crime 
is  that which endangers the conditions of  social life, and of 
which legislation is convinced  that it can be  removed  only 
by punishment. 
The standard by which  the legislator  measures  this 
character  of  crime  is not  the  concrete  danger  of  the 
particular  act,  but  the  abstract  danger  of  the  whole 
category of  acts.  The punishment of  a particular act is 
only the necessary consequence of the threat of  punish- 
ment once it is made, for without it  the latter would be 
ineffective.  Whether the particular act  endangers society 
or not is quite indifferent,  and there is no error  more 
serious in criminal law than to  substitute the standpoint 
of  the  execution  of  punishment  for that of  the  threat 
thereof. 
Violation of  the civil law is also in opposition to the 
conditions of  social  life, but  it is  an attempt of  the 
powerless against the powerful, which glides off  without 
producing any effect.  The means of  the civil law (legal 
action  and nullity)  are quite adequate for  society  to 
defend  itself  against the attack.  The complete failure 
of  the latter makes punishment superfluous. 
The criminal  law shows  us everywhere a  gradation 
of  punishment according to the nature of  the crime.  It 
will be granted that a definition of  crime which gives the 
key for the explanation of  this fact, and at  the same time 
supplies the standard for the gravity of  the penalty, is 
to be preferred  to every other that cannot do this.  I 
believe I can claim this for my definition.  The stand- 
point of endangering the conditions of  social life embraces 
two elements that are capable of  gradation, and should 
therefore be considered in the legislative estimation of 
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They are, the conditions  of  life-not  all 
are equally  important, some  are more  essential  than 
others:  and the danger  accruing to them -not  every 
injury to the conditions endangers society equally. 
The higher  a good stands, the more thought we take 
to make it secure.  Society does the same thing with its 
conditions of  life (I shall call them social goods) in so far 
as the legal protection is concerned which it summons for 
their  security.  The higher  the  good,  the  higher  the 
punishment.  The list  of  penalties  gives  the  standard  of 
for  social  goods.  What  price  is  for  business, 
that punishment is for  criminal law.  If you put the social 
goods on one side and the penalties on the other, ycu 
have the scale of  social values.  And if  you do this for 
the various peoples and times, you will find that the same 
fluctuations in value which commerce shows in economic 
goods  as indicated  by the price,  are also  seen  in  the 
criminal law in reference to the social goods as indicated 
by  the penalty.  Life,  honor,  religion,  morality,  mili- 
tary discipline, etc., did not always have the same rate 
of  exchange.93  Some  things  stand  low  with  us which 
93 Exemplified in my "Kampf  ums Recht,"  (7th ed.),  p.  32.  I 
print the passage here, "Theocracy  stamps blasphemy and idolatry 
as capital crimes, whereas it sees in the removal of  boundary marks 
only a sirnplc offence (Mosaic law).  An agricultural State on the 
other hand will conversely inflict the entire weight of its punishment 
upon the latter, whereas it lets the blasphemer go with a very mild 
punishment  (old  Roman law).  A  commercial State will  give the 
first  place  to the counterfeiting  of  coins and forgery  in general; 
a military State will give it  to  insubordination, malfeasance in office, 
etc.; an absolute  State, to 18se-majestt; a republic to ambition for 
royal  power,  and all of them will exhibit a severity in this place 
which  forms a strong contrast to the manner in which they prose- 
cute other crimes.  In short, the reaction of  the sense of  right of 
States and individuals is most violent  where they feel themselves 
immediately threatened in their peculiar conditions of life. THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH.  VIII 
were high  in former times, and conversely.  The judg- 
ment of  society concerning the greater or lesser impor- 
tance of  certain conditions of  life varies.  This point of 
view  of  the valuation of injured  goods in  the criminal 
law meets us in all its simplicity in the regulations of the 
old German laws concerning bodily injury and homicide. 
All  parts of  the body had their  precise values.  Nose, 
ears, teeth, eyes, foot, hand, finger, everything had its 
definite price;  "price  currents of  the criminal law,"  as 
they have been called."  Similarly the life of  a noble- 
man, of  a freeman, of  a slave.  It  was the valuation of 
man  from  the  standpoint  of  the  criminal  law.  The 
valuation of  society in the same way is the criminal law. 
What is the value of  human life, honor, freedom, prop- 
erty, marriage, morality, security of  the State, military 
discipline, etc.?  Open the book of  the criminal law and 
you  will  find  it. 
In commerce, the system of  money, i.  e., the differ- 
ences in value of  gold, silver, copper and nickel, and the 
divisibility of  the metals, makes possible the fixation of 
minimal differences in value.  The criminal  law solves 
the same problem likewise partly by the variation of  the 
penalties (penalties affecting life, honor, freedom, money), 
partly by  their  divisibility (penalties affecting freedom 
and  money,  permanent  or  temporary  withdrawal  of 
civil rights -  hotzor cannot be taken away temporarily). 
Between the lowest penalty affecting money or freedom 
and the death penalty there is  a wide field, wide enough to 
make possible the finest nuances and particularizations 
in the criminal law. 
In addition to the objective element of  the threatened 
good on the part of  society, there is the subjective element, 
on the part of  the criminal, arising from his disposition 
and  the manner  in which  the crime  was  carried out, 
a  Wilda,  "Strafrecht der Germanen,"  (Halle, 1842), p. 729. 
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which constitutes  him a danger  to society.  Not every 
oiminal  who commits the same crime endangers society 
in the same degree.  Society has more to fear from the 
relapsing or habitual criminal than from the novice in 
crime;  it has more to fear from a conspiracy or band 
than from a single individual.  Cunning threatens greater 
dangers than passion;  design than negligence. 
I now turn to the classification of  crimes according to 
the nature of the subject against whom they aredire~t~d.96 
06  Hugo  Meyer also, "Lehrbuch  des Deutschen  Strafrechts,"  (Zd 
ed., 18771,  $84, to which my attention was not called until after 
the appearance of  the first edition of  my work, arrives at  a threefold 
classification of crimes, which coincides with mine in content.  The 
first two classes are the same as  mine, crimes against the individual 
and against the State.  The third he characterizes as  crimes against 
generallegally protectedinterests,  by which he understands those which 
1 dcsignate as  crimes against society.  The author thus gives up the 
basis of  classification from which he derived the first two members, 
viz., the person against whom the crime is directed, and substitutes 
another, that of the legally protected interest.  His classification, 
therefore, lacks the unity of the "fundan~entum  dividendi,"  not to 
speak of the fact that no crime can be committed against a good, 
the crime is always directed against the bearer of  the good.  The 
irrjury or the endangering of  the good is forbidden only in the inter- 
est of the bearer and not in that of  the good itself.  If we have to 
hring  in the objective standpoint of  the good, then the two first 
categories also  must  be  determined  in accordance  with  it as the 
injury of  the interests of the individual and of  the State.  The impor- 
tant element of  the classification set up by me, vie., the idea of  the 
subject, which is laid at  its basis, was not seen by Meyer despite the 
similarity of  the three categories in content.  And  I attribute so 
much importance to  my presentation of this idea because the appli- 
cation of  the idea of the subject in the classification of  crimes is 
only a special case of this point of  view which I set up and carried 
through to the widest extent, not merely in the world of  law but in 
the entire ethical world-order (11, pp. 133-154).  My classification 
has no value for me as such, but only because it confirms the cor- 
fectness and realizability of the quite general idea discovered by me 
In another way.  Let him who adopts it in criminal law see how he 
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There will be no danger of  misunderstanding if  for the 
sake of brevity I shall speak of  the subject in crime also, 
though it would be more correct to say, the subject for 
whose sake the crime is forbidden. 
The subject in crime may be 
(a)  The  Individual.  Crimes  against  an individual 
have  long  been  comprehended  by  criminologists in  a 
unitary concept and designated  by the name of  private 
crimes.  I  distinguish  three  classes, according  as they 
threaten  the  conditions  of  the subject's  physical, eco- 
nomic, or ideal life. 
The physical conditions of  life are threatened in their 
totality (life) by murder and homicide,  and by the expo- 
sure of  helpless persons  (for abortion and the duel see 
below) ; partially by bodily injury (mutilation of  the body, 
injury to health and to the intellectual powers). 
The economic conditions, i.  e., property, are threatened 
by  robbery,  theft, embezzlement, damage,  removal  of 
boundary marks, extortion, criminal self-seeking, decep- 
tion, treachery. 
By  ideal  conditions  of  life  I  mean  all  those  goods 
which are not outwardly visible, but exist only in idea, 
and without the security of  which in accordance with the 
notions of  society, a satisfying and ethical life is not pos- 
sible.  These are, freedom  (crimes against it are kidnap- 
ping, seduction, rape, taking away the use of  one's per- 
sonal  freedom, illegal  imprisonment, constraint, breach 
of  domestic peace), honor  (insult, false accusation, vio- 
lating another's secrets, soliciting for sexual intercourse), 
family (adultery, bigamy, crimes against personal status, 
in particular the substitution of  children). 
(b)  The State.  The crimes directed  against  it are 
not limited to the State crimes of  criminalistic  theory, 
but extend as far as the conditions of  political life which 
may  be  threatened  by  them.  The expression  public 
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crimes  is  not  appropriate  according  to my  opinion, 
because  like  the Latin  "publicus"  ("publica  utilitas," 
iipublice  interest"),  it is  also  used  in  application  to 
society (crimes against  public  safety, see below).  To 
differentiate  these crimes from the social, 1 use the expres- 
sion political. 
political crime is characterized as an attack on the 
conditions of  life.  Can the latter be classified? 
~f  this were possible, we should at  the same time obtain 
a classification  of  the crimes directed against them. 
The simplest method would seem to be to carry over 
the classification made above in the individual;  which, 
as we shall see later, is applicable also to society.  The 
only objection is that the State has no physical existence 
in the true sense of  the word.  Physically considered it 
is nothing more than the sum of all the members of the 
State.  But the State, too, exists, and we can place the 
indispensable conditions of  its existence on the same line 
with those of  the individual, except that in the former 
also as well  as in the latter we separate the economic 
conditions from the physical;  although the physical life 
is just  as impossible in the State without the economic 
means for its preservation, as in the individual. 
Indispensable in this sense, i. e., postulated with abso- 
lute necessity in the concept of the State, hence, meta- 
phorically  speaking, a physical  condition  of  the life of 
the State, an element  constituting its essence-  is the 
possession of  a territory.  Next comes the possession of 
the highest power;  hence the organization of  the forces 
of the State (government), the system of officials, includ- 
ing the sovereign as the highest officer of  the State,  deter- 
mined  by  birth, and the army.  All  acts which  have 
as their  purpose  to remove  or to threaten  this power 
of the State which is posited in its existence, I would class 
among those  that endanger  the physical  conditions of 372  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [ CH. VIII 
the life of  the State; hence treason to the country, high 
treason, revolt, riot, hostile acts to  friendly States.  Then 
come the peculiar offences of  the officials, upon whose 
dutiful conduct the whole system of  the State power de- 
pends;  and of the soldiers, of whose dutifulness in the 
service  (evasion  of  service,  desertion)  and  obedience 
(insubordination, mutiny) the same holds true. 
The economic  conditions of  the life of  the State are 
threatened  by refusal of  taxes, defrauding the govern- 
ment, embezzlement of  public moneys. 
I called freedom, honor and family the ideal conditions 
of  the life of  the individual.  We can speak of  a crime 
against honor in the State also (insult to the sovereign, 
to the  honor  of  the  office).  By  crimes  against  the 
freedom of  the State I understand those which hinder its 
voluntary action, i. e., the functions of  its organs or citi- 
zens which are necessary for its purpose ; hence resistance 
to the authorities, refusal to serve on the jury  and the 
witness stand, crimes in reference to the exercise of  the 
rights of  citizens. 
I must not conceal the fact  that in this attempt to 
carry over to the State the division  of  physical,  eco- 
nomic and ideal conditions of  life which are applicable 
to the individual and society, I have the feeling  that 
this is possible only in a forced manner.  I shall be the 
first  to feel  gratified  if  this classification  be  replaced 
by another which shall answer better to the peculiarities 
of  the State. 
The subject in crime may be finally 
(c) Society.  I designate these crimes as social.  They 
are those by which neither the individual nor the State 
is threatened, but the masses, society  (acts dangerous 
to the community). 
The physical conditions of  the life of  society, i. e.,  the 
external security of  its existence, are threatened by arson, 
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the causing of an inundation, destruction of  dikes, dams, 
railroads, and also by breach  of the peace of  the land. 
is  not this or that person whom the perpetrator has 
in mind; or, even when such is the case, it is not a par- 
ticular  person who suffers from the deed, but an indeter- 
minate number of  people, the masses. 
The economic  conditions  of  the life of  society, i. e., 
the security of  commerce, are threatened by false coinage 
and the counterfeiting  of  documents.  It is a complete 
in my opinion, to  place the  first of  the two among 
political crimes, for the State  is in nowise injured thereby, 
not even as the proprietor of the prerogative of  coinage. 
For what injury can false coins do to the State?  The 
privilege of coining money has nothing to do with the 
essence of the State, i. e., with its power.  Instead  of 
the State the banks could issue coins as they, in fact, 
issue banknotes, the counterfeiting of  which must be, 
and is, punished in the interest of  the public quite as 
much  as the paper  money or the coins issued by  the 
State.  Society alone is injured by false coins or money, 
not the particular person who happened to have gotten 
it, for counterfeit  money  passes  from  hand  to hand. 
Business in general suffers, and the feeling of  security 
disappears.  The same is true of  false documents.  Busi- 
ness  can not go on if  every coin and every document 
must first be tested for its genuineness. 
The ideal conditions of  the life of  society are threatened 
in  their  ethical  and religious foundations  by  perjury, 
for example, and offences against morality and religion. 
Is  it possible to commit  a  crime  against  religion  and 
Only in the same sense as against property 
and honor, i.  e., the crime is not committed against these 
This would be as absurd as a crime against 
the  airy  by infecting it, or the water, by poisoning it. 
The crime is committed  always against  a person.  In 374  THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH.  VIII 
crimes against honor  and property  the injured  person 
is the individual, in the crimes above named it is society. 
It is not God, as was formerly assumed in reference to 
religious offences and perjury, for God cannot be injured. 
And the circumstance that crime denotes a falling away 
from God,  i. e.,  a sin, is true of  all crimes, not of  particular 
ones only.  Nor  is it the State, for  its power  is  not 
threatened by them. 
To the category of  social crimes  in the wider  sense 
belong also most offences against the police.  The police 
are in a very proper  sense the representatives  of  the 
interests of  society, using the term in the more limited 
meaning as defined here. 
I have omitted so far two crimes of  a dubious nature, 
and I want to say a few words about them. 
First, the duel.  We  may see in the duel an  interference 
with the judicial sovereignty, inasmuch as the duellists 
fight their differences out alone instead of  allowing the 
courts to decide them.  If  they did it with sticks or a 
squirt or by means of  a contest in running instead of 
deadly weapons, no one would see in it  anything criminal, 
The deciding elements are the deadly weapons  and the 
reciprocal danger to life caused by them.  For this reason 
the  duel  does  not  belong  to political  crimes,  but  to 
private  (reciprocal  danger to life). 
Secondly,  abortion.  Who is the subject here?  The 
future child?  It does not yet exist as a person.  It is 
at  the time, as the Roman law properly says, a part of 
the mother.  The subject in abortion is therefore  pot 
the child, but society.  Its criminality  consists  in  the 
fact  that it endangers  the coming  generation,  which 
belongs to the conditions of  the life of  society (p. 339). 
I  will  not deny that some of the crimes  I  classified 
above may also be brought under a different category. 
I arranged them  accordingtothe  point of  view that  seemed 
proper to me. 
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~h~  of  crime according to the subject 
in whose behalf it is forbidden, which 1 attempted in the 
above  discussion,  does not claim  to exercise  a  deter- 
mining influence upon the systematic treatment of  crim- 
inal  law.  I made it with the sole purpose of  showing 
that my idea of  the subject is applicable also to crime, 
and this, I hope, I have succeeded in doing.  The crim- 
inalist may reject this classification as not available for 
his  purposes, just  as the civilian  will  and must reject 
my  conception  of  foundations.  There  are  various 
points of  view from which a subject may be considered, 
and every one of them is justified if  it  furthers the matter 
in any way.  I think I may claim this for mine. 
My discussions of  the subject in law are now finished. 
Whether they will gain assent in all details I am not 
much concerned.  But I do lay great stress upon intro- 
ducing the fundamental idea that the highest principle 
of  classification  in law from the philosophical point of 
view is the subject for whose sake the law is made;  and 
that in addition to the individual and the State (Church, 
associations)  society also, in the narrower sense, must 
be  recognized  as such a  subject.  The less  the jurist 
will be reconciled to this third subject, which can not be 
classed in his category of  legal subjects, the more I think 
it imperative to strengthen the above proof of  its justi- 
fication by giving it a historical safe-conduct on its way, 
issued by no less a person than the model nation of  the 
law,  the Romans.  They apprehended  the concept  of 
society in the above sense and gave it  expression in their 
government with a  clearness, keenness and consistency 
belonging to a theoretical problem,  as if  it had been a 
question of an  abstract and systematically correct formu- 
lation of a concept not in any way restricted by practical 
considerations.  Witness the offices of  censor and aedile. 
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turn their attention and their care was society in the sense 
we defined it above.  It  was the business of  the censors 
to determine what was the condition of  Roman society 
at  the time, and what means it  was in a position to place 
at the disposal of  the powers of  the State.  They had 
to keep the government informed of  the number and 
increase  of  population,  of  the number  of  men  under 
arms and their equipment, of the amount of  capital, etc., 
in short their problem was, in a word, the statistics of  the 
national forces,  in the interests  of  the government  ad- 
ministration.  Out of  this statistical function developed 
in  a natural progress the  censorious function.  If  the 
wealth  of  any one retrograded since the holding of the 
last census, it was the most natural thing for the censor 
to inquire after the reasons;  and if  the man was not able 
to give a just account of  himself, to  deliver him a lecture 
and remind  him of  his  duties  to society.  In case of 
repetition of  the offence, the admonition changed into 
a  reprimand  and a  public  censure  ("nota  censoria"). 
Bad management, careless cultivation of  the field, was 
a  censorial offence, for the well-being of  society could 
proceed only if every man did  his duty and obligation 
as a  proprietor.  The same  applied  to celibacy  and 
childlessness;  for society had  need of  the new genera- 
tion.  For this reason  a  person  who  had had  no chil- 
dren with his wife regarded  himself, in consequence of 
the censor's admonition, as required to  separate from her 
and marry another.  Here we have two of  our "mixed- 
legal"  conditions of  social life, viz., work and reproduc- 
tion  (p.  338), as the object of  the censor's  care.  But 
they were not protected in the form of  law.  The require- 
ments which  the censor  made were not legal  in their 
nature.  He could not employ the penalties of  the law 
(fine, imprisonment, death) against disobcdience;g6 thc 
See my "Geist des romischen Rechts,"  11,  1, p. 54 ff. (3d ed.). 
Cuero, "Pro Cluentio," ch. 42.  "Majores nostri  (animadversionern 
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only  pressure he could bring to bear was the moral  one 
of ethical disapproval, by which society emphasized its 
ethical demands (Ch. IX), and which he, as the repre- 
sentative of public opinion, employed.  The censor was 
the legal personification of  public opinion, of  the ethical 
judgment of  the people.  His  power  extended  farther 
than public opinion only in this, namely that whereas 
the latter could realize the idea  of  exclusion from  the 
community of  one's fellowmen only in a social way, he 
was able to give this idea a legal  form  by depriving an 
unworthy person of positions  of political  honor, which 
indeed are dependent upon  the respect of  one's fellow- 
men  (exclusion  from  the  senate,  from  the  order  of 
knights, from the "tribus").  The point of  view which 
guided the censor in his ethical regimen was not regard 
for the individual as with the pastor, and the father con- 
fessor, but  for  society.  Morality interested  him  only 
on  the side of  its practical value to society, i.e., as an 
indispensable condition for the progress of  society;  for 
the  conservation  and  increase  of  the  national  power. 
It was  the thought, in short, that national morality is 
national  power. 
The office of  the aediles also turned exclusively about 
society.  They had nothing to do with the State as such. 
The interests which they had to guard were solely those 
of the people, of  the masses. 
They were  the  following,  1.  Care for  the physical 
conditions of  the life of  the people;  viz., maintenance, 
grain,  water,  baths,  cook-shops,  security  of  public 
thoroughfares, repairs of  houses and of  public roads, etc. 
2.  The economical  conditions:  trade, market  police, 
genuine coinage, measures, weights, usury in money and 
grain, transgressions of  the social-political regulations of 
et auctoritatem censoriam) nunquam neque judicium  nominaverunt 
neque perinde ut rem judicatam  observaverunt." 378  THE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH. VIII 
the  "Lex  Licinia"  concerning  the  use  of  the  "ager 
publicus," etc. 
3.  The  Ideal  conditions:  morality  (prosecution  of 
offences against chastity, ancient  press police, i.e., the 
destruction  of  immoral  or  dangerous  books),  public 
decorum  (offensive appearance in public,  disrespect  to 
the sovereign people),Q7  economy and sobriety  (limita- 
tion  of  luxury  even  at funerals,  management  of  the 
sumptuary laws,  confiscation  of  dainties  exhibited  in 
public),  pleasures  of  the  people  (popular  festivals, 
games). 
The province of  the aediles 98 as shown in this by no 
means exhaustive sketch presents them as the protectors 
of  Roman society in the narrower sense, as police admin- 
istrators of  the public safety and welfare.  The requisite 
external  power  of  enforcement  they  enjoyed  was  the 
natural  consequence  of  the  task  assigned  to  them. 
Without going further into the matter, which would be 
out of  place here, it may suffice to remark that the three 
fundamental  forms  of  the  existence  of  society  shown 
above in connection with  the fundamental concepts of 
law (p. 347 ff., under c),  viz., social property, social obliga- 
tions, and  protection  against  crimes dangerous to the 
community, were placed in Rome essentially under the 
care of  the aediles.  In cert~in  cases they actually inter- 
fered, for example in obstructions of  the public thorough- 
fare, by in person removing the obstru~tion;~S  in others 
87 The well-known case of  Claudia (Gellius 10,6).  It  is not with- 
out importance in the discussion of  principles because an authority 
like Th. Mommsen, "Rom. Staatsrecht," 11, p.  461, wanted to bring 
it under the concept of  "a  crime directed immediately  against the 
State,"  in  which  case  the entire conception  above  given  of  the 
province of  the aediles would be changed. 
See the complete presentation in Th. Mommsen, "Staatsrecht," 
pp. 461491. 
98 D 43. 8.2-24; 43. 10.2. The well-known case of  18.6.12  and 13, 
"Lectos emptos, cum in via publica positi essent, aedilis concidit." 
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they gave an  order to  the private person to undertake the 
necessary measures, and the order was followed by the 
infliction of  a  "m~lta"~'"'  in case  of  disobedience.  In 
other cases still they issued edicts of  their own,'O1  and 
finally  in all grave offences they came before the "comi- 
tia tributa"  themselves with a motion for a fine.  This 
fine had not the significance of  a criminal charge, as was 
the case in the "comitia centuriata," but was a proposi- 
tion of "compositio,"  i.e., of  redeeming the guilty from 
punishment by means of  money. 
The moneys which they realized in this way were not 
delivered to the State treasury ("aerarium"),  and were 
not  collected  by  the fiscal  officials  of  the State, the 
quaestors, as  was the case with the property of those who 
committed an offence against the State, but, in accord- 
ance with the social character of  their office, the aediles 
themselves collected them and used them in the interests 
of  society, by providing  therewith  the expenses of  the 
public games, roads, buildings,  monuments, etc.  The 
crime committed against society was to be made good to 
society. 
Thus the standpoint of  society is seen to accompany 
us throughout the aedile ministration.  I have not found 
a  single  point  in  which  it is  wanting.lo2  The  other 
'" D. 43. 10.  1  8 1 ". . . . multent eos, quousque firmos fecerint 
(parietes)."  Ibid.  3, "construat vias publicas unusquisque  secun- 
durn propriam domum." 
lo' "Actiones aediliciae," to which belongs also the criminal action 
in 21. 1. 40-42. 
lo2 Mommsen,  "Staatsrecht,"  p. 463, misses in the criminal  func- 
tion of the aediles the connection with their ~rovince  in other matters, 
especially in the case of "by  far the greatest number of crimes." 
He thinks therefore that it must be conceived as "a  province quite 
distinct  from the rest of  their official activity."  I  for my  part 
know of no case in which the pint of view established  by me of 
Social crimes (p. 372) dangerous to  the general welfare, does not hold 
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magistrates,  with  the  exception  of  the  censors,  have 
nothing to do with society.  If we want to characterize 
briefly  the legal tasks of  all the Roman magistrates in 
accordance with our point of view of the subject in whose 
behalf they exercised their functions, we may say that the 
subject of  the consuls is the State on its political  and mili- 
tary side;  of  the quaestors likewise  the State, but on 
its economic side; of  the tribunes, the plebs;  of  the prae- 
tors, the individual, so far as it concerns the protection 
of  his private  legal claims  (to which  according  to the 
Roman  conception  belong  also  delictual  actions  and 
"actiones  populares");  of  the  censors  and  the  aediles, 
society.  If  the officials are not equal to  their tasks, then 
the State  suffers in the consuls; the treasury ("aerarium") 
in  the quaestors;  the plebeians  in  the tribunes;  the 
individual in the praetors, and society in  the  censors 
and aediles. 
I have now reached the end;  not merely the end of 
my discussions of  the subject in the purpose of  the law, 
but the end of  my whole development of  the concept of 
law.  We began with the formal element, i.e., the exter- 
nal form of  the law.  To  this we added later the content 
or,-since  the entire content of  the law is determined by 
the purpose,-the  purposing  element.  We have thus 
been led to the exhaustive definition of  law with which 
we now close our whole investigation. 
Law is the sum of  the conditions  of  social  life in the 
widest  sense  of  the  term, as secured  by the power  of  the 
State through the means of  external compulsion. 
We now  leave  the standpoint  of  society, which  we 
have held  and had to hold  till now in order to present 
the content or teleological element of  the law, and turn 
our attention to the individual.  Society is nothing more 
than the sum of  the individuals;  and even though, in 
order to present the significance of  law as a part of  the 
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whole order of  human things, we may look away from the 
individual and substitute the community for it, still it 
is after all the individual upon whom the law exerts its 
activity;  it is for his benefit, and it is upon him that its 
limitations  are laid.  Is the individual  reimbursed  for 
the limitations  to which  he submits in the interest of 
society, by the advantages which the latter offers him? 
The following exposition shall give the answer to this 
question.  Its purpose is to settle accounts between the 
individual and society in reference to the regulations of 
the law, by placing credit and debit in parallel columns. 
We shall begin with the price which the  individual must 
pay  in order to partake of  the advantages of  the law. 
I call it the pressure  of  the law upon the individual. 
8 13.  The Pressure  of  the Law upon the Individual. 
The progress  in the development of  the State and the 
law is a continuous increase in the demands which both 
make  of  the individual.  Society  becomes  ever  more 
covetous and pretentious.  Every satisfied desire bears 
the germ of  a new one.  But every new purpose which 
is added on the list of  social purposes  to those already 
existing magnifies, with the measure of  labor power and 
money  which  it  requires,  the contribution  demanded 
of the  individual.  And  as this contribution, whether 
it consists in personal service or in money, must be secured 
by force, there is also increased the strain put upon the 
social  apparatus of  force  for  the purposes  of  society. 
This is most plainly evident and most deeply felt in the 
budget.  The  enormous increase which it  has experienced 
in our century, and which, as far as can be foreseen, will 
keep  on growing, has its ground  and justification  (in 
far as it is not merely a consequence of  the increase 
in the price of goods and labor power), in the recognition 
that our present society can no longer be satisfied  with 
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that it needs more and has more to do than its prede- 
cessor.  Every new step in its course brings new social 
problems.  But  every  important  problem  is indicated 
in the State budget in millions. 
However high  or however  low we  may estimate the 
duty of  the individual  to contribute to the charges of 
the State, every one must say to himself, I, too, for my 
part  contribute to the purposes  of  society;  and were 
the contribution  ever so small, I participate by means 
of it in  all  the  expenses  of  the  State.  There  is  no 
expense  for  which  the contribution,  perhaps  only  the 
millionth part of a penny, could not be calculated pre- 
cisely.  This assertion  is just  as certain as the one we 
made above (p. 17l),  that in the price of  a cup of  coffee 
which  a person drinks, or of  a cigar which he smokes, 
he must pay all the costs needed in its production.  The 
administrators of  the public  revenue  have  solved  the 
problem  of  making all persons and things tributary to 
the purposes of  society.  They stretch out their hands 
everywhere, and as there is scarcely a person who does 
not have to pay his contribution in form of  an income 
tax, an industrial tax or a head tax, so there is scarcely 
a thing from which, before it comes into the hands of  the 
consumer, the State or the municipality has not deducted 
its share in advance. 
But what have taxes to do with  law, you  will  ask? 
Very much.  The  obligation to pay taxes is synonymous 
with the duty of  the citizen to assist  as far as he can 
in the pursuit and the furtherance of  all the purposes 
of  society  for  which the taxes are used.  In place of 
every item in the budget  of  expenditure  we  may  put 
down the rule  of  law:  "You are legally bound  to con- 
tribute to  this."  The  expense budget  of  the  State 
or the municipality  resolves  itself  into as  many  legal 
rules as it has items.  Every one says to you, contribute 
to  this  item.  It  is  your  duty  to support  the army 
and the fleet, to build  streets,  to provide  for schools 
and  universities,  etc.  With  every new  purpose which 
arises  in  the  system  of  the administrative authorities 
you  get  a  new obligation, and  the expense  budget  of 
the State or  of  the  political  and ecclesiastical com- 
munity  tells you for what purposes society makes these 
claims upon You. 
In taxes you see what society costs you in cash money. 
~ut  there  are besides  the  personal  services  which  it 
of  you, oiz., the duty (in Germany) of  military 
service, which  costs you a few years  of  your  life, and 
if there is a war, may cost you your life or your limbs; 
service on  the jury  and other  services  besides.  Then 
there are the police and criminal laws, which prescribe 
to you  the paths to which you must hold in oider not 
to come in conflict with the authorities of  the State. 
Now, you will say, I have finally done with  society. 
What remains now  belongs to me  alone.  Society  can 
not interfere in the sphere of  my private rights;  here 
her  empire ends and mine  begins.  Here  is  the point 
where I can say to her, so far and no further. 
If we might expect to see this demand realized in any 
law in the world, it would have to be the old Roman law, 
for there never  was  any other law  that conceived  the 
principle  of  individual  independence  so  clearly  and 
consciously, and carried it out so energetically and in so 
extensive a manner as the Roman.lo3  Let us hear what 
is its attitude to that demand. 
"You  have  "patria  potestas"  over  your  children, a 
power  such  as no other  people  knows,"  says the old 
law to the father, "but you must not,"  it adds 
"sell  your  children as slaves.  They remain 
free citizens even if  you should make the attempt to sell 
Io3 See my  "Geist des riimischen Rechts,"  11, pp. 133-218. 384  THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [ CH. VIII 
them, and I  place a  limit even upon your right to sell 
them into servitude ("mancipium").  If  you transgress 
this limit, you lose your right of  power over them by 
reason of  your abuse of  it, for your children are not only 
for you, they are also for themselves and for the com- 
munity, which cannot use citizens who have been accus- 
tomed  to slavish obedience. 
"Your property belongs to you, do with it as you like 
while you live.  Your egoism is my guarantee that you 
will guard and take care of  it.  But if  you are frivolous 
enough to squander it, I will place you under the care 
of  a guardian as a spendthrift ("cura prodigi") ; for your 
property is not only for  you,  but also for  those who 
belong to you.lo4  After your death it falls to them.  If 
you want to exclude them, lay your reasons before the 
people,  and they will decide whether they are valid or 
not.lo5  You must do the same thing if  you want to put 
yourself  under  the paternal power  of  another, for the 
people  lose  an independent  citizen  thereby,  and they 
have to  see whether it  is agreeable to  their interests." 
Our present law has increased considerably these legal 
limitations upon the individual in the interest of  society. 
Let us take as an example the relations of  parents to 
their children.  Even before the child is born, society 
stretches forth its hand  for it, protecting  and desiring 
it.  "The child which you bear in your body,"  the law 
says to the mother, "belongs  not to you alone, but also 
to society.  Woe to you if  you interfere with its rights" 
(abortion, exposure).  When the child is born, the law 
imposes as a permanent duty the obligation to support 
lMD. 28. 2. 11.  ". . . quiet iam  vivo  patre  quodammodo domini 
existimantur." 
"Testamentum in comitiis calatis."  Concerning the guarantee 
which this form gave to  children to  their right of  succession, see  my 
"Geist des R. R." 111, 1, p.  147 (4th ed.). 
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it; as a temporary duty, compulsory report of  its birth 
(until recently also compulsory baptism) ; then a  little 
later  vaccination,  and when  the  child  is 
grown  up, compulsory education.  The law sets limits 
t,  the abuse of  the right of  chastisement;  similarly to 
the right of exploiting the child by putting it  in factories 
number of hours of  labor, age).  The judge 
gives  his  consent to the  marriage which  is arbitrarily 
refused by the parent, and in cases of  necessity he even 
forces the parents to  provide the daughter with a dowry. 
In spite of  these limitations, the right of  parents over 
their children is still more extensive today than, it  seems 
to me, is consonant with the nature of  the relation and 
the degree of  civilization of  our present society.  It is 
perhaps the sorest spot of  our entire private law today 
and I  am firmly convinced  that in the distant future 
there will  be a change here, and the moral neglect  of 
children in houses which are breeding places of  vice and 
crime  will  be  prevented  by  putting  them into public 
homes.  Of  what avail is it to fight vice and crime if  we 
leave their breeding places open?  Resistance and struggle 
against the two must pursue them into the home;  and 
I doubt not that this conviction will one day gain ground 
and  will  overcome the false timidity which  still keeps 
us  back  today  from  interfering  in  the home  and the 
rights of parents.  To  be sure, a mighty transformation 
must take place in regal opinion before this can Rappen, 
and  it will  require  perhaps  thousands of  years.  In 
reality the change would not be greater than that from 
the Power of the Roman parent to the limitations above 
mentioned which our law imposes upon him, and which 
wouid have scarcely appeared in a different light to an 
ancient Roman than those I anticipate for the future. 
If the idea that a right exists exclusively for the per- 
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law, it could only be property, and this is as a matter of 
fact  the  prevailing  conception.  Jurists  and  laymen 
agree in the view that the essence of  property consists 
in the unlimited  control of  the owner, and that every 
restriction is essentially an encroachment upon it, which 
is incompatible with the idea of  the institution.  How is 
this?  My view is that this conception is fundamentally 
wrong.  The relation of  property  to society is subject 
to  the same conditions as that of  the family.  The only 
reason that the demands of  society are not so evident 
in  property  is  the circumstance  that the proprietor's 
own interest determines him as a rule to  use his property 
in such a way as will further the interest of  society along 
with his own.  The same thing is true here as in our 
mixed-legal conditions of  social life (p. 337), i. e., there is 
no need of  law because his own advantage and pleasure 
lead a person in the right path without any other stimu- 
lus.  But suppose there were large tracts of  arable land 
lying uncultivated, and weeds grew where corn might 
grow, or that whole  stretches of  land were  withdrawn 
from  cultivation  and  given  over  to hunting,  should 
society look quietly on?  In later Roman imperial times 
it  often happened that  on account of  the  enormous burden 
of  land tax, owners allowed  their lands to lie desolate. 
If  the land existed only for the owner, the Roman gov- 
ernment would  have had  to endure this quietly  as a 
consequence of  the concept of  property.  But the land 
exists also for society, that it  may bear fruit, and there- 
fore they did not endure it; but they offered the estate 
to one who was willing to cultivate it and make it use- 
ful for society.lo6  A garden on the street is an impro- 
priety in a large city, for the site is intended for a house 
'"Cod.  11.  58.  8.  The rest  does  not  belong  here.  The title 
contains besides a series of  other ordinances calculated to secure the 
cultivation of estates.  It signifies a complete misunderstanding of 
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and  not for a garden.  Appreciating this point of view 
,any  systems of  law offer the owner the alternative of 
building up the ground himself or of  selling it for a fair 
price to one who volunteers to do it.  Another example 
is found in the law of mining in  connection with the free- 
dom of  prospecting.  Society has an interest in bringing 
the treasures of the ground to  the surface.  If the owner 
to  do  this, the law gives the right to  anyone else 
who is ready to  do  so to "burrow"  and to  "search."lo7 
The limitations mentioned  so far refer  altogether to 
immovable property.  In respect to movable property, 
the law did not consider it necessary to secure legally its 
use in the interest of society.  The  prohibition of  cruelty 
to  animals is no objection to our view, for its ground is 
not the consideration that the animal is used in a manner 
opposed to  the  economic interest of  society (for in that  case 
the uneconomic use of  other things would  have to be 
forbidden also), but the ethical  point of  view  (see Vol. 
11).  The only danger to society that might arise from 
misuse  of  property  in movable  things  would  be their 
destruction,  which  would  mean  their  effective  loss  to 
society, but it is secured against this danger by the inter- 
the meaning of  that constitution to try to explain it on the basis 
of  the idea of  "derelictio"  (abandonment).  The motive  was  the 
public  interest,  "ad  priuatum  pariter  publicumque  compendium 
excolere."  It is from a  similar consideration  that  a  tumble-down 
house, which on the refusal of one of the joint owners was repaired on 
hisownaccount  by the other, is made over to  him, D.  17. 2.52 Q 10. 
Suetonius,  "Vespas."  ch.  8, tells of  a  temporary  measure  of the 
same  tendency,  "Deformis urbs veteribus incendiis ac ruinis erat, 
VacuaS areas occupare et aedificare, si possessores  cessarent, cuicumque 
permisit."  The lax landowner was in ancient times reminded cf his 
duties to  society by the censor.  Gell. 4, 12. 
lU7  This is already the case in  Roman law.  See Cod. 11. 6, "De 
Metallariis."  In 1 of the same place  the same point  of view  is 
emphasized as in Cod. 8  of the preceding pote,  "sibi el  rei publicae 
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est of  the owner  himself.  That the owner  squanders 
his fortune is (apart from the loss to his next of  kin, 
p. 384) indifferent  to society, it only passes into other 
hands, but its constituent parts are preserved for society. 
The contrary is  possible  only in testamentary disposi- 
tion.  It  is conceivable that a miser, who grudges every- 
body everything after his death just  as he did in life, 
might direct in his will that his documents and valuables 
should be put in his grave or be destroyed.  From the 
standpoint of  the individualistic conception of  property 
such a disposition  would  have to be  carried out, but 
natural feeling  will  tell  everyone  that this cannot be 
allowed,  and so the  Roman  law decides,  too.lo8  Not 
because there is no room in a will for anything except 
the institution  of  heirs  and  legacies  (for  the testator 
can make any  kind of regulations besides that he pleases), 
but solely and simply because such a disposition would 
oppose the social destination of  property.  Goods belong 
to  man and not to  theworms.  The  necessity of  bequeath- 
ing is based  upon the same principle.  The law knows 
no form of excluding an heir.  The property which  a 
man loses by death must fall to  man again.log 
'08  D. 11.5.14  55.  "Non autem oportet ornamenta cum corporibus 
condi nec quid aliud hujusmodi, quod homines simpliciores faciunt." 
lo9The Romans emphasize this idea by  saying  that the inheri- 
tance belongs to  the  present generation.  The testator must choose his 
heir among those who are living at  the time, he cannot skip over  his 
generation and assign  his property to a  succeeding one.  For the 
same reason the addition of a "dies ex quo" in the institution of  an 
heir is not valid;  the testator can neither deprive the present of  its 
right, nor can he restrict it.  The only privilege he has is to choose 
his heir among the individuals already living  (or conceived) at the 
tire  of  his death.  To  be sure he  can, by the addition of  conditions, 
effect a delay in the accession to  the inheritance, but -and  here the 
above idea comes out again -even  before the condition comes in 
force, the inheritance is assigned to  the person entitled provisionally 
C"'onorum  possessio secundum tabulas").  The dead cannot restrict 
the living. 
it is therefore not true that property involves in its 
"idea"  the  absolute  power  of  disposition.  Property 
in such  a  form society cannot  tolerate and never  has 
tolerated.  The  "idea"  of  property  cannot  contain 
anything which  is  in contradiction with  the "idea"  of 
aociety.l10  This srandpoint is a  last  remnant of that 
unhealthy conception of the Law of Nature which iso- 
lated  the individual as a being all apart.  It needs no 
proof to show where it would lead to if  an owner could 
retire  to his  property  as  to an inaccessible  fortress. 
The resistance of a single person would prevent the con- 
struction of  a public road or a railway;  the laying out 
of  fortifications -works  upon which  may depend  the 
well-being  of  thousands,  the  prosperity  of  an entire 
province, perhaps  the safety of the State.  If  he said, 
"The  house, the land, the cattle, the horses are mine," 
society would have to look on helplessly  upon the rav- 
ages of  fire, water, disease;  and in  case of  war,  men 
would have to pull the cannons if there were no horses 
to  be  bought.  The principle  of  the  inviolability  of 
property means the delivery of society into the hands of 
ignorance,  obstinacy and spite;  into the hands of  the 
meanest and most frivolous egoism of  the individual- 
"Let everything go to ruin, as long as I have my house, 
110 I  am glad  to have found now  the above view,  which  I  had 
already expressed in my "Geist  des R. R."  I, p. 7, in the brief for- 
mula, "There is no property which is independent of  consideration 
forsociety" (with which compare  the discussions in Vol. II),expressed 
by Adolf Wagner, in his "Allgemeine oder theoretische  Volkswirts- 
~chaftslehre,"  Part I (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1876), p. 499  el seq. 
in an exposition which in my opinion leaves nothing to  be desired; 
and I gladly make use of  this opportunity to  express to  this writer 
my fullest and warmest agreement.  1 know of  no work in which the 
{undamenta! conception of  the social function of  law has been de- 
"loped  so carefully,  uniformly  and convincingly as in  his;  with 
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my land, and my cattle."  But will you really have it, 
you  short-sighted  fool?  The  dangers  that  threaten 
everybody threaten you  also.  The flood, the fire, the 
epidemic, the enemy, will overtake you also; in the gen- 
eral ruin you will also be buried.  The  interests of society 
are really your own;  and if  the latter interferes with 
your property and puts restrictions upon you, it is done 
for  your  sake as much  as for  the sake of  society  (see 
below). 
The limitations of  property just touched upon reduce 
themselves  to the  so-called  social  right  of  inevitable 
necessity of  which we spoke above (p. 317).  The jurist 
knows that there are many others besides,  which have 
as their  purpose  not the interest of  society, but of a 
single person.  Does it contradict the idea of  property 
to demand sacrifices from the owner in favor of  other 
persons who do not concern him?  The answer to this 
question will remove the last remnant of  the problemati- 
cal in the theory of  property, which  our investigation 
so far has left. 
An avalanche has covered the way to my land, or the 
river  has  flooded  it.  The only  access  still  remaining 
leads  through  the  land  of  my  neighbor.  What shall 
happen now?  The Roman law obliges him to give me 
a way in return for compensation (way of  necessity). 
A  person  used  another man's stones in building  the 
foundation  of  his  house,  thinking they were  his  own. 
After  the building  is finished, the owner appears and 
claims  his  stones.  How  shall  the  judge  decide?  If 
we are to carry out the idea of  property to its last con- 
sequences,  the entire  structure would  have to be de- 
stroyed to get out the stones, or the defendant would 
have to come to terms with  the plaintiff,  and in view 
of  the critical situation in which he is placed, would be 
forced to pay him perhaps a  thousand times the value 
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of the  stones.  According  to the Roman law the judge 
awards the plaintiff double the value of  the stones ("act. 
de  tigno  junctoV).  Even  if  the  defendant  stole  the 
stones, the judge does not decide to take them out, but 
imposes a higher  amount. 
I,  both cases it  is not a question merely of  the interest 
of  a  single party, but also of  that of  society.  If the 
owner cannot get access to  his estate, he cannot cultivate 
it and it will not bear him any more fruit.  The damage 
will  affect not only him but society as a whole, for the 
sum total of  national production is thereby diminished. 
1f thehouse is torn down to  take out thestones, a valuable 
product of labor is completely destroyed to  no purpose, 
and the man himself  perhaps will go to  ruin along with 
the house.  If  property exists solely for the owner, the 
losswhichsociety must  suffer in both casescan be no  reason 
for limiting it.  But if  it exists also for society, the law 
must  try to reconcile the interests of  the two.  This is 
done in all such cases by means of  expropriation or by 
putting an  injunction upon the exercise of  one's rights. 
The meaning of  expropriation is completely misunder- 
stood in my opinion by those who see in it  an interference 
with the rights of  property, an abnormality which is in 
opposition to the "idea"  of  property.  It can appear in 
this light only to him who views  property solely from 
the standpoint of  the individual  (individualistic  theory 
of  property). 
But this standpoint is no less false for property than 
for  contract."'  The only correct one is the social (social 
of  property).  From this standpoint expropriation 
far from appearing as an abnormality, or as offending 
against the idea of  property, is on the contrary peremp- 
torily  demanded  by the  latter.  Expropriation  solves 
the problem of harmonizing the interests of  society with 
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those of the owner.  Only by means of  it is property 
made a practicable  and feasible institution.  Without 
it property would become the curse of society, and that 
too not only in the case of general necessity, but also in 
that of the individual.  The former is met by the expro- 
priation of public rights, the latter by the expropriation of 
private rights. 
The last  concept  is  virtually  unknown  to  modern 
theory,  although  it is  expressed  distinctly  enough  in 
Roman law.  From the application which the Romans 
made of  it, it is clear that they were fully aware of  the 
dangers which  a regardless realization of  the abstract, 
formalistic concept of  property (absolute mastery of the 
thing)  contains.  In reference  to the legal  protection 
of  property the Romans combine two methods:  actual 
realization  of  property,  and  money  payment.  Roman 
procedure grants the judge the power to decide for the 
actual restituiion of  the thing without giving him the 
autholity of  enforcing it ("arbitriurn de  re restituenda"). 
In case of  disobedience of  the order, the judge is merely 
directed  in his final sentence ("sententia")  to condemn 
the defendant in money, which is practically equivalent 
to expropriation.  In this  regulation  the  Roman  law 
gave  the  realization  of  property  an elasticity  which 
excluded entirely the dangers accompanying the attempt 
to follow out rigidly the consequences of  property and 
realize them absolutely -  the  dangers of  profierty  as I 
might call them.  And it enabled the judge at  the same 
time, in estimating the amount to be paid, to do com- 
plete justice to the party expropriated,  by  paying  due 
regard to  his position (function of  money a.s  equivalent), 
as well as to the possible unreasoning resistance  of  the 
opponent  (penal  function  of  money).  I  see  in  this 
arrangement one of  the most ingenious ideas of  Roman 
procedure. 
Of what practical value the possibility of  this money 
payment was and to what horrible result an  action "rei 
vindicatio"  must lead which would  make it its task to 
realize absolutely  the individualistic theory of  property, 
the reader may be convinced by the following case. 
ln  building a house the boundary was exceeded a few 
inches.  After the house is built, his neighbor, who with 
purpose perhaps looked on quietly while the 
house  was  building,  brings  a  possessory  action ("act. 
negatoria")  against him.  How shall the judge decide? 
According to the textbooks of  our modern Roman law 
he would have to decide to have the wall set back, i. e., 
to destroy the entire house.  According to my opinion 
the outcome in this case was that the judge condemned 
the defendant to pay the value of  the strip of  land, i.  e., 
the latter was  exprofiriated  by him.  In this way  the 
house was saved and the opponent received compensation 
for the lost strip of  land.  If  the latter wanted to  prevent 
this he had to move as long as it was still time, i.  e., 
he had to raise a protest when the building operations 
began  ("operis  novi  nuntiatio"), and irr  that case  th.e 
latter had an injunction put upon them.  This is surely 
the most intelligent solution of  the problenl.l12 
But it is solved at  the expense of  the law, the legal 
rigorist will tell me, and purely in favor of  expediency. 
In this objection  is expressed  the fundamental differ- 
ence which exists between  the prevailing conception of 
law and my own, and which I shall not be able to settle 
scientifically until the secolid  part.  According  to my 
"2  I  quite alone in the opinion  ("Jahrbiicher,"  VI, p. 99) 
that this is valid also for our modern law.  Whether my opponents 
made clear to  th~mselves  the above consequence, and whether they 
be sufficiently  masters of  themselves to  apply their theory in 
Practice as judges, I should like to  be  allowed to  doubt.  In  any  case 
'he confidence of the people in jurisprudence  would  likely be con- 
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theory, utility forms the sole concern of the law.  What 
is opposed to this as legality ("ratio juris")  is simply the 
deepest and firmest stratum of  the expedient, deposited 
in the law (p. 330). 
As a second instance of  the application of  the idea of 
expropriation  in private  law  I  name  "adjudicatio"  in 
procedure  in  partition.  The authority  given  by  the 
praetor to the judge  to adjudicate ("adjudicata") was 
synonymous  with  the  right  to expropriate,  and  the 
point of view by which the judge had to  be guided in this 
is expressly designated by the jurists as utility.ll3 
But the case of  expropriation is not the only one in 
which the above point of view is proved, viz., that the 
rigid  consequences  of  individualistic  property  must 
yield to the social interest.  Other instances are found in 
"usucapio"  and iiaccessio."  In the former the Roman 
jurists  themselves  emphasize  the point of  view  of  the 
public interest as the deciding one.  The interest of  the 
owner, they say, must yield in this case to that of  soci- 
ety.l14  By ilaccessio," they understand the case of  an 
adherence of  another's  thing to one's  own.  I  planted 
another's tree in my land.  The owner demands it back. 
Must I pull it out again?  The answer of  Roman law is, 
as long as it  has not yet taken root, yes; after it  has taken 
root,  no.  Why  is  this?  The reason  with  which  the 
jurist  satisfies himself,  viz.,  that in the latter case the 
113 SO, for example, for the "act.  finium  regundorum,"  I, 4.  17. 
Q 6, . . . "comrnodius,"  D. 10. 1.2 Q 1;  for the "act.  familie erciscun- 
6'.  d~"  10.2.3, . . .  zncommodu";  for the "act. cornrnuni dividundo" 
10. 3.  6 5  10, 7  5 I, 19  Q 1, ibid. 21, "quod  omnibus utilisszmum." 
Cod. ibid. 3.37. 1 . .  . "commode."  A modern example, unknown to 
the Romans, of  private law expropriation is found in parcelling out a 
farm for the rotation of  crops. 
11'  D.  See 41. 3. 1, where the two are placed in opposition to  each 
other. '  ' bono public0  usucapio introducta est, cum sufficeret dominis," 
etc. 
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tree has become a constituent part of  the land, has dis- 
appeared  as an independent  thing,  and  therefore  its 
owllershi~  is extinguished,-is  not appropriate, for there 
is no doubt that the tree may nevertheless be separated 
from the land.  And  if  it were the task of  the law to 
carry out the idea of  property to  its fullest consequences, 
then, if the owner desired it, its separation would have 
to be carried out even if  the tree died as a result -  "fiat 
justitia, pereat  arbor."  But the tree is saved for the 
same reason that the house is saved into which another's 
material has been  built, and for the same reason  that 
the possessor  of  an object  belonging  to another  and 
claimed by its true owner must not destroy the expendi- 
tures made in it,  if  he has no advantage therefrom, or if 
the former is disposed to  compensate him for the advan- 
tage he may have.  The reason is because the economic 
result for the one party would be altogether out of  pro- 
portion to that of  the other.  The tree, the house, the 
tapestried  wall,  the constructed  hearth,  is preserved, 
and the other party is paid off  with money.  The law 
stands in the way of  property, which, to maintain itself, 
would  destroy  the  object,-either  by prohibiting  its 
exercise, or by taking away its ownership and awarding 
it to the opponent, i.e., by expropriating it. 
This is Roman property in its true form, and every one 
is now in a position to  form an  idea concerning it  and to 
judge whether it gives any support to the ,current con- 
ception, which  has found  its scientific expression  and 
sanction in the usual definition of  the jurist, that  property 
is the complete legal mastery of  a thing.  I was not con- 
cerned  in  rectifying  an erroneous  conception  about a 
Roman  institution, but in withdrawing from the indi- 
vidualistic conception of  law the support which it is sup- 
posed to have in this institution. 
The content of the entire discussion from page 383 on TIJE CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH. VIII 
may be condensed in one word, wiz., in the idea of  the 
social  character of  private rights  All  rights of  private 
law,  even  though  prirr~arily  having  the individual  as 
their  purpose, are infiilcllcc.d and FL*ouncI b!.  regard  for 
society.  There is nct a sir~ple  right in which  the suh- 
ject  can say, this I  have exrlusive!y  for m>self, 3  ain 
lord  and master over it, the consequences of  the con- 
cept  of right demand that society shall not limit  me. 
One need noc be a prophet to recognize that this sociai 
conception of  prikate law wi!l  coqtinuall>-  gain grui~nci 
over the individualistic.  There will come a time when 
property will bear another form than it does at  present; 
when society will no more recognize the alleged right of 
the individual to gather together  as much  as possible 
of the goods of  this world,  and combine in his  hand 
a landed possession upon which hundreds and thousands 
cf  indepeildent  farmers inight live,  than it recognizes 
the right oC  life and death of  the ancient Roman father 
over ?.is chlltiren. or the feudal right, the highway rob- 
berjr of  the kiiiglit, and the law of  salvage of  the middle 
ages.  Privdte  property  and  the  right  of  inheritance 
will  always remain, and the socialistic and communistic 
ideas directed to  its  removal I regard as vain folly.  But 
we must ha\-e little confidence in the skill of  our finanzizl 
artists if  we  think  they can  not succeed,  through in- 
creased  taxes,-  -income,  inheritance,  sumptuary  and 
other taxes, -  in exerting a pressure upon private prop- 
erty which will prevent an excess of  its accumulation at 
single  points  and which, by diverting the surplus into 
the State treasury, will make it possible to lighten the 
pressure upon the other parts of  tlie social body.  This 
will bring about a distribution of  the goods of  this world 
more in accord with  the interests of  society, i.e.,  more 
just  (p. 274 ff .) than has been and must be effected under 
the influence of  a theory of  property which, if  it is to be 
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called by its right name, is the insatiability and voracious- 
ness of  egoism.  The name which  it applies to itself  is 
"sacredness  of property,"  and the very men  to whom 
nothing  else  is sacred, the miserable  egoist, whose  life 
has  not  a  single  act of  self-denial to show,  the crass 
*,-,aterialist,  who  respects  only what he  can grasp with 
his  hands,  the pessimist, who in the feeling of  his own 
nothingness, carries his worthlessness over into the world, 
-all  these are at one on the sacredness of  property; for 
property they invoke an idea which otherwise they know 
not;  which  they  mock  and  in  reality  trample  under 
foot. 
But egoism has always known how to unite God  and 
holiness to its purposes.  When the law governing sal- 
vage was still in force, there was a passage in the prayer 
of  the Church which read, "God  bless our strand," and 
the Italian bandit recites an Ave Maria before he goes 
out to rob. 
I have drawn up the account of  the individual, as I 
have promised.  It says, you have nothing for yourself 
alone, everywhere society or, as the representative of  its 
interests,  the law,  stands by your  side.  Everywhere 
society is your partner, desiring a share in all that you 
have;  in yourself, in your labor power, in your body, in 
your  children,  in  your  fortune.  Law  is  the realized 
partnership  of  the individual  and society.  Wherever 
You are, you are  surrounded by the law, society's invisible, 
omnipresent representative,  as by the atmospheric air, 
and you  can no more find a spot in society where the 
law does not follow you, than you can find a spot on 
the earth where there is no air.  It  is habit alone which 
brings it about that in most cases you do  not feel at  all 
the pressure which it exerts upon you.  As a matter of 
habit  YOU  move, without being  conscious of  it, in the 
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where error, haste, or passion carries you away that you 
become  aware, in the resistance which  the law  offers 
to you,  of  the  limits  within  which  it restrains  you. 
Conscious  reflection  is necessary  to become  aware of 
all the limitations with which law in a  civilized people 
has surrounded individual freedom. 
And  must we  still be continually  prepared  for  new 
restrictions?  Must the claims of  society, as is alleged, 
keep on increasing (p. 381)? Is there not a point where 
the individual may exclaim, "Enough  of  pressure, now, 
I  am weary  of  being  the beast of  burden of  society. 
There must be a limit between me and it, beyond which 
it must not interfere in my affairs:  a sphere of  freedom 
which  belongs  to me  exclusively,  and  which  society 
must respect"? 
Here I  touch upon  a question of  the highest  funda- 
mental  importance, the question  of  the limits of the 
State and the law over against the sphere of  individual 
freedom.  I touch upon it not because  I believe I can 
solve it, but simply because the sequence in my develop- 
ment of the concept of  law puts it in my way and I 
cannot avoid it. 
For me it denotes the closing point of  this develop- 
ment,  the  "so  far  and no  further."  The formula  in 
which I comprehended above (p. 51) the relation of  the 
individual to  society, viz.,  "every one exists for himself,- 
every  one exists for  the world, -  the world  exists  for 
every one," does not afford us the least  answer  to this 
question.  For  the  latter  is  not  concerned  with  the 
that, it wants to know how far the individual exists for 
society;  but the above formula gives not the slightest 
information on this matter.  Shall we ever succeed  in 
determining clearly this "how far"?  I doubt it. Accord- 
ing to my opinion the matter will always be fluid.  As 
society progresses, and purposes and requirements, ever 
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newly  attach themselves to it  irresistibly, the 
idea of the debt which the individual owes society will 
keep pace with it.  Standing upon a relatively very low 
stage  in  with  the  immeasurable  future 
which lies before us, we cannot at  all see the end. 
These doubts of  mine concerning the solubility of  the 
problem, far from being shaken by the attempts which 
have been undertaken so far to solve it, have on the con- 
trary been confirmed by them.  I know only of  two such 
attempts.  They bear the  names of two of  the most impor- 
tant thinkers  of  our  century,  Wilhelm von Humboldt 
and John Stuart Mill, both, as  I think, equally influenced 
by  the fundamental error  of  the (individualistic)  doc- 
trine of  the Law of  Nature in vogue in the last century, 
that the State and society  can be built  up from  the 
standpoint of  the individual.  In the theory of  the Law 
of  Nature  the individual  is the cardinal  point  of  the 
whole law and the State.  According to  it the individual 
exists  for  himself  alone,  an atom without  any other 
purpose in life than that of  maintaining itself  alongside 
of the innumerable other atoms.  To be able to do this 
it gets along with them according to the Kantian for- 
mula  of the compatibility  of  one's  own  freedom  with 
that of others.  The  State and the law merely have the 
task  of  realizing  this formula,  i.e., of  preventing  the 
encroachment of  the freedom of one upon the sphere of 
the freedom of  the other, -a  dividing off  of  the spheres 
of freedom in the manner of  cages in a menagerie;  that 
the wild beasts may not tear each other to  pieces.  With 
this  purely  negative  relation  all that  is  necessary  is 
attained; apart from this these individuals have nothing 
to do with  each other.  The State and the law have 
solved  their  problem  completely  with  the  cordon  of 
"fet~  which they drew about them. 
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have already met above (p. 201) inconnection with the 
question of the binding force of  contracts; the construc- 
tion of the moral world from the standpoint of  the indi- 
vidual regarded as an isolated being  and referring  the 
whole purpose of  his existence to  himself; the idea that 
every one exists for himself  and nobody exists for  the 
other. 
From the standpoint of  this conception, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt115 demands of  the State that it "shall  not 
interfere in the private affairs of  the citizens any further 
than to prevent the injury of  the rights of  one by the 
other"  (p.  16).  It must  not  limit  their  rights  any 
further  "than is  necessary in order to  secure them against 
themselves and external enemies"  (p. 39).  Everything 
else is an evil, hence, in particular, "its  efforts to raise 
the positive well-being cf  the nation, its whole care for 
the popu!at.ion  of  the land, the support of  the inhabi- 
tants, part!y  in a direct way by means of  institutions for 
the poor, ~nrtly  in an indirect way by furthering agri- 
culture, industry and commerce;  its financial and coin- 
ing  opera.tions, prohibitions of  import and export, all 
arrangements for guarding against or restoring injuries 
of  nature, in short every institution of  the State which 
has as its purpose to conserve or further the physical 
wellare  of  the  nation.  All  these  arrangements  have 
injurious consequences and are incompatible with true 
politics,  which  proceeds  from  the highest  but always 
human points of  view"  (p. 18).  Nor should  the State 
concern itself about marriage, but leave it  simply to  the 
free choice of  the individuals and the autonomic regula- 
tion by contract (p. 29).  Even public acts of  immorality 
In his work, "Ideen  zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der Wirk- 
~mkeit  des  Staates zu  bestimmen"  (Breslau,  1851),  which  was 
written in the preceding century, but was not published until after 
his death. 
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must not be forbidden, for "nobody's rights are in them- 
selves injured by them, and the other person is free to 
oppose his own strength of  will and reasons to the evil 
impression"  (p.  108).  The State must "absolutely  re- 
frain from endeavoring to  influence directly or indirectly 
the morals or character of  the nation.  All special charge 
of  education,  religious  institutions,  sumptuary  laws, 
etc.,  lies absolutely outside the limits of  its activity" 
(p. 110).  Every one must guard against deceit himself 
(p. 111).  If he consents, all crime against him is ex- 
cluded, and even "the murder of  another with his con- 
sent  must  remain  unpunished,  unless  the  too  likely 
possibility of  dangerous abuse should make a criminal 
law necessary in this latter case"  (p. 139). 
Thus all  restrictions which  the historical State put 
about individual freedom are torn down, with the only 
exception of  those which  are inevitably demanded  for 
the security of  mutual rights.  The  only thing the indi- 
vidual cannot attain with his own powers is the security 
of his rights  (p. 45), and for this, and only for this is 
there need of  union in the State.  The latter is "only  a 
subordinate means, to which  the  true end,  man,  must 
not be sacrificed"  (p. 104). 
"Man,  i.  e.,  the individual, as the  true end" -in 
these few words the whole view is characterized.  The 
thought  that man exists also for  others, that society 
which has made him a real man also has a claim upon 
him  and can demand  of him that he should  help to 
further its purposes as it has helped  further his,-this 
thought  which  the most superficial observation of  life 
brings before one constantiy and in actual realization, 
is altogether foreign to  the entire book. 
But in justice  to the great thinker, whom  we  have 
thus seen gliding down the steep path of  an aprioristic 
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from historical reality, we  must add that the aim which 
he has before his mind is, despite all the devastations 
which he must carry out on the way thither, after all an 
ideal one.  It  is not low, insipid egoism which he intends 
to establish thereby, but freedom as a means of  the high- 
est  and harmonious development  of  all  the powers  of 
man.  "That  upon  which  the whole greatness of  man 
finally rests, and which the individual man must always 
struggle  to attain, . . .  is  individuality  of  power  and 
education. This individuality is brought about by freedom 
of  action and the diversity of  the agent; and it in turn 
produces them"  (p.  11).  "The  highest  ideal  of  the 
existence of human beings together is in my mind that 
in which  every one develops only from himself  and for 
the sake of himself" (p. 13).  "True reason can wish man 
no other condition rhan that in which not merely every 
one enjoys the most  unrestrained  freedom  to develop 
himself  from  himself  through  his  individuality,  but 
where physical nature also receives no other form from 
human hands than that which every individual involun- 
tarily  and by  himself  gives  it in  accordance with  his 
needs and inclination,  limited only  by  the  boundaries 
of his power and his right"  (p. 15). 
Upon  such  freedom  all  his  hopes  are based.  The 
men who are educated in its school will do of  their own 
accord all that ordinarily the State forces them to do. 
They will unite of  their own free will to ward off  great 
catastrophes, famine, flood, etc. (p. 44).  They will, of 
their own  free will, further the purposes of  the State, 
"for  they will find all the motives thereto in the idea of 
the use which  the regulations  of  the State will  afford 
them in attaining their individual aims"  (p. 76).  "The 
State can even abstain from positive regulations of  edu- 
cating the nation for war.  Training of  the citizens in 
the use  of  arms  is  the only  thing  that is  absolutely 
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necessary, but  patriotism  will  imbue  them  with  such 
Grtue as will not merely bring out in them the bravery, 
readiness  and  subordination  of  the  soldier,  but  will 
inspire them with the spirit of  true warriors;  or rather 
of noble citizens who are always ready to fight for their 
fatherland1' (p.  53).  Such  is  the  conception  of  the 
citizen he was able to form. 
We must not forget that it was not the mature states- 
man  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  who wrote this, but the 
young man, not  yet  thirty years  old, with  the warm 
pulsation  of  enthusiasm  for all  that  was  noble  and 
beautiful, and a complete faith in the spring of  national 
freedom which seemed to have dawned with the French 
Revolution.  The  mature  man  Humboldt  kept  the 
work from publication.  No one was in a better position 
than he to observe the enormous gulf  which separated 
the dream of  his youth from reality. 
The case is  quite different with  the attempt which 
John Stuart Mill undertook in his work on Liberty 116 to 
assign the law its limits.  For this is the effort of  a ripe 
mind, and between him and Humboldt lies a period long 
and  fruitful in political experiences.  An  entire revolu- 
tion in political science lay between:  from the political 
and  legal  individualism of  the Law  of  Nature to the 
enlightened understanding of  the real  historical  State 
and law  as revealed  to history  and  science in  recent 
'I6  (H. M. Caldwell Co., New York, s. a.).  The author directs his 
attacks not only against law, but also against custom and public 
opinion;  and anyone who  knows what  unjustifiable  pressure  the 
latter exerts in the land of the author in many things which are of 
a purely external and conventional nature (11,  p.  375), and have 
not the least to do with ethics, will not only fully comprehend the 
resistance which he thereto opposes, but will recognize this as highly 
meritorious in him.  For our consideration, exclusively concerned 
with law, this side of  his polemic against the existing order does not 
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times.  The authority which  the name of  Mill rightly 
enjoys makes it doubly necessary to characterize in its 
true form the erroneous doctrine which, clothed with it, 
attempts to question  our entire social  order.  And  I 
beg the reader to permit me for this reason to treat this 
matter with a degree of  detail which I should decidedly 
not have allowed myself  in the case of a less important 
opponent  ."I 
The formula which Mill sets up for the attitude of  the 
law toward the individual is essentially the same as that 
of  Humboldt.  It is  as  follows:  "The  sole  end  for 
which  mankind  are warranted,  individually  or  collec- 
tively, in interfering with the liberty of  action of  any of 
their numbeq is self-protection . . .  The only purpose 
for which  power  can be rightfully  exercised  over  any 
member of  a civilized community, against his will, is to 
prevent harm to  others.  His own good, either physical 
or moral, is  not  a  sufficient warrant. . . .  The only 
part of  the conduct of  any one, for which he is amenable 
to society, is that which concerns others.  In the part 
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute"  (p. 21). 
The formula  maintains  that there  are two ways  of 
exercising individual freedom.  One is where the effects 
are confined exclusively to the agent, the other is where 
they extend also to  others-  I use instead of  this my own 
expression, society.  If  the latter are injurious  in their 
nature, the legislator is authorized to prohibit such use 
of liberty.  In the first case he is not. 
But all acts of  sufficient meaning to  make it worth our 
while raising this question at all  extend in their effects 
117 In England also Mill met with  decided opposition.  See espe- 
cially  the  work  of  James  Fitzjames  Stephen,  "The  Watchwords 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." 
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to  others.  Always  are  others affected,""  and  this  is 
the  only  reason  why  society  takes any notice  of  the 
acts.  1 know of  no example of  a  legal rule which has  ,, its purpose to force an individual against his own will 
in  his own interest for his good.  Where it appears to 
do so, it is always in the interest of  society.  Securing 
the good of  the individual is not an end in itself, it is 
only a means to the end of securing the good of  society. 
Society  is  not  concerned  in  preventing  the  primary 
injurious effect upon the subject, but in  preventing the 
secondary effect upon itself.  If  we grant it the absolute 
power, as Mill does, to resort to self-protection through 
the law in case of  such injury, then it is all over with 
individual freedom.  Armed with this formula I promise 
so to compress and tight-lace it that it will not have the 
power  to move.  If  the  father squanders  his  money, 
do  not  the children  suffer?  And  when  the children 
become  a  charge  upon  the poor-box, does  not  society 
suffer?  Surely  it  does.  Hence  I  forbid  prodigality. 
But not this alone, I forbid also stock-jobbing, all daring 
speculations, every extravagant expenditure; in short, I 
bring the entire control of  a man's property under police 
superintendence.  If  the parents affect the children by 
their bad example, do not the latter suffer?  If  the hus- 
band  becomes  a  drunkard, and ill-treats  his  wife and 
children and refuses to  work; if  the wife becomes dissolute 
and neglects the home, do not the husband and children 
suffer?  Certainly.  This circumstance  is  sufficient  to 
open  to the police an entrance into the interior of  the 
"'  Mill himself recognizes this fact in one place in  his book  (p. 
133 f.), "NO person is an entirely isolated being;  it is impossible for 
a person to  do  anything seriously or permanently hurtful to  himself, 
without mischief reaching at  least to  his near connections, and often 
far beyond  them."  But he neglects to draw therefrom the conclu- 
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house, and to place the  moral life as well as  the economic 
under surveillance. 
But if a man is quite alone in the world, without wife 
or child, has he not then at  least the  right to  ruin himself? 
Has he the right to  sell himself as  a slave?  Mill himself 
forbids it.  Why?  "By  selling himself  for a slave, he 
abdicates his liberty;  he foregoes any future use of it 
beyond  that single  act.  He therefore defeats,  in his 
own case, the very purpose which is the justification of 
allowing him to dispose of  himself"  (p. 171).  Freedom 
is therefore dependent upon the permission of  society. 
But in that case the latter is also authorized not merely 
to forbid complete  renunciation  thereof,  but  also  to 
lay down its partial measure and aim, and this authority 
society  has indeed  always  claimed.  But not  for  the 
sake of the logic of  the concept of  freedom, -the  law 
of  logical contradiction, as Mill says, because "the prin- 
ciple of freedom cannot require that he should be free 
not to be free.  It is  not freedom,  to be  allowed  to 
alienate his  freedom"  (p.  172), but for  the practical 
reason, namely,  because  society has come  to  recognize 
that slavery is incompatible with it.  The standpoint 
of the logic of  the concept, which Mill brings to bear to 
avoid  the last csnsequence of  individual freedom, viz., 
selling oneself as a slave, takes us much further than he 
can venture to  admit according to  his theory.  For what 
is true of the whole must also be true of  a part.  But 
every contract contains a partial renunciation of  freedom. 
And what is true of  freedom must also be true of  life, 
which is the condition of  it.  Can we  not maintain in 
respect to life the same thing that Mill says of  freedom? 
"The idea of life implies that one has it.  It is not life 
if  one renounces it." 
The law  punishes  duelling  and homicide  committed 
with  the consent  of  the subject.  According  to Mill's 
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theory there should be no punishment since the persons 
involved give their consent. 
Has legislation a  right to fix the maximum hours of 
labor?  Has it the  right,  according  to the  theory  of 
freedom, to prevent the laborer if he wishes to shorten 
his  life by excessive labor?  Mill also agrees with  this 
legal  measure,  the introduction  of  which  will  always 
redound to the credit of the enlightened and practical 
sense of his countrymen.  He  approves of  the provisions 
for the protection of  the heaIth of the workmen and for 
their  safety in  dangerous works.  But the reason  he 
-  "the  principle  of  individual  liberty  is  not 
involved here" (p. 159)  ,-  is again of such a nature that 
his whole theory can belifted by it  out  of  its hinges.  For 
if the  prohibition to  work as  much and w  little as I please 
does not constitute an  interference with my personal free- 
dom, where does such interference begin?  It  is a peculiar 
picture  of  freedom  that is composed  of  the particular 
examples which  Mill cites.  "The laws which, in many 
countries on the Continent, forbid  marriage unless  the 
parties can show that they have the means of  supporting 
a  family do not exceed  the legitimate  powers  of  the 
State . . .  they are not objectionable as violations  of 
liberty"  (p. 181).  "If  either a public officer or any one 
else  saw a  person  attempting to cross a bridge which 
had  been  ascertained to be unsafe,  and there were  no 
time to warn him of  his danger, they might seize him 
and  turn him  back,  without  any real  infringement  of 
his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, 
and he does not desire to fall into the river"  (p. 160). 
I  ask, does the frivolous person,  the lover of  pleasure, 
desire to ruin himself?  He only wishes to  enjoy his life, 
hence he can also be prevented without an infringement 
his  liberty.  And  suppose  the man on the  bridge 
wants to take his own life, can he still be seized THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH.  VIII 
without an infringement of  his liberty?  A  man who is 
penetrated by the respect for freedom would  first have 
to ascertain  his  real  purpose  before  restraining  him. 
"If,  either  from idleness or from  any other avoidable 
cause, a man fails to  perform his legal duties to others, 
as for  instance to support his children  [I add another 
example, payment of  debts and public duties], it is no 
tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation, by com- 
pulsory labor, if  no other means are available"  (p. 163). 
So the lazy should be put in institutions of  compulsory 
labor!  And th~s  too on the platform of  liberty!  "Drunk- 
enness," says Mill (p. 163), "in  ordinary cases, is not a 
fit subject for legislative interference;  but I should deem 
it perfectly legitimate that a person who had once been 
convicted  of  any act of  violence  to others under  the 
influence of  drink, should be placed under a special legal 
restriction,  personal  to himself;  that if  he were  after- 
wards found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and 
that if  when in that state he committed another offence, 
the punishment to which  he would  be  liable  for that 
other offence should be increased in severity."  A young 
man breaks a window in a state of  intoxication.  Hence- 
forth, according to Mill, a special law, issued personally 
for him, dogs his footsteps, follows him as long as he lives, 
and stands as a spectre behind his chair at every joyful 
feast. 
And  now  again  we  see his  strange sensitiveness  to 
liberty in reference to Free Trade.  "The restrictions of 
the sale of  poisons and the prohibition of  the importa- 
tion of  opium into China are infringements on the liberty 
of  the buyer, because  they make it impossible or diffi- 
cult to  obtain a particular commodity" (p. 159).  So  the 
Chinese government  has not the right to prohibit  the 
opium trade?  It must stand idly by with folded arms 
and look on while the nation is ruining itself physically 
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and morally, simply out of academic respect for liberty, 
in order not to violate the inherent right of every China- 
man to buy whatever he pleases?  Will Mill censure the 
English government for prohibiting the importation of 
cattle  from a  country  where  there is an epidemic  on 
cattle,  in order  to prevent  contagion of the cattle at 
home?  And the Emperor of China should not be allowed 
to do in the interest of man what England does in that 
of cattle? 
The fine shipwreck  which  two  thinkers  like  Hum- 
boldt and Mill have suffered  in the above question is 
not due to their own fault, but to  the insolubility of  the 
If one steers his ship upon a rock to force a 
passage through it, he must not be surprised if  his ship 
is shattered.  We keep back our ship because we have 
no hope of  the possibility of a passage.  Will a fortunate 
pilot  find  some day the means of  passing through?  I 
do not believe it.  Legislation will, in the future as in 
the past,  measure  restrictions  of  personal  liberty  not 
according to an abstract academic formula, but accord- 
ing to practical need. 
Having shown how society restricts the individual in 
his liberty by means of the law, let us now show what it 
o?ers  him in return. 
5  14.  TheBeneJit of  the State.  I do not say the benefit 
of the law, but of  the State.  The demands which  the 
State makes  upon  the  individual  we  could  designate 
as the demands of  the law,  because they bear the form of 
law, but we cannot do this in reference  to the benejib 
the State, for they do not coincide with those of the 
law* they extend far beyond it. 
He who wishes to settle  his account with  the State 
must  be  careful to keep  the following  two  questions 
distinct from each other.  One is, do I get a correspond- 
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the State paid for in that which  I receive from it? The 
other is, do not others get more than their due in propor- 
tion to me;  does the distribution of  the advantages of 
political community to  all the members correspond to the 
principles of  justice? 
He who  answers  the first  question  in  the negative, 
either  condemns  the  State as such,  and  must, if  he 
desires to be consistent, retire from political community 
to a desert island or the primeval forest ; or his charge is 
directed  only against this particular State, and in that 
case, if he does not want, to  submit without resistance, 
he must either endeavor to bring about a change of the 
existing political and legal institutions with the help of 
those  who  think  like  him  and the means at his com- 
mand, or look  for another State instead of  the one in 
which he is.  The last two alternatives are true also if 
he answers the first question in the affirmative and the 
second in the negative.  If he is not alone in this judg- 
ment, if it  is the feeling of  the entire social class to which 
he belongs, such a State of  real or supposed social injus- 
tice leads either to  emigration en masse like the attempts 
at secession of  the plebeians in ancient Rome, or to the 
so-called class struggle, like the struggles of  the plebeians 
against the patricians in Rome, the rise of  the peasants 
at the time of  the Reformation, the labor movement of 
the present  day, the strikes of  certain classes of labor, 
etc., etc. 
The  following  investigation  has  to  do  exclusively 
with the first question, which alone permits of  abstract 
treatment;  whereas the second can be answered only in 
reference to given historical conditions.  Only so much 
must be quite generally admitted for the second question 
also, viz.,  that there have not  been  wanting examples 
in history of  the kind of  social injustice which favors one 
class of  the population at  the expense of  the other.  And 
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this  leads  me  again  to an objection  which  I  already 
raised above (p. 336) against my definition of law as the 
sum of the conditions of  social life secured by compulsion, 
but left unanswered in that place to  be disposed of  in the 
present connection.  How  is this fact, this exploitation 
of the law in the interest of a pa1 ticular class, compatible 
,;th  the assertion that the law has as its purpose the 
of  life of  society, i. e., of  every body? 
Let us suppose a strong man combining with a weak 
one.  If we remove in thought all considerations which 
may restrain his egoism, he will arrange the social com- 
pact in such a  way that he will  himself  get the lion's 
share  (the so-called  "societas  leonina").  If  we  apply 
this to civil society, it means that its order will always 
correspond to the relative power of the several strata or 
classes of  which it is composed.  When the victor admits 
the vanquished  nation into his  State, he will  not give 
them an equal station with himself, but will reduce them 
to a state of  dependence.  In the same way  the more 
powerful  class  within  the same' uniformly  growing  up 
people will give expression to its predominant power in 
the regulations of the law.  Unequal rights appear here 
as  the  modus  vivendi  between  the  stronger  and  the 
weaker, as the presupposition  upon which  the peaceful 
living together of  the two is dependent.  And it is the 
weak one who has the most vital interest not to shake it, 
as long as nothing has changed in the relative powers of 
the two parties.  The law which  the stronger dictates 
to him, be it ever so hard, constitutes, however  para- 
doxical it may seem, after all relatively a benefit in com- 
parison  with  the  condition  which  would  be  awaiting 
him if it were wanting-the  benefit, namely, of  relative 
Pressure as opposed  to absolute.  The measureless self- 
of the powerful is still always possible,  yet only at 
the price  of violation  of  the law, and we  have shown THE  CONCEPT  OF  PURPOSE  [CH. vrir 
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above (p. 264) how important this moral element is even 
in comparison with physical force. 
Although it is true (p. 276 f.) that justice is the vital 
principle of society and hence the highest purpose which 
it has to realize, still it would be mistaken to  refuse to 
recognize  that there  may  be situations in the life  of 
nations when social injustice may have a temporary and 
relative justification  and necessity,  like so many other 
institutions which have no  permanent  justification,  as 
for example, slavery.  Better slavery than slaughter of 
the enemy;  better a society established on the basis of 
inequality  of  rights  than  bare  force  and  lawlessness. 
In such a society too the law fulfils the function I assigned 
it, viz., to secure the conditions of  social life, except that 
the latter are not everywhere the same, as was shown 
above (p. 332). 
I  shall  now  return  to the first  question  mentioned 
above,  though  I  do so  not  without  some  hesitation. 
There are questions which one has to propose in the sys- 
tematic connection of  the development of  an idea, but 
which  one is almost  ashamed  to answer, because  the 
thing  is  self-evident.  The above  question  is  of  this 
kind.  A few words may suffice. 
What does the State give me?  If  we confine ourselves 
to the immediate services of  the State, and leave alto- 
gether out of  consideration  its indirect significance for 
the development of  social life, we shall have to distin- 
guish, I think, three kinds. 
The  first  thing the State gives me is protection against 
injury from without.  In the present time the security 
of  this good takes up, as is well known, by far the greatest 
part of  the national  strength, personal  as well  as eco- 
nomic.  In  comparison  with  the  amount  which  the 
individual contributes for this purpose by means of  mili- 
tary service and that portion of  the taxes which forms his 
share of the military  budget,  all other services he has 
to  perform  are  scarcely  appreciable.  Of  all  goods 
which a  possesses none is paid for so dearly as  the 
independence of  the State on an external power, and the 
permanence of  nationality secured thereby.  No nation 
that feels  itself such has ever found the price too high. 
case of necessity it has freely offered infinitely greater 
sacrifices  than the State demanded from it. 
The second good is protection within the State,  namely, 
law.  There is no good which costs the  individual so  little, 
after it has been once acquired, in comparison with its 
incalculable  value,  as  the  security  of  rights.  Our 
ancestors paid the dear purchase price  in the form of 
hard-fought, bloody battles, the  descendants have to  bear 
only the relatively small costs of  maintenance. 
The lowest standard by which we may measure the 
value of  this good  is  the economic, the money  value 
which legal security has for property.  How high this is 
in money is shown by comparing the value of  real estate 
in the Christian States of  Europe with that in Turkey. 
If legal conditions in Turkey could attain to our stand- 
ard, the value of  real estate would at  once increase two- 
fold and more.  And even within the European civilized 
States, the fall in the price of  land during great political 
upheavals shows what share the security of  rights has 
in  the sum  total  of  the national  value  of  property. 
What is lost at  such times is to  be placed to  the account of 
the law. 
And  yet,  how  insignificant  is  the legal  security  of 
property  in  comparison with  that of  the person.  To 
waste words  on this point  would  mean  to forget  for 
what  readers this work of  mine is intended.  I shall only 
myself to recall two remarks made above.  One 
Concerns  (P. 287) the  emphasis of  the ethical significance 
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the other (p. 343) the proof of  the value of  criminal law 
for the offender. 
The third good which the State gives to its members 
consists  in  all  those  public  arrangements  and  plans 
which it brings to life in the interest of  society.  There 
seems to be a certain amount of  opposition in reference 
to these.  What benefit  does the peasant derive from 
universities,  libraries,  museums?  And  yet  he  must 
contribute his share, be it ever so small (p. 381). But if 
he charges  these institutions to the scholar, the latter 
charges him with those devoted to his interests, and for 
which  the  scholar  must  pay  his  contribution.  And 
then, how insignificant are these contributions, and how 
valuable they prove ultimately for the whole of  society, 
and hence also for him!  The agricultural  chemistry of 
Liebig  has done the most valuable services to agricul- 
ture.  It  originated in the laboratory of  the University 
of  Giessen supported at  the  expense of  the State.  In  the 
observatory of  the University of Goettingen, Gauss and 
Weber  made  the  first  experiments  with  the  electro- 
magnetic  telegraph.  The economic value of  the tele- 
graph, as  developed  today for  trade  and  commerce, 
mocks  all  computation.  Have  these  two  institutions 
paid for themselves? 
But enough!  It needs  not science to enlighten  the 
thinking person  of the measure  in which  he finds his 
benefit in the State; it is sufficient to  open one's eyes to 
become  aware of  it.  But it is  demanding too much 
of  the unthinking masses to expect them to do this.  If 
you hear their complaints about the burdens and restric- 
tions which  the State imposes, you  might  believe  that 
it is more  a  plague  than a  benefit.  The advantages 
which it affords they take as  a matter of  course, -  that 
is what the State is for! -  or rather they are not con- 
scious of  benefits at  all.  The State is like the stomach, 
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one speaks  of it only to complain against it; it is felt 
only when it becomes a matter  of  discomfort.  Every 
thing  is nowadays  brought  near  to the understanding 
of  the people, -  nature, history,  art, technics ; there is 
scarcely  a  subject  about  which  the  layman  cannot 
inform himself from popular treatises.  The  State alone 
and the law, which touch him SO nearly, form the excep- 
tion, and yet it is only fair that not only the educated 
man  but also the man of  the people should have the 
opportunity to find out what they do for him and why 
they can not be essentially different from what they are. 
I  thought formerly of  filling this want by a legal cate- 
chism  for the people  intended  for the citizen  and the 
farmer.  My  aim was to  reconcile the unbiased judgment 
with the legal arrangements at  which it takes offence in 
so many ways;  to make an apology for the law and the 
State before the forum of  the simple and healthy com- 
mon sense of  man, after the model of  Justus Moser.  I 
am convinced  that the task is beyond  my powers.  I 
hope some one else will take it up.  He who will carry it 
out right will earn great credit from society, but he must 
think like a philosopher and speak like a peasant.  It 
would  be a worthy  theme for the establishment  of  a 
prize.  A  hundred  thousand  marks would  not  be too 
high a premium; they would be repaid a hundred and a 
thousand  fold.  The work would  be translated into all 
languages and would bring the world more blessing than 
entire libraries. 
5 15.  Solidarity  of  the  Interests  of  Society  and  the 
Individual.  We have so far let the individual settle his 
accounts with  society as if  the two were strangers to 
each  other, each  going  his  own way and intent only 
his  own  advantage.  But  this conception  does 
correspond to the nature of  their mutual relation, for 
the  State  is  the  individual  himself -  the dictum of THE CONCEPT  OF PURPOSE  [CH. vIrI 
Louis XIV, "L'btat c'est moi" is true of  every member of 
a State-  to settle his accounts with it is  exactly thesame 
thing as when the husbandman settles his account with 
his  field:  how much it cost him to cultivate it and how 
much it brings him in.  To  be sure, there is one differ- 
ence, the field  belongs  to him  alone,  the State he has 
in common with all other citizens.  And it  is because of 
this  difference  that  his  imagination  puts  him  into 
seeming  opposition  with  the State instead  of  showing 
him that relation of  unity and mutuality which in reality 
subsists between  them.  If  the State were myself,  the 
individual will  reply, it would  not have to compel  me 
to do all that it requires of  me, for I care for myself for 
the sake of  my own interest, and do not have to be com- 
pelled. 
When the child  is forced by the teacher  to learn, is 
it done for the sake of  the child or the teacher?  And 
yet the child must  be  compelled.  Why?  Because  he 
is still a child.  If  he were grown up, he would do from 
his own impulse what he requires compulsion to do  now. 
So the State compels you to do that which, if  you had 
the  true  insight,  you  would  do of  your  own  accord. 
Imagine the State as non-existent,  or in a condition of 
powerlessness at the time of  a revolution, and you will 
realize what the State and the law mean for you.  The 
times of  upheaval, revolution, anarchy, are the school 
hours of  history, in which she gives the nations a lesson 
on State and law.  A year, perhaps a month, teaches the 
citizen more about the significance of  law and State than 
his whole experience hitherto.  The State and the law 
which he formerly reviled, he now invokes when he is in 
trouble.  And the same man who laughed at  us when we 
said to him, "In the  law  you  protect  and assert yourself, 
defend the law, for it is the condition of  your being," - 
has suddenly understood  us. 
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Upon the presence or absence of  this insight is based 
the political maturity and immaturity of  nations.  The 
politically  immature nation is the child, which  thinks 
that  it must  learn  for  the sake of  the teacher.  The 
politically mature is the adult, who knows that he must 
learn for his  own sake.  The former regards the State 
as its opponent, the latter as its friend, confederate, pro- 
tector;  there the State meets with resistance, here it 
finds support; there the people help the criminal against 
the police, here they help the police against the criminal. 
What is meant by political education of  a nation?  Does 
it mean that the common man can talk politics?  That 
shoemakers,  tailors  and glove-makers can lecture the 
skilled  statesman?  In my opinion political  education 
of a nation means nothing else than the correct under- 
standing  of  their  own  interests.  But  there  are two 
kinds of interests,  the proximate,  which  can be seized 
with the hands, so to  speak, and the remote, which only 
the practised eye can see.  And so there are two kinds 
of  politics, a far-sighted and a near-sighted.  The former 
alone deserves the name politics in the true sense of  the 
word.  True  politics defined in a word is  far-sightedness- 
the eye of  the far-sighted, which  extends far beyond 
the narrow  circle of immediate interests, to which  the 
glance of the short-sighted is confined.  In  this sense we 
can speak also of  the politics of  business life.  It  is that 
of  the  penetrating  business  man.  The bad  business 
man has sense only for the advantage near  by, like the 
bad  chess  player  who  is happy  when  he takes off  a 
Pawn, and loses the game thereby.  The good business 
man sacrifices his pawn and wins the game.  To  express 
Ourselves in more abstract terms, -  the characteristics of 
bad  business politics consists in its attention to  the par- 
ticular act and the passing moment, of  good  business 
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This is also true of  social politics in its application to 
State, law and society.  Linguistically politics is charac- 
terized  as the  sight  of  the TOALTLK~S,  i. e., of  the man 
whose wit has been  sharpened by life in a community 
(T~XLF),  in comparison  with  the peasant whose horizon 
is  limited  by his  vocation  to himself  and the narrow 
circle  of  his  immediate  interests.  The former  knows 
that his own success is conditioned by the success of  the 
whole and that he advances his own interests along with 
the general; the latter believes he can exist by himself. 
The demands which the community makes upon hiin are 
regarded by him as sacrifices which he must offer to the 
purposes of  others.  The  former considers the community 
as his own affair, the latter as that of  others. 
This is the light in which the ancient Roman regarded 
the State.  What belongs  to the State belongs  also to 
him.  They are the "res  publica," which he has in com- 
mon  with  all  others,  in  contradistinction  to the  "res 
privatz," which he has for  himself  alone.  The officials 
of  the State are his officials.  For his private affairs he 
chooses a representative, for his public affairs, the official. 
Of  both he requires an account of  their management of 
the business  entrusted  to them.  The law  is  his  own 
work.  As  he disposes of  his private  interests through 
the "lex  privata," so he disposes of  his public interests 
through the "lex  publica."  Both stand upon  the same 
line in his mind;  the one represents an agreement with 
an individual, the  other, with  the community.11g  For 
this reason  he  regards  himself  also as the guardian of 
the law; and as he enters the lists in behalf of  his private 
interests by means of  the "actio privata," so he defends 
the common interests by means of  the "actio popularis" 
"Communis reipublicae sponsio,"  as  Papinian expresses himself in 
1. 3.  1 -a  tradition from the time of  the Republic, which had for 
his time only the significance of  a historical reminiscence. 
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(P  349).  The solidarity, or rather the identity, of  the 
interests of the comm~~nity  and of the individual could 
not have been  more clearly expressed  than is done in 
the Roman law by means of  the last named action.  The 
*laintiff guards his own interest at the same time with 
the interest of  the nation. 
1f we compare with this picture which ancient Rome 
to our mind, and to which  our own  national 
past offers a refreshing counterpart in the history of the 
Hanse towns, the dreary conception of  the State which 
modern absolutism  and the police State has produced 
among  the  nations  of  modern  Europe,  the complete 
estrangement,  nay,  opposition  in the relations  of  the 
individual to the State, we are astonished at  the almost 
incredible  difference  which  one and the same relation 
can  exhibit.  We shall have to suffer  from its effects 
for a long time to  come.  The theory of  private law has 
not yet overcome these effects by any means.  A rem- 
nant of  them has been preserved to this day, according 
to my opinion, in the theory of  juristic  persons.  The 
Roman knew that just as the State is nothing else than 
its  citizens,  so  the  "gens,"  the  "municipium,"  the 
"colonia"  are nothing else than the "gentiles,"  "mun- 
icipes,"  "coloni."  Our modern  science has placed  the 
juristic  person in place  of  the particular members for 
which alone the former exists (the beneficiaries as I call 
them), or the subjects for the sake of  whom the juristic 
Person is constituted, as if  this imaginary person, which 
cannot  enjoy  or feel anything, existed  for itself.lZ0 If 
what 1 said above is true, that the State  is I,  I make the 
same assertion about the juristic person. 
But if that statement is true, why should it be neces- 
sary to  exert force against me?  Is not my interest alone 
See, against this  formalistic conception, my "Geist des R.  R.," 
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ordinarily sufficient to guide me in the right path? Why 
compulsion, if  society requires  nothing  of  me  except 
what my own interest involves? 
For two reasons.  The first reason is, deficient know& 
edge.  Not every one has the insight to know that the 
common interest is at the same time his own.  To  per- 
ceive an advantage which  concerns himself  exclusively, 
the eye of  the most near-sighted  is sufficient, it is the 
politics of narrow  egoism.  Thinking of  himself  only, 
he sacrifices others to save himself;  determined by the 
moment alone, he waits until the danger which he could 
and should have met in the proper time when it started, 
knocks at  his door and seizes him by the throat. 
Law may be defined as  the union of  the intelligent and 
far-sighted against the near-sighted.lZ1 The  former must 
force the latter to  that which their own interest prompts. 
Not for their own sake, to  make them happy against their 
will, but in the interest of  the whole.  Law is the indis- 
pensable  weapon  of  intelligence  in  its  struggle  with 
stupidity. 
But supposing  even  that the  understanding  of  the 
solidarity of  the common interest with one's own were 
fully  alive  in every  individual,  and the consequences 
involved in the former were objectively so  free from  doubt 
that no difference of  opinion could at  all arise regarding 
them, this would not yet in any way make the lawsuper- 
fluous.  And here we touch on the second reason which 
makes social coercion necessary.  The imperfect knowl- 
edge of  the individual is not the only reason that makes 
law necessary; the second reason is the bad or weak will, 
which  sacrifices  the more remote  common interest for 
the sake of  his own more proximate interest.  This leads 
me again to a point which  I  had frequent occasion to 
12'  SO Papinian in  his definition of  law in 1. 3. 1, "Lex  est corn 
mune precepturn, virorum prudentium  consultum." 
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touch upon in various connections  (pp.  163, 220, 344), 
vjz.,  the difference  between the  particular and the  common 
interest which is in the essence of  the social relation.  It 
is found  again in civil society,122  and therein lies the weak- 
ness as well as the strength of  law.  Weakness, in so far 
as the particular  interest  (I understand  by this every 
motive in which the agent has himself only in mind, not 
merely,  therefore, interest in  the ordinary sense,  i.  e., 
desire for gain, but also hatred, desire of  revenge, etc.) 
tempts the individual to  assert his own ego at  the expense 
of society.  Strength, inasmuch as the common interest 
combines  all  other  individuals  in  a  defensive  union 
against him, and opposes to  the interest which he has in 
injustice the interest which they have in justice;  to the 
power which he commands for the purpose of  attack, the 
powcr  which they command for the purpose of  defence 
(p. 219). 
When  we  said  that the person who violates the law 
desires himself at  the expense of  society, it did not mean 
that  he  desires  himself  only,  but as was  brought  out 
above (p. 344), he desires himself and society;  and just 
herein lies the morally objectionable character of  viola- 
tion  of law.  It is not simple egoism  which  wants to 
This opposition  Rousseau  also  emphasizes  in  his  "Contrat 
Social,"  I, ch.  7,.to  which  my attention was called after the pas- 
sages of my book quoted before had already been  printed.  "En 
effet," he says, "chaque  individu  peut, comme homme,  avoir une 
volontC particuliere contraire ou dissemblable A la volontC gCnCrale 
quTil  a comme citoyen;  son intCr&t particulier peut lui parler tout 
autrement que 1'inthrCt commun; son existence absolue, et  naturelle- 
merit independante, peut lui faire envisager ce qu'il doit B la cause 
comme  une  contribution  gratuite,  dont la  perte  sera 
mOins nuisible aux autres, que le paiement n'en  est onhreux pour 
lui; et regardant la personne morale qui constitue l'htat comme un 
""  de raison. Parce que ce n'est pas un homme, il jouirait des dmits 
dU  citoyen saxis  vouloir remplir les devoirs du sujet;  injustice dont  Ie 
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exist for  itself only and not for others; it  is egoism raised 
to the highest power, which profits by the advantages 
and  blessings  of  society  for  itself,  but  refuses  the 
moderate  price  which  the latter demands in turn.  If 
all acted like the egoist, his account would  not square, 
nay, he would come to be convinced that his own inter- 
est peremptorily demands co-operation for the common 
purpose.  His thought therefore is not, "The  common 
purposes are indifferent to  me," but, "I leave their reali- 
zation, with wliich I can no more dispense than any  one 
else, to others, and pursue my own interests only.  Let 
them  bother  with it, I for my part care only for my- 
self."  If  he were  given  the alternative,  "either  your 
own ego or society," his choice would not be doubtful. 
But modern society does not present this alternative 
before him, it does not deprive him of  the blessings of 
the law because he himself disregards it.  It is only in 
the lowest stages of  the development of  law that we meet 
with the opposite mode of  treatment in case of  a heavy 
offence (expulsion of  the offender from society:  Roman 
"societas," German outlawry and proscription, -a  rem- 
nant  of  these  regulations  of  primitive  times  in  later 
Rome is voluntary exile in case of  imminent condemna- 
tion).  In scientific discussions this alternative is made 
use  of  by  the individualistic  theory  of  law  and  the 
Law of  Nature, to  base upon it the criminal law of  soci- 
ety.'"  The deduction is as follows:  If  you free yourself 
lZa  So  by J.  G. Fichte in his "Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prin- 
zipien  der Wissenschaftsiehre"  (Jena  and  Leipzig,  1796).  "The 
least injury to  property destroys the entire property contract, and 
it  justifies the offended in taking away everything frcrn the offender 
if  he can" (Vol. 11, p. 7).  He who violates the civil contract in any 
respect,  whether  deliberately  or thoughtlessly  where the contract 
counted on his thoughtfulness, loses thereby, strictly speaking, all 
his rights as  a citizen and as  a man and becomes an outlaw com- 
pletely"  (p. 95).  In place of  outlawry comes the "expiation  con- 
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froln US, we  free ourselves  from  you.  You  have lost 
the protection of  the law because you have disregarded 
it;  you are deprived of  all right, hence any punishment 
we  inflict upon  YOU  is justified.  The consequence of 
this would be that the smallest opposition to the police, 
nay, even a violation of the civil law, might be punished 
with death or confiscation of  one's whole property.  That 
society does not do this is merely a kindness on its part. 
The result with which the discussion closes is the social 
indis~ensabiZity  of  coercion. 
But however indispensable it may be, it is also at  the 
same time insufficient.  If it should attain its purpose 
completely,  there would  have to be no crimes.  This 
gives  us  the point  of  transition  to the next  chapter. 
What keeps a man from committing an injustice where 
he knows that he will not be found  out and need not there- 
fore fear compulsion?  The answer to this will be found 
in the next  chapter.  The two egoistic levers of  which 
society makes use to make the individual serviceable to 
its purposes, are not the only ones.  There  is still another, 
which appeals not to the lower egoism, but to  something 
higher in man -  morality. 
tract"  (p. 98), the thief must make amends, or if  too poor, by labor. 
So long as he has not done it, "he  ceases to  be a citizen, as is the 
case in  all penalties"  (p.  112).  "With  exclusion is connected ips0 
fact0  confiscation  of  the entire propertyw (p.  130).  I  know of  no 
work in  all literature in  which the folly of  consistency in following 
UP an erroneous fundamental idea rises to such dizzy heights as in 
this one. APPENDICES APPENDIX I 
RUDOLF VON  IHERINGl 
The man and his works!  How much alike!  He who 
would  describe  the work  must  characterize the man; 
and  to explain the personality  is to interpret  the ac- 
complishment.  Ihering's  literary effort represents  the 
progressive unfoldment of  his nature in the domain of 
theoretical  pursuits. 
Ihering's personality  was  of  a  kind  so  original and 
that in whatever field of  endeavor he entered, 
he immediately made a distinct impression on its thought 
and  reached  its central  position,  with  a  sympathetic, 
and  if  need  be,  antagonistic  understanding.  Rare 
warmth of  disposition, sociability, a candid and upright 
nature, unenvious recognition of  the merits of  others, 
a quick sympathy for the misfortune of  strangers, and 
especially a lively interest in the welfare of  his friends, 
gained for Ihering many attachments.  A man of  great 
conversational talent, eloquent, rich in humor, buoyant 
of spirit, with a talent for initiative in a hundred different 
directions, of  an  impulsive  nature,  impartial  in  the 
estimate of his own work, sensitive to opposition, and 
unreserved  in  the  expression  of  his  convictions,  he 
achieved enemies.  One is struck by the combination in 
lhering of a prudence of  life and a certain naiveness of 
'  [The text translated is a reprint from Iherzng's "Jahrbiicher  fiir 
Dogmatik des heutigen  Rfimische.  und  Deutschen  Privatrechts," 
Bd. xxxii, N. F. xx  (Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1893). 
It was translated  by Albert  Kocourek, Lecturer on Jurisprudence 
in Northwestern University,and member of  the Editorial Committee.] 
'  [Late Professor of  Law  at the  University  of  Strassburg.  To 
Merkel the first edition was dedicated by the author.] 428  APPENDIX  I  MERKEL  429 
expression of  thought, and the conjunction of  a matter- 
of-fact  judgment upon men and things, with an imagina- 
tive and enthusiastic tendency of mind, concerning the 
practical  and  practicable.  He  possessed  a  joyous 
nature such as is not found often among those of  con- 
spicuous  learning.  While  his  life is  closed, yet  as a 
sanguine spirit he richly experienced the alternation of 
heaven-high exultation and the depths of  despair, though 
with far more joy than unhappiness in his career.  Hap- 
piness poured from a hundred springs, and yet did not 
suffice. 
He was a modern through and through, with the most 
finished sense of  the realities of  life, but wanting in con- 
templative inclinations, and an enemy of  the twilight 
and  the Romantic  in  poetry  and  action.  A  mighty 
passion for intellectual domination of  the objects within 
the province of his thought  surged within  him.  This 
found expression in a two-fold aspect: on one hand,  in a 
struggle  for unconditional  precision of  ideas,  and  the 
greatest  completeness of  what is utilizable,  clear,  and 
essential;  and on the other hand, in a rapid elevation 
of  thought  to  a  far-reaching  outlook.  No  matter, 
though, to what height he arose, the concrete actualities 
of  earth were always clearly within his range of  vision. 
He might be likened to  the eagle which, perched upon the 
cliff, surveys at  a glance, all that crawls or moves below. 
Moreover, the view from aloft did not lessen his sym- 
pathies.  The things that engaged him were not appre- 
hended alone by the intellect, but were grappled by all 
the faculties of  his mind.  His whole personality moved 
as a unit, and he identified himself with his problems. 
All  these characteristics are mirrored  in the literary 
style of  his  scientific works,  and give  them  their at- 
traction  and meaning.  Ihering's  effectiveness, in large 
measure, is the product of  his style.  The same fact has 
contributed chiefly  to  his fame  beyond  the borders of 
Germany, and  gained him an enthusiastic following in 
foreign  countries.  It is interesting in this connection 
,-ompare  him with Savigny.  From the standpoint of 
literary expression no other German jurist can be con- 
sidered  in  the class of  these two men.  Both  had  the 
gift of crystal  clearness of  statement, but in other re- 
spects what  a  difference!  Savigny's  writing  has  the 
quality of  aristocratic coldness and repose, balance  of 
coloring, aloofness, and personal withdrawal behind the 
shadows of his work.  His canvas seemed to lie far from 
his  soul.  As  Ihering  has  remarked,  the subject  does 
not express itself with Savigny through the material, but 
the matter itself takes hold of the form of  thought. 
Ihering's  style, on  the contrary,  possesses  a  lively 
coloring,  is frequently oratorical  and  exuberant ;  the 
author does not conceal himself with his thoughts;  he 
projects  himself  in living form in every  line;  and  he 
seeks not only to clarify his subject, but also to carry his 
reader  with him by storm.  He coins apt phrases and 
winged  words  to serve as carriers for  his  ideas.  His 
exposition  is  marked  by  profusion  and  breadth;  he 
would illuminate his thesis to the point of  triviality and 
leave  nothing  in  doubt.  A  major  device  which  he 
employs is to resort to things plain to the senses.  Ihering 
was  a  master  in  combining the abstract  and  the self- 
evident.  His  so-called  "natural  historical  method"  is 
founded throughout  on this plan of  combining diverse 
ideas;  although, perhaps,  Ihering  may  at times  have 
considered  this  method  as having  another  and higher 
function.  By  all  means,  this  combination  of  general 
and  special  ideas  accounts  for  the  abundance  of  his 
striking  and  frequently  witty  comparisons.  In  this 
regard, and in yet another, Ihering suggests a German 
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farthest removed from him -  Schopenhauer, who in the 
sphere of  philosophy, in the same way that Ihering in 
the domain of  jurisprudence, is distinctive for his clear- 
ness of  literary expression, wealth of sprightly compai-i- 
sons, and constant association of  the abstract with the 
concrete  in thought.  There is also to be remarked a 
common tendency in both to  battle against the dominion 
of  idea as opposed to  reality. 
It  hardly needs to be said, in speaking of  these quali- 
ties of Ihering's writing  that they are based on eminent 
scholarship.  If  Ihering  as a "Docent"  did not attain 
the position of  a Vangerow, the chief reason lay in that 
his temperament prevented a superior, magisterial bear- 
ing necessary for great success, and made laborious for 
him a satisfactory treatment of  student-like miscellanies 
for the purpose of  a balanced, comprehensive,  reliable, 
and understandable notebook of  the materials in hand. 
This temperamental defect naturally did not apply to the 
practical  courses where  Ihering was in his proper  ele- 
ment.  To the present writer,  the lectures of  Ihering 
were  far  more  interesting  than  those  of  Vangerow. 
After  I had heard Ihering, Vangerow's discourse was a 
closed book. 
Ihering was an inspired  jurist  in his reading  of  the 
"Corpus  Juris."  He  was  fascinated  by  the  juristic 
world  into which  he entered, a  world  of  intellectual 
materials, in which "the motive power of  ideas" appeared 
to be a  reality,  and he was  attracted  by the mental 
powers  and independence  of the rulers and masters of 
this  world.  Jurisprudence  appeared  to him  a science 
in which, notwithstanding its practical purpose, specu- 
lative talent had  free scope, and in which  this  talent 
best served its practical objects, in that it was subject 
to its own laws.  In the third volume of the "~eist," 
and  in  the  treatise  with  which  he  introduced  the 
jahrbiicher," he exhaustively characterized and glorified 
,.he  speculative problems here set forth.  The operative 
for this speculative mission is that which Ihering 
calls  the higher or productive jurisprudence as opposed 
to the lower or merely receptive jurisprudence.  Within 
its domain  the juristic  skill of  the Roman jurist  is to 
be emulated.  However much  the position  of  practical 
and professional jurists in the development of  law differs 
from that of  Labeo and Julian, yet Ihering appears to 
have  made possible, in large degree, the prosecution of 
a productive effort in jurisprudence, even to the present 
day.  The content of ideas which  the positive law in- 
volves goes beyond  it to make all necessities conform- 
able to the conditions of  the present time.  The point is 
that the positive law is to be more completely developed 
and  extended,  but  not in  slavish  dependence  on the 
Roman jurists at  the point where their labors ended. 
Construction  was  for  Ihering  the chief  form  of  this 
productive labor, and the "Jahrbucher"  were  especially 
designed for this purpose.  For him, a  revival  of  con- 
structive  jurisprudence  together  with  a  restoration of 
the  sources of  the  law  led  the way  to a  new  epoch 
in the science  of  law, advanced  by  Savigny's  treatise 
on possession. 
Ihering's positive contributions from the standpoint of 
constructive jurisprudence are in the main unassailable. 
But it is clear that the elaboration of  his ideas brought 
Out his fiercely contested and much derided logical cult. 
He  was  the unmistakable  high-priest  of  this doctrine. 
His  exposition is biased, and the conditions under which 
the constructive operation promises real results and the 
limits  which  mark  out  an  unprofitable  Scholasticism 
not made clear -  at  least not in the treatment of the 
Jahrbiicher." 
However, if  we examine the long series  of  dogmatic 
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we shall fail to  encounter any  over-valuation of  the logical 
element, or any  over-extension of its  limits.  Surveying the 
range of  these efforts, no difference is to be encountered 
in them as between the youth and maturity of  Ihering, 
apart from  more  general  points  of  view.  From  the 
beginning  he possessed  a  lively sense of  the nature  of 
the relations of  life and their commerce, and the way in 
which legal rules operate on them.  Even there, where 
his investigations did not directly serve practical trends, 
as perhaps in the treatment of  the reflex action of  laws, 
and in his discussion of the  passive effect of  laws, one 
does not find  a  mere juggling  of  concepts.  He found 
occasion  here  to deal with  a  group  of  phenomena  of 
legal life which, while interesting enough, had previously 
escaped  attention.  His  purpose  was  to  show  their 
practical bearings,  to unify  them  under a  single  point 
of observation, and to disclose in them at  the same time 
the terminal point  of  civil  protection  of  private  legal 
interests  (not  however  "conceptionally  necessary"  in- 
terests but actual interests con:orming  to  relative ends). 
This exposition  was  designed  to  combine  a  series  of 
related  (although  in previous  juristic  thought, wholly 
unconnected) phenomena and to reduce their distinctive 
qualities to a common and simple characteristic;  that 
is to say,  the state  of  perpetual legal constraint of  persons 
and things alongside of  a temporary absence of  a person 
entitled.  As  to the rest, so far as the present  writer 
can  see,  the conceptual  process  never  extends  in  the 
dogmatic labors of  Ihering, beyond the point where an 
obvious, practical interest may be found.  In fact, the 
objective factor  is, after a fashion, directively  present 
even in Ihering's earlier works (for example, that con- 
cerning the limits of  ownership of  land), which, in his 
later  works, is established  as the leading  principle  of 
juristic  thought.  Not  infrequently  practical  cases 
,,.ere  encountered  which  appeared  to offer  a  conflict 
between  the traditionally accepted view and the neces- 
sities of legal life, which gave occasion to these labors. 
~h~~ his exposition of the doctrine of "caveat ernptor." 
participation in decisions, in the rendering of  opinions, 
in the discussion of  cases in juristic associations, and his 
experience, influenced  to a  very large extent 
the trend of  his dogmatic studies, and exerted at  the same 
time a profound  and even revolutionary power over his 
more general, scientific views.  Among these influences, 
mention must not be omitted of  the happily composed 
legal instances to which  Ihering gave a general value. 
Especially  characteristic is his  "Law  in  Daily  Life"3 
which brought to  juristic notice the trivialities of  the day 
with their manifold con~plications. 
Ihering with  a  preference for theories yields  not to 
conceptual but to  casuistic proof.  The results achieved 
by casuistic reasoning concerning the interests involved 
in a legal proposition furnish the chief  measure of  legal 
judgment,  even as against the "lex  lata";  for he will 
not  admit  its  conflict  with  purpose  without  cogent 
ground.  He therefore delights to  start with these inter- 
ests, and examines to  find whether the protective mantle 
of  the law is adequate to safeguard  them.  If  defects 
appear in the arnior of  legal protection, according to  the 
prevailing theories, then these theories for him are not 
to be trusted.  He thinks that prejudices  have inter- 
vened  between  law and necessity, and that this evil  is 
attributable not to the Roman jurist but to the narrow 
point of view of  the modern jurist.  He  therefore searches 
through the intellectual domain of  Roman jurisprudence 
for the materials  to supply  the deficiencies of  modern 
I"Jurisprudenz  dcs  T~glichen  Lebens,"  translated,  with  notes, 
from the 8th (9th and 10th) edition of  the German under the text 
by  Nefzry  Gaudy, Oxford, 1904 1 434  APPENDIX I  MERKEL  435 
law, and to combat  the  hindering obstacles  of  tradi- 
tional dogmatic thinking.  AS a rule he finds what he is 
looking  for.  Many  of  the  legal  propositions  of  the 
Roman jurists, however, attain only a fragmentary ex- 
pression, or are stated only within the limits of  the legal 
transactions, and in response to the practical occasions 
of  the day, and are not founded on any system of  legal 
thought.  Ihering here exerts his whole energy to  make 
way  for a  more  universal  application of  Roman legal 
principles conformable to the necessities  of  the present 
time.  Examples in his labors of  this effort of  reconcile- 
ment  are his  studies  of  "culpa  in contrahendo,"  the 
extension  of  the law of  obligations to things of  special 
value ("affektionsinteresse"), and civil protection against 
injuries to  reputation.  In all these discussions, it would 
be of  no little interest to compare Ihering's method with 
that of  Windscheid, but that must be left to others. 
The  dogmatist  Ihering  does  not  change  character 
even in his contributions to the doctrine of  possession. 
The only difference is that in these writings there is also 
found the characteristic method expressing his scientific 
views which first attained an unlimited validity for him 
in his sharp controversial attitude against Savigny and 
others.  The method of  operation assimilates the corre- 
sponding  theory  with  Ihering,  and  dogmatic  inquiry 
becomes a process of  demonstration for the theory. 
Whether the views of  the author as to  what is expedi- 
ent and his notion of  legal justice did not unduly influ- 
ence, in these  labors, the interpretative  function, is a 
question  which  Romanists  may decide.  But possible 
defccts of  this kind  do not detract from  the stirring 
interest  of  his works or  their legitimate influence  on 
legal thought.  Nor can it be denied that these writings 
actually contain something of  the productive jurispru- 
dence  postulated  by Ihering, and also serve  practical 
interests. 
yet, as to productive jurisprudence,  much remains to 
be said, if this were the place to  say it.  It  may, however, 
be stated  with due reserve, that this jurisprudence has 
brought to  light a certain amount of  difficulty in dealing 
the legal  life of  the present  day,4 and that this 
as it seems to the present writer, is coex- 
tensive with a defect in its method. 
lhering's original overvaluation of  the logical element 
in  jurisprudence  later  harmonized  with  his  desire  of 
freedom from the spiritual letter of  the law, in which 
attitude the purely  positive  standpoint had  its influ- 
ence.  This  highly  characteristic  position,  however, 
found expression in another and more important manner. 
Two ways lead to  this  end -  to  freedom from the  burden- 
some difficulty of  the material content of  law, or rather, 
to intellectual domination of  this content.  These were 
the dogmatic and  the genetic methods:  logical treatment 
and  concentration  on one  hand;  and, on the other, 
exposition of  the intellectual process by which the posi- 
tive  law  arises, is  maintained,  and develops,  and  in 
which  likewise  the  test of  its interpretation  is to be 
found.  Without doubt the latter method is  the more 
difficult  and important, and Ihering applied himself to it 
in its connection with Roman law in his earlier years with 
'The  unwilling attitude which our jurists  schooled in the Civil 
law have always maintained  with reference to an extension of lia- 
bility for injuries to third persons in the domain of  culpable acts, 
in the face of  obvious  necessities and a present legal sense of the 
desirability of  such extension, is an example of  this.  We have not 
made a possession of  the legal generalizations of  the Roman system, 
which,  with  respect  to civil  liability,  has,  like our criminal  law, 
scarcely (and illogically) made application of  the legal consequences 
of intentional and negligent legal injuries.  Productive jurisprudence 
in  Ihering's  view of  its meanings coincides with the mission  of  a 
Positivistic legal philosophy in that its content of  ideas as to legal 
Principles is to be reduced  to the simplest possible term with the 
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incomparable ability.  Ihering's desire to master the law 
in the sense noted, corresponded to our national desire 
for legal independence growing out of  the fact of  recep- 
tion of Roman law.  This law had made itself a part of 
the intellectual organism of  the German people;  it was 
an authoritative and invisible force, and an unassailable 
factor of  our practical philosophy.  But this philosophy 
was, and is, a foreign element in national life, so long and 
to the extent that it is not critically examined as to its 
sources and made conformable to the conditions of  our 
own economic, political, and cultural life.  Ihering was 
an instrument of  the existing national impulse for inde- 
pendence,and his greatestwork, theC'Geist  des Rornischen 
Rechts"  was destined to serve this tendency.  Its pur- 
pose was a full understanding of  Roman law and the his- 
tory of  its development;  in order to derive from it its 
standards of  legal measurement, and to  create the possi- 
bility  of  future national  legislation,  by a  method  of 
selection  and  exclusion, revision  and adjustment, the 
connection of  the new with the old, and the forging of  a 
conformable law agreeable  to the requirements of  the 
present day and our national genius.  "Through Roman 
law and beyond  Roman law"  was the motto for  this 
side of  his activity.  That such was the task which he 
set for himself, and that he achieved actual results in this 
direction -  upon this chiefly rests his title to fame. 
Savigny laid  down  the program  of  an evolutionary 
history of  law.  But the historical  labors of  his school 
(apart from  Puchta's  "Institutes")  did not yield results 
showing an  appreciably intimate relation to  this platform. 
Without dwelling on their  antiquarian character, these 
labors were  principally  directed to the service of  legal 
dogmatic, and not to the explanation of  the psychic side 
of  law, and its development in  connection with cultural 
life.  Ihering undertook  the work which the Historical 
school only proposed; but what he brought forth quickly 
showed him numerous contradictions of  its thesis. 
The historical  view of  law found its origin in the age 
of  ~~~~nticism,  and took form in the war against the 
ideas  of  revolutionary  times.  This  relation  was  out- 
grown  with  Ihering, and  the Romantic vestment  was 
cast  aside.  This explains his anomalous  position with 
reference to universalism  in law.  The contrast of  the 
period  against  cosmopolitanism  led  the 
~<i~t~i.ical  School  to an exclusive  accentuation of  the 
national  element in the law.  Law, for this school, is an 
integral  part of a  specific national culture, as was the 
case  among  the  Greeks and in ancient  Rome  (unlike 
modern  peoples)  where  custom and law had a distinct 
national  character.  Ihering sought in his "Spirit"  and 
elsewhere to  show how, in what form, and by what means 
the Roman  law developed  out of  national character in 
the period  of  classical  jurisprudence, beyond  the range 
of  mere  national  disposition,  and  became  a  cultural 
element  fit  to have a universal  position  in the modern 
world  among other national elements of  like character. 
Were it otherwise, then with the re-invigoration of our 
llational life, our purpose could be only to eliminate this 
foreign  law,  root  and branch, as speedily  as possible; 
a11  object  which  was farthest from  the thought of the 
Historical  School.  In  other  respects  touching  the 
national  origin  of  law, the Historical School contented 
itself  with attributing it to a  "Volksgeist"  or the con- 
sciousness  of  the  people.  Ihering,  on  the  contrary, 
to discover  the intellectual  forces  which  con- 
stituted this "Volksgeist," and to  explain in detail their 
part  in  the development of law.  He further opposed 
the notion of this school of  an unconscious creation and 
growth of law arising out of  the mysterious bosom of the 
of  the  people.  His  contention  is  (and his view APPENDIX I  MERKEL 
is  correct), that in  the  formation  of  distinctive legal 
institutions,  there is operative, from the very beginning, 
a conscious activity of  will;  and there is present a reflec- 
tive  participation  of  the  understanding.  His history 
of  ancient Roman law aims to furnish the proof of  this 
position;  and in this connection he arrives at a different 
estimate of  legislative effort from the Historical School. 
With Leist and others, he  asserts the eminent importance 
of  legislation  in  the self-assertion  of  law, against the 
narrowness of  view of  this school in its emphasis upon 
customary law.  This Roman history affords him tan- 
gible proofs for his standpoint.  Altogether, the evolu- 
tionary concept has a different complexion with Ihering 
than with  Savigny.  This central  thought  of  modern 
science has a conservative reception with Savigny and 
those of  his school.  They make prominent always the 
stability of  history, and the dependence on one hand 
of  the present on the past, and on the other, of  indivi- 
duals on objective forces.  Ihering, however, in harmony 
with general, modern science, gives this idea a progressive 
coloring.  Yet, as already indicated, he represents the 
opposition  against  the  intellectual  self-independence 
of  positive law. 
Ihering's exposition of  the self-assertiveness of  Roman 
law in relation to  other cultural elements, that is to  say, 
the distinctive forms in which it  distinguishes itself from 
them  and  develops  and  manifests  itself  as a special 
domain, is a lasting contribution.  The same may be 
said of  his explanation of  the working methods of  Roman 
jurisprudence,  and the ethical and intellectual qualities 
which show themselves in these methods and predestined 
the Roman people for this system.  Ihering is right in 
accepting that the prodigious marvel of Roman juris- 
prudence is not to be explained by mere reference to a 
logical  virtuosity of  its jurists;  and that there are to 
be considered pre-eminently, as  conditions of  this labor, 
the singular practical tendencies and talents of  the Roman 
mind, and  definite  underlying  qualities  of  character, 
rather  than bare logical skill.  Pertinent in this connec- 
t;,,  is  what  Ihering  says concerning  the  disciplined 
of the Romans, their impulse toward power and 
freedom, and the importance of these factors for the self- 
independence of their law.  Indeed, the specific function 
of law lies in the delimitation of the sphere of  might and 
freedom.  The working-out  of this function in its dis- 
tinctive  qualities  is essentially  favored  by  the energy 
of colliding interests whose proper spheres of  power are 
to be marked  out against each other.  Among a people 
with  an  overbalanced  spirit  of  passivity  or  altruism, 
the development  of  the characteristic  quality  of  law, 
as it was in Rome, would be unthinkable;  the generative 
force of  law would be lacking. 
Ihering had the intention from the beginning of  con- 
tributing a "natural science of  law" through an exposition 
of the evolutionary course of  Roman law; in other words, 
to present  a  philosophy  of  law.  His assumption  of  a 
coincidence of  mission  of  legal  philosophy  and history 
was  well  founded.  Condensed  evolutionary  history is 
philosophy.  The mind  which  should  be able to make 
a complete survey of  the evolutionary history of  man- 
kind,  and  render  a  unified,  concentrated, and precise 
statement of this history, would  belong  to the greatest 
of  philosophers.  What such  a  mind  could  teach  us, 
wo~ld,  in  any given  age, exceed  the whole  of  general 
knowledge. 
Ihering's work, however, affords a contribution in this 
direction, and future legal philosophy will have to draw 
On  him.  His discussion of  his subject repeatedly  lays 
almost  entirely  its historical  garments.  Particular 
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a system of legal philosophy.  Thus, the excursus in the 
last volume  of  his  "Geist,"  concerning  the notion  of 
rights. 
Complete harmony between these writings and a phil- 
osophy of law, of course, is not to  be expected.  Ihering's 
views on philosophy of  law underwent numerous changes. 
Apart from this fact, there is apparent, in many of his 
elaborations, a certain amount of  incongruity due to  the 
animated manner in which he seized the matters  in hand 
in an  effort  to bring out a brilliant illumination of a point 
under  consideration.  Judgments, which  in themselves 
are compatible, thereby end sometimes in contradictory 
explanations.  Ihering's strength  did not lie in a calm 
understanding  and  contemplation  of  the  results  of 
his  labor, permitting a harmonious, proportionate, and 
complete  view  of  things.  Accordingly,  the  revision 
of  the first edition of  the "Geist"  here and there mitigated 
these  incongruities  (as in the valuation  of  the logical 
element in law), but did not conceal them.  It  may be 
said in general, that as  to  all the chief problemsof general 
jurisprudence,  Ihering's work will admit of  pointing out 
such defects;  for example, his notion of  rights. 
In the second volume of  the "Geist,"  in his considera- 
tion  of  ancient  Roman  law,  and  under  its influence, 
Ihering  states that legal  relations  are in their essence 
relations of dominion or power;  that the view that power 
and dominion are the sole starting points of  the whole of 
private law is the correct one;  and that the essence of 
jurisprudence  lies  this,  that it abstracts everything 
which does not react upon these two elements.  In the 
fourth volume of  the "Geist,"  on the contrary, rights are 
defined  as interests protected by the State; the stand- 
point  of  power  substitutes  for  conformable  purpose; 
and  the will  theory  is expressly  overthrown.  In two 
different volumes of  the same work, different aspects of 
rightj are treated  in a  superior manner, but in neither 
case  is  the fundamental notion  thoroughly  examined. 
~t is clear that the point of view of  power does not pro- 
vide  a satisfactory  basis  for the apportionment  and 
delimitation of  rights; that it  cannot give the reason for 
their extension or restriction and an exhaustive explana- 
tion of their change; and that it  cannot therefore be the 
ucys  KaL &v"  of  jurisprudence.  On the other hand, it is 
also  certain  that  interests  cannot  be  the  substance 
of rights, if  these rights are derived from the law.  The 
law  does not provide  men with interests, but endows 
them  with certain powers applicable to these interests. 
This would  seem  to be the correct notion,  giving  the 
proper position to  both the idea of  interest and of power, 
without  running  into difficulty.  But  Ihering's  solici- 
tude in making logically accurate definitions was always 
less  than his effort to bring  out fully the elements of 
legal  relation^.^ 
This duality of  viewpoint in Ihering is also maintained 
in his position toward law.  In his "Kampf  ums Recht" 
the power  idea has a new and vigorous representation 
while the "Zweck  im Recht"  turns entirely on the idea 
of  purpose. 
The personality of  Ihering speaks out most distinctly 
in these two works.  In the "Kampf"  we see his force of 
character, his militant side, his strong sense of legality, 
and  the whole  dynamic  energy  of  the  man;  in  the 
"Zweck"  his earlier intellectual side is portrayed.  One 
like Ihering does not rest until his theoretical views attain 
the  full  expression  of  his  distinctive  character.  The 
of  his theories depends on the human side 
most prominently asserting itself,  and their immediate 
Operation  depends on the relation  which  the personal 
bears  to opposing principles  and problems for 
'  Cf. in this connection, Ihering's "Scherz und Emst," p. 360. APPENDIX I  MERKEL  443 
the time being affecting it.  How this comes about  in 
Ihering's final theories will be shown. 
In the "Kampf  ums  Recht,"  as already  suggested, 
Ihering  expressed  in a  manner  fitting  his  personality 
the element of  force in law.  In an admirable work of 
earlier origin, "Das Schuldmoment im Romischen Privat- 
recht," he already touched on the questions raised in the 
"Kampf,"  but  he  glossed  them  as  a  historian.  He 
sketched  the progressive  separation  of  the penal  ele- 
ment from the domain of the civil administration of jus- 
tice, and he correctly saw in this a species of  the process 
of  differentiation which underlay Roman law and which 
exhibited an essential aspect of  its onward development. 
He soon  observed, however, that with  the retreat  of 
penal  law, certain  related  phenomena appeared, which 
have multiplied and extended in the modem world, and 
show a debilitated energy of  legal will in the defence of 
law and rights.  He was conscious of  the contradiction 
which this evolutionary process offered against his whole 
intellectual attitude.  This contradiction is brought out 
in  his  "Kampf  ums  Recht"  in sharply  vehement  lan- 
guage, and the immense success of  this writing proved 
that he did not stand alone in his views.  It evoked a 
widely disseminated influence, which became apparent in 
a variety of  endeavors, and particularly in the field  of 
criminal law.  Our modern legal life gives evidence of 
much sickly and pale cast of  thought, against which the 
influence of  this work reacts.  Our law had lost some of its 
courage, and  this  was  especially true of  private  law. 
Since the social question has come to the fore, doubt has 
arisen as to the universal justice  of  the law, and this 
question, taken in connection with  the inspired  social 
movement of  the age, will prevent a reversion of  legal 
attitude in the sense intended by Ihering in his "~ampf" 
notwithstanding its wide influence. 
That essay, for the rest, has to do with the validation 
of  rights and represents'the  thesis,  that an energetic 
defence against wrong is a duty.  This part of  the work 
might be called a homily on the Kantian text, "Do not 
let  your rights be trodden  under  foot without resent- 
ment."  But this sermon contains a legal philosophical 
core, and in its essence is ~nassailable.~ 
Ihering based his theory of  duty in the maintenance of 
one's  rights,  firstly, on the connection between rights 
and personality;  and secondly, on the solidarity of  law 
and  rights.  The relation  of  rights  to personality  is 
admirably stated.  In truth, our rights involve a parcel 
of our social worth, our honor.  Whoever violates our 
rights, attacks our worth, our honor. 
If  rights had not been accepted as isolated interests, 
as appears in the fourth volume of  the "Geist,"  Ihering 
would not have hit upon personality, and it would not 
have been possible for him to take the position that the 
assertion of  a right  is moral  self-assertion.  Ihering's 
theory regarding the struggle for rights has been assailed 
frequently, but if  certain exaggerations in the form of 
statement are laid aside, there is only one standpoint 
from which it  may be attacked consistently.  This is the 
Christian point  of  view,  in so far as it requires  that 
when our coat is taken away we shall also surrender to 
the taker our cloak.  Ihering's ethics, an  ethics of  asser- 
tion of life and will, does not harmonize with this de- 
mand;  but it does express the spirit which has created 
the law, and lives in it.  The energy with which rights 
''The  present writer has  already developed the legal philosophical 
ideas of this work, in part, in  various works.  But although Ihering 
have been familiar with the latest of  these writings, it is cer- 
tain that they did not have the slightest influence on him.  Ihering 
had to find his way always by his own efforts.  He therefore con- 
sistently carried behind his own flag his own equipment; the same, 
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maintain themselves against wrongs belongs to the same 
system of assertiveness in life  as that by which  law 
defends itself  against wrong.  The same human inter- 
ests are involved in both cases.  This brings us to the 
second proposition:  the solidarity of  law and rights. 
That this solidarity ever could  have been misunder- 
stood is curious.  Nevertheless,  a right detached from 
law, through which it gains expression, and derives its 
life  and  being,  is unthinkable.  The idea  that  there 
may be a penal  violation  of  a  right which  does not 
come in contact with law is absurd, and an  essential dis- 
tinction between pure (penal) civil wrongs and criminal 
wrongs  is  therefore  impossible.  For  this  reason  the 
functions of  civil protection in a certain degree coincide 
with  those  of  criminal protection, as Ihering correctly 
understood. 
What this same work says regarding the force element 
in  law  and the struggle in which  the law  is  formed, 
changed, and asserted, is beyond attack. 
Of  greater  importance  in relation  to Ihering's  final 
system of  thought than the "Kanlpf  ums Recht," is his 
"Zweck  im Recht."  This work grew out of  the labor 
on the "Geist"  and is its culminating point.  Here, the 
child slew its mother.  In his development of  the theory 
of  rights, the thought of  the dependence of  legal rules on 
social purposes seized him with such power, and brought 
about such a change in his general views, that it now 
appeared to  him to  be the chief problem of  his life to  give 
this idea adequate treatment in an independent work. 
He thought that he had found the principle from which 
all legal establishments take their origin, and by refer- 
ence to  which they may be understood.  He found the 
position of  that natural science of  law, which, from the 
beginning,  had been  in his mind as the object of  his 
labors.  Instantly, there arose a program of treatment, 
and  it  extended  to  colossal  proportions.  Extending 
beyond the limits of  a mere legal philosophy, it widened 
out as a ~roject  of  a phenomenology of  the whole ethical 
and social  world.  This work  was to demonstrate this 
entire domain as the creation of  human purpose,  and 
this creation itself, and its  products, were to  be set before 
the eyes of  the reader in the unified system of  social life. 
Ihering  distinguishes  the objects resting on egoistic 
(that is to  say physical, economic, and legal 
objects)  of  the individual from  those based  on social 
self-assertion.  The  latter correspond to  ethical objects  of 
individual  self-assertion.  This logical  classification  is 
adopted by Ihering as  the plan of a doctrine of  evolution. 
He seeks to show how "one object is connected with an- 
other, the higher to  the lower; and not simply connected, 
but  the one derived from the other as  a consequence of 
itself by the force of  necessity."  In the beginning, there 
is egoism.  This is "the mother, from which  everything 
issues, fructified by the force" of  historically determined 
conditions.  Serving itself, individual egoism transforms 
into social ends, and produces the material for the legal 
structure.  This is the organization of  social power con- 
trolled  by the State for these objects, that is to  say, for 
security of  the  shcial conditions of  life.  The  ethical spirit, 
which is characterized by the identity of individual ends 
with objects of  the community, makes its entrance then 
into this legal structure  for the purpose of setting  up  therein 
its dominion.  That which  is conformable to law, and 
what is ethical, therefore, are not contrary to  what con- 
forms to purpose.  They simply designate "the deepest 
and most permanent stratum of  a matured expediency 
ends in the social organization."  Furthermore, they 
are not an original endowment, not a "lex innata,"  but 
'he  product of an adjustment to definite social condi- 
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than a system  of  absolute  ends.  Every evolutionary 
stage of  society has its own objects, and accordingly its 
own fortune, and its own standards of  ethics;  and on 
each page turned over by the history of  humanity, there 
appears always the word  "verte."  The ends achieved 
admit of  new purposes;  the ethics attained changes to  a 
new ethical creed. 
The  ethical and legal philosophy of  Ihering with which 
we have todeal  is  that  of social utilitarianism.  This  utili- 
tarianism does not imply scepticism, or a destructive 
attitude toward the ethical law.  The theoretical utili- 
tarian is a practical idealist, and Ihering intends that his 
elucidation of ethical sources shall not diminish the power 
of  ethics but elevate it. 
This work did not gain the reception which 'lhering 
had hoped; especially not among professional specialists 
who failed to  see in it  either a juristic or a philosophical 
contribution.  This attitude of  the specialists,  led  by 
Windscheid,  caused  Ihering  to give  up the  further 
development of  this program, and to apply himself to 
labors of more direct interest to  jurists. 
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the 
"Zweck im Recht"  was without influence in the juristic 
world.  Its relation  to the general content of  modern 
thinking is too great to admit  that  belief.  Unfortu- 
nately, this  is true not only of  its merits,  but also of 
its defects.  The influence of  the demerits of  the work 
is easily  recognized  in  present-day  juristic  literature. 
Modern naturalism has also made its entrance in this 
field  and found a support in the "Zweck  im Recht." 
This work has lent to  naturalism the purpose idea, but 
employed in such a manner as  to  utilize not the strength 
of  Ihering's thesis but its weakness.' 
The present writer's "Festschrift" for Iherzng entitled "Vergelt- 
ungsidee und Zweckgedanke" deals with this point. 
~h~  hostile  judgment  of  the juristic  critic was not 
thought out.  There was neither a recognition 
of the importance of  this work of  Ihering's, nor was an 
accurate  account  given  of  its deficiencies.  Thus one 
could only see in this labor "a  loose construc- 
t;,,  of a clever idea"  (Nation), while, on the contrary, 
it exhibits a wonderful unity and cohesion in its arrange- 
ment of  thought.  Again,  the question  has been  put, 
"Where and when will all the things come to  pass that 
lhering  writes about?" and the answer is  given, that they 
have an existence only in Ihering's mind  (Dahn).  It 
might be replied, from Ihering's point of  view, that these 
things have happened  everywhere that law  and ethics 
have been developed.  His work was intended as  a com- 
pendium of  the history of  evolution, a summary, giving 
the typical examples of  its complete statement.  Such a 
program does not admit of  essential criticism.  National 
dissimilarity in laws does not alter the proposition, since 
this  diversity  does  not  exclude  a  common  element. 
Certain identical functions are universally essential to 
law, because  in these functions similar necessities  and 
similar mental powers are brought to  expression.  These 
agencies  have  everywhere  been  determinative  in  the 
creation of  the legal world, and it is Ihering's purpose to 
make conspicuous their creative reality.  Another ques- 
tion is presented, whether his delineation is universally 
applicable, and, in general, whether this work is suited 
to provide an insight into this creative history.  More 
favorable judgment has been rendered here on the philo- 
sophical side than on the juristic.  The  elegant and dis- 
tinguished  philosopher,  Eucken,  has  aptly  remarked 
that the important problem essayed by Ihering entered 
a new phase in this work.*  According to him, a new 
Series of ideas is constructed, new  groups of  facts are 
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brought  forward, and the questions involved  receive  a 
new  and more sharply defined form.  He promotes  a 
recognition of the importance of the essential value of 
the work and praises its execution. 
Comparing Ihering's performance with other utilitarian 
systems, we find as  its chief  characteristic the accentua- 
tion  of  the notion  of  society  and  social  purpose,  in 
agreement with certain fundamental trends of  modern 
science, and the energetic reduction of  legal and ethical 
problems to this basis.  This social utilitarianism is far 
superior to the purely  individualistic utilitarianism of 
Bentham  who was not able to explain  ethical motives 
as against egoistic impulses, or ethical  norms as such. 
Again, Ihering's central thought of  social utilitarianism 
had never before the "Zweck"  received such a powerful 
statement, and at  the same time, such a comprehensive 
representation founded on the materials adduced.  Iher- 
ing's work has been contrasted with Spencer's and rated 
above  it.  Whether  the  "Data  of  Ethics"  was  prior 
to Ihering's  work  I  do not  know,  but  the dominant 
thought  of  social  utilitarianism  was  not  treated  by 
Spencer with  the definition  and clearness of  Ihering's 
work.  There is apparent in Spencer's system a certain 
amount of  indetermination, and, as a result, a defect of 
treatment such as cannot be charged  against  Ihering: 
in  this,  that the opposition between  moral  conduct of 
individuals  (or  to use  the language  of  Ihering,  their 
ethical self-assertion) and their egoistic conduct  is not 
fully appraised.  In other respects both writers exhibit 
a  frequent harmony of  view.9 
At this day, this social  utilitarianism  has become  a 
mighty force in the domain of  science, to which  every 
Cf. "Data  of  Ethics,"  Secs.  4-6,  63.  There  is  a  difference 
between  them,  of  course,  with  reference  to the  question  of  the 
proper  scope of  State activity. 
discussion  turns,  which  would  be  more  than  a  mere 
working-o~er  of  details.  It derived from Ihering a sup- 
port not to be despised.  That Ihering was a man with 
only an imperfect  philosophical training does not alter 
the fact that it was a man of  such sense of  reality who 
has given us an inspired account of  this system as the 
product of his experiences  and labors. 
A  general estimate of  Ihering's philosophical  position 
would be out of  place here, but some additional  obser- 
vations  are necessary with respect  to special  phases of 
his system in order that my valuation of his performances 
may not be without critical value.  Anyway, my object 
is not to praise, but to characterize. 
A thought touches the relation of  individual person- 
ality to society in Ihering's system.  According to him, 
human beings enter the world  and begin  their lives as 
pure egoists.  From this foundation he derives a legally 
organized society which generates an ethical personality. 
Ethical personality is a later birth which takes possession 
of the legal system as a  completed  construction.  The 
world  of  law  cannot,  however,  be conceived  without 
ethical support, and it has nowhere been found without 
the co-operation  of  ethical  forces.  We thrive here  in 
a circle.  Ihering, the historian, has more correctly appre- 
hended the matter than Ihering, the dogmatist.  In this 
connection,  as well as in many others, it is possible to 
oppose his "Zweck" with his "Geist" (I,  118 seq., 263 seq. ; 
II761-4th edition).  Social impulses are  not the products, 
but  the conditions of  society;  they are not implanted 
in  individuals  in a disciplinary  world  of  legality  from 
without, but have developed  in the individual parallel 
with social organization, due to the reciprocal  influence 
between the individual and his s~rroundings.'~  Ihering 
''This  point was developed in detail in my "Vergeltunsidee  und 
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also does not make any explanation of  the initiative of 
individuals in the domain of  ethics.  And yet the inquiry 
of  the ancient systems of  ethics returns.  A new ethos 
has not been brought into the world within our reckoning 
of  time by society and its organs, but by a Christ. 
Another thought relates to  the position of  the purpose 
idea in Ihering.  His notion in general is that of  con- 
scious purposes, and thesocial objects to  which he attaches 
the law are  regarded as  the  associated ends of  individuals. 
It frequently  appears that the ideas of  purpose enter- 
tained at  the beginning evolve, and at the end do not 
reach adequate expression, or  perhaps are not realized 
at  all.  They set in motion forces which, under the inter- 
play of  new  agencies, bring  about  results  which  may 
be  far from the original  purpose.  Again, institutions 
generated by  definite ideas of  purpose may in the course 
of  time alter, and later be maintained  by an entirely 
different connection of thought than that which favored 
their existence.  Naturally,  all  this was  not unknown 
to Ihering;  but the method by which purpose officiates 
in  his  view  as an explanatory  principle,  conceals  the 
evolutionary historical meaning of  the matter and is a 
source of  a great deal of  misunderstanding."  Further 
a  variety  of  institutions find  their justification  in  the 
forum  of history -and  one thinks  here of  slavery - 
not  in the purpose  which  evoked  them, but in  their 
importance  for  an advancing  development of  cultural 
life.  Ihering here resorts to "objective purpose."  This 
objective  purpose  raises  a  number  of  questions which 
do not find  an exhaustive answer, and which in serious 
application would lead to modifications of  his system.12 
l1 See Wundt,  "Ethik,"  pp. 98, 103, 131. 
l2 An  approach  toward  certain  systems  combated  by  Iherzng 
would  be unavoidable.  The concept  of  society  (the sum of  indi- 
viduals) would  be different.  Teleological speculation, to which the 
~~*h~r  comment in this direction may be omitted, 
to give way only to the most fundamental philosophical 
and  juristic  objections  urged  against  Ihering's  theory 
of purpose.  These objections may be found in theories 
which regard  the development of  law  and morals with 
~~ib~it~  as the "progressive  disclosure and clarification 
of what from  the beginning has lain dormant as  an  eternal 
law in the unconscious  mentality  of  individuals";  an 
emergence, as it were,  of  a finished,  harmonious,  and 
valid system of concepts and principles in the conscious- 
ness of the race.  In the domain of  legal science, criticism 
is based on various forms of our juristic Scholasticism. 
The a  priori  method  of philosophy,  and Scholasticism 
in legal science, are internally  related, and may be con- 
tested from the same point of view.  Indeed, our Scholas- 
ticism, juristic logicality, or "jurisprudence of  concepts," 
has  its own  sources.  These sources are found  in  the 
technical problems of jurisprudence  as Ihering has ably 
described  them,  and  again  in the  inclinations  of  a 
concept-building reason  which  overvalues  its progeny, 
its concepts, and regards them as entities of  independent 
worth  having  their  own  existence  and a  predestined 
fruitfulness.  It  is  therefore  an  ineradicable  accom- 
paniment  of  our dogmatic system;  it is like a  smoke 
which  rises above and conceals  its fire.  If  one would 
seek, however,  for  a  philosophical  foundation of  this 
jurisprudence of concepts, resort would be had to  theories 
such as indicated; for it assumes a stationary, a prior;, 
and incontestable world of  ideas, in which the governing 
idea of objective purpose  belongs,  irresistibly compels the impres- 
"0"  that it is not the nature of individuals with which it deals, but 
thqrace;  that is to  say, society in an  entirely different sense than that 
regards it as the totality of its partsfor the time being.  This 
alteration in the notion of society, however, would involve an  advance 
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plumb-line  for the regulation  of a real  world  is to be 
found.  Only on this   remise can this world have anv 
meaning for the logicians  where at one time the pro- 
tection  of  definite  interests  is  inconceivable,  and  at 
another their  injury is conceptually  necessary;  again, 
where at one time they deduce distinctions and limita- 
tions from ideas,  and at another turn when they seek 
concepts which  properly  belong to definite words and 
names.  This  philosophy  and  this  Scholasticism  are 
scientifically  shattered by the evidence that law in  its 
essence, and not by way of  exception, here or there, but 
always and everywhere, has an alogical nature.  Ihering 
produced this proof in his "Zweck" by making prominent 
the reality  factors in law.  Yet, his  proof  requires  an 
addition.  This is furnished  by a consideration of  the 
compromise  character of  law,  and  the dependence  of 
this compromise on changing forces which mock at any 
derivation  credited  to concepts,  and do not admit of 
adequate expression in a system of  concepts.l3 
Ihering's opposition to  the concept system grew on him, 
and in the latter part of  his life he attacked this cultus 
with all the vehemence  of  his nature.  In his "Scherz 
und Ernst" he covered it with the biting acid of  derision. 
Ihering erroneously supposes it peculiar  to this system 
13The "Zweck  im Recht"  does not  deal  with  the compromise 
character  of  law.  Ihering  proceeds  generally  on the basis  of  a 
harmony of  the normal interests of  individuals which, as  assumed, 
does not exist.  According to him, the coincident purposes of  indi- 
viduals create social purpose which generates law.  The postulate 
of  a quiescent, logically unified system of  concepts which constantly 
and symmetrically embraces the world of  practical interests, would 
be consistent with this interpretation.  In the "Kampf  ums Recht," 
on the contrary, Ihering develops a position which shows  the compro- 
mise  nature of  law.  See my "Recht  und  Macht"  in Schmoller's 
"Jahrbuch  fiir  Gesetzgebung,  Verwaltung,  und  Volkswirtschaft," 
v. 1 seq.; v. Holtzendorff's "Enzyklopadie der  Rechtswissenschaft," 
5th ed., p.  16 seq.;  and cf. my "Juristische  Enzyklopadie,"  Sec. 40. 
to deal with Romanistic literature, while in fact it  makes 
its home in all departments of legal science.  The formal 
trend  in  law-and  it is here  in question,-  flourishes 
as well  in criminal law  and public  law  as among the 
Romanists.  Ihering, therefore, is wrong  in attributing 
it to Savigny and Puchta.  They seem  to him  to be 
the leaders of  the Muses who direct the dance from the 
heights.  He is not disinclined to relegate them and the 
majority  of their followers to a conceptual heaven, or 
rather, a conceptual pit. 
Laying aside the extravagances of  the work last men- 
tioned, the later works of Ihering, as against his earlier 
labors, exhibit in a form more and more sharply defined 
that  which  will  be  permanent  in  him;  namely,  the 
realistic aspect of  legal thinking applied  to the ends of 
practical life and governed by the forces which set these 
objects in motion and create the institutions of  society. 
If  a  further  comparison  with  Savigny may  be per- 
mitted,  I  would  say that Savigny's historical position 
was  a  more  favorable  one  than  Ihering's.  Savigny's 
labors are the central point of  a new experience in the 
world of  Romanism in the first half of  his century, and 
had  an application  in  all directions;  while  the same 
fortunate situation did not befall  the investigations of 
Ihering.  Again, Ihering's work has a universal relation 
to the great problem of  the mental sciences -  mankind, 
an understanding of  its conditions, and the laws of its 
own  conduct.  The value of  his work  in dealing with 
this problem is for the future to determine. APPENDIX  I1 
FINALITY IN THE LAW1 
Sec.  1.  Ihering's  law  as  a  means  to  an  end.  The 
celebrated  jurist  and  historian,  Ihering,  deserves  a 
special  place  with  reference  to the Historical  School. 
He not only renewed the attack on the views of  Savigny 
and  his leading  disciples,  amplifying criticism  of  this 
school with the rich colors of  his imagination and style; 
but he constructed upon ideas of  his own, and after a 
different  interpretation  of  the evolution  and  facts  of 
history, a complete system of  Philosophy of  Law.  In 
this system, he sets up, over against the too idealistic 
concept  of  unconscious  development  of  the  juridical 
order proceeding  from the hidden forces residing in the 
character  of the people, a theory not less exclusive,- 
absolute finality, and a development of  law always con- 
scious of  objective ends which it is called upon to  reali~e.~ 
The text translated is pp. 44-81  of  "~'fivolution  du Droit et la 
Conscience  Sociale"  so art  second), third revised  and enlarged edi- 
tion, in "RibliothPque  de Philosophie  Contemporaine,"  Paris (Fklix 
Alcan, 1911). 
The translation  is  by  Albert  Kocourek,  Lecturer  on  Jurispru- 
dence  in  Northwestern  University,  and  member  of  the  Editorial 
Committee. 
President of  the Court of  Cassation of  France. 
Ihering is especially known in France on account of  his "Geist 
des  Rbmischen  Rechts auf  den verschiedenen Stufen  seiner  Ent- 
wickelung,"  translated into French as, "L'Esprit  du droit romain," 
2d  ed.,  Paris,  1880;  his  "Kampf  urns  Recht,"  translated  as "Le 
Combat pour le Droit,"  Paris, 1875; and his miscellaneous writings 
published by his  faithful  and learned translator, M. de  Meulenaere, 
under the title, "Etudes  Compl&mentaires de L'Esprit  du  Droit 
Remain."  See particularly, in the last work,"  Du Role de la Volont6 456  APPENDIX  I1  TANON  457 
Ihering asserts at  the beginning of  this work the prin- 
ciple of finality, which he applies, in this volume, to  the 
law, and in the second volume,4 to morals.  This inver- 
sion of the natural order of  treatment, in a system which 
assigns one and the same principle to morals and law, 
has introduced some confusion in his book, numerous 
repetitions, and  certain contradictions.  This  resultsfrom 
the method adopted by the author in composing this 
work, and in pursuing his subject progressively in the 
course of  publication. 
The object is the governing principle of  the law; there 
is no rule of  law which does not owe its origin to a prac- 
tical motive, to an end.  A douhle law governs the sen- 
sible world:  the law of  causality for inanimate beings; 
dans la Possession," A. Maresq, 1896.  The first volume of  Ihering's 
"Der  Zweck im Recht," Leipzig, 1877-1883,  2 vols., (2d ed., 1884- 
1886), has been translated under the misleading title, "~'fivolution 
dans  le  Droit,"  A.  Maresq,  1901.  This  work  at once  became 
famous.  It was briefly reviewed by M. Durkheim (Reuz~e  Philoso- 
phique, 2 sem., 1897), and afterwards by M.  Agtlilkra in his book, 
"L'Idke  du  Droit en Allemagne depuis  Kant jusqu'8  nos  Jours," 
raris (F. Alcan), 1893, p.  220 seq.  It has also been the subject of 
an interesting analysis by  M. Bougli  in a study on "Les  Sciences 
Sociales en Allemagne,"  Paris (F. Alcan),  1896.  See, among the 
critical studies of  this work in Germany, the book of  Felix Dahn, 
"Die  Vernunft  im  Rccht,  Grundlagen  der  Rechtsphilosophie," 
Berlin, 1879, which contains, as  the title indicates, the personal view 
of  the author on the Philosophy of Law.  [See also the able account 
of  Professor  Munroe  Smith  of  Columbia  University  in  Polifical 
Science Quarterly, xii, 21, -  Tr.1.  M. de Meulenaere has also trans- 
lated  one  of  Ihering's  posthumous works,  "Vorgeschichte  der In- 
doeuropiier," under the  title, "Les Indo-Europkensavant L'Histoire," 
Paris, 1895.  He also translated another posthumous work which is 
only the beginning of a  "Histoire de ~'fivolution  du Droit ~omain" 
("Ent~ickelun~sgeschichte  des Romischen Rechts-Einleitung  und 
Verfassung des Romischen Hauses," Leipzig, 1894), which  IIcering 
had engaged to write for a project of  Binding's, and of  which he com- 
posed only the introduction and some chapters relative to the Roman 
household. 
[Not translated in this series.] 
the law of  finality for animate creatures.  Nothing hap- 
pens in the world without a cause.  An impulse of  will 
without  cause  is  as inconceivable  as a  movement  of 
matter  without  cause.  The  only  difference  is,  that 
cause  is mechanical  in  the material  world,  while  in 
will  it  is  psychological.  For  the  will,  the  cause  is 
final -  it is the end. 
The most general end of  law is a guaranty of  the con- 
ditions of  social life by the coercive power of  the State. 
TIlese  conditions  may  be  divided  into  three  classes: 
extra-juridical,  mixed,  and  juridical.  Extra-juridical 
conditions are those which  impose on man the natural 
surroundings in which he lives; the law has no power over 
these  conditions;  it operates  only  on  man  and  his 
efforts.  Mixed conditions concern the maintenance and 
conservation  of  society,  and its normal  development, 
by the organization of  labor, commerce, and industry; 
the law ought only exceptionally to  come to  the assistance 
of  the natural activities which minister to these various 
objects.  Juridical conditions are those whose guaranty 
society assigns exclusively to  the law. 
When it is said that the law guarantees the conditions 
of social life, it is not by that to be understood  that it 
ought to  regulate them so  as  to  apply to  a11 of  them with- 
out distinction the sanctions which  it provides.  The 
law relates only  to juridical  conditions,  This concept 
of purpose in the law and its  adaptation to  the conditions 
of life, taken in its wide generality, leaves little open for 
criticism, and is perhaps accepted by all those who seek 
to establish the juridical order on a positive basis.  But 
it  has received in the second volume of this work (devoted 
more especially to morals), and in later writings of the 
author,  enlargements which  demand extended  reserva- 
tions.  'These  reservations  principally  apply  to  the 
philosophical generalizations of  the author touching the 458  APPENDIX  I1 
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generative forces of  morals and law, and regarding exter- 
nal  causality.  In this external  causality  Ihering,  at 
the last, thinks that he has found a complete explanation 
of the creative impulses of  law and morals, and from it 
he derives the evolution of  the whole of  social life.  ~t 
seems that the bearings of  Ihering's doctrine were not 
always v ell understood by him, and one is able to point 
out in the elaboration which he makes in the progress 
of his work  a considerable number of  variations.  The 
position of  tlLe  author, manifestly, has had a course of 
development, and has been subject to modification and 
transformation since his "Spirit of  Rorrian Law," and up 
to the time of  his last work.  The progressive advance 
of  his thought may already be noted in the twovolumes 
of  which the present work is a part, published six years 
apart, and, later, in a more marked fashion in the writ- 
ings which followed.  Whilst he distinguishes clearly in 
the first volume (the present work) between material and 
ideal conditions of  life, and appears to  recognize in human 
naturea duality consistingof egoistic instincts and moral 
and disinterested motives,  yet in the second volume he 
lays stress throughout  upon  the egoistic  forces, from 
which  he derives all others.  In his later writings  he 
emphasizes sovereign action in evolution, the material 
conditions of  life,  and external causality from  which, 
in the last analysis, he deduces all the elements of  social 
life. 
M. Neukamp in his  "Introduction  B L'Histoire  de 
~'~volution  du Droit," thinks that in this connection he 
has  discovered  an inconsistency  in  the  last  work  of 
Ihering on the evolution of  Roman law.  He observes 
that in different passages of  this work, the author seems 
now to admit a double causality, internal and external, 
and then to  hold to  external causality alone.  In a begin- 
ning  passage,  Ihering  recognizes  two kinds of  efficient 
,-,uses  in the creation of law:  first, internal impulses, 
the character of  the people,  their habits of  feeling and 
thipking,  their degree  of  culture in a given  age;  and 
second, external impulses proceeding from the econoric, 
political, and social conditions of  the same people in the 
same age.  In other places, on the contrary, he asserts 
that the object of  the science of  law is to replace, every- 
where, the point of view of internal spontaneity by exter- 
nal causality; and, as the special purpose of  his book, 
he destroys the prevalent  theory in the history of  law, 
according to which,  evolution moves from within out- 
wardly, by substituting the contrary idea of  an external 
force of  the world exercised on the law. 
This contradiction  is not simply apparent.  Ihering 
fully recognizes in history the existence of  two kinds of 
phenomena,  internal  and  external,  which  appear  to 
exercise, concurrently, an influence upon the law, in the 
course of  its evolution.  But,  for  him,  that is only  a 
matter of  appearance; it  is  not the substance of  the thing. 
Internal phenomena, such as  the character of  the people, 
their habits of  thinking and feeling, which he still regarded 
in his "Spirit of  Roman Law"  as established facts, as an 
ultimate  principle  of  explanation,  resolve  themselves 
purely  and  simply  by  a  final  analysis, into  external 
phenomena from which they spring.  A part of  his other 
book, the "Indo-Europbens avant L'Histoire,"  wherein 
he discusses the Aryans, their migration, and the Baby- 
lonian civilization, is devoted to the illustration of  this 
thesis.  We  are  not  able  here  to enter on a detailed 
examination of  the effort to  reconstruct an ante-historical 
past, or the bold  hypotheses upon which he relies.  In 
that book one may read the ingenious and brilliant dis- 
closures in which the author has ferreted out the entire 
civilization  from  a  habitat,  the soil,  the 
Proximity of the sea, and the manufacture of  brick and 
the building  of ships. APPENDIX  I1 
That  work shows the same ultra-positivistic tendencies 
of  Ihering which  one remarks in the second volume of 
the present work, with its determination of  motives of 
human conduct, and the final unity to  which he restores 
them  all.  He finds this unity  in  mere egoism.  One 
may believe, if  he restricts himself to  the present volume, 
that Ihering admits, alongside of  egoism, another senti- 
ment equally natural and coexistent with it -  the feeling 
of disinterestedness, detachment from the self, or under 
its most usual modern name, altruism.  But we see, in 
the second volume, that there this is not Ihering's real 
thought.  Egoism  is proclaimed  as the sole  primitive 
and natural sentiment, and it is from this feeling that 
social life has derived all the others, different in appear- 
ance,  but  yet  rigorously  connected.  Hard  and  bare 
in  the man  of  nature,  transformed in  civilized  man, 
purified  and especially elevated  in the social  body,  it 
remains always egoism, fundamental, and primitive. 
Ihering develops this idea in all its forms and with a 
character more and more absolute in his later writings. 
Nature has  implanted egoism in the  heart of  man; history 
alone has drawn from him the moral sense and the feeling 
of  justice.  The egoist  is the product  of  nature;  the 
man of  morals is the product of society.  Morals is only 
egoism in its highest form; it is a repetition of  the same 
thought  raised  to a  higher  degree  of  development. 
According  to a formula which  he delights to repeat, it 
is not the sentiment of justice which has created the law, 
but the law has created the feeling of  justice.  The  law, 
like everything in the moral world, is a pure creation 
of  man "in which nature has not had the smallest part." 
Merkel, in apt terms, pointed out Ihering's error on 
this point, in his philosophical introduction to  the science 
of  law in Holtzendorff's "Enzyklopadie."  An improved 
utilitarianism such as he finds in Ihering, John Stuart 
 ill,  Leslie  Stephen,  and others,  does  not grant  the 
\,slue to man which belongs to him;  and denies to him 
part in the origin  of  the moral  sentiments which 
are found in him in all stages of  his development.  We 
have within us instincts and inclinations which find their 
root in the nature of  man and the peculiar organization 
of the individual.  The mind of  a  child  is not a blank 
page upon which any content may be inscribed, and to 
which  nothing  is added.  Man is a  product of  society 
only in the sense that an oak is the product of  the soil 
where  it takes root, and which, coming from an oak, is 
only able to grow into an oak.  There are  ethical forces 
wfiich are coexistent with egoistic inclinations, in human 
nature;  and both develop in varying degrees under the 
influence  of  social  conditions.  Goodness  of  heart  is 
not  a  consequence  of  social influence  in any different 
sense  than  hardness of  heart.  The notion  that man 
comes into the world an  absolute egoist, and that society 
causes to  spring up, as  by enchantment, from his egoism, 
all the moral forces of  which he has need  to attain his 
social ends, is as arbitrary as that which  makes of  the 
individual, marching in the ranks of  society, an autom- 
aton susceptible of  being changed  in any degree what- 
soever at  the will of  social interests. 
To show  the untenable character of  such beliefs, it 
suffices to consider maternal love, which on one hand is 
an  essential  element  of  ethical  humanity, and  which 
there discovers itself as  one of  the forces of nature;  and 
which, on  the other  hand, equally shows that it is in 
a high  degree a  power  in  the animal kingdom.  The 
instincts  corresponding  to our  moral  feelings  are,  in 
general, represented in various ways in the animal world, 
where, nevertheless, they cannot be regarded as an arti- 
ficial product of education, or explained  finally by the 
of the individual with reference to his well- 
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the assertion of  a dogmatism  which  closes its eyes to 
the facts, that the organization of human nature in this 
regard is less favorable than that of animals, and that 
what in the one arises by natural inclination develops 
in the other only artificially.  Man is sociable by nature; 
he is not such solely by virtue of social institutions.  His 
experiences rest, from the beginning of life,  at  once upon 
egoistic instincts, and upon different forces which con- 
tribute to  the formation of  a definite, ethical ideal, and 
which are  not solely the echo of a social imperative. 
In the third edition, recently pubished, of  the same 
"Enzyklopadie,"  the  new  editor,  Kohler,  estimates 
Ihering's  concepts on this position,  in the same way. 
They are, says he, contradicted by the elementary facts 
of  history.  We find  altruistic sentiments in  man, no 
matter how far we go back into the past.  The love of 
children  and  hospitality  are  more  ancient  than  the 
institution  of  property.  The author  likewise  affirms 
that social  instincts,  doubtless more elementary, have 
nevertheless a  large part in the origin of  societies, and 
that it is only later that the egoism of  the individual 
takes  on  its  full  extension.  Ihering's  interpretation 
of  the historical facts regarding moral institutions is a 
perversion  of  the truth.5 
Ribot,  in  his  very  acute  work,  "Psychologie  des 
Sentiments," in  like manner rejects  the theory which 
makes altruism a simple product of  a transformed ego- 
ism.  He  shows  that  the  altruistic  instinct  is  itself 
natural  and primitive;  that it is the same of  moral 
feeling which  is  derived  from  it;  that this sentiment 
R.  von  Holtzendorff,  "Enzyklopadie  der  Rechtswissenschaft"; 
Merkel, 5th ed., p.  87;  and  Kohler, 6th ed., 1902, p.  13.  See, on 
utilitarian morals, Guyau,  "La Moral Anglaise Contemporaine";  and 
Fouillbe, "L'  Idte Moderne du Droit";  also the important work of 
Wz~ndt,  "Ethics," 3d ed., 1903, vol.  I, p. 484, and vol. 11,  p. 9 seq. 
does not in its origin spring from an idea, from a judg- 
ment;  that basically  it belongs  not to the intellectual 
but the motor order, movement or arrest of  movement, 
instinctive tendency to act or not to  act.  It  is, in this 
sense, innate; and, in a word, is not fashioned according 
to an assumed, invariable archetype, illuminating every- 
thing  and always  from  which  the moral  ideas,  them- 
selves innate and completely formed, arise; but is of  the 
same nature as  hunger and thirst and other fundamental 
feelings.  M. Ribot, like Merkel, gives as the strongest 
proof of the innateness of  altruistic feelings, the affec- 
tion, the attachment which is found also in the animal 
world, and which  cannot be attributed  to calculation 
and interested prevision, and which appears to  establish 
the original character of  these forces without questi0n.O 
Ihering,  again, at another  point of  view  pushes his 
theory  to extreme consequences  in  his  perversion  of 
absolute finality, which, for him, shows in all the periods 
of  social life, even the most primitive, a conscious process 
in  morals  and law.  He is in  disagreement  here with 
adversaries, also, of  the Historical  School, who gener- 
ally recognize the unconscious growth of law in its earliest 
customary period.  The  same is  true with reference to  the 
philosophers most occupied with the methods of  positive 
science. 
M. Ribot, whose work we have cited, remarks that it 
is necessary to  distinguish two distinct periods in moral 
development.  The first is instinctive, spontaneous, and 
unconscious;  it is determined  by  the  conditions  of 
existence  of  the group  expressed  by  customs,  and  a 
diversity of  beliefs and acts, moral, immoral, amorous, 
trifling.  The second  period  is conscious and reflective 
'Ribot, "La  Psychologie  des  Sentiments,"  pp.  234,  286,  Paris, 
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in  the multiple  aspects as well as the superior forms 
of social life, and expresses itself in institutions, written 
laws, civil and religious codes, and chiefly in the abstract 
speculations of  moralists and philosophers.  The learned 
builders  of  moral  systems have usually  disdained  the 
first period;  but  this  is a  mistake, because  it is  the 
source.' 
Conscious finality, whatever may be its proper scope, 
and  although  its  importance  increases  progressively 
with  the periods of  advancing civilization, is not suffi- 
cient to give a complete explanation  of  social life, and 
of  all  the rules  of  morals and law.  This criticism  of 
Ihering  on two points, of  which  the  first  is of  great 
importance for morals, but of much less interest for the 
law, ought not to obstruct our appreciation  of  all the 
value of  this work in which this great jurist points'out, 
better than had ever before been done, the true objec- 
tive purpose  of  the law.  Kohler,  in this connection, 
does not render to Ihering the justice which is due.  He 
does not properly limit his criticism to  his theory of  moral 
sentiments.  He estimates with great severity, and, in 
our view, with much injustice, this whole effort, which 
Ihering valued well above his "Esprit du Droit Romain," 
and which constituted in Ihering's opinion the ultimate 
expression  of  his  scientific  elaboration  of  the  law.8 
Kohler does not recognize any other philosophy of  law 
'  Eod. op. p.  284. 
Cf.  in the preface of  the translation  of  M. de  Meulenaere,  ex- 
tracts from letters written by Ihering  April 3, 1883, "This  work, 
and  not the 'Espr~t  du  Droit Romain,' sums up  the  results of  my  entire 
scientific labor.  This will not be understood until this work is  corn- 
pleted;  [the preface to the first  edition of  the second  volume is 
dated, Aug. 22,18831.  In  my  judgment the 'Esprit du Droit Romain' 
is only a preparatory work;  but it  was necessary to  write the 'Esprit' 
to  be able to  engage in  this study, the elaboration of  which achiev- 
my highest scientific aspiration." 
than that of  Hegel, and condemns any system unpro- 
vided  with  a metaphysical  basis.9  We cannot under- 
take here a discussion of  the philosophy of  Hegel, which 
is on the whole justly abandoned, even in Germany, by 
contemporary thought."  Icohler's reproach of  Ihering, 
that he has not fortified  his system with n~etaphysics, 
upon a view which we are not able to  share, as 
to the value of  a transcendental principle of  law in the 
domain of  science.  No doubt it is allowable to  moralists 
and philosopher-jurists who desire to  introduce a certain 
unity into their concepts of  the world  and of life, to 
connect  their theories with some elevated metaphysical 
p-inciple.  But, at that moment, they leave the high- 
way  of  observation and science;  and they are not able 
to find in such a principle any tangible help in working 
out the concrete rules of  morals and law. 
Sec.  2.  Finalistic  and  utilitarian  theories  and  their 
opposition.  If, besides following  Ihering on this point, 
the  current  utilitarian  theories  exaggerate the role  of 
conscious  finality  in primitive  periods  of  the develop- 
ment  of  morals and law, a  new  school, by a contrary 
theory, is straining itself  in these latter years to banish 
this notion entirely from these two domains.  The utili- 
tarian and teleological systems have not been combated 
long except in the name of  idealism.  Their supporters 
were regarded  as the representatives of  science against 
Kohler, loc. cit : "When  one descends from the elevation of  the 
philosophy  of  Hegel  to the system of  a  Krause, an Ahrens,  or a 
Roder,  it is Iike  passing  from a  magnificent  palace  to the small 
cottage of a commoner;  and when one arrives at Ihering, the im- 
Pression  is that of  descending to a  room filled  with poor  people. 
Ihering's whole work is built upon the sand, it has no philosophical 
fourldation and its metaphysics is much like that of  a Fris~an  shep- 
herd.  The picture is not,  overdrawn;  it is diminished rather, and 
outlined." 
lo [This statement will require re-writing in the next edition of this 
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philosophical  speculation, of  the facts given  by experi- 
ence against abstract reason. 
Latterly a new  school has risen  in opposition, under 
the name of  science itself.  The  desire to  exclude finality 
from sociology, morals, and law appears under a scien- 
tific  impulse.  But  the  discussions  which  have  been 
raised on this subject exhibit a certain amount of  con- 
fusion.  After  having with  reason  rejected  finality  in 
the natural sciences, and justly criticised the abuse which 
has been  made of  teleological  ex~lanations  of  natural 
phenomena, nevertheless finality should not be excluded 
from  its proper  sphere,  where  it manifests  itself  by 
irresistible evidence -  that of  voluntary and conscious 
human acts.  Yet this is what some writers, and even 
including sociologists and moralists, appear to  do.  These 
writers desire to proscribe finality in all departments of 
science.  They attack all the finalist concepts with such 
vigor that one would say that they desire to  exzlude even 
voluntary  and  conscious  human  action as indifferent, 
idle, and lacking all value. 
There is here an  equivocation which it is necessary to 
dissipate.  It arises from a distinction,  correct in the 
main,  which  these authors make between  science  and 
art, but which  must  not  be  unduly  extended  when 
treating the moral and political  sciences.  Science, it is 
said, is knowledge of  what is; art is knowledge of  what 
ought  to be.  The science of  morals  investigates  the 
reality of  morals and customs in the present and in the 
past.  This  reality ought itself to  be studied in construct- 
ing abstractions of  any finality.  This entirely scientific 
inquiry has for its object the discovery of  the laws which 
govern the social world.  It  will be a long and difficult 
study.  It  will give, nevertheless, when it shall be fully 
developed, some laws which will permit the anticipation 
of  social phenomena:  it will in a certain measure pro- 
vide  man  with  the  most  suitable  means  of  securely 
realizing his ends; and, therefore, will substitute for an 
method  a  rational  art based on  the simple 
facts  of experience.  But  these results, however imperfect 
they  may  be, will  not  be attained  except  in a very 
remote future which we are not yet able to  foretell.ll 
This distinction is applied to the law.  The science of 
law is knowledge of  what is, or has been, in other words 
the whole  of  juridical  reality,  made  up of  customary 
law  and  legislation,  of  the  present  and in  the  past. 
Legislation, which is improperly called a science, is only 
an art.  Only  the discovery of  the laws of  the social 
world  will  provide the means to pursue and attain its 
true objects and will give it the fixed bases which it now 
lacks. 
These writers, however, do  not explain what should be 
the method of  proceeding in the discovery of  these sup- 
posed laws, so necessary to know, and yet so  remote and 
difficult of  establishment.  They appear  to be  almost 
wholly  indifferent  to the matter.  Life will develop its 
course empirically, and we may say as it is able.  The 
simple statement of  this thesis discloses its extravagance. 
This assimilation between  supposed  social laws which 
are yet to be discovered, for the greater part, and of  the 
rest  of  which  none  is admitted  without dispute, and 
natural  laws, is evidence of  an exaggerated  scientific 
''See,  especially,Ltuy-Bruhl, "La Morale et la Science des Moeurs," 
(F. Alcan, 1903).  In this able essay which contains a learned and 
profound analysis of empirical moral reality, the author maintains 
that there can be no science of morals, but only a rcience of CUS- 
toms, and a rational moral art, which does not yet exist, and which 
this science alone will be able to  discover, independently of all social 
Purposes and ideas.  This proposition  has already, often and suffi- 
ciently, been refuted.  See Fouzllte, "El6ments  Sociologiques de la 
Moraleu (F. Alcan, 1903), p. 252 seq.;  Ch. Belot, "Etudes de Morale 
Positive," p.  112 seq. (F. Alan); and quite recently, E. Faguet, "La 
Dbmission de la Morale,"  Paris, 1910, p.  115 seq. APPENDIX  11  TANON  469 
optimism which misconceives the nature of  things, and 
confuses  two  distinct  worlds -  the sciences properly 
so  called,  and  the  political  and  moral  sciences.  We 
find  here  a  legacy  of the philosophy  of  Comte,  which 
regarded  knowledge  of  these  laws as highly  advanced 
upon  the mere  appearance of  his philosophical system, 
and which believed that it saw in this system a valuable 
instrument  ready  to forecast the course of  social phe- 
nomena.  We know that this hope of  Comte has been 
shattered. 
Whatever  social  laws  we  may  be  able  to discover 
will  always be marked  by a  character  of  contingency 
much  greater  than in the case of other scientific laws, 
such  as the laws of  the natural sciences, regardless  of 
the degree of  our learning.  This results from the infinite 
complexity of  the elements which the investigator must 
take into account, and which he is only able to encom- 
pass in their  entirety, under  great difficulty,  with  any 
degree of assurance.  It  is not without a certain abuse of 
language,  that  learned  sociologists  speak  so glibly  of 
true  sociological  laws,  with  such  imperfect  means 
of  their  establishment;  when in  the sciences properly 
so called, we find that experimental laws better sustained 
carry  certain  hypothetical  qualifications.  But  even 
though knowledge of what is shall be established  in soci- 
ology,  morals,  and  law,  which  is  the most  important 
object of scientific investigation, still it will be improper 
to maintain in these departments of  learning, a separa- 
tion so absolute between  science and art. 
A large part of  social reality is composed of  voluntary 
and conscious human acts, and it is not possible even in 
the bare study of  this reality to exclude all consideraticn 
of finality.  It  is, no doubt, dangerous and erroneous to 
attribute to institutions  the  purposes  which  we  con- 
ceive for them and the objects which they serve today, 
in discovering the causes of  their original establishment. 
~ut  it is not less useful and indispensable for our com- 
plete understanding of  this reality to know, in addition 
to the actual objects of  institutions, the motives which 
gave them birth. 
To diminish  the practical value of  all finalistic con- 
cepts, it is objected that the object sought in individual 
or social acts is frequently imperfect, and that the choice 
and  selection  of  the means of  action are much  more 
important  for  conduct  than  the end  to be  attained. 
Experience incontestably proves that an end pursued is 
often defective, and that acts carried out for a definite 
purpose and with a view of  a certain effect, may produce 
an entirely  different, and  even  contrary, result.  But 
though, by force of  the complexity of  our acts, and the 
reactions which  they exercise  the one upon  the other, 
and also because of  the infirmity of  human foresight, our 
acts never  attain  the purposes  at which  they aim, it 
does not follow that better results would be accomplished 
by purposeless action.  Otherwise, the most incoherent 
life would be the most reasonable.  The best means for 
obtaining  an individual  or  social  existence  with  the 
greatest possible coherence, is to have a clear view of  its 
ends.  Change from an unconscious to a conscious stage 
in society is one of the certain characteristics of  evolu- 
tion and progress. 
Another  fact  well  recognized  is  opposed  against 
finalism.  It is that of  institutions  established  for  a 
certain purpose, serving afterwards other objects which 
are substituted for the first.  This is what is called the 
heterogeneity  or metamorphosis of  ends.  This substi- 
tution  of  objects  proves nothing against  finalism.  It 
simply  demonstrates the extreme  ~lasticity  of  human 
institutions.  It shows  that  man  is  always  strongly 
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adapt his old institutions to new ends in place of  invent- 
ing  others.  This  phenomenon  explains and  justifies 
itself all the more by this, that such an adaptation which, 
perhaps, may not be more imperfect than a newly created 
institution, has nevertheless the advantage of  disturbing 
in the least  possible manner continuity with  the  past, 
and  renders  unnecessary  a  general  readjustment of 
settled conditions, which the invention of  a new institu- 
tion requires.  It has been observed that frequently the 
best method of introducing and perpetuating a reform is 
to adapt it, as far as possible, to the conditions already 
established, by allowing to remain all that may be pre- 
served of the older  situation.  Old  institutions,  there- 
fore,  may  be  maintained  alongside  of  new  purposes, 
but on condition that they adapt themselves in a more or 
less complete fashion to these objects.  If  this adapta- 
tion is impossible, or if its ends have failed, then  the 
institution falls; it becomes a mere survival, and finally 
disappears. 
Another  objection  from  a  more  general  and funda- 
mental  standpoint  has  been  leveled  against  finalism, 
especially in recent years.  It  is asserted, that in reality, 
ends do not determine even our conscious and voluntary 
acts;  that the end  projected  is only a sort of  epiphe- 
nomenon which is not able to exert the slightest influence 
on the natural course of  things.12  No doubt it is true 
that the immediate  objects of  our acts are not  their 
primary causes, and that these acts are determined by 
a  complex series of  phenomena  of  which  a  large  part 
escapes our observation, and the succession of  which is 
Post  to our  view.  But,  even  though  these  objects, 
proceeding  through  an  infinite  series of  antecedent 
l2 See Le Dantec  ("Le  Conflit," Paris,  1901;  and "Les  Influences 
Ancestrales," Paris,  1905) who drives this theory to  extreme conse- 
quences. 
phenomena, generators of a given act, lose themselves in 
an hypothetical, universal, mechanical process of  which 
our  understanding  doubtless only attains an imperfect 
notion, their consideration is not in less degree of  capital 
importance for practical matters, since they are incon- 
testably the most proximate conditions of  our acts.  To 
say  that these pretended  epiphenomena,  because  they 
accompany necessarily conscious and voluntary acts, do 
not have any influence upon  the course of  things, and 
that everything would  happen  in the same manner  as 
if they did not exist, appears to  us as  nonsense, even from 
the standpoint of  universal determinism. 
Finality  cannot  be  ignored  in  the study  of  social 
phenomena.  These phenomena may always be studied 
under the two different aspects of  finality and causality. 
These  two principles are not mutually  exclusive-one 
presupposes  the other.  Application  of  finality  is not 
possible except on condition of  the validity and simul- 
taneous  application of  causality.13  Yet  Ihering's  con- 
fusion  must be avoided, of  classifying physical  cause 
and purpose, which he calls the psychological cause, as 
of  the same order.  Representation of  purpose does not 
necessitate action in the same way that a natural cause 
requires a certain effect.  The act may not be performed ; 
it may  perhaps  be  stayed.  If  executed, the act may 
not  accomplish the object  projected, or it may result 
in  a  different end.  Finally, many  different  acts may 
be imagined which are effective  to realize the same end. 
If these contingencies make the teleological method less 
secure than the causal approach, yet they do not deprive 
it of its utility.  The nature of  the phenomena  to be 
studied and the sciences or arts under investigation will 
determine the employment of the one or  the other of 
these  methods,  according  as their  application  will  be 
la Wundt, "Logik";  "der Zweck," p. 642 seq. APPENDIX  I1  TANON  473 
more or less difficult, or more or less effective, for solving 
the practical  problems of  social life. 
Finality manifests itself especially and with irresistible 
force in the law.  There is no law, important or unim- 
portant, whether it concerns the fundamental organiza- 
tion of  the State, the interests of the general community, 
or dispositions supporting the most trifling advantages, 
which  has not been inspired by a purpose, or which  is 
not justified  by an end.  Any judgment which may be 
supported regarding it, its expediency,  its validity, or 
its character as harmful or inopportune, is, above all, 
a  teleological  judgment.  That which  is discussed  in 
the  deliberations  preceding  its  promulgation,  is  the 
effect which  it will produce. 
It  is not otherwise in the political sphere.  All parties 
invoke public welfare as the most general object of  their 
activity.  This, at any rate, is the mark with which 
they cover and conceal even  their most self-interested 
intentions.  A11  political rCgimes, whether monarchical, 
oligarchical, or democratic, and all systems of  govern- 
ment, may invoke other principles, but they lay stress 
in the highest degree, for justification of  their acts, upon 
their objects and rhe benefits which they diffuse among 
individuals  and  the  community.  Political  eloquence 
itself is more and more throwing over abstract principles, 
fine language, and verbal idols.  It still employs these 
devices, no doubt, like a military standard, to lead the 
multitude and to arouse popular  passion.  In reality, 
however, it is ends and concrete objects which are the 
material of  discussion and of  which account is taken for 
the purpose  of  obtaining  enlightened  judgment  upon 
all those things which should be the subject of  thoughtful 
deliberation. 
Sec. 3.  Latent  Finality.  The several systems which 
appear  to base  law  upon  religious,  mataphysical,  or 
ideological  and  a  priori  foundations do not, however 
exclude all finality.  Finality is not entirely inconsistent 
with theological principles.  As it is impossible to con- 
nect  all rules  of  law  with commandments claiming an 
origin in divine authority, consideration may be taken, 
contradiction of  the theories of  these systems, 
of concrete ends of  life, for the purpose of  establishing 
the  varied  and  complex  residuum  of  juridical  pre- 
scriptions.  Purpose here is not simply secondary; it is 
necessary always that these prescriptions should be in 
accord with revealed truth, or what is regarded as  such. 
In a word, the law, in this  regard, isdependent on theology. 
This dependence may be much  or little, according to 
the theological views of  the writer in question; it exists 
nonethe less of  necessity, and it is precisely on this point 
that the essential character is seen which  distinguishes 
these systems from all others. 
Finality is capable of  harmonizing,  and quite easily 
too, with the social contract theories.  The theories of 
Hobbes and Rousseau show this in a somewhat inexact 
and incomplete fashion.  It is frequently said that in 
the system of  Hobbes, the just and the unjust are arbi- 
trarily  determined  by  the  absolute  sovereign.  This 
statement is true only with reference to the relation of 
the  sovereign  and  his  subjects.  But  in  the view  of 
Hobbes, the just  in itself, as it is understood  by the 
philosopher, and even by the sovereign lawgiver himself, 
is that which conforms to the general good, and injustice 
is the contrary.  The exposition of  the general will of 
the people ("volont6  g&neraIe") by Rousseau, gives rise 
to similar  confusion.  Finality  is not excluded;  it is 
simply presented in an indirect form.  General will, in 
this  theory,  has the  same  significance as that which 
Hobbes attributes to the absolute sovereign:  his com- 
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general  will  is always good  and always right, because 
it is not able to desire other than the common welfare. 
This necessary  conformity  of  general  will  with  what 
Rousseau  calls  "common  welfare"  best  explains  and 
reconciles  the  obscure  passage,  standing in  apparent 
contradiction, in which he defines general will. 
The purely  rationalistic  systems,  which  appear  to 
exclude all finality with the greatest rigor, are not able 
to any extent to render account either of  the content of 
law  or of  its true origin.  When, by rare chance, the 
writers of  these systems lower their abstract speculations 
to the level of  practical  concerns, they are not able to 
explain even the most elementary juridical rules except 
by unfounded hypotheses, or forced deductions, entirely 
arbitrary, and under a  logical appearance;  and  when 
they give good explanations, it is by a process of  uncon- 
scious  teleological reasoning, more or less artfully  dis- 
guised.  The proof  of  this is often found in Kant in the 
application  of  his standpoint to the simplest  juridical 
rules;  as, for example, the rule against breach of  a bail- 
ment relation.  This subject has had renewed  investi- 
gation  and  been  largely  developed  in  its connection 
with  morals by Sidgwick  ("Method  of  Ethics"),  in his 
critical inquiry into the different forms  of  intuitional 
morals. 
Latent finality, either more or less openly displayed, 
is implicated in all the theories which propose any other 
basis whatever for the juridical order;  and they are not 
able, in  their practical  applications, to escape the ob- 
jective  consideration  of  purpose.  Admissions  of  this 
finality are frequently found among those authors them- 
selves  who  have  recently  combated  most  vigorously 
in morals all finalist  concepts in the name of science. 
It  is thus, that L6vy-Briihl speaks ("Science des ~eurs," 
p. 17) concerning the reasonable application  of  existing 
things for the essential welfare of all; of  turning social con- 
ditions to the best account for the best  and happiest  life 
(P.  165); and yet more decisively  in an article in  the 
Revue  Philosophigue, of  the  exception  made  "of  ends 
which  are universal  and instinctive,  so much  so,  that 
without  them,  there could  be  no  question  either  of 
moral reality, of a science of this reality, or of  applications 
of this science.''  He speaks, lastly, of  the  object  con- 
ceived for reconciling "the coexistence of individuals and 
societies, in order that each may live, and live  in  the 
largest  sense."  l4  But everything  accords  with  these 
universal ends, so  indispensable, it is said, to  the science 
of  morals,  which  necessarily  decomposes  them into a 
series  of  particular  ends  consistent  with  the  same 
object. 
The historical realism of Marx and his school, which 
is today energetically  battered in  the breach,  is itself 
completely colored with finality.  It  would make a new 
society, of  which it predicts the coming, from the neces- 
sary evolution of  the economic order, and due alone to 
the irresistible operation of  natural forces.  It has long 
since been shown that this theory does not, in reality, 
exclude  the idea of  finality;  and that it is thoroughly 
penetrated by teleological  notions in its postulate of a 
new society, and yet more, in the measures pointed out 
to hasten its approach.  Appeal to a conflict of classes 
does not have any meaning,  if human purposes have 
no  influence  upon evolution.  Stammler, in a  notable 
work  dealing with economics and law, was one of the 
first to perceive  this  fact.15  This author  has  clearly 
shown, as  Croce has called to  mind, how finality is always 
l4 Rwue  Philosophzque, July, 1906, p.  14. 
l5 R.  Stammler, "Wirtschaft und Recht nach der Materialistischen 
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assumed by historical materialism  in all its affirmations 
of  a  practical  nature.16 
Stammler does  not  limit his investigation,  however, 
to  discovery of  the relations of  political economy and law. 
He has sketched in this first study, and elaborated in a 
second work dealing with the theory of  justice, a system 
of  philosophy  of  law which, emanating from a jurist  so 
esteemed  and so learned in all the departments of  social 
science, cannot be here passed in silence.17 
While  Stammler, in his much  more  profound  study 
of  finality,  in  agreement  with  Ihering,  recognizes  that 
juridical  regulation of  social life necessarily implies the 
idea of  purposes to  be realized and that the law is always 
the means to an end, yet he develops a  system which 
differs  entirely  from  that of  Ihering.  He states from 
the  first  the  general  principle  of  finality  in  the  law. 
He asserts  that all  juridical  rules  tend  by their  very 
nature  to stimulate a  certain  conduct on the  part of 
those subject to  them;  that the idea of  purpose is neces- 
sarily given in such rules;  and that with the law, entrance 
is made into the domain of  teleology, its validity  being 
determined  by the ends which  the law seeks to realize. 
He puts aside,  however,  concrete purpose  in law, con- 
ditioned  historically  or variant  according  to time and 
place,  and seeks a rule of validity  for law, independent 
of  all  contingency.  To establish  this rule,  he  invokes 
the  notion  of  a  community  of  men  of  good  will,  the 
members of  which shall be free from all subjective feel- 
ings and all interested motives, and in which each may 
pursue  all  the legitimate ends of  all others.  It is  in 
l6Benedetto Croce, "Le  MatCr~alisrne  Hlstorique,"  translated by A. 
Bonnet, Paris, 1900. 
l7 "Dle  Lehre  von  dern  rlcht~gen  Rechte,"  Berlin,  1902.  [See, 
also,  Stammler's  latest  effort,  "Theorie  der  Rechtswissenschaft, 
Halle, 1911. -  Translator 1 
cor~formity  of the creative will of the law with that of 
this ideal community, that he discovers the formal law 
of all juridical  purpose, and the governing standard by 
which  its validity  is determined. 
It  is not necessary to  dernonstrate that this community 
of men of good will is entirely imaginary; that the notion 
of an impersonal purpose, stripped of  all subjective and 
concrete desire, is a contradiction in terms;  and that an 
object  cannot  he  established  in pure abstraction, nor 
separated  from a subject, be  it what  it may.  If the 
thought be extended to include a  subject, that subject 
cannot be a community, whether large or small, a party, 
a  nation, or a State;  and, finally, this imaginary com- 
munity is as much  inconceivable from a logical stand- 
point, as unreal in experience (as Stammler himself has 
admitted)  .I8 
Stammler, in his second work, derives, and exerts him- 
self  to apply, four leading rules from the principle which 
he had stated as the object of  his earlier book.  But it 
has been  justly  observed  that the results at which  he 
thus arrives are hardly appreciable;  and that they are 
besides, an application in appearance only of  this method 
and could  be attained more directly and more securely 
by  other  lines  of  reasoning.19  Stammler's  principle  is 
manifestly  inspired  by Kant's law of  good will;  again, 
so far as it requires that each one may make his own 
the legitimate ends of  others, it  is the altruism of  Comte, 
or rather the egoistic altruism of  Spencer.  It exhibits 
a tendency of  thought and a direction of  motive very 
desirable from the viewpoint of  the legislator;  but it is 
not a principle from which the concrete rules of law may 
be  deduced.  While appreciating at its true value the 
18G.  Stmmel, in "Schmoller's Jahrbuch," 1897, p. 578. 
l9 M. E.  Mayer,  in  "Kr~tische  Vierteljahrschrift  fur  Gesetzge- 
bung und Rechtswissenschaft,"  1906, p.  178 seq APPENDIX  I1 
entire critical part of  Stammler's earlier work, notably 
that which deals with natural law, finality, and historical 
materialism,  Simrnel  says, with  some severity, that it 
proves again that in works of  this class the instability 
of  the foundation does not detract from the solidity of 
the ~u~erstructure.~~ 
Z0G. Sirnmel, loc. cit., p. 578. 
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